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SYNOPSIS 
The thesis tries to define and explain the rudiments of a `non- 
philosophical' or `non-decisional' theory of materialism on the basis of a 
theoretical framework provided by the `non-philosophy' of Francois 
Laruelle. Neither anti-philosophical nor anti-materialist in character, non- 
materialism tries to construct a rigorously transcendental theory of matter by 
using certain instances of philosophical materialism as its source material. 
The materialist decision to identify the real with matter is seen to retain a 
structural isomorphy with the phenomenological decision to identify the real 
with the phenomenon. Both decisions are shown to operate on the basis of a 
methodological idealism; materialism on account of its confusion of matter 
and concept; phenomenology by virtue of its confusion of phenomenon and 
logos. By dissolving the respectively `materiological' and 
`phenomenological' amlphihol_ies which are the result of the failure to effect a 
rigorously transcendental separation between matter and concept on the one 
hand; and between phenomenon and logos on the other, non-materialist 
theory proposes to mobilise the non-hybrid or non-decisional concepts of a 
`matter-without-concept' and of a `phenomenon-without-logos' in order to 
effect a unified but non-unitary theory of phenomenology and materialism. 
The result is a materialisation of thinking that operates according to matter's 
foreclosure to decision. That is to say, a transcendental theory of the 
phenomenon that licenses limitless phenomenological plasticity, 
unconstrained by the apparatus of eidetic intuition or any horizon of 
apophantic disclosure; yet one which is simultaneously a transcendental 
theory of matter, uncontaminated by the bounds of empirical perception and 
free of all phenomenological circumscription. 
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INTRODUCTION 
MATERIALISM, SCIENCE, 
PHENOMENOLOGY 
Philosophy and Non-Philosophy 
This thesis will attempt to articulate something that we shall 
characterise as a `non-Decisional' or `non-philosophical' materialism in 
accordance with the theoretical framework provided by Francois Laruelle's 
'non-philosophy'. However, to explain what we mean by a `non- 
philosophical' materialism, and why it in no way constitutes an anti- 
philosophical materialism, is to explain why the expression `non-philosophy' 
as used by Laruelle is in no way indicative of an anti-philosophical stance. 
Thus, from the very outset, our attempt to communicate the powerfully 
original import of Laruelle's work through the elucidation of a non- 
philosophical materialism must first proceed by setting aside the immediately 
possible misinterpretations triggered by the expression 'non-philosophy'. 
Laruelle's non-philosophy is not yet another voice joining in the 
clamorous post-modern chorus celebrating the supposed death of philosophy. 
Yet neither is it a variant of deconstruction, petitioning the undecidable in 
7 
order to effect a destabilization or dislocation of metaphysical decision. Non- 
philosophy is not an anti-philosophical doctrine but a theory for philosophy, a 
theory that, once applied to a philosophical material, radically reconfigures 
the structures of philosophical thought on the basis of that material. Far from 
seeking to terminate or to interrupt philosophical Decision', the Laruellean 
practise of non-philosophy constitutes a non-Decisional theory for 
philosophical Decision; a theoretical praxis which seeks to broaden the 
horizons of Decision and widen the conceptual possibilities available to 
philosophical thought by suspending the sufficiency of Decision as practised 
in its autonomously philosophical mode. Neither an autonomous 
philosophical position, nor an anti-philosophical alternative to philosophising 
per se, non-philosophy is rather an organon for the transformation and 
explanation of problems whose immediately philosophical form, Laruelle 
suggests, simultaneously compromises both their theoretical rigour and their 
ontological, ethical, aesthetic, or political pertinence. 
Accordingly, one of our central objectives in this thesis will to be to 
demonstrate how, although producing no substantive philosophical Decisions 
in and of itself -whether these be ontological, ethical, aesthetic, or political in 
1The expression `philosophical Decision' designates an important technical concept in Laruelle's 
thought. We will be setting out a preliminary philosophical delineation of this notion in the course of 
Chapters 2,3, and 4, before providing a detailed account of its function in non-philosophical theory in 
Chapter 5. 
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character-, non-philosophical practise provides the `working philosopher' 
with a rigorous but non-Decisional theory for Decision. In operating upon 
what Laruelle will characterise as the `empirico-transcendental composites' of 
philosophical ontology, philosophical ethics, philosophical aesthetics, or 
philosophical politics, non-philosophy seeks to emancipate the rigorously 
transcendental, but non-ontological Identity2 of ontology, the non-ethical 
Identity of ethics.. . etc. We shall see how, for every such composite structure 
constituted by `the-philosophical-theory-of-X', wherein the elemental essence 
of `theory' and of `X' remains compromised through the bi-lateral 
correspondence of their philosophical envelopment, non-philosophical 
thinking will endeavour to separate both the relationless Identity and the 
unilateral duality of `theory' and of `X', an Identity and duality irreducible to 
their bilateral philosophical correspondence. More specifically, our aim in this 
thesis is to try to show how, operating on the basis of a `philosophy-of- 
matter', non-philosophy can help discover materialism's non-materialist 
essence by developing the unilateral Identity and duality of `theory' and of 
`matter'. 
Conscious of the fact that such formulations must appear chronically 
obscure at this introductory stage, we will try to introduce Laruelle's novel 
2 Again, the Laruellean characterisation of `Identity' as a non-philosophical concept will be explained 
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and undeniably difficult conceptual apparatus through a series of incremental 
steps, each one building on the one before in a succession of chapters 
presenting the reader with a gradually increasing degree of technicality. We 
hope thereby to allow the reader to become slowly acclimatized to an 
idiosyncratic but rigorously exacting theoretical vocabulary. 
In order to facilitate the difficult conceptual transition from the 
philosophical to the non-philosophical register, the thesis is divided into two 
parts. Part I, `The Decline of Materialism As Such', comprises Chapters 1 
through 4 and will try to identify the conditions of the philosophical problem 
which we intend to treat non-philosophically in Part II, `The Name of Matter 
Itself, which consists of Chapters 5 through 9. That problem is the 
materiological3 amphiboly of matter and logos, or of phenomenon and hyle, 
as exemplified both in the `material phenomenology' of Michel Henry and in 
the `absolute hyletics' of Deleuze & Guattari. This amphiboly, we shall argue, 
leads to an fundamental indiscernibility between the theoretical postures of 
materialism and idealism, an indiscernibility in virtue of which philosophical 
materialism remains incapable of distinguishing itself from idealism. 
Consequently, `the decline of materialism in the name of matter' describes 
that movement whereby any philosophical materialism which accepts the 
in Chapter 5. 
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premise of a transcendental distinction between `thought' and `matter' must 
forsake the attempt to encompass matter in the concept and abandon the 
materiological register in order to initiate a theoretical posture whereby not 
only does materialism no longer presume to circumscribe matter by way of a 
concept, it is now matter which determines materialism through its very 
foreclosure to every concept. In other words, Part I argues that transcendental 
materialism achieves its most rigorous theoretical consummation at the point 
where it necessitates its own elimination as a system of discursive statements 
`about' matter. 
Part II, `The name of matter itself constitutes the non-philosophical 
half of the thesis. It implements the radical shift in theoretical posture 
recommended in the final Chapter of Part I and describes the consequences 
devolving from that change of posture. The materiological amphiboly of 
matter and concept is replaced by a `first-name' or `non-conceptual symbol'4 
that enacts matter's transcendental foreclosure to thought within thought. It is 
now matter `itself as `non-conceptual symbol', rather than matter `as such' or 
as conceptually defined, which determines materialism through its foreclosure 
to conceptual thought. Where materialism implicitly presupposes that matter 
remains commensurate with thought, non-materialism lifts the premise of 
3 For a preliminary definition of `materiology' cf. infra , 
Chapter 1, pp. 59-62. 
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commensurability in order to universalise the parameters of materialist theory 
on the basis of matter's foreclosure to thought. 
Accordingly, the two-part structure of the thesis attempts not only to 
describe but also to provide a philosophically intelligible legitimation for the 
shift from a philosophical to a non-philosophical materialism, for it is on the 
basis of a philosophical problematic that the transition to the non- 
philosophical treatment of that problematic is rendered not only intelligible 
but also necessary. Thus, our hope is that the philosophical half of the thesis 
goes some way toward providing a stringently philosophical legitimation for 
its non-philosophical complement. 
Conversely, from a non-philosophical perspective, the philosophical 
part of the thesis is non-philosophically validated insofar as the materialism 
articulated in the first half of the thesis provides the empirical occasion or 
material required in order to implement a non-philosophical theory of 
materialism. In other words, foregrounding the latent dimension of 
materiological amphiboly intrinsic both to the phenomenological and anti- 
phenomenological varieties of philosophical materialism furnishes us with the 
philosophical occasion required for mobilizing the resources of non- 
philosophical theory; a mobilization which will circumvent the equivocal 
4 Cf. supra, Chapter 6, pp. 267-277. 
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idealism common both to the phenomenologisation of materialism and to the 
materialisation of phenomenology by constructing a non-phenomenological 
theory of the phenomenon which is equally and simultaneously a non- 
materialist theory of matter. Accordingly, the second half of the thesis will 
attempt to show how a non-philosophical approach can render the 
problematics of transcendental phenomenality and transcendental materiality, 
which are philosophically incommensurable, non-philosophically 
commensurable by effectively outlining a unified theory5 of phenomenality 
and materiality. 
Thus, having introduced the transcendental framework subtending the 
materiological problematic in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 examines its 
phenomenological exemplification in the work of Michel Henry, while 
Chapter 3 investigates its materialist instantiation in the thought of Deleuze & 
Guattari. Chapter 4 draws out the philosophically intractable consequences of 
the materiological aporias delineated in the two preceding chapters, arguing 
that the theoretical conditions required for the resolution of those aporias 
exceed the resources of philosophical Decision. In so doing it prepares the 
transition to the non-philosophical stance pursued in the second half of the 
thesis. Chapter 5 describes the shift from the philosophical to the non- 
5 `Unified' but not unitary. In other words, a non-dialectical theory, capable of simultaneously 
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philosophical register by outlining the structure of philosophical Decision as 
that which must be suspended in order to effectuate a non-Decisional 
materialism. Chapter 6 argues both for the a priori validity and the irrecusable 
necessity of that stance, introducing the organon of non-materialist theory 
whilst explaining why it possesses the resources required for the simultaneous 
neutralisation and explanation -i. e. the dualysation6 - of those materiological 
amphibolies. It does so by extracting from them the non-philosophical notions 
of a hyle without concept and a phenomenon without logos. In Chapters 7 and 
8 we use the work of Quine and Churchland as a philosophical material on the 
basis of which to expand on the latter two notions, exploring the realm of 
radical phenomenological plasticity concomitant with the non-materiological 
identity of phenomenon and hyle. Finally, our Conclusion will attempt to 
explain how, by accepting that philosophy and capital are bound together in a 
relation of reciprocal presupposition, the non-philosophical identification of 
philosophy and capital as `World-Capitalism' may yet be able to provide 
thought with the theoretical means whereby it can constitute itself as an 
instance of a priori resistance to intellectual commodification. 
articulating the identity and duality of `phenomenon' and `matter' without synthesizing them. Cf. 
Chapters 5 and 6. 
6The notion of non-philosophical `dualysis' is introduced and explained in Chapter 5, before being 
exhibited `in effect' in the course of Chapters 6 and 7. 
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Moreover, the fact that we are taking the fundamentally 
methodological character of non-philosophical theory as our starting point 
explains this thesis' twofold heuristic strategy: in treating the problem of 
philosophical materialism non-philosophically our aim is to provide the 
reader with a philosophical perspective on non-philosophy at the same time as 
we furnish him/her with a non-philosophical vantage upon philosophy. 
Accordingly, on the one hand, we'll be attempting to map the `quadrangular' 
philosophical space delineated through the shifting patterns of allegiance 
binding materialism to idealism, and phenomenology to realism, but also 
materialism to realism, and phenomenology to idealism, in order to shed 
some philosophical light on the relationship between `thought' and 'matter'. 
On the other, by applying a non-philosophical methodology to a specific 
philosophical material, we hope not only to explain and critically evaluate its 
functioning, but also the extent to which, through its suspension of `the 
Principle of Sufficient Philosophy'7, it succeeds in its stated aim of opening 
up the restricted, `six dimensional' realms of philosophical Decision to a 
7 Cf. Chapter 5. 
81n Chapter VI of Principes de la Non-Philosophie, Laruelle sets out a particularly complex 
`transcendental analytic' of philosophical Decision. He analyses its architectonic structure in terms of a 
single `vertical' axis or hinge articulating the reciprocally presupposing realms of position and 
donation; and three distinct `horizontally' interleaved layers comprising the dimensions of 
transcendence, ground and unity on the side of position, and those of affection, reception, and intuition 
on the side of donation. The complex auto-positional and auto-donational structure of 
Decision is then 
characterised in terms of the reciprocal pre-supposition of position and donation; to wit, the reciprocal 
articulation of transcendence and affection; of ground and reception; and of unity and 
intuition. Hence 
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hitherto unanticipated, perhaps even potentially infinite domain of conceptual 
possibility. 
Accordingly, following Part I, which sets out the philosophical 
conditions of materialism as a theoretical problem in a manner that 
presupposes no prior familiarity with non-philosophy, all of the fundamental 
Laruellean concepts we intend to mobilize for the purposes of this thesis will 
be introduced, defined, and explained in Chapters 5 and 6, the first two 
chapters of Part II, in order to be subsequently refined and expanded upon in 
Chapters 7 and 8. 
Why Materialism? 
Our goal is to articulate a non-Decisional materialism by effecting the 
non-philosophical transformation of that variant of philosophical Decision 
known as `materialist'. This choice of philosophical material is not arbitrary. 
The materialist Decision is one that we feel compelled to make on the 
grounds of intellectual probity. Yet this fact must be coupled with the 
recognition that non-philosophy refuses to indulge in ontological Decision. 
Non-philosophical thinking can no more be described as `materialist' than it 
can be characterised as 'phenomenological'. The non-philosopher refuses to 
the fundamentally six-dimensional structure of the space of philosophical conceptuality. Cf. Laruelle, 
1996., pp. 281-370. Laruelle's non-philosophical analytic of Decision will be examined in detail in 
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add to what he regards as an excessive glut of equally contingent, equally 
unrigorous Decisions. Accordingly, we need to explain: 1. the empirical 
conjunction of philosophical circumstances in terms of which the materialist 
Decision appears to us as uncircumventable; and 2. why non-philosophy 
promises to provide the transcendental conditions in accordance with which 
the materialist Decision can be rigorously effectuated. 
1. The empirical contingency of materialism's philosophical necessity 
First, an admission of personal conviction: materialism seems to us to 
be the only serious, intellectually reputable ontological option available to the 
philosopher in the wake of those theoretical revolutions that have defined our 
intellectual modernity. We have in mind here primarily the unquestionably 
epochal scientific revolutions inaugurated by Copernicus, Darwin, and 
Einstein, insofar as they definitively undermined the hitherto unassailable 
legitimacy of the kind of philosophical anthropocentrism harboured by Judeo- 
Christian culture. But also the comparatively minor, more localised 
philosophical revolutions initiated by Marx, Nietzsche and Freud, in whose 
work the epistemological privileges previously ascribed to human subjectivity 
were effectively terminated. 
Chapter 6, pp. 301-305. The consequences of suspending and reconfiguring that six-dimensional 
structure will be explored in Chapters 7 and 8. 
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Closer to us in time, but just as significant as the remarkable 
breakthroughs in physics during the first half of the last century, there have 
been the succession of equally extraordinary advances in evolutionary biology 
in the latter half of the twentieth century; breakthroughs which, mobilizing 
new techniques of algorithmic modelling pioneered by dynamical systems 
theory and subsequently refined through developments in the fields of 
Artificial Intelligence and Artificial Life, have via the emergence of the 
`complexity' paradigm, given rise to the possibility a single, unitary 
theoretical perspective on nature encompassing what were previously 
considered to be incommensurable domains of phenomena9. Paul Churchland 
has persuasively suggested that a generalised thermodynamics may well 
provide the most amenable theoretical framework for this fundamentally 
monistic physical perspectivel0: "it is [thermodynamics] that renders 
9 Cf. Parts I and II of Dennett, 1995, pp. 17-331. Stuart Kauffman (1993) provides the most fully 
realised theoretical articulation thus far achieved of the `complexity' paradigm in biology. However, 
the philosophical consequences Kauffman chooses to draw from his own scientific work (e. g. in 
Kauffman, 1995) are, in certain regards, almost diametrically opposed to those we are drawing from it 
here. Assenting to the irrecusable philosophical consequences of scientific research does not mean 
assenting to the individual scientist's philosophical interpretation of his or her own work. 
10 Although made in the context of the eliminativist debate in the philosophy of mind, Churchland's 
suggestion provides a salutary corrective to claims made as to the putatively `antireductionist' 
implications of complexity by certain of its champions -Stuart Kauffman being the most distinguished 
among them. That self-organising systems are substrate-independent or multiply instantiable does not 
mean that they are physically `irreducible' in the sense that it would be impossible to provide a general 
physical characterisation of complex systems within the parameters of physics. Thus, Churchland 
writes: "(... ) it does not follow, from multiple instantiability per se, that no such general 
characterisation is possible. It follows only that the required characterisation cannot be expressed in 
the theoretical vocabulary peculiar to any one of the available substrates. It remains entirely possible 
that there is a level of physical description sufficiently abstract to encompass all of them, and yet 
sufficiently powerful to fund the characterisations required. As it happens, there is indeed a physical 
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physically intelligible such things as the process of synthetic evolution in 
general, and the Sun-urged growth of a rose in particular. And what is human 
knowledge but a cortically embodied flower, fanned likewise into existence by 
the ambient flux of energy and information? "(Churchland, 1979, p. 151) Thus, 
subatomic particle collisions, spiral nebulae, and carbon-based sapience could 
all ultimately be explainable as systems of negentropic energy capture. 
Moreover, in binding together the physico-chemical and bio-organic realms at 
this abstract level of thermodynamic energetics, the substrate independent 
algorithmic modelling approach favoured by complexity analysts, abstracting 
from the scalar distinction between micro- and macro-logical levels of 
analysis, effectively promises to provide something like a `unified field 
theory' for the Neo-Darwinian synthesis in the natural sciences. A synthesis 
not only liquefying previously entrenched categorial divisions between the 
physical, the chemical, and the bio-organic, but also effectively neutralizing 
the distinction between `nature' and `culture' as such, thereby allowing for the 
naturalization of hitherto irreducibly complex socio-cultural phenomenal 1. 
Meanwhile, in the realm of physics, the `superstrings' paradigm offers 
the possibility of reconciling the quantum microcosm and the cosmological 
theory of sufficient generality to encompass the activity of all of these substrates, and any others one 
might think of. The theory is thermodynamics -the general theory of energy and entropy. " (Churchland, 
1989, p. 46). Cf. also Churchland's `Is Thinker A Natural Kind? ' in Dialogue2l, no. 2: pp. 223-238. 
11 Cf. for example Part III of Dennett 1995, pp. 335-521 
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macrocosm by supplementing the physics of four-dimensional space-time 
with seven higher dimensions. The hypothesis of 11-dimensional hyperspace 
promises at once to simplify the laws of nature and to unify all physical forces 
by reconfiguring them in accordance with a strictly geometrical paradigm12 
That paradigm suggests that the apparently insuperable gulf between the sub- 
atomic realm governed by quantum field theory and the cosmological domain 
ruled by gravitational field theory is a consequence of distortions engendered 
by partial perspective. The unified field theory required in order to bridge the 
gulf and reconcile these conflicting perspectives suspends the assumption of 
the inherently four dimensional character of space-time, and postulates that 
both the quantum microcosm and the gravitational macrocosm have been 
abstracted from the seamless, encompassing consistency of a fundamentally 
11-dimensional physical field13. 
As a result, the methodological conception underlying the program of 
physical unification can no longer be understood in terms of a straightforward 
process of physical `reduction' through the uncovering of more and more 
`fundamental' particles. It is instead a question of supplementing the 
12 Interestingly, superstring theory proposes a thoroughgoing (but obviously non-Euclidean) 
geometricisation of nature; or, in other words, the thoroughgoing `hyperspatialisation' of time. Perhaps 
the philosophical lesson to be retained from all this is that the `phenomenon' of hyperdimensional 
space may well turn out to be far more mysterious than that of phenomenological time. 
13Brian Greene (2000) sets out an exemplary overview of superstring theory for the uninitiated. 
Michio Kaku (1994) also provides an extremely clear layman's introduction . 
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impoverished perspective concomitant with a four-dimensional physics by 
adding to it the requisite higher dimensional complement. Thus, physical 
unification of microcosm and macrocosm is a matter of dissolving 
incommensurabilities or inconsistencies at the restrictive four-dimensional 
level through a process of re-integration into the 11-dimensional whole. 
If superstring theory is of profound philosophical significance it is 
because it achieves a univocally consistent physical monism by revealing all 
scalar incommensurability across the material universe, such as that which 
apparently separates the realm of quarks and neutrinos from that of galaxies 
and nebulae, to be the result of a four-dimensional abstraction; a perspectival 
`illusion' engendered by assumptions about physical space that are ultimately 
rooted in the limited parameters of phenomenological perception. As a result, 
the consequences of superstring physics as far as the phenomenological 
parameters of mammalian perception are concerned are perhaps even more 
damning than those associated with traditional physical 'reductionism'. For 
the implication is that in order to attain an adequate conceptual grasp of the 
unitary nature of physical reality, it is necessary to achieve a complete 
theoretical suspension of the image of the world derived from perceptual 
intuition. In other words, physical theory has to effect a rigorously 
mathematical circumvention of those imaginative limitations inherent in the 
21 
physiologically rooted cognitive apparatus with which an aleatory 
evolutionary history has saddled us. Thus, the chief obstacle standing in the 
way of a proper scientific understanding of the physical world would seem to 
be that of our species' inbuilt tendency to process information via epistemic 
mechanisms which invariably involve an operation of subtraction from the 
imperceptible physical whole. Phenomenology remains a function of 
physiology14. Perhaps not least among the many startling philosophical 
consequences of superstring theory is the way in which it seems to provide a 
rigorously physicalist vindication of Plato: phenomenological perception 
would seem to be akin to that of the prisoner in the cave who mistakes 
flickering shadows for `the things themselves'. 
We are not making the foolhardy claim that all these scientific 
developments in and by themselves somehow `logically' necessitate or imply 
philosophical materialism. Nor are we suggesting that they are a priori 
incompatible with one or other variety of phenomenological approach. 15 What 
14An explicit philosophical rationale for this proposition is provided below in Chapter 8 via an 
examination of Paul Churchland's work. Cf. infra, Chapter 8, pp. 383-389. 
15 See for instance the `autopoietic' paradigm put forward in the work of H. Maturana & F. Varela, in 
which we find an attempt to ground the putatively irreducible phenomenological reality of intentional 
consciousness in an apparently thoroughgoing evolutionary naturalism. On our view, however, the 
trouble with such attempts becomes apparent when one realizes that the naturalization of intentionality 
comes at the price of a new categorial cleavage between organic and inorganic; a division moreover, 
which surreptitiously resurrects a form of organismic vitalism: only certain kinds of `living things' -i. e. 
organisms -, are composed of the appropriate material `stuff required to qualify for the possibility of 
sentient awareness. But an important philosophical consequence of the neo-Darwinian synthesis is that 
the difference in kind between organic and inorganic, between the biological and the chemical, is 
ultimately untenable precisely insofar as it makes it impossible to explain how sentient, animate 
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we are claiming, however, is that the combined upshot of these various 
developments can be boiled down to a single prohibitive injunction, which, it 
seems to us, phenomenology, insofar as it simply begins by presupposing an 
irreducibly human dimension of subjective individuation16, is singularly ill 
equipped to satisfy. The injunction in question is that of the impossibility of 
continuing to conceive of the human as if it constituted the unobjectifiable 
exception in terms of which the ontological validity of what the empirical 
sciences define as objective nature is to be gauged. This is not quite as banal 
or easily admissible a requirement for contemporary philosophy as some may 
initially think. Although many will readily concede the inappropriateness of 
Man's ontological designation as a zoon logon echon or a res cogitans, few 
biological `life' could be constituted through (and not merely have `arisen out of as vitalism evasively 
puts it) nothing but insensate and inanimate chemical processes. Cf. H. Maturana & F. Varela, 
Autopoiesis and Cognition: The realization of the living, Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1980; also The Tree of 
Knowledge: The biological roots of human understanding, Boston: Shambhala, 1992. 
16 The very notion of `phenomenon' as that which shows or manifests itself to consciousness simply 
assumes the apprehending subjectivity as an irreducible and intuitively given datum for philosophy. 
Moreover, the fact that many phenomenologists have abandoned the use of the words `consciousness' 
or `subject' is, by itself hardly a refutation: the reference to subjective apprehension is simply built 
into the phenomenological definition of `phenomenon'. That phenomenology has moved from being an 
explicit and impenitent philosophy of transcendental subjectivity (Husserl), to one which is so only in 
an elaborately camouflaged fashion (post-Heidegger), does little to impede the substance of our attack, 
which targets the guiding spirit of the phenomenological project, rather than the letter of doctrine. In 
fact, the underlying assumptions of the project are rendered all the more dangerous for being so 
cleverly disguised. Even a putatively `material phenomenology', of the sort espoused by Michel Henry 
(cf., Henry, 1990), which seeks to identify the pre-intentional, sub-representational materiality of the 
phenomenon with a radically immanent dimension of phenomenological `Life' -characterised in terms 
of its absolute, auto-affecting ipseity-, never calls into question the transcendental privilege afforded to 
that subjective dimension of already individuated ipseity. Henry's phenomenology of an inapparent 
`materiality' -perhaps on account of certain residual hylomorphic prejudices inherited 
from Husserl- 
simply refuses to countenance the possibility of a materiality not only withdrawn a priori from the 
realm of ekstatic phenomenality, but also from that of subjective ipseity per se. For an extended 
critical discussion of Henry, cf. infra, Chapter 2. 
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seem willing to admit that, after Darwin, it is no longer possible to continue to 
conceive of human being transcendentally, whether it be as Subjekt, Geist, or 
Dasein. 
Challenged by the philosopher to provide something like an 
`adequate' account of the phenomenon of human sapience, the scientist, 
distilling the various insights provided by evolutionary biology, Al, and 
thermodynamics, is in a position to put forward a perfectly precise response: 
human sapience, like many other instances of negentropic energy capture, is a 
carbon based variety of information processing system17, and nothing besides. 
The philosopher of course will immediately protest that the response is 
`inadequate' vis a vis the phenomenon in question because hopelessly 
reductive. But it is no more reductive than the claim that water is nothing but 
H2O; that temperature is nothing but mean molecular kinetic energy; or that 
the colour red is nothing but electromagnetic radiation with a determinate 
spiking frequency. All scientific truth is `reductive' precisely insofar as it 
dissolves the veneer of phenomenological familiarity concomitant with the 
limited parameters of anthropomorphic perspective. The real question the 
philosopher has to ask him/herself is this: what is it exactly about the 
17Cf. for instance, Quine, 1960; Smart, 1963; Wiener, 1967; Sayre, 1976; Churchland, 1979 and 1989. 
In our opinion, Paul Churchland is the most sophisticated contemporary exponent of this sort of 
vigorously materialistic account of human sapience: information is physically encoded by the human 
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scientist's banal but remarkably well-supported statement that he or she finds 
so intolerably `reductive'? Is not part of the philosopher's unease concerning 
scientific `reduction' directly attributable to the unavowed wish that, as far as 
man is concerned, there always be `something' left over besides the material: 
some ineffable, unquantifiable meta-physical residue, some irreducible 
transcendental remainder? 
Nowhere is this unavowable philosophical longing more 
transparent than in the phenomenological project, which seems determined to 
stave off this putative `disenchantment' of phenomena by science by 
delimiting a dimension of radically unobjectifiable transcendence' 8: that of 
the phenomenon's invisible phenomenality. It is with the inapparent `how' of 
the phenomenon's appearing, rather than the `what' which appears, that 
transcendental phenomenology concerns itself19. Yet the phenomenological 
conception of `phenomenality' seems to us so dangerously narrow and 
parochial as to render the much-vaunted project of a `transcendental 
brain in the form of neuronal activation vectors and subsequently processed via patterns of vector-to- 
vector transformation. Churchland's work will be discussed in some detail in Chapter 8. 
18 Or radically unobjectifiable immanence, in the case of Michel Henry. However, as we shall see in 
Chapter 2, Henry's invocation of immanence operates according to a logic of phenomenological 
idealisation which renders it ultimately transcendent. 
19Similarly, Kantians claim that science itself remains constitutively incapable of investigating the 
objectivity of the object, and of uncovering the transcendental a priori conditioning the possibility of 
empirical actuality. Thus, phenomenological transcendentalism resembles its Kantian predecessor in 
this particular respect if not in others: it tries to provide scientific cognition with an a priori conceptual 
armature ultimately rooted in subjectivity. 
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phenomenological ontology'20 into an insidious form of anthropomorphic 
imperialism. If the concept of `phenomenon' is, in Heidegger's definition21, 
that of something `which shows itself in itself', a `self-showing' which 
`manifests itself in and through itself alone', then we require: 
1. A rigorously theoretical, rather than intuitive, definition of 
individuation in order to explain what is to count as an individuated 
appearance, one which does not simply reinstate the metaphysical circularity 
implicit in Leibniz's maxim according to which, `to be is to be one thing'. 
2. A rigorously theoretical, rather than intuitive, account of 
`appearance' or `manifestation' which does not surreptitiously invoke the 
predominantly optical22 paradigm of sensory perception with which we are 
empirically familiar. 
On both these counts, phenomenology -whether it take intentional 
consciousness or human being-in-the-world as its starting point- seems to us 
to remain wanting: it illegitimately universalises a paradigm of 
`phenomenality' constructed on the basis of intuitions about individuation and 
20Cf. for instance Heidegger's claim that "Phenomenological truth is veritas transcendental is[j 
Philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 62). 
21 CE Heidegger. 1962, pp. 51-55. 
22The point being not that it is wrong to privilege vision as opposed to other sensory modalities, but 
that it is wrong to surreptitiously transcendentalise any empirical modality -especially one whose 
perceptual and cognitive capacities are as mired in evolutionary contingency as are those of the human 
body. Phenomenology is not sufficiently transcendental because it remains rooted in empirical 
physiology. Pure transcendental thought should be rigorously disincarnate, as we shall try to suggest in 
Chapters 7 and 8. 
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manifestation derived from our empirical perception of middle-sized 
objects23. Yet in exactly what sense, for instance, can the Big Bang, the 
Cambrian Explosion, or a 26 dimensional superstring (phenomena which are 
strictly unphenomenologisable precisely because they remain utterly 
unintuitable in terms of our habitual spatio-temporal parameters), be said to 
be things that `show themselves in themselves'? What are the parameters of 
this `showing'? To whom and for who is it supposed to occur? Whence does 
the mysterious faculty of intuition that is supposed to provide us with an 
immediately pre-theoretical access to the phenomenological essence of these 
rigorously imperceptible entities originate? 
The standard phenomenological rejoinder to such questions, which 
consists in protesting that these, along with all other varieties of scientific 
object, are merely `theoretical' entities whose mode of being derives from that 
4 more originary' mode of phenomenality concomitant with our `primordial' 
pre-theoretical engagement with `the things themselves', is hopelessly 
question-begging. Belief in this pseudo-originary, pre-theoretical dimension 
231n Chapter 7, we shall see how a non-philosophical materialism -which is also thereby a non- 
phenomenology-operates according to a rigorously theoretical, and non-intuitive, conception of 
individuation and phenomenalisation. Non-materialist theory singularises its object of cognition by 
cloning it as an Identity-without-unity, whilst phenomenalising it according to the strictures of a non- 
intuitive, or non-thetic phenomenality, thereby satisfying the two requirements mentioned above. Cf. 
infra, pp. 361-372. 
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of experiential immediacy is the phenomenological superstition par 
excellence. 
Briefly: the claim that intentional consciousness subtends a continuum 
of eidetic intuition running from tables and chairs at one end to transfinite 
cardinals and hyperdimensional superstrings at the other is grotesquely 
reductive. Just as the suggestion that objects of `regional ontology' such as 
quarks, leptons and black holes have as their ultimate ontological root 
Dasein's being-in-the-world (or the subject's infinite responsibility for the 
Other; or the auto-affecting pathos of subjective Life24) is an outrageous 
instance of anthropocentric idealism. If anyone is guilty of imperialistic 
reductionism as far as the extraordinary richness and complexity of the 
universe is concerned, it is the phenomenological idealist rather than the 
scientific materialist. Husserl's idealism is as punitive as it is unmistakable: 
"The existence of a Nature cannot be the condition for the existence of 
consciousness since Nature itself turns out to be a correlate of consciousness: 
Nature is only as being constituted in regular concatenations of 
consciousness. "(Husserl, 1982, p. 116). When it was written in 1913 -a full 54 
240ne will recognize here Levinas and Henry. Significantly, despite their critiques of Husserl and 
Heidegger, and in spite of their silence concerning the relation between phenomenology and science (a 
silence more likely to index contemptuous indifference rather than a cautious respect), neither of these 
thinkers is prepared to give up on the fundamental premise that it is the business of phenomenology to 
uncover the `archi-originary' conditions of phenomenalisation; conditions upon which, if the latter are 
indeed `archi-originary', the phenomena investigated through scientific cognition are inevitably 
supervenient. 
28 
years after the publication of Darwin's On the Origins of the Species- this 
statement was already profoundly reactionary25. Now, 142 years after Darwin, 
Husserl's idealism is utterly indefensible -unless it be by those who approve 
of phenomenology's apparently boundless contempt for natural science26. The 
choice with which we are confronted is as clear as it is unavoidable: either 
Darwin or Husserl. To continue to persist on the course initiated by the latter 
is to plunge headlong into intellectual disaster and the ruin of philosophy as a 
credible theoretical enterprise. The future vouchsafed to philosophy by 
phenomenology is too dismal to contemplate: a terminally infantile, 
pathologically narcissistic anthropocentrism. The situation is too grave, the 
stakes too high to allow for equivocation or compromise. 
Once again, the issue seems to us to boil down to a simple matter of 
intellectual honesty, a blunt but irrecusable alternative that no amount of 
conceptual obfuscation or rhetorical sophistry can obviate. Either the 
25Compare Lenin, writing in 1908: "A philosophy which teaches that physical nature itself is a 
[psychical -RB] product, is a philosophy of the priests, pure and simple. " (Lenin, 1972, p. 271). The 
magnificent verve of Lenin's anti-idealist invective in Materialism and Empirio-Criticism provides a 
salutary corrective to the Jesuitical sophistries propounded by his phenomenological contemporaries. 
26Although he continually invokes science, it is important to remember that Husserl seems to have 
approached it in terms of the typically 19th century distinction between the exalted 
Geisteswissenschaften or sciences of the spirit (pre-eminent amongst which are logic and mathematics, 
but also including psychology, history, etc. ) and the lowly Naturwissenschaften or sciences of nature 
(which would include physics and biology). Thus, if Husserl deemed physics worthy of philosophical 
consideration, it seems to have been solely on account of its rigorous mathematisation, a fact which 
would render it an honorary sub-species of the Geisteswissenschaften. This might explain why Husserl 
apparently regarded biology as unworthy of serious philosophical attention, perhaps seeing in it an 
entirely empirical, sub-theoretical activity, and thus explain why phenomenology proceeds as if Darwin 
had never existed. 
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philosopher insists that man is de jure irreducible to the natural ontological 
order investigated by science because the essence of human being is 
transcendence (subjectivity, Spirit, Dasein, etc. ), in which case everything 
science implies concerning the ontologically derivative rather than 
transcendentally constitutive character of Homo Sapiens is not merely 
irrelevant but false; or scientific statements of the type "Man is a carbon- 
based information processing system" are true -in exactly the same way in 
which a statement such as "the earth is not flat" is true, not just `empirically 
adequate' or `factually correct'-, and man is not a transcendent exception to 
the cosmos but just one relatively commonplace material phenomenon among 
others. There is no longer any room within the bounds of a univocally 
physical natural order for a special category of putatively trans-natural being 
called 'human'. 
Thus, materialism as we understand it is nothing but the conviction 
that science -whether it be that of Copernicus, Darwin, or Einstein- is the 
formulator of truths endowed with a quasi-transcendental bearing, rather than 
the mere promulgator of empirical facts27. Consequently, either the 
27The `quasi' here being used to index a crucial non-philosophical nuance vis a vis the transcendental 
status of scientific truth. For non-philosophy, scientific thought harbours a dimension of relatively 
autonomous, but nonetheless rigorously transcendental truth; one which is neither reducible to 
correspondence nor to coherence. Central to Laruellean thought is a reformulation of the notion of 
transcendental truth as adequation-without-correspondence. Non-philosophy as unified theory of 
philosophy and science provides an account of their Identity without unity and their Duality without 
difference, an account which tries to liberate the relative transcendental autonomy of scientific truth 
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philosopher accepts the irrecusable pertinence of scientific truth, and a 
fortiori, the scientific truth about human being; or he rejects wholesale the 
notion that science is in any position to formulate truths about man, in which 
case he subordinates scientific truth to a higher authority: to wit, the 
putatively unobjectifiable transcendence of human being. The latter option is, 
it seems to us, fundamentally indicative of the phenomenological stance in 
philosophy. Unfortunately, the popularity enjoyed by this stance among many 
contemporary philosophers -whether of a `continental' persuasion or not- 
does not render it any less repugnant in our eyes. 
Accordingly, and in conformity with the injunction stated above, 
the philosophical materialism we shall be attempting to radicalise non- 
philosophically in the context of this thesis will be characterised in terms of 
two complementary but nevertheless independent theses: univocity and 
naturalism. 
a). Univocity: The thesis of ontological univocity reconciles two 
fundamental, but apparently contradictory materialist imperatives: that Being 
know of no differences in kind (hence the destitution of all equivocal 
ontological transcendence such as that which separates mind from matter, 
culture from nature, freedom from necessity, etc. ); but also that it be 
from its subordination to philosophy, just as it seeks to emancipate the relative transcendental 
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untotalisable, that it remain unsubordinated to any overarching principle of 
transcendent ontological unity. If Being is multiple rather than One, it is 
because, as Badiou reminds us, God is dead and the One is not28. And it is 
precisely insofar as it tries to reconcile ontological immanence with 
ontological multiplicity that univocity stipulates that being always be said `in 
the same sense'29 of the untotalisable multiplicity of that which is30. The 
univocal ontological immanence required may be exceptionless precisely by 
virtue of the fact that it is consistently excessive (Deleuze); or, alternatively, 
one that is occasionally supplemented by virtue of its own constitutively 
excessive inconsistency (Badiou). Be that as it may, the crucial proviso 
autonomy of philosophy from its positivistic supervenience on an arbitrarily favoured science. Cf. 
chapters 7&8. 
28We shall see how Laruelle can happily concur with statements like this precisely because the One he 
invokes is without-unity and without-Being. 
29Clearly, the notion of `sense' implied here must be neither semantico-linguistic, nor 
phenomenological, nor even hermeneutic. The ontological `sense' invoked in the thesis of univocity 
must be formal-axiomatic rather than phenomenologico-hermeneutic. Particularly important in this 
regard is Badiou's claim that only the mathematical formalisation of ontology via axiomatic set-theory 
is sufficient to escape from the insidious reintroduction of hermeneutic equivocity into materialism, an 
equivocity rendering materialism vulnerable to idealist reappropriation through the combined re- 
phenomenologisation and re-hermeneutisat; on of the concept of `materiality'. Badiou criticizes the 
Deleuzean naming of matter as `anorganic Life' precisely because he believes it is a nomination which 
reintroduces equivocal transcendence into univocity. For its part, non-materialist theory will attempt to 
effect a transcendental axiomatisation and theorematisation of materialist Decision according to the 
radical immanence of `matter' or `hyle' as a first name or non-conceptual symbol cloned from 
philosophical materialism. As first name or non-conceptual symbol `matter' remains meaningless or 
uninterpretable. The language of philosophical Decision serves only as an indifferent symbolic support 
for the theoretically rigorous but strictly meaningless series of axiomatic abstractions effected on its 
basis. Moreover, this radically immanent, or non-Decisional nomination, de-ontologises univocity. For 
clarification, cf. Chapter 6, pp. 267-277 and 289-295. 
30Our definition of univocity here simply reiterates Deleuze's, although we shall later have occasion to 
criticize what we consider to be Deleuze's ontological idealization of immanence. Cf. infra, Chapter 3. 
Perhaps uniquely among `materialist' philosophers, Deleuze ceaselessly insists on the equation 
`immanence=univocity' as an uncircumventable sine qua non for any materialism worthy of the name. 
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required in order to maintain the univocal immanence necessary for a 
materialism concomitant with the premise of untotalisable ontological 
multiplicity is that the variously distributed instances of being qua multiple 
remain comprised within one and only one immanent Being (Deleuze: 
`matter' qua anorganic Life; Badiou: `matter' qua inconsistent void). Deleuze 
will be the exemplary representative of this thesis31. 
b). Naturalism: `Naturalism' as we understand it does not involve 
the dubious hypostatisation of some supposedly `natural' ontological realm in 
contradistinction to that of cultural artifice. Such an interpretation would 
render it immediately incompatible with the thesis of univocity. The 
naturalism we wish to invoke here is simply a thesis, which asserts the 
necessary interdependence of philosophy and science. Taking as given the 
empirical fact that all philosophical attempts to define conditions of 
possibility for scientific thought have proved to be dismally unsuccessful, we 
conclude that these failures are a matter of principle rather than empirical 
circumstance, and that it is the presumption that philosophy is in a position to 
provide a transcendental footing for science which must be abandoned. There 
Cf. for example Difference and Repetition especially pp. 35-42; or What is Philosophy?, especially 
pp. 44-49. 
31Although Badiou's materialism of the inconsistent void is arguably even more vigorously anti- 
phenomenological than Deleuze's, we will not be able to afford it equal consideration here. 
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is no first philosophy32. Consequently, although relatively autonomous vis a 
vis science, philosophical ontology can neither ground nor disregard the 
ultimately physical description of the universe provided by the natural 
sciences. W. V. O Quine and Paul Churchland will be our favoured 
philosophical proponents of naturalism in the sense that we have begun to 
give to the term here33. According to this definition, naturalism simply 
stipulates that, as far as science is concerned, philosophy can permit itself 
neither the privilege of legitimation nor the luxury of indifference. 
Yet if philosophy can no longer afford to busy itself with 
contriving sophistical exceptions to the natural physical order by shrouding 
the phenomenon of human sapience in a veil of pseudo-transcendental 
mystery, still less can it afford to disingenuously minimize the profoundly 
corrosive consequences entailed by the perspective of scientific naturalism 
with regard to the complacent naivety of our own phenomenological self- 
image. 
32Cf Quine, 1969, pp. 126-127. 
33Although we shall not be discussing it here, Daniel Dennett's work deserves to be mentioned 
alongside that of Quine and Churchland as the third member of the philosophical triumvirate 
representing a `hardcore' naturalist Weltanschaung in the contemporary analytical pantheon. The 
broad synoptic sweep of Dennett's philosophical vision, coupled with his consistent ingenuity and 
tireless inventiveness, renders him in many ways the most eloquent and persuasive spokesman for the 
brand of philosophical naturalism we are invoking here. Cf. for example, Dennett 1978; 1987; 1993; & 
1995. 
34 
In this latter regard, the recently touted prospect of a `naturalized 
phenomenology' 34, the offspring of an unholy alliance between an 
unreconstructed Husserlianism and some of the more conservative strands in 
contemporary cognitive science, remains, from our point of view, vitiated by 
its ultimately oxymoronic character. Given that, as far as the philosophy of 
mind is concerned, the most distinctive philosophical feature of the 
naturalistic approach has been its excoriation of phenomenological 
intentionality as a perspectival illusion; there is something spurious about 
using it as the philosophical basis upon which to reinstate the latter. This 
attempt strikes us as the result of an insidiously reactionary equivocation 
implicitly motivated by the overweening desire to avoid the unsettlingly 
sceptical consequences devolving on the one hand from the deconstructive 
and/or post-structuralist critiques of Husserl's Cartesian phenomenology 
(Heidegger, Derrida, Lacan, Deleuze, etc. ), and on the other, from the quasi- 
behaviourist and/or naturalist inspired attacks on the inviolable epistemic 
authority traditionally attributed to subjective interiority (Ryle, Quine, 
34For a particularly blatant example of such disingenuousness, one in which the primary theoretical 
motivation seems to be simply that of avoiding at all costs the profoundly counter-intuitive 
consequences devolving from the application of the `natural scientific attitude' to consciousness, 
especially the destruction of such `intuitively obvious' features of first-person phenomenology as that 
of its putatively pre-theoretical immediacy and its privileged access to data, see for example the essay 
by Woodruff-Smith, as well as the Introduction by Roy, Petitot, Pachoud, and Varela in the collection 
entitled Naturalizing Phenomenology, edited by Jean Petitot et al. Cf. Woodruff-Smith, 
`Intentionality 
Naturalized? ', and Roy, Petitot, Pachoud, & Varela, `Beyond the Gap', in Petitot et al., 1999; pp. 83- 
110 and pp. 1-80 respectively. 
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Wittgenstein, Dennett, Churchland, etc. ). Tip-toeing between what it 
doubtlessly regards as the Scylla of post-modem nihilism on the left, and the 
Charybdis of neurocomputational reductionism on the right, `naturalized 
phenomenology' hopes to inaugurate a middle-path, a third-way; one that 
would add a reassuring gloss of scientific legitimation to the aura of 
unassailable epistemic privilege which many, faithfully kow-towing to a 
Cartesian inheritance, continue to ascribe to phenomenological subjectivity. 
Against such reactionary philosophical protectionism, it is the 
business of a thoroughgoing naturalism to emphasize -rather than minimize- 
the corrosive power of scientific reductionism vis a vis both the tenets of 
phenomenological orthodoxy and the established parameters of socio-cultural 
consensus. That task can be achieved by exposing the entirely contingent, 
conventional character of the phenomenological self-image promulgated 
through the myth of subjective interiority; by denouncing the hallucinatory 
character of privileged access; and by inveighing against the illusory authority 
of the first-person perspective; myths which, whether taken separately or in 
combination, serve to shore up the subjectivist ideology through which liberal 
democratic capitalism convinces a stupefied population of consumers that 
they are sovereign individuals, naturally endowed with freedom of choice, 
and that the interests of subjective freedom coincide with the interests of a 
36 
free market economy35. It is by puncturing the persistent myths of first-person 
autonomy and of the irreducibility of consciousness; it is by excoriating the 
apparently inviolable ubiquity of the cultural privilege which folk 
psychological superstition has successfully arrogated to itself through the 
process of its enshrinement in the medium of natural language, that a 
virulently anti-phenomenological scepticism of the kind espoused by Quine, 
or an eliminative materialism such as that endorsed by Paul Churchland, 
suggesting as they do that a radical reconfiguration both of our own self- 
image and of our vision of the world around us is always possible, can help 
undermine those phenomenological Ur-doxas36 which help perpetuate the 
cultural consensus manufactured by capitalism37. 
To sum up: philosophical naturalism, as far as we are concerned, 
entails taking the scientific world-view seriously, and accepting the 
profoundly anti-phenomenological consequences of that world-view insofar 
351t is by tirelessly promoting the illusion of individual freedom that capitalism successfully diverts 
attention from the reality of the population's collective socio-economic enslavement, from its nigh-on 
total political impotence. Consider for example how the invocation of the consumer's inalienable `right 
to choose' is becoming increasingly synonymous with the notion of `freedom' tout court. Now that the 
capitalist axiomatic identifies `freedom' with the individual's freedom to keep consuming, philosophies 
defending the irreducibility of subjective interiority are also guilty of promulgating the myth of 
individual freedom by default, thereby furnishing the machinery of consumer capitalism with a useful 
ideological lubricant. 
36Cf. the critique of the Ur-doxa by Deleuze & Guattari in What is Philosophy? ;a critique with which 
we wholeheartedly concur. Cf. Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, pp. 80,142,178,206,207,209. 
37Accordingly, our Conclusion will suggest that non-materialism constitutes an instance of a priori 
resistance to the commodification of thought by being tantamount to a form of transcendental 
scepticism vis a vis those phenomenological Ur-doxas that are concomitant with the all-encompassing 
sovereignty of World-Capitalism. Cf. infra, pp. 430-440. 
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as it necessitates expunging all vestiges of folk psychological superstition and 
anthropocentric narcissism from philosophy. `Phenomenon'; `consciousness"; 
`intentionality'; `Ego'; `meaning'; `sense-bestowing act': these are the folk 
psychological fictions which have provided the basis for an elaborately 
sophisticated, but disastrously misconceived theoretical edifice38 
Phenomenology is folk psychology transcendentalised. Belief in the 
phenomenological mysteries, in the transcendental sovereignty of intentional 
consciousness, or in the irreducible reality of such denizens of the intentional 
realm as `eidetic intuitions' or `qualia', are now the contemporary 
philosophical equivalents of faith in the immortality of the soul or confidence 
in the ubiquity of phlogiston. "Consciousness", we might say paraphrasing 
Deleuze, "did not survive God"39. 
2. The transcendental necessity of materialism's non-philosophical 
transformation 
At this stage, the reader will doubtless be starting to suspect that our 
convictions are borne of nothing more sophisticated than a naive relapse into 
dogmatic scientism. To which we are tempted to respond by pointing out that, 
38And it should be remembered that it is on the basis of such subjective intuitions that phenomenology 
has had the temerity to try to suspend scientific objectivism by spuriously conflating science with the 
natural attitude of common sense; not only withdrawing subjectivity from the ambit of scientific 
investigation, but effectively subordinating the latter to the former. In this regard, far from being a mere 
caprice, Heidegger's contemptuous antipathy toward the sciences is the logical extension of Husserl's 
paternalistic condescension. 
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since the indiscriminate use of this epithet as a blanket term of abuse by irate 
phenomenologists convicts of `scientism' anyone who takes it on scientific 
trust that the earth orbits around the sun, or who believes in the existence of 
black holes and neutrinos -notwithstanding all phenomenological evidence to 
the contrary40-, then we can only plead guilty as charged. If `scientism' 
simply means refusing the obligatory subordination of empirical science to 
transcendental philosophy, then by our lights, there is not nearly enough 
`scientism' in contemporary philosophy. 
Nevertheless, although happy to assent to the charge of `scientism', 
we do not believe that the accusation of `dogmatism' is justified. Were we to 
continue to operate in an exclusively philosophical register, wherein 
everything is ultimately reducible to the level of a basically aleatory Decision 
either for or against science, the accusation would be pertinent. However, it is 
precisely on account of our wish to circumvent the apparently deadly impasse 
between materialist scientism and phenomenological idealism, and in order to 
provide the materialist Decision with a rigorously critical degree of 
theoretical validity, that we wish to effect its non-Decisional transmutation. 
39C£ Deleuze, 1994, p xix. 
401t might be apposite to remind ourselves here that as far as the committed phenomenologist is 
concerned, contrary to what a flimsy scientific dogmatism mired in the natural attitude dares to 
suggest, the earth does not move (i. e. the `archi-originary' earth subtending the `transcendental' 
corporeality of phenomenological subjectivity). Divine surprise! Thus, and perhaps appropriately, the 
phenomenologist is one who believes that the earth shall always be flat. Phenomenological wonders 
39 
That transmutation, interestingly enough, is to be effected on the 
basis of a theoretical discovery which realizes a philosophically contradictory, 
not to say non-sensical, feat; one which withdraws Man from the domain of 
that which is ontologically problematisable without reinstituting him as a 
transcendental exception. Neither Subjekt, nor Geist, nor Dasein, Man's non- 
ontological essence is radical immanence41. And as radical immanence, "Man 
is not-in-question ", Laruelle insists, "because he is not-in-philosophy"42. For 
non-philosophy, the essence of Man is that of an immanence without-essence 
and without-being, ergo non-human, precisely insofar as the `humanity' 
predicated of the human has always remained within the parameters of the 
ontologically problematic. But it is as `Given-without-givenness' (Donne- 
sans-donation) or `vision-in-One' (vision-en-Un)43; as index of a `humanity' 
shorn of all predicable `human' attributes, a `humanity' devoid of all 
recognizably human characteristics, that Man is the unproblematisable par 
excellence. 
Consequently, it is precisely insofar as the `human' is invariably a 
transcendent, anthropo-ontological construct, that for the non-philosopher, 
shall never cease. Cf. E. Husserl, La Terre Ne Se Meut Pas [The Earth Does Not Move], French trans. 
by D. Frank, Paris: Minuit, 1989. 
41 Cf. Chapter 5. 
42Laruelle, 1991, p. 36. 
43 Hopefully. all these claims will become intelligible during the course of Chapters 5 and 6, wherein 
the postulate of radical or `non-Decisional' immanence will be discussed at some length. 
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Man is nothing human. Man is ontologically indifferent because he `is' in- 
One and without-Being. Yet it is also on account of that radical indifference 
that he cannot be said to be in-human or trans-human. Thus, the unconditional 
immanence of Man's non-ontological Identity renders him equally indifferent 
to the temptations of humanism and anti-humanism. 
As a result, the shift to the non-philosophical register begins once 
one has rccogýýiýcd t hc extraneously transcendent character of the 
philosophical gesture rendering Man's being problematic. For non- 
philosophy, Man is no longer of the order of an ontological problem 
formulated in terms of the human entity as constituting a Difference within, or 
relative to, Being ("What or Who is Man? ", "How is his being articulated or 
given? "). His impredicable transparency as Given-without-givenness makes 
of him the inalienable but non-ontological solution, the sine qua non 
preceding and explaining the articulation of every ontological problem. 
Accordingly, non-philosophy proceeds on the basis of the discovery that Man 
as the One-without-Being (l'Un-sans-l'Etre) is not an exception to Being; nor 
a folding or a placeholder of Being; nor even a fissure or hole in being; but 
rather that radically immanent foreclosure which functions as the last-instance 
determining all thinking `of Being. 
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Accordingly, for the non-philosopher, it is not Man who is 
transcendent or exceptional vis a vis Being, it is Being which is absolutely 
transcendent vis a vis Man. Yet if `the problem' as far as non-philosophical 
thinking is concerned is no longer that of trying to `think the Being of the 
human', still less is it that of trying to think the human `in terms of the 
foreclosure of immanence. It is rather that of trying to think according to 
(selon) Man's immanent foreclosure to the twofold transcendence of Being 
and of thought. 
The `solution' to that problem is the recognition that Man's 
immanence-without-essence and without-existence, his foreclosure to 
thought, can nevertheless become effectuated by thought. It is on the basis of 
Being's transcendence as occasional cause and material support that Man's 
radically opaque transparency becomes effectuated by non-philosophical 
thought, allowing him a theoretico-practical `existence'44 as transcendental 
clone or Stranger for the onto-cosmological order problematised in 
philosophical thinking. As a result, Man's ontological effectuation, his 
occasional `existence' as Stranger or clone for the World, is simultaneously 
44Predictably, the non-philosophical translation of the concept of `existence' bears only a nominal 
relation to the familiar Heideggerean or Sartrean versions. Here as elsewhere, Laruelle's use of a 
familiar philosophical concept in an entirely new, unfamiliar conceptual context inevitably invites 
misunderstanding. The effectuation or `existence' of the non-philosophical subject or Stranger 
designates the complex structure of its theoretical articulation as non-thetic transcendence spanning the 
unidentity and unilaterality of transcendental clone and empirical support. All of this is of course 
unintelligible at this introductory stage. For clarification, cf. Chapter 6, pp. 277-289. 
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theoretical and practical in character, without constituting a synthetic unity or 
hybrid of theory and practise. The Stranger-subject (le Sujet-Stranger) of non- 
philosophical thought exists as the Identity-without-unity and Duality- 
without-difference of theory and practise. 
Nevertheless, bearing in mind that the subject of non-philosophical 
thought enacts this performative coincidence of theory and practise, it is 
possible to state that Man `is' only insofar as he exists as a theoretical 
Stranger for Being and for the World. Hence our continuously reiterated 
emphasis throughout the second half of this thesis on Man's radically 
inconsistent, non anthropo-logical, and ultimately alien existence as the 
transcendental Subject of extra-terrestrial theory. Accordingly, were we to 
distil the substance of this thesis down to a single claim it would be this: the 
more radical the instance of humanity, the more radically non- 
anthropomorphic and non-anthropocentric the possibilities of thought. By 
definitively emancipating Man's theoretically alien, non-human existence, 
non-materialist theory promises to purge materialism of all vestiges of 
phenomenological anthropomorphism. 
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It is this rediscovery of Man's irrefrangibly alien existence as a 
universal Stranger that prevents non-philosophy's gnostically inflected45 
`hypertranscendentalism' from merely reinstating Kant's transcendental 
protectionism vis a vis man as Homo noumenon. In this regard, it would be a 
mistake to consign Laruelle to the long line of post-Kantian thinkers 
labouring to provide a definitive formulation of man's supposedly 
unobjectifiable essence. Such efforts are merely variations on the Kantian 
gesture of special pleading concerning the human; a gesture which, providing 
as it did a transcendental guarantor for the inviolable moral authority of 
religious faith, was always explicitly intended as a protective measure, 
designed in order to forestall the nascent threat of atheism harboured by the 
prodigious successes of scientific materialism46 
45For an account of the relation between non-philosophy and gnosis cf. infra, Chapter 6, pp. 312-315; 
and our Conclusion, pp. 430-440. 
46Kant explicitly withdrew religious faith from the purview of critique -distilling it down to its 
inviolable noumenal core in the good will qua categorical imperative- in the same gesture with which 
he delimited the bounds of objective knowledge: "I have therefore found it necessary to deny 
knowledge in order to make room for faith. The dogmatism of metaphysics, that is, the preconception 
that it is possible to make headway in metaphysics without a previous criticism of pure reason, is the 
source of all that unbelief, always very dogmatic, which wars against morality[.. ) Criticism alone can 
sever the root of materialism, fatalism, atheism, free-thinking, fanaticism, and superstition, which can 
be injurious universally; as well as of idealism and scepticism, which are dangerous chiefly to the 
schools, and hardly allow of being handed on to the public". Kant, 1929, Bxxx-xxxv. Typically 
however, and fortunately for us, Kant's critical operation was intrinsically double-edged. For it is 
through the very same gesture whereby Kant sought to render faith cognitively unassailable, that he 
also terminated the discourse of rational theology, undermined the transparent sovereignty of Cartesian 
subjectivity, and ultimately paved the way for the sort of `noumenal' or critical-transcendental 
materialism whose conditions of elaboration we intend to set out in the course of this thesis. Thus, 
whether they like it or not, materialists, fatalists, atheists, freethinkers, sceptics, and fanatics of all 
stripes remain profoundly indebted to Kant. Conversely, we shall consider that the superstitious 
idealists have found their true home in phenomenology; -more precisely, that the phenomenological 
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For the non-philosopher however, such attempts at special pleading 
condemn Man in the very gesture of Decisional transcendence through which 
they endeavoured to save him. Man as radically immanent phenomenon 
remains foreclosed to meta-physical inflation as well as to infra-physical 
reduction. If he is the non-redeemable par excellence it is only because he 
remains the already-redeemed, as indifferent to the promise of transcendental 
redemption as he is to the threat of empirical degradation. Philosophical 
attempts to immunize Man against the menace of material oblivion through 
perpetual reinjections of salutary transcendence only succeed in occluding his 
immanent foreclosure, his ultimate indifference to noumenal salvation as well 
as to phenomenal extinction47. 
Of course, for the philosopher, non-philosophy, which endeavours to 
think according to Man's foreclosure to Decision, necessarily appears as an 
impoverishment or diminishment of thinking conceived in terms of the 
elision of the distinction between phenomenon and thing-in-itself caters for the sense of transcendental 
reassurance that the latter so obviously crave. 
471n saying this we do not, of course, intend to suggest, as Michel Henry does in his own 
phenomenologisation of radical immanence, that it is now as the latter that Man can be said to be 
eternal and immortal. The radical immanence invoked by the non-philosopher is not a 
phenomenological principle: it is a necessary but never a sufficient condition; a sine qua non which by 
itself yields nothing, produces nothing. We oppose the radical in-consistency of immanence as non- 
ontological condition, an in-consistent condition characterised in terms of a primacy-without-priority 
(Laruelle), to its phenomenological consistency as archi-originary ontological principle(Michel Henry). 
It is only by means of an empirical occasion that this inconsistent condition becomes effectuated in 
non-philosophical thought. Apart from that effectuation, its foreclosure guarantees nothing; least of all 
an immutable and eternal phenomenological Life. Thus, in order to forestall the danger of a quasi- 
phenomenological -which is to say, crypto-religious- misreading, it is necessary to insist that radical 
immanence as inconsistent condition is not so much eternal or immortal as foreclosed a priori to the 
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inviolable necessity of ontological Decision. But for the non-philosopher, the 
poverty, austerity and minimalism characteristic of the non-Decisional 
streamlining of transcendental thought remain the best guarantee of 
theoretical rigour, and, a fortiori, the best guarantee for the transcendental 
consistency of the materialist Decision. 
For the question facing the materialist is whether a Decision carried 
out in the philosophical register furnishes him/her with the theoretical means 
required in order for him/her to live up to the desired degree of conceptual 
probity; in other words, whether philosophy allows the materialist to do as 
s/he says and say as s/he does. Laruelle, for reasons we will elaborate on 
later48, believes that philosophical Decision falls short on this very count: the 
philosopher in the throes of Decision is never doing what s/he is saying or 
saying what s/he is doing. The problem of Decision then, is the problem of 
discovering the theoretical conditions according to which this performative 
consistency of saying and doing in Decision becomes realizable. It becomes 
realizable, Laruelle suggests, only by shifting from a posture whereby 
Decision constitutes an absolutely autonomous, self-positing act, to one 
wherein Decision becomes a relatively autonomous, heteronomously 
ontological alternative, or even the differance, between living and dying. For an extended critique of 
Michel Henry's phenomenologisation of immanence, cf. infra, Chapter 2, pp. 80-97. 
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determined experience; the non-synthetic unity of theory and practice. A non- 
Decisional theory is not anti-Decisional; - it suspends the self-sufficiency of 
Decision, transforming its absolute autonomy into a merely relative 
autonomy. The point is not to abdicate from Decision but to permit a radically 
transcendental determination of Decision, one allowing for Decision to be 
carried out under scrupulously exacting theoretical conditions. It is the 
general lack of theoretical scruple concomitant with the absolute autonomy of 
Decision in its philosophical register which the non-philosopher objects to, 
not Decision as such. Consequently, our belief in the necessity of a non- 
materialist universalisation of materialism goes hand in hand with the 
conviction that non-philosophical theory alone provides the conditions under 
which the materialist Decision can be rigorously carried out. It furnishes the 
indispensable transcendental supplement required in order to render the 
materialist Decision unequivocally consistent in word and deed. 
Man as Non-Materialist Identity of Philosophy and Science 
Ultimately, the pertinence of non-philosophical theory for the brand of 
materialism we are interested in here is apparently twofold, but in reality 
onefold. The superficially twofold pertinence concerns the relation of 
48Cf. Chapters 5 and 6; but also for instance Chapters 2&3, where we try to show how the 
philosophical decision in favour of materialism invariably reinstates a form of idealism. In other words, 
the philosopher decides against idealism in a way that is still idealist. 
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philosophy and science on the one hand, and the non-exceptional status of 
Man on the other. If materialism as we understand it is implicitly predicated 
on the basically sound but unstated assumption that science and philosophy 
are and should be bound together in a relationship of reciprocal 
presupposition, then Laruelle's work is crucial because it promises to provide 
that unstated philosophical assumption with an explicitly articulated 
theoretical basis: non-philosophy promises to provide a `unified' but non- 
unitary theory of philosophy and science49. On the other hand, non- 
philosophy is equally important as far as the injunction forbidding the 
philosophical conception of the human as ontological exception is concerned. 
Man is no longer conceived of as a locus of transcendence, but rather as the 
radical immanence whose foreclosure to all anthropomorphic predication 
renders it the sine qua non for a rigorously non-anthropomorphic theorising. 
In the final analysis however, the superficial character of this double- 
aspect becomes apparent when one realizes that it is ultimately Man as radical 
immanence that constitutes the last-instance according to which the double 
articulation of philosophy and science simultaneously attains its 
49Thus, non-philosophy refuses to discriminate a priori between philosophy and science; it deals with 
them together en bloc as a single indivisible empirical datum. For non-philosophy, philosophy and 
science are necessarily bound together in a relation of reciprocal presupposition. It is on this basis that 
non-materialism tries to provide a non positivistic radicalisation and generalisation of the naturalist 
thesis according to which philosophy supervenes on science. Cf. the discussion of Quine and 
Churchland in Chapters 7 and 8. 
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transcendental validity as well as its non-Decisional legitimacy. For it is 
Man's non-Decisional essence that provides an Identity-without-synthesis and 
a Duality-without-difference for all the Decisional hybrids of philosophy and 
science. 
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PART I 
THE DECLINE OF MATERIALISM AS SUCH 
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CHAPTER I 
MATTER: COMME TELLE OR TELLE 
QUELLE? 
"When, in its better moments, materialism abandoned its empiricist 
concept of matter, on the whole it never proved able to go beyond the hyle, 
the identity of thought and the real, of ideality and matter -the level of relative 
materiality or of materiality `as such'[comme teile] rather than of matter 
`itself' [teile quelle] or absolute matter. " (Laruelle, 1981, p. 78) 
What would it be to think matter `itself or absolutely, as opposed 
to thinking it `as such' or relatively? Is it - pace Hegel- possible to conceive 
of a matter `outside' the concept, a matter distinct from every concept of 
matter? Or is any attempt to think along such lines inevitably doomed to 
relapse into pre-Hegelian naivety? 
Clearly, the very formulation of the question points away from 
Hegel and back toward Kant. For the Critical turn is inaugurated in the 
gesture whereby Kant acknowledges what he calls `the transcendental 
difference' between thought and thing, representation and represented, 
phenomenon and in-itself, or more generally, the difference between the ideal 
realm of that which is representable for the knowing subject, and the real 
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realm of that which subsists `problematically'50 or independently of the 
possibility of relation to the subject. Thus, from a quasi-Kantian perspective, 
one might say that whereas the ideal is intrinsically relational -a function of 
the relation to subjectivity-, the real -not to be confused with the empirical 
reality of the represented phenomenon- is simply defined negatively as the 
absence of relation. In other words, it is problematically or hypothetically 
defined as the in-itself: - that which is relationless or absolute. Yet according 
to Hegel it is this very difference between the ideal as relative and the real as 
absolute which turns out to be internal to thought itself. Subjectivity qua self- 
relating negativity, self-sundering and self-synthesizing Notion, is nothing but 
the processual identification of ideal identity and real difference, the 
ultimately Ideal relation of relation and non-relation, relative and absolute. 
It is perhaps on account of its resolutely anti-Hegelian tenor, that 
Heideggerean phenomenology, at least as set out in Being and Time, seems to 
have inherited something of Kant's transcendental-idealist legacy. From our 
point of view, the constitutively `idealizing' tendency of its transcendental 
50For Kant the realm of the problematic is that concerning which the judgement of existence or 
inexistence is inapplicable. The noumenal realm remains problematic insofar as we can neither say of it 
that it is or that it is not, since for something to be posited as being it must first be capable of being 
given through sensibility in an experience: "The concept of a noumenon is thus merely a limiting 
concept, the function of which is to curb the pretensions of sensibility[... ] What our understanding 
acquires through this concept of a noumenon is a negative extension; that is to say, understanding is 
not limited through sensibility; on the contrary, it itself limits sensibility by applying the term noumena 
to things in themselves (things not regarded as appearances). But in so doing it at the same time sets 
limits to itself, recognizing that it cannot know these noumena through any of the categories, and that it 
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methodology find its canonical formulation in the Introduction to Being and 
Time, wherein Heidegger defines phenomenology in the following way: "The 
expression phenomenology' may be formulated in Greek as legein to 
phainomena, where legein means apophainesthai. Thus, `phenomenology' 
means apophainesthai to phainomena -to let that which shows itself be seen 
from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself. " (Heidegger, 
1962, p. 58) However, this dimension of phenomenal self-showing is 
necessarily bound to that of the logos as realm of discursive apophansis: "The 
logos lets something be seen. [.. ]Discourse `lets something be seen' apo 
(from itself} [ 
.. 
Jthat is, it lets us see something from the very thing which the 
discourse is about. In discourse (apophansis), so far as it is genuine, what is 
said is drawn 
. 
from what the talk is about, so that discursive communication, 
in what it says, makes manifest what it is talking about[... ] This is the 
structure of the logos as apophansis. "(Ibid, p. 56) Heidegger's definitions here 
render the intrinsic link between showing and saying, or more exactly, 
between self-showing and self-saying in the transcendental structure of the 
phenomeno-logos, perfectly explicit. That transcendental bond between 
phenomenon and logos is assured through the dimension of apophantic 
disclosure necessary for the manifestation of the phenomenon as 
must therefore think them only under the title of an unknown something. " (Kant, 1929, B311-B312, pp. 
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phenomenon. A disclosure whereby every phenomenon is necessarily 
manifested as some-thing by virtue of its coming-to-presence against a pre- 
given horizonal backdrop of intelligibility: - Dasein 's Being-in-the-World. 
Moreover, Heidegger reminds us that "because logos as legomenon can also 
signify that which, as something to which one addresses oneself, becomes 
visible in its relation to something in its `relatedness', logos acquires the 
signification of relation and relationship. "(Ibid, p. 58) It is in virtue of this 
constitutive structure of discursive apophansis that every phenomenon 
disclosed through the logos is intrinsically and indissociably related to every 
other through the overarching structural whole of which it remains an 
inextricable moment. Thus, from our point of view, the `phenomenality' of 
the phenomenon as laid bare in Heidegger's phenomenological analyses still 
remains intrinsically bound to the ideal realm of the relational, the intelligible, 
the meaningful, etc. Being-in-the-world is an essentially holistic and 
inherently Ideal phenomenons 1 
Thus, although Laruelle's hypothetical separation of matter insofar as 
it is phenomenologically disclosed `as such', through the logos, from matter 
`itself , independent of every horizon of apophantic disclosure, is necessarily 
272-273). 
51 Interestingly enough however, chief among the many remarkable virtues of Laruelle's stunning 
reading of Heidegger in Les Philosophies de la Difference, is its explicitly anti-idealist or `realist' (one 
might even say `quasi-materialist') slant. Cf. Laruelle, 1986, Chapters 3&4. 
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a transcendental hypothesis, it is one which implies a rearticulation of Kant's 
transcendental agenda very different from that set out by Heidegger in Being 
and Time. For by distinguishing matter `itself from every phenomenological 
apprehension of matter `as such', it seems to be suggesting that `matter' -even 
if only problematically or hypothetically- is not only a real instance distinct 
from every ideal sublation of difference in the Concept, but also an 
unphenomenologisable `in-itself ; `something' which is neither a 
phenomenon showing itself from itself, nor even the inapparent 
phenomenality of showing as such. Yet it is difficult to see how such a 
distinction -a distinction that apparently distinguishes itself from the 
distinction of ontico-ontological difference as such- could even be entertained 
as a conceivable hypothesis. 
Accordingly, in order to conceive of Laruelle's hypothetical 
separation of matter comme teile from matter teile quelle we shall be obliged 
to re-evaluate both the Kantian and the Heideggerean characterisation of the 
transcendental in terms of difference. Laruelle's hypothesis forces us to 
reconsider the extent to which this transcendental separation of matter `itself 
from matter `as such' is ultimately differential in character. For it may be that 
the transcendental separation of the comme tel from the tel quel has to be 
conceived of in terms of immanence rather than transcendence, and in terms 
55 
of Identity rather than Difference. Furthermore, it may be that although this 
separation-without-difference is effected in thought and has some effect on 
the World, it is neither realized through the power of conceptual thought 
alone, as Hegel maintained, nor experienced on the basis of my being-in-the- 
world as Heidegger believed, but rather proves to be the result of a separation 
that is anterior both to the transcendence of thought and to that of the World; 
one to which thought and World themselves are ultimately subject. These are 
the possibilities that we are particularly interested in elucidating here, along 
with Laruelle. For our ultimate aim is to show how this transcendental 
separation of `matter itself from `matter as such' must be conceived of solely 
according to an Identity of immanence proper to `matter itself, rather than in 
terms of a transcendent Difference between `matter as such' and `matter 
itself . 
Now, of the many fascinating avenues of philosophical exploration 
delineated in Laruelle's Principe de Minorite (1981), the most salient for our 
present purposes is his suggestion that the pursuit of these afore-mentioned 
possibilities necessitates a radicalisation of Kant's transcendental separation 
of the real from the ideal, of matter-in-itself from the phenomenal logos, in 
such a way as to effect the simultaneous withdrawal of matter from the 
idealized materiality of the representational object, and the subtraction of 
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thought from the reified ideality of the phenomenological subject. Only in this 
way does it become possible to forestall both the Hegelian identification of 
real and ideal within the domain of the Idea itself; and Heidegger's 
phenomenological idealization of the transcendental difference through Da- 
sein 's unobjectifiable circumscription of the ontico-ontological caesura 
between real and ideal. 
However, where Kant yoked the transcendental to subjectivity and 
rendered the notion of a `material noumenon' into a purely limiting concept, 
by definition devoid of cognitive import, our goal here involves freeing what 
Deleuze called "the prodigious domain of the transcendental"52 from the 
nexus of idealist relativity in order to formulate the conditions for a thinking 
of matter `itself in the positivity of its unconditionally immanent Identity; a 
thinking which, by simultaneously liberating matter from what Laruelle calls 
its `materiological' subordination to the logos and by emancipating cognition 
from the constraints of phenomenological presentation, would furnish us with 
the theoretical means required in order to access `matter itself -Va matiere 
teile quelle'. Our aim throughout, in this as well as in all subsequent chapters, 
will be to show how Laruelle's `non-philosophy' can be used to explore the 
52Deleuze, 1994, p. 13 5. 
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diversely ramifying consequences of this twofold but ultimately indivisible 
theoretical gesture. 
In the first part of this thesis however, our preliminary investigation 
into the legitimacy of this distinction and the feasibility of such a gesture as 
far as the possibility of defining a `non-materiological materialism' is 
concerned, will focus exclusively on their tentatively sketched articulation in 
Laruelle's Principe de Minorite53. The specific feature of the work we intend 
to single out for analysis here can be stated in relatively simple terms: 
radicalising and generalizing his own earlier `machinic materialist'54 critique 
of philosophical idealism, set out in those texts making up his Philosophie I, 
53Le Principe de Minorite is the key transitional work in the entire Laruellean oeuvre. It represents the 
pivotal moment where Laruelle takes his first philosophically unprecedented step away from the 
problematic of Difference governing his early works (that is to say, the theoretical problematic mapped 
out in the philosophical `quadrangle' delimited by the proper names Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida and 
Deleuze), grouped together by iiiiii under the heading Philosophie I, toward the articulation of what he 
will later come to recognize as the non-philosophical project proper, the beginnings of which are set 
out in those works of Laruelle comprised under the heading Philosophie II (for full details concerning 
this division, cf. our bibliography, pp. 441-443). From a heuristic point of view, its particular 
importance for us here, at a stage when we are trying to introduce the philosophical problem for which 
we will try to articulate the non-philosophical resolution, hinges in no small part on the fact that Le 
Principe de Minorite is still conceived and written as a philosophical work, operating on the basis of a 
recognizable philosophical stance, an assessment which Laruelle's own comments about the book 
explicitly confirm: see for example, Laruelle, 1991, p. 208. Although complex and difficult (like 
everything Laruelle has ever written), it is not yet entirely alien in its basic premises and outlook, in the 
way in which Laruelle's later, explicitly non-philosophical works will prove to be for the philosophical 
reader. 
54The attempt to effect a `machinic deconstruction' of the metaphysical and implicitly idealist theses of 
historical and dialectical materialism plays a significant role in several of Laruelle's works from 
Philosophie I. Thus, in his Nietzsche contre Heidegger (1977) for instance, Laruelle defines his 
version of machinic materialism in terms of three theses displacing and occupying, rather than 
opposing and negating, those of both dialectical and of historical materialism: 1. a materialist thesis 
asserting the primacy of libidinal matter over every form of representation; 2. a syntactical thesis 
asserting the primacy of differance over contradiction which it determines independently of form; 3. a 
machinic thesis proper asserting the primacy of materialism over the syntactical. Cf. Laruelle, 1977a, 
pp. 122-129. 
58 
and according to a gesture we shall see constantly reiterated throughout his 
non-philosophical work55, Laruelle in Le Principe de Minorite begins to 
discern in every variant of philosophical materialism (and a fortiori in 
philosophical thinking per se) something like an intrinsically idealist 
component, generally indexed by its persistent subordination of `matter' (or 
what he will also call `the real') to a `materiality' whose theoretical status 
remains for Laruelle that of an idealized and invariably transcendent 
abstraction. 
But what precisely does it mean to claim, as Laruelle does in Le 
Principe de Minorite, that all species of philosophical materialism are 
ultimately kinds of materiological idealism? According to Laruelle, it means 
basically that these materialisms "still subordinate in the last instance matter 
to the last possible form of the logos (logos or Idea of matter as such), instead 
of subordinating the logos of matter to matter, and initiating a truly 
dispersive becoming-real of ideality rather than a continuous becoming-ideal 
of the real. " (Laruelle, 1981, p. 107) What the initiation of a `dispersive 
becoming-real of the ideal' would consist in is something we will only begin 
to elaborate on in Chapter 5. At this stage however, we will confine ourselves 
551n his indispensable Initiation ä la Pensee de Francois Laruelle, Juan Diego Blanco sees in the 
operation of "radicalisation/generalisation" the fundamental theoretical trope lying at the heart of all 
Laruelle's non-philosophical thinking. Cf. Blanco, 1997, passim, but especially pp. 90-96. 
59 
to an examination of the first branch of the alternative: the materiological 
subordination of matter to the logos. 
Materialism and Materiology 
Laruelle identifies three invariant features in every philosophical 
materialism, then goes on to list those conceptual confusions that he takes to 
be constitutive of the materiological idealization of materialism56 
Materialism = 
1. Primacy of immanence over transcendence. 
2. Primacy of the real over the ideal. 
3. Exteriority of being to thought. 
Materiology = 
1. Confusion of real or ontic immanence with ideal or 
ontological immanence. 
2. Confusion of irreversible or unilateral determination of 
the ideal by the real with a bi-lateral or reversible co- 
respondence, whereby the real ends up being co- 
constituted in return through the ideality which it is 
supposed to determine. 
56Cf. Laruelle, 1981, pp. 77-78. 
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3. Confusion of the exteriority of the entity 'itself', as 
instance of unobjectifiable immanence, to all forms of 
presentation, not just thought, with the unobjectifiable 
transcendence of the entity's Being `as such' relative to 
intentional consciousness. Confusion, in other words, 
of the unobjectifiable immanence of the phenomenon 
`itself with the unobjectifiable transcendence proper to 
the phenomenality (=Being) of the phenomenon `as 
such'. 
What is Laruelle trying to distinguish here? What exactly is being 
elided in these three instances of materiological amphiboly between ontic and 
ontological; real asymmetry and ideal reciprocity; exteriority of immanence 
and exteriority of transcendence? 
Basically, for Laruelle, each of these materiological amphibolies is a 
function of the idealizing -and crypto-Hegelian- elision of the transcendental 
distinction -which he insists on upholding- between an unobjectifiable 
dimension of real or `ontic' immanence, and an unobjectifiable dimension of 
ideal or ontological transcendence. Whilst the refusal to recognize the claim 
of the former is for Laruelle symptomatic of idealism, materiology, for its 
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part, is invariably indexed by a philosophically confused hybrid or mixture'? 
of ontic immanence and ontological objectivity. In other words, materiology 
mistakes the real but unobjectifiable immanence of the `thing itself, 
independent of its phenomenological presentation, for the idealized or 
transcendent reality of the object `as such'. More precisely, it operates on the 
basis of a variedly proportioned hybrid of real and reality, immanence and 
transcendence. It is this confusion of the phenomenon or entity's 
unobjectifiable exteriority with the unobjectifiable transcendence of its 
phenomenality `as such', its Being, that underlies the materiological 
confusion of real with ideal and the confusion of the latter's unilateral 
determination by the former with their bi-lateral co-determination. 
We will have more to say about the motif of unilateral asymmetry as 
far as the relation of real and ideal is concerned in the following chapter. For 
the time being, however, it is necessary to focus on this fundamental, 
constantly reiterated distinction between unobj ectifiable ontic immanence and 
unobj ectifiable ontological transcendence. What lays behind this apparently 
57Laruelle contends that all philosophical thinking is intrinsically constituted through the articulation 
of a hybrid or composite structure. Consequently, an analysis of materiological thinking which shows 
how it operates on the basis of a typically philosophical `hybrid' or `mixture' (mixte) of real 
immanence and ideal transcendence is the fundamental precondition for the non-materialist `dualysis' 
of materiological Decision we intend to pursue. For a preliminary examination of this materiological 
hybridisation of real and ideal, cf. infra, Chapter 2, pp. 90-97; but especially Chapter 3, pp. 121-141. 
For general elucidation conceIfling the status of philosophical Decision in non-philosophical theory. 
and for an examination of the role played by its hybrid or composite structure as occasional cause and 
empirical material in the process of non-philosophical dualysis, cf. infra, Chapter 5, pp. 218-258. 
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obscure Laruellean contrast between the unobjectifiability of the phenomenon 
'itself' nd the unobjectifiability of its phenomenality `as such'? 
The fundamental philosophical reference for understanding this 
Laruellean contrast lies in the `material phenomenology' of Michel Henry. 
Central to the latter is the distinction between an `en-static' dimension of real 
immanence and an `ek-static; ' realm of ideal transcendence; a distinction 
formulated by Henry on the basis of a particularly trenchant 
phenomenological critique of Husserl and Heidegger. Consequently, 
following a brief recapitulation of that critique, the next chapter will try to 
show how Laruelle's transcendental separation of the tel quel from the comme 
tel must be understood in terms of a `non-phenomenological' radicalisation of 
Henry's phenomenological distinction58. 
58As we shall see, the crucial non-phenomenological nuance in the Laruellean radicalisation of Henry's 
distinction concerns specifically whether the enstatic immanence Henry invokes is to be understood in 
terms of the phenomenality of the phenomenon `as such', or in terms of the phenomenon `itself. 
Although focusing specifically on the relation between Levinas and Laruelle, the comprehensive 
overview of the interface between phenomenology and non-philosophy provided in Hughes Choplin's 
De la Phenomenologie ä la Non-Philosophie also includes a succinct but useful precis of the 
Laruelle/Henry connection. Cf. Choplin, 1997, especially pp. 33-49 and 116-117. In contrast to 
Choplin however, the intent throughout our account of the relation between Laruelle and Henry will be 
to emphasize the profound discontinuity between the phenomenological and the non-philosophical 
invocation of radical immanence. 
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CHAPTER 2 
MICHEL HENRY: MATERIAL 
PHENOMENOLOGY 
En-stasis/Ek-stasis 
In Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics59, Heidegger famously 
proposes to identify the transcendental difference between phenomenon and 
in-itself with the ontico-ontological difference between the entity and its 
Being, phenomenon and phenomenality. He does so, moreover, by reading 
the schematising function of the transcendental imagination, its synthesizing 
of concept and intuition in the production of schemata as transcendental 
determinations of time -the appearing of appearances-, as an analogue for the 
temporalising function of Dasein's ekstatico-horizonal transcendence. 
However, Henry, in The Essence of Manifestation and subsequent 
works60, argues that Heidegger's alignment of the transcendental difference 
with the ontico-ontological difference between intra-temporal phenomena and 
temporalising phenomenality, wherein the latter dimension is originarily 
59Cf. Heidegger, 1990. 
60Cf. Henry, The Essence of Manifestation (English translation 1973, original French publication 
1962); but also The Genealogy of Psychoanalysis (English translation 1993, original French 
publication 1985); and Phenomenologie Materielle, 1990. 
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anchored in Dasein's Being as ekstatico-horizonal transcendence, falls short 
of attaining the authentically transcendental and, Henry provocatively insists, 
constitutively atemporal essence of originary phenomenological Being. 
According to Henry, Heidegger, like Husserl before him, still operates within 
the parameters of what the former, following Husserl, refers to as a `Worldly' 
and transcendent (i. e. ontico-empirical rather than rigorously 
phenomenological) characterisation of the phenomenon's transcendental 
phenomenality; which is to say, its Being. The hallmark of such worldliness, 
as far as Henry is concerned, is the failure to acknowledge the radical 
asymmetry or heteromorphy between two fundamentally incommensurable 
modes of phenomenalisation: the ideal, or ekstatico-temporal modality of 
phenomenalisation through which phenomena first become intentionally 
apprehended and given for consciousness according to the horizonal ekstasis 
of World; and the absolute immanence-to-itself of en-static auto-affection as 
the real but non-intentional and non-representable essence of 
phenomenalisation; the veritable phenomenological `substance' of 
phenomenality, subtending all ekstatico-temporal manifestation. The 
asymmetry or heteromorphy regulating the relation between these two 
incommensurable modalities according to Henry is a variant on a classical but 
under appreciated Neoplatonic philosopheme: ekstatic transcendence 
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distinguishes itself unilaterally from enstatic immanence while the latter does 
not distinguish itself from the former in return. Accordingly, Henry 
maintains, the phenomenological `substance' of ekstatic visibility, its 
originary phenomenality, is woven out of enstatic invisibility, but enstasis is 
never revealed, never disclosively articulated within ekstasis, its invisible 
opacity absolves itself from reflexive illumination in the light of ekstasis61: "It 
is only as an un-seeing, in not relating to itself in a seeing, in not revealing 
itself through a seeing, and thus as un-seen, as invisible, that seeing 
effectuates itself. " (Henry, 1990, p. 111) 
Thus, according to Henry, the genuinely real, phenomenologico- 
transcendental condition for the ideal, intentional structures of the 
temporalising ekstasis through which phenomena become apprehended by 
consciousness in the disclosure of the World is the immanence of enstatic 
auto-affection as the ontological (but, Henry insists, definitively non- 
metaphysical) prima materia through which the phenomenality of the 
phenomenon is originarily constituted. It is phenomenological materiality as 
that which remains entirely occluded, invisible in the light of ekstatic 
manifestation, absolute phenomenality or phenomenality in-itself as the real 
condition for the structures of intentional ideality through which the 
6I As we will see below, Henry's mobilization of the theme of unilateral asymmetry will be subjected to 
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phenomenon is grasped in consciousness. Consequently, Henry will argue, 
"'Matter', for material phenomenology as understood in its decisive 
opposition to hyletics, no longer indicates the other of phenomenality but its 
essence. " (I d, p. 58) Phenomenological `matter' then, for Henry, is the 
`always already' of radical immanence as pure Affectivity-in-itself; 
transcendental Affectivity absolved of the reference to the empirical 
exteriority of an affecting instance. It is absolute auto-affection wherein 
givenness and given are indivisibly locked together in the grip of archi- 
originary self-Impression. 
Henry and Husserl 
How does Henry arrive at these provocative conclusions? We will 
now attempt to provide some clarification for these initially puzzling claims 
by considering Henry's reconstruction of the problematic of 
phenomenological `givenness' as formulated in his critique of the Husserlian 
analysis of internal time-consciousness62 (a critique set out in the opening 
chapter of Henry's Phenomenologie Materielle). We shall briefly recapitulate 
the main points of that critique here, without pausing to ask whether or not it 
J 
I does full justice to the labyrinthine intricacies Husserl's text. 
a stringent critique by Laruelle on the grounds that it remains insufficiently rigorous and basically 
equivocal. 
62Cf. Husserl, 1964. 
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For Husserl, the immanent flux of phenomenological subjectivity, 
which has as its locus the living present of transcendental consciousness, is 
self-constituting: it is at once that which does the constituting (or the giving), 
and that which is constituted (or given); the co-incidence of appearing and of 
that which produces appearing. This self-constituting character of the living 
present is rooted in the structure of auto-temporalisation accomplished 
according to the three modalities of temporal givenness: that of the `now' or 
punctual present; that of retention; and that of protention. But Husserl's 
account shows these three forms of temporal synthesis to be intrinsically 
fissured by a constitutive structural equivocation: they are species of noetic 
intentionality implying at once an intra-temporal distinction in the order of 
their logical consecutiveness; and a transcendental distinction between that 
which is constituted or given through the synthesis, and that which does the 
constituting, the giving, or synthesizing. 
Now, Henry identifies this latter distinction between synthesizing and 
synthesized, givenness and given, as one which is fundamentally 
phenomenologico-transcendental, rather than logico-temporal, in nature. But, 
he argues, an acknowledgement of the rigorously transcendental character of 
this distinction -insofar as it inheres intrinsically in the structure of 
transcendental synthesis per se- renders it incompatible with the logico- 
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consecutive structure of inter-articulation between these syntheses according 
to Husserl. For to characterise the inter-articulation of these modalities of 
transcendental syntheses according to an order of logico-temporal consecution 
would be to relapse from a strictly phenomenological to a worldly -i. e. 
empirico-transcendent, rather than transcendental-immanent- viewpoint: the 
synthesis of retentional giving would then be seen as something succeeding 
the present which it gives to intentional consciousness by retaining it, 
according to a temporal order of logical succession experienced by empirical 
consciousness. 
However, Henry argues, this is precisely what Husserl does: he 
accounts for the upsurge of the `now' in the consciousness of the living 
present through the retentive synthesis by which every `now' is constituted as 
given, retained in the present as `having just taken place'; and invokes the 
continuous upsurge of a perpetually renascent `now' -one which remains 
fundamentally unconstituted, heterogeneously inserted within the immanent 
flux of transcendental consciousness through the transcendent auspices of a 
noematic `impression'- in order to explain the origination of the retentive 
synthesis which will constitute it as the present `now' given in consciousness. 
As a result, Husserl can only explain the genesis of these originary `acts' of 
phenomenological synthesis by recourse to an already constituted synthesis: 
Im 
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"each constitutive phase of the flux only accedes to phenomenality insofar as 
it is itself constituted[.... ]it never phenomenalises itself as constituting and 
.. 
] that which is ultimately constitutive remains `anonymous "'(Ibid, p. 44) 
Thus, for Husserl, even at the level of absolute transcendental 
consciousness, the given can only be given insofar as it is constituted as 
given. Yet at the -, am. - time, Husserl continues to insist that givenness and 
given cannot be isomorphic, that they are separated by an unbridgeable 
transcendental abyss, that the structures of the given cannot be projected back 
onto their constituting conditions: "It is thus evident that the phenomena 
which are constitutive of time are as a matter of principle objectivities other 
than those constituted in time[.. ]Similarly, there can be no sense in saying of 
them that they are in the now, that they have been, that they are successive or 
simultaneous relative to one another. " (Husserl, 1964, quoted in Henry, 1990, 
p. 45) Consequently, Henry argues, Husserl is forced to maintain 
simultaneously two ultimately incompatible claims: that absolute 
transcendental consciousness is self-constituting, and that the unbridgeable 
divide between constituting and constituted effectively forecloses the 
possibility of the constituting synthesis ever being given as constituting. In 
other words, Husserl carefully traces the genesis of the given back to the 
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originary noetic syntheses of givenness, only to collapse the genesis of 
givenness qua givenness back into the realm of the given. 
For Henry, this circularity marks Husserl's signal failure to explain 
the putatively auto-constitutive or self-giving character of absolute 
transcendental consciousness. By continuously shifting back and forth 
between the phenomenologico-transcendental and the worldly-empirical 
perspective whenever he tries to account for the origination of the constituting 
synthesis as such, Husserl compromises the rigour of his own categorical 
distinction between the realm of constitutive phenomenality - transcendental 
temporalisation as givenness of the given- and the domain of the constituted 
phenomenon as that which is intra-temporally or empirically given. 
Moreover, as far as Henry is concerned, it is precisely because the business of 
transcendental phenomenology lies exclusively in uncovering the originary 
modalities of phenomenality according to the `how' of their 
phenomenalisation, rather than according to the manifested `what' as 
constituted phenomenon, that Husserl's inability to grasp the originary 
upsurge of givenness qua givenness indexes a fundamental phenomenological 
failure. 
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The Ur-Impression as Coincidence of Phenomenon and 
Phenomenality 
However, Henry maintains, the fact that Husserl's own account 
requires the origination of a perpetually renascent `now' in the appeal to an 
`Ur-impression' as something remaining heterogeneous to all consciousness 
of impression constituted as given through the `now', provides a clue to the 
authentically transcendental, sub-intentional condition for all ekstatico- 
intentional phenomenality: "Why impression is continuously there anew is 
something we have begun to understand: because nothing comes into being 
unless it be in the site wherein being first grasps itself in the pathos of its 
original Parousia. Because the origin is a pathos, because the latter is always 
in effect as such, nothing comes forth unless it be as an impression, which for 
that reason `is always there "' (Henry, ibid, p. 49) Thus, Henry argues, 
Husserl's phenomenology of internal-time consciousness simultaneously 
encounters its own unarticulated condition and glimpses the veritable 
ontological essence of phenomenalisation in the hypothesis of the `Ur- 
impression' as that which is irreducible to the consciousness of impression 
constituted in the present because `always already given'. For Henry, it is the 
erroneous paradigm of givenness as intentional constitution articulated 
through the three passive synthesis of transcendental temporalisation which 
,q 
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prevents Husserl from seeing in the Ur-impression that through which the 
self-givenness of transcendental consciousness itself comes to be constituted; 
the archi-originary but sub-intentional or non-ekstatic paradigm of givenness 
in which the `how' of givenness and the `what' which is given finally achieve 
perfect phenomenological co-incidence. Thus, Henry maintains, a proper 
phenomenological comprehension of the Ur-impression demands that it be 
understood not simply as a `something' that is impressed (a quid, a what, a 
phenomenon), but also as a self-impressing; as an impression coinciding with 
the `how' of impressionality per se; the sheer phenomenality or Being of the 
phenomenon. More precisely, Henry suggests, the Ur-impression must be 
understood in terms of the indivisible co-incidence of the ontological `how' 
and the ontic `what', givenness and given, phenomenality and phenomenon. 
The self-impressing proper to the Ur-impression, says Henry, is the self- 
givenness of the given in and through itself alone: pure phenomenological 
Being as absolute, self-constituting, auto-affection; a sub-intentional 
immanence subsisting in-itself and on the hither side of temporalised 
phenomenality, furnishing ekstasis with the living phenomenological 
substance for the phenomenality of the phenomenon. This non-punctual 
coincidence of givenness and given in the absolute Parousia of an eternally 
self-impressing but unrepresentable `living present' provides the timeless 
19 
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ontological `material' on the basis of which the passive syntheses of 
intentional consciousness effect their constitutively temporal articulation of 
phenomena. 
`The Historiality of the Absolute': Eternal Subjective Life 
Moreover, for Henry, in contrast to Heidegger, Husserl's inability to 
recognize the originary en-static essence of phenomenality cannot merely be 
the result of the failure to maintain a sufficiently rigorous distinction between 
ontological temporalisation and ontic temporality. According to Henry, 
Heidegger himself fails to recognize that the fundamental issue for 
phenomenology is no longer that of distinguishing between time and 
temporalisation, but that of acknowledging the radical asymmetry between 
temporalized and temporalising ekstasis on the one hand, and the atemporal 
enstasis that constitutes their essence on the other. The profound truth 
glimpsed by Husserl in the problematic of reduction, Henry suggests -one that 
Heidegger passed over inadvertently in his rejection of that problematic- , 
finds its authentic fulfilment in the recognition that, through the Ur- 
impression's absolute inherence-in-itself, ekstatic transcendence has, so to 
speak, `always already' been transcendentally reduced; excluded from the 
indivisible self-inherence of enstatic immanence. 
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Thus, for all its originality, Heidegger's attempt at grounding the 
transcendence of intentionality in ekstatico-horizonal projection, Henry 
insists, merely replays the Husserlian amphiboly of conditioning 
phenomenality and conditioned phenomenon through which the ontological 
essence of temporalising phenomenality is apprehended on the basis of the 
temporal phenomenon, and the former reinvested with all the features of the 
latter. In the final analysis, Henry argues, both the noetico-noematic 
transcendence-in-i münane nce characteristic of the intentional structure of pure 
transcendental consciousness, and the horizonal projection of Dasein's 
standing-outside-itself are ultimately species of ek-stasis: "How can one fail 
to notice that[... J 'being-in' consciousness as intentional inherence already 
designates nothing other than the `There' of that `outside' which the notion of 
Dasein seeks to think - how can one not notice that, far from being different in 
the two cases, the sense of the word `being', of the `sein' in Bewußt-sein and 
in Da-sein, insofar as it tries to designate phenomenality as such, is precisely 
the same? " (Ibid. p. 109) 
Subsisting `beneath' temporal ekstasis then for Henry lies its 
authentically non-temporal ontological condition; enstatic auto-affection as 
"the irremissible, unsurpassable and irrefrangible embracing of life by itself, 
embrace in which there is no divide because the how of life's self-giving is 
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neither Ek-stasis nor its endless production, but rather precisely this passivity 
which remains fundamentally alien to Ek-stasis, enduring [le souffrir] as self- 
enduring of life in every point of its being: Impression. " (ibid., p. 57) But 
Impression as absolute affectivity, as hyperpassivity, is in turn the ontological 
essence of the sub-jektum; auto-affectivity is constitutively subjective: "This 
originary self-givenness of givenness is the self-feeling [le s'eprouver soi- 
meme] of absolute subjectivity, which is to say subjectivity itself as such[.. ]In 
the self-feeling of absolute subjectivity original Ipseity is born, the Self-same 
grasped in its internal possibility, to which every `self', even the most 
external, secretly refers. "(Ibid, p. 74) 
Consequently, for Henry, not only is phenomenological subjectivation 
- contra Heidegger- not ndmentally finite on account of its ekstatico- 
temporal constitution; the ontological essence of subjectivity turns out to be 
atemporal and eternal at its very phenomenological root. Yet, because it can 
only be characterised as indifferent to the metaphysical opposition between 
the immutability of the eternal and the mutability of the temporal, auto- 
affecting Life must be understood as changeless precisely by virtue of its 
ever-changing-ness, so that, as Henry writes "When originary sensation 
withdraws, there is something that does not withdraw, and that is, we say, its 
essence as auto-affection of life. What remains is thus not like some 
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unchanging substance in the midst of universal passing away, like a stone at 
the bottom of the river -it is the historiality of the absolute [l'historial de 
l'absolu], the eternal coming into itself of life. Because this coming never 
ceases surging forth, that which remains is change, not dehiscence and 
escape outside itself at every instant but that which, on the contrary, in the 
feeling of itself and as the implosion of that feeling, attains to itself, grasps 
itself, increases itself frort üs own being. "(Ibid, p. 55) 
So, underlying ekstatic finitude, according to Henry, but on the hither 
side of the metaphysical antagonism between being and becoming, lies the 
immutable mutability of enstatic Life in the unrepresentable plenitude of its 
eternal increase. That movement of increase, in its unreifiable metastasis, 
constitutes temporalisation's radically enstatic `kinematicity', its originary, 
non-spatio-temporal essence, and it is this non-spatio-temporal kinematicity 
which is cryptically characterised by Henry -perhaps by way of an oblique 
allusion to Heidegger- in terms of the `historiality' of absolute impression's 
perpetual self-impressing. 
Now, the precise conceptual lineaments of Henry's philosophical 
relation to Heidegger are far too complex for us to delve into in any detail 
here. We shall, however, note the definite phenomenological link between the 
`always already' of auto-affectivity as non-spatio-temporal -but nevertheless, 
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according to Henry, historialising- essence of subjectivation, and what 
Heidegger in Being and Time designates as that dimension of `attunement' 
(Gestimmtheit; Stimmung) or `pre-disposition' (Befindlichkleit) which is a 
constitutive component for the `historial' (Geschichtlichkeit) character of 
Dasein's temporalized subjectivation. That link is important because the 
unilateral asymmetry in terms of which Henry describes the relation between 
the immanent reality of enstasis and the transcendent ideality of ekstasis is 
clearly neither that of a straightforwardly metaphysical opposition, nor one 
coordinated according to an order of merely logical priority. Enstasis is 
always indissociably constitutive of ekstasis (although clearly, the reverse is 
certainly not true). 
More fundamentally, it seems to us that Henry wishes to root Dasein's 
unobjectifiable transcendence as site for the non-latency (a-letheia) of Being 
as spatialising-temporalising `clearing' (Lichtung), in a dimension of 
unobjectifiable immanence concomitant with Being's archi-originary latency, 
with the invisibility of that self-forgetfulness63 which is constitutive of 
Being's enstatic kinematicity. In other words, Henry wishes to root the 
finitude of Dasein's ekstatico-horizonal project (and a fortiori, the 
philosophically contestable privilege accorded by Heidegger to Dasein's 
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intrinsically futural orientation in the Ur-ekstasis of Being-unto-death), in the 
eternal pre-disposition of Affect as absolute immanence of Dasein's `always 
already'; its radically unretainable and unrepresentable past. 
Immanence/Transcendence: Two Versions of the 
Unobjectifiable 
Thus, underlying all ekstatic phusys within what Heidegger calls `the 
openness of the open' -that openness which coincides with Being's bestowal 
of presencing yet which is also inseparably conterminous with Being's auto- 
occluding withdrawal, its self-withholding as unobj ectifiable transcendence- 
and subtending even the unobjectifiable withdrawal through which ekstasis is 
dispensed, Henry discerns enstatic immanence -the radically subjective root 
of phenomenality-in-itself- as that which has always already withdrawn from 
constituted presence. But even this formulation is misleading. For, as we said 
above, it is clearly not the case that enstasis and ekstasis can be contrasted as 
if they were two distinct metaphysical principles, with the former underlying 
the latter. If the unrepresentable immanence of enstasis constitutes the 
unobj ectifiable essence of phenomenality, then it thereby also constitutes the 
unobjectifiable transcendence of ekstatic presencing. Thus, the withdrawal of 
63"Life is forgetful by nature, as immanence, which insurmountably expels ek-stasis and thus all 
possible forms of thought. "(Henry, 1993, p. 211) 
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ekstatic transcendence has the withdrawal of enstatic immanence at its root: 
they are distinct but indiscernible. And it is in terms of this distinction of 
indiscernibles that the unilateral asymmetry previously alluded to must be 
understood. Unobjectifiable transcendence distinguishes itself from 
unobjectifiable immanence without the latter distinguishing itself from the 
former in return. The fact that the essence of presencing, in its enstatic 
immanence, has always already withdrawn from presence, constitutes and 
explains that originary self-withholding through which ekstatic 
transcendence withdraws from all constituted presence64. 
Consequently, what we will specifically retain from Henry's critique 
of Husserl and Heidegger is this radical phenomenological reworking of the 
transcendental distinction between real and ideal in terms of the indiscernible 
difference between enstasis and ekstasis. Where Henry's phenomenological 
predecessors situated that difference between phenomenon and 
phenomenality, time and temporalisation, Henry now rearticulates it as 
obtaining between two distinct but necessarily indiscernible instances of 
64Laruelle's reading of Heidegger in Les Philosophies de la Difference is particularly notable for the 
way in which it ascribes a version of this very thesis to Heidegger himself, albeit with the crucial 
proviso that, according to Laruelle's reconstruction, it is precisely because the unobjectifiability of 
enstasis is a function of the phenomenon of the Da as `that being which is in each case mine' rather 
than of its phenomenality as rooted in the Sein, that the immanence of the former can constitute the 
real, non-ontological essence of the latter as ideal ontological ekstasis. Thus, it is by situating 
unobjectifiable immanence on the side of the entity or the `Da', rather than that of its Being, that 
Laruelle implicitly sides with what he -at least in Les Philosophies de la Difference - decides to call 
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unobjectifiability; two radically incommensurable yet phenomenologically 
inseparable forms of the withdrawal from reified presence: that of ideal, 
ekstatic transcendence, and that of real, enstatic immanence65. Moreover, it is 
Henry's rigorously phenomenological and transcendental -rather than 
speculative and metaphysical- redefinition of the 'in-itself' s radically 
immanent sub jektum, eternally withdrawn from intentional illumination, that 
Laruelle will draw on in his critique of materiological thinking even as he 
subjects the notion of radical immanence to a thoroughly critical, and non- 
phenomenological, process of purification. 
The Phenomenological Idealisation of Immanence 
Thus, whilst crediting Henry with a rigorously argued 
demonstration of the way in which unobjectifiable transcendence presupposes 
unobjectifiable immanence, Laruelle maintains that Henry's 
phenomenologisation of immanence, his identification of it with absolute 
auto-affection, immediately compromises the radicality of Henry's own 
discovery. The hyperbolic66 pathos of Henry's characterisations of radical 
Heidegger's `transcendental realism' against what he takes to be the latent transcendental idealism in 
Henry's ontologisation of immanence. Cf. Laruelle, 1986, esp. Chapters 3 and 4; pp. 55-120 
65Although, as we shall shortly see, Henry's rearticulation of the transcendental difference partially 
reiterates the structural amphiboly between given and givenness, constituted and constituting, condition 
and conditioned, which Henry himself had criticized in his phenomenological predecessors. 
66Interestingly enough, in Henry's post-Heideggerean phenomenology of radical immanence as well as 
in Levinas's post-Heideggerean phenomenology of radical transcendence, the pathos of the hyperbolic 
is inextricable from the apophantic logic of the phenomenon `as such'. Consequently, those 
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immanence (the absolutisation of subjectivity, the transcendentalising of 
Affectivity, the ultra-phenomenological vitalism) is in fact concomitant with 
Henry's philosophical Decision to ontologise immanence. For by identifying 
immanence with ontological auto-affection, Laruelle argues, Henry 
surreptitiously re-idealises it: he re-envelops the phenomenon of immanence 
`itself in the insidious transcendence proper to the phenomenality of 
immanence `as such'. However, in order to rescue the baby of radical 
immanence from the sullied phenomenological bathwater of auto-affection, 
we require a fuller understanding of those underlying philosophical 
mechanisms responsible for Henry's idealization. 
Henry's phenomenological idealization of immanence has two 
aspects: one ideological or superstructural; the other substantive or 
infrastructural. The former aspect is indexed by the glaringly arbitrary 
character of Henry's decision to identify `materiality' with `affectivity'; an 
apparently gratuitous identification which remains deeply unconvincing by 
any philosophical standards, not just Laruelle's. For it certainly seems 
difficult to reconcile Henry's claim to be the initiator of a `material 
phenomenology' with such an otherwise classically idealist philosopheme as 
phenomenological conservatives (Husserlian fundamentalists) militating for a return to a rational 
phenomenological sobriety against the rigorously pathological radicalism of thinkers 
like Henry and 
Levinas, attacking the latter on the grounds that they are `just exaggerating', or `excessively 
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the above cited absolutisation of subjectivity, or with the more or less 
explicitly religious tenor of Henry's characterisation of Life as eternal 
subjective Pathos67. One cannot help feeling that, in the process of `de- 
substantialisation' and `de-hylification', `matter' has become so thoroughly 
and successfully spiritualised by Henry that there is no longer anything 
remotely `physical' left about it. Perhaps this is Henry's goal. For after this 
remainderless phenomenologisation of matter, the materialist hypothesis of an 
unphenomenologisable dimension of reality becomes effectively ruled out of 
court as an instance of pre-philosophical dogmatism. Thus, through a tour de 
force of tactical manoeuvring, Henry's pre-emptive idealization of matter robs 
the materialist wishing to contest the transcendental privileging of 
subjectivity of a fundamental resource in his agon with phenomenological 
idealism: the appeal to an a priori unphenomenologisable physical reality68 
This surreptitious phenomenological imperialism renders it difficult to 
escape the feeling that there is something singularly disingenuous in Henry's 
choice of the term `material phenomenology' to describe his philosophical 
project; a flagrant quid pro quo which can only confirm the fears of those 
hyperbolic', are typically missing the point. It may well be that phenomenological thought is 
constitutively pathological. 
67The fact that Henry has recently published a book entitled C'est moi la verite. Pour une philosophie 
du christianisme [I am the truth. For a philosophy of Christianity ] (Paris: Seuil, 1996), hardly comes 
as a great surprise. 
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who suspect that phenomenology's presumptuous relegation of all physical 
science to the `naive' realm of the natural attitude is invariably a prelude to 
the most disastrous varieties of anthropocentric idealism. Physicists, 
biologists, cosmologists, and other benighted denizens of the natural attitude 
may be forgiven for greeting with incredulity the revelation that `materiality' 
in its ultimate ontological essence, far from having anything to do with 
particle collisions, DNA, or spiral nebulae, is in fact synonymous with Eternal 
Subjective Life. Coupled with this (typically phenomenological) 
transcendentalisation of subjective Affect, Henry's decision to equate `Life' 
with `Matter' not only seems more than a little ad hoc; at a more profound 
level, it seems to us to be indicative of the manner in which the expression 
`material phenomenology' is doomed to remain forever oxymoronic on 
account of deep-rooted methodological assumptions intrinsic to the 
phenomenological enterprise as such; assumptions operating entirely 
independently of Henry's own superficial ideological prejudices69. 
68Cf. our earlier comments concerning the parochial, dubiously intuitionistic character of the 
phenomenological conception of `phenomenality' in our Introduction, supra, pp. 24-27. 
69Thus, anti-scientific prejudices of the most wearyingly familiar kind certainly play a fairly central 
role in the contempt Henry displays toward any suggestion that the physical sciences may have 
something to contribute to our philosophical understanding of materiality. And while he dismisses as 
"barbarism" the "belief that scientific knowledge constitutes the unique form of genuine, veridical, 
objective knowledge" (Henry, "Ce que la science ne sait pas" in La Recherche, 208, March 1989, pp. 
422-426; quoted in Schmid, 1998), Henry seems entirely oblivious to the manner in which a `material 
phenomenology' carried out in flagrant disregard of everything that the physical sciences have to teach 
about matter may in fact be tantamount to a form of intellectual barbarism. 
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In this particular case, the methodological assumptions underlying this 
phenomenological idealization of immanence have their substantive root, 
their infrastructural basis, in the structure of the philosophical Decision 
through which Henry articulates his phenomenologisation of matter. In fact, 
the unilateral asymmetry governing the relation between enstatic immanence 
and ekstatic transcendence belies a particularly complex triadic structure, 
which we shall come to recognize as characteristic of all philosophical 
Decision as far as Laruelle is concerned70. For we have to bear in mind that, 
according to Henry, immanence is at once absolute, indivisible, autonomous; 
and coordinated with the dyadic distinction which it composes as constituting 
term reciprocally articulated with the constituted counterpart. Thus, enstatic 
auto-affection simultaneously constitutes, on the one hand, an absolutely 
relationless, self-inhering invisibility; and on the other, the relation between 
the invisible essence of appearing and its visible ek-sistence. It is at once the 
self-constituting, invisible, essence of phenomenality; and the dyadic 
coupling composed by the constitutive invisibility of phenomena and their 
constituted visibility. As a result, the invisible-in-itself as radical immanence 
or absolute Indivision is surreptitiously sub-divided by the relation between 
the visible and the invisible as a transcendent dyad or Division. 
70Cf. infra, Chapter 5, pp. 218-230. 
Im 
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The Relative Absolute 
Consequently, what Henry initially presents as a strictly unilateral 
asymmetry between the absolute self-inherence of radical immanence and the 
relative, ekstatic exteriority of transcendence, actually presupposes an 
ultimately bi-lateral symmetry, a reciprocal co-respondence between absolute 
and relative, immanence and transcendence. The fact that, for Henry, enstasis 
has to absolve itself from ekstasis, even as it constitutes the latter, renders it 
relative to ekstasis once again. For even in excluding transcendence from 
itself through its absolute self-inherence, immanence has to relate to it 
precisely as that which it must exclude in order to achieve its absolute self- 
inherence. Absolute immanence bears a latent, implicitly constitutive 
reference to transcendence within itself by very virtue of the fact that it expels 
it. As a result, Henry's phenomenology of absolute immanence does not 
succeed in interrupting the quintessentially philosophical (or quasi-Hegelian) 
circle that always posits the relation of relation (transcendence) and non- 
relation (immanence); the ultimate relativity of absolute and relative. 
Crucially, it is in order to dispense once and for all with this 
pernicious residue of ultimate relativity in the very notion of `absolute' 
immanence, that Laruelle will invoke an immanence whose radicality resides 
in its foreclosure or indifference -rather than exclusion or opposition- to all 
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those instances of dyadic coupling which are variations on the originary dyad 
of immanence/transcendence: thinkable/unthinkable; absolute/relative; 
unilateral/bilateral; asymmetry/symmetry; identity/difference, and so on. If 
immanence is to be truly radical rather than absolute, Laruelle argues, then it 
can be neither thinkable nor unthinkable; nor even the differance between the 
thinkable and the unthinkable; it can only be that which is simply foreclosed 
or indifferent to the dyad thinkable/unthinkable, without that foreclosure 
becoming retroactively constitutive of its immanence. In other words, 
Laruelle insists, our nominal definition or characterisation of immanence in 
terms of its foreclosure to all forms of dyadic Decision is in no way 
constitutive of immanence qua immanence. It is not our description of 
immanence as indifferent that constitutes it as indifferent. To suggest the 
contrary is, for Laruelle, to relapse into idealism: it is to maintain that thought 
is always co-constitutive of the real. Thus, if radical immanence is real, it 
must remain indifferent to our characterisations. And it is that radical 
indifference which guarantees that our definitions can be entirely adequate 
(albeit only in the last instance) to immanence without somehow becoming 
constitutive or determining it. We shall return to these crucial points in 
Chapter 5. For the time being, suffice it to say that if immanence is foreclosed 
to the dyadic articulation or differance between the thinkable and the 
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unthinkable, this is not the same as saying that it resists it, expels it, or is 
otherwise obliged to absolve itself from that dyadic distinction. On the 
contrary, Laruelle insists, immanence's radical autonomy lets the dyad subsist 
by allowing it its own relative autonomy? 1. 
Thinkable/Unthinkable 
The impenetrable opacity of Henry's absolute immanence, by way of 
contrast, is that which, by unilaterally absolving itself from the dilatory 
transcendence of ekstatic differentiation, effectively crushes dyadic couplings 
such as those of being/becoming, phenomenon/phenomenality; 
thought/unthought. Its absolute, unrepresentable immediacy forcibly 
compresses the terms coupled together through dyadic mediation, flattening 
them onto one another at the point of their indivisible, enstatic coincidence; 
crushing them together in their absolute immediation. Most importantly for 
our present purposes, in absolving itself from mediation through the dyadic 
articulation thinkable/unthinkable, enstatic immediacy ultimately becomes 
co-constituted by it: the absolute immediation of the dyad 
thinkable/unthinkable requires that, for Henry, immanence be thinkable as 
unthinkable and unthinkable as thinkable. The result is idealism. In other 
words, the determination of the ideal (i. e. thought) by the real (i. e. 
71 Cf. infra, Chapter 5, pp. 248-251. 
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immanence) is secured only through that of the real (immanence) by the ideal 
(thought). Henry's absolute immanence is constituted as unthinkable through 
thought, just as thought or the thinkable is constituted through unthinkable 
immanence. 
A consideration of Henry's reconstruction72 of Descartes' proto- 
phenomenological reduction in the Meditations should help clarify this point. 
In that reconstruction, Henry suggests that a transcendental distinction 
between the dubitability of constituted appearance and the indubitability of its 
sheer appearing, its originary phenomenality, is crystallized in Descartes' "At 
certe videre videor" ("At the very least, it seems to me that I see"), wherein 
the videor, that originary upsurge of seeming which is irreducible to the seen, 
figures for Cartesian phenomenology as the self-appearing of appearances, the 
enstatic self-sensing of thought which remains invisible and unthinkable in 
the ekstatic exteriority of intentional representation: "Thought's primal 
sensing, the sentimus nos videre (i. e. the self-sensing that originally presents 
thought to itself and makes it what it is, appearance 's self-appearing) is 
radically opposed to the sensing that rules seeing, hearing, touching, and 
even understanding /insofar as it is a seeing, intueri); it is opposed to 
transcendental seeing in general, which inhabits all these determinations and 
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has its essence in ek-stasis. Thought's essential self-sensing is not merely 
different from ek-static sensing; it excludes it, and precisely this exclusion 
determines the concept of immediacy. " (Henry, 1993, p. 22). 
According to Henry then, enstatic immediacy at once constitutes 
thought's absolutely immediate self-sensing, the transcendental element 
within which thought has `always already' begun to think; yet it is 
simultaneously unthinkable precisely insofar as it constitutes consciousness' 
unrepresentable, unintelligible grasping of itself. Consequently, the enstatic 
essence or originary phenomenality of thinking is simultaneously qualified by 
Henry as inhering constitutively in all thought, as the essence of the thinkable, 
through which thought has always already begun thinking; but also as 
constitutively unthinkable, as utterly recalcitrant to exposure in the ekstatic 
realm of intentional cogitation, Yet that unthinkability is thought through the 
thinking it has made possible; just as thought `is' through its unthinkable 
ontological essence. And although the enstatic immanence of thought's self- 
sensing is the absolute immediation of the transcendent distinction between 
the thinkable and the unthinkable, that absolute immediation, that self- 
sensing, subsists in and as thought: it both constitutes thought's self-sensing 
essence as immediate coincidence of thinkable and unthinkable; but is also 
72Cf. Henry, 1993, esp. Ch. 1, pp. 11-40. The discussion of Descartes continues through Chapters 2& 
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inseparable from, and ultimately co-constituted by, the intentional thinking or 
`transcendental seeing' within which the dyadic distinction between thinkable 
and unthinkable subsists. The result is that, for Henry, thinking is 
simultaneously something separate and inseparable from auto-affection; 
immanence is both thinkable and unthinkable. Moreover, it is thinkable as 
unthinkable, as self-sensing of thought; while its unthinkable essence 
constitutes the essence of the thinkable as `transcendental seeing'. 
Immanence `itself' or Immanence `as such'? 
What are we to conclude then from Henry's characterisation of radical 
immanence as absolute immediation of the thinkable and the unthinkable? 
This primarily: that auto-affecting immanence as enstatic immediacy of the 
thinkable and the unthinkable, absolving itself from the dyadic distinction 
between thinkable and unthinkable, engenders a quasi-absolute idealism of 
auto-affection wherein the `reality' of enstatic immediacy is only separable as 
real through its ideal inseparability from the transcendence of ekstatic 
mediation. In other words, real immanence is posited as absolutely separate 
through its inseparability from the transcendent ideality of thought; 
conversely, thought's transcendent positing is putatively constituted through 
the absolute separation of real immanence. In the final analysis, real 
3, pp. 41-102. 
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immanence is obliged to absolve itself from ideal transcendence by 
transcendent means. Thus, Henry's phenomenological immanence is posited 
as the absolute immediation of given and givenness; it is posited as absolute 
in virtue of a transcendent Decision through which the unilateral asymmetry 
between enstatic immediation and ekstatic mediation is surveyed from above, 
seen from a viewpoint of transcendent exteriority and circumscribed within an 
encompassing reversibility, an ultimately bi-lateral symmetry73. 
This is the price to be paid for the ontologisation of immanence. 
Immanence affects itself in order to phenomenalise itself, but through that 
auto-phenomenalisation, it is the phenomenality of immanence `as such', 
rather than the phenomenon of immanence `itself' that is manifested. 
Moreover, we have seen how this ontological idealisation of immanence has 
its source in Henry's phenomenologically motivated elision of the 
transcendental separation between the comme tel and the tel quel, thought and 
thing, description and constitution; a refusal which leads him to construe 
immanence as consisting in the auto-affecting `immediation' of 
73Although implicit critiques of Henry abound throughout Laruelle's Philosophie II, an explicit non- 
philosophical critique of Henry's philosophy of radical immanence does not appear in Laruelle's work 
until Philosophie III, in Principes de la non Philosophie (1996). Moreover, although the main points 
of our critique here draw on certain features of Laruelle's analysis there, we have not attempted to 
reiterate it any detail because of its considerable non-philosophical technicality. Cf. Laruelle, 1996, pp. 
116-125; 133-143; 228-231. 
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phenomenality and phenomenon; thought and thing; description and 
constitution. 
It is in terms of this phenomenological elision that we can understand 
Henry's attempt to trace the ekstatic distinction of thought and thing back to 
its veritable phenomenological condition in the indivisible enstatic 
coincidence of phenomenality and phenomenon, thinking and being; and his 
invocation of the asymmetry between their enstatic coincidence and their 
ekstatic distinction. It is this attempt to root transcendence in immanence, 
ekstasis in enstasis, through the absolutisation of the latter, which leads to an 
idealism of auto-affecting immanence; to the absolute ideality of an 
immanence which posits itself for itself through its own transcendent other 
(ekstasis). Henry conflates the phenomenon of immanence as radically 
separate (but separate-without- separation) and foreclosed to transcendence, 
with the phenomenality of immanence as absolute distinction that repels 
transcendence. The latter leads to an absolutisation of immanence through the 
expulsion of transcendence, but an absolutisation which merely reinforces the 
reciprocal co-dependence between immanence and transcendence; a 
reciprocity inscribed within the intrinsically circular structure of philosophical 
Decision as relation of relation and non-relation. 
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By way of contrast to Henry's ontologisation of absolute immanence 
as immanence-to-itself -a self-relation concomitant with the 
phenomenological idealization of immanence `as such', wherein the `to' 
indexes the enstatic immediation of immanence's self-inherence-, Laruelle's 
Principe de Minorite invokes a phenomenon of immanence which is 
"positively devoid [.. ] of relation to... self. This new immanence can be said to 
be ontic or real. Ontic, and not ontico-ontological: the objective entity, the 
one which appears as an object, is an ontico-ontological hybrid [mixte], and 
it is usually this hybrid which is mistakenly confused with the entity. " 
(Laruelle, 1981, p. 125) Moreover, it is in terms of the unobjectifiable 
immanence proper to the phenomenon of immanence 'itself, rather than that 
ontico-ontological hybridisation of phenomenon and phenomenality, real and 
ideal, associated with the phenomenality of immanence `as such', that we 
must seek the identity proper to the phenomenon of matter itself; a radically 
immanent identity which is separate (yet without-separation) from that 
process of ontological idealization whereby it is confused with the 
phenomenological hybridisation of phenomenon and phenomenality. 
Thus, Laruelle's non-phenomenological radicalisation of the 
separation between thought and thing, phenomenon and phenomenality, 
comme tel and tel quel, wilt necessitate a reconceptualisation of unilateral 
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asymmetry wherein immanence's radical autonomy neither constitutes nor 
excludes, but rather gives-without-givenness transcendence's relative 
autonomy; a non-phenomenological giving which will transform the bilateral 
correspondence between immanence and transcendence into an Identity 
without synthesis or unity, and a Duality without distinction or difference74. 
Instead of the idealism of Henry's bilateral correspondence between 
immanence and transcendence; instead of the circle of auto-position whereby 
the indivisible immediacy of phenomenon and phenomenality simultaneously 
constitutes and is constituted by the mediating division through which it is 
determined as immediate; Laruelle's non-phenomenological radicalisation 
aims at a separation whereby a phenomenon-without-phenomenality 
unilaterally determines the Decisional or phenomenological mixture of 
phenomenon and phenomenality; and the Real as given-without-givenness 
unilaterally determines the Ideal self-positing circle of given and givenness; 
the Ideal self-giving by brid of real and ideal. 
A fuller account of the precise ramifications of Laruelle's position - 
specifically of the initially baffling description of radical immanence as 
`separate-without-separation'- will have to wait until Chapters 5 and 6. 
Nevertheless, we are now in a position to understand how Henry's `material 
74Once again, this is an anticipatory, but for the time being rather obscure, contrast. Further 
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phenomenology' instantiates the three structural amphibolies in terms of 
which we characterised materiological thinking in the previous chapter75: it 
deliberately synthesizes the real phenomenon of immanence `itself with the 
ideal phenomenality of immanence `as such'; it substitutes an ultimately 
bilateral co-determination of the ontologically ideal and the ontically real for 
the strictly unilateral determination of the ideal by the real; finally, it roots the 
unobjectifiable transcendence of ekstasis in the unobjectifiable immanence of 
enstasis only to render the ontological absolutisation of the latter 
constitutively inseparable from the former. 
Thus, Henry confuses the unrepresentability of Being qua absolute 
immediation of giveness and given, phenomenality and phenomenon; with 
that of the Real as given-without-givenness, phenomenon-without- 
phenomenality. Consequently, although by invoking Being's unrepresentable 
exteriority vis a vis ekstatic intentionality, Henry's `material phenomenology' 
proposes a non-metaphysical radicalisation of the Marxist thesis asserting 
Being's exteriority to thought, it is able to do the former only insofar as it has 
characterised Being in terms of the enstatic immediation of phenomenon and 
phenomenality. Yet we have seen how, far from vouchsafing the radical 
separation of real and ideal, their enstatic immediation indexes an idealism of 
clarification will be provided in Chapters 6 and 7. 
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ontological auto-affection. In fact, Henry's `material phenomenology' merely 
supplants classical metaphysical materiology, such as that of Marxism for 
instance, with a transcendental materiology. For as Laruelle points out, the 
Marxist thesis of the exteriority of Being to thought is itself the result of an 
idealist elision of the distinction between the entity `as such' and the entity 
'itself, a confusion of the entity with its Being and of the real with the ideal: 
"Being never opposes itself to thought, the problem does not arise, it is the 
real that is capable of opposing itself to those forms of ideality=of being=of 
presence wherein one must include thought. " (Laruelle, 1981, p. 78) In other 
words, whereas the vulgar versions of Marxist materialism posit the 
exteriority of Being to thought at an entirely empirical or ontic level, on the 
basis of a `weak' or empiricist interpretation and critique of the Parmenidean 
axiom76 for which Hegel and Heidegger, albeit in their very different ways, 
provide a `strong' or quasi-transcendental reading; Henry posits Being's 
`exteriority' as transcendental vis a vis the realm of intentional ekstasis, but 
does so in terms of the enstatic immediation of thinking and Being. Thus, 
whereas the pre-Heideggerean variants of materialism remain materiological 
75Cf. supra, Ch. 1, pp. 59-61. 
76Usually rendered in English as "It is the same thing to think and to be". The identity-in-difference of 
thought and being posited by Parmenides is interpreted by Hegel in terms of the becoming-substance of 
subject and the becoming-subject of substance through the self-sundering, self-synthesizing Notion; 
while Heidegger for his part interprets it in terms of the originary Austrag or Unterschied through 
97 
on account of an empiricist failure to recognize the ontico-ontological -which 
is to say, quasi-transcendental- status of the difference between ideal and real, 
phenomenality and phenomenon, thought and thing; for Laruelle, post- 
Heideggerean materiologies such as that of Henry operate on the basis of a 
quasi-Hegelian `sublation' (releve) of that difference. 
Nowhere is the immense power of this `sublation' better exemplified 
than in the explicitly anti-phenomenological materialism promulgated in 
Deleuze's work (both with and without Guattari). Significantly in this regard, 
Laruelle's Principe de Minorite contains a powerful but indirect critique of 
Deleuze's `machinic' materialism. The latter, Laruelle argues77 "consummates 
the logico-transcendental and synthetic tendency contained within 
Kantianism. Nietzsche 's four or five fundamental theses (identity of force and 
of differential relation; identity of force and of the subject of force; identity of 
force and of its effects, etc. ) provide the basis for an absolute hyletics 
[hyletique absolue] which remains the hyletic form of absolute idealism. It is 
along this filiation that we find the ultimate avatar of the Man-machine, albeit 
which thinking is `enowned' to Being and Being `enowned' to thought. For a discussion of the way in 
which non-philosophy suspends the Parmenidean axiom, cf. infra, Chapter 5, pp. 259-263. 
77The reader should bear in mind that here as throughout almost all his writings, Laruelle deliberately 
indiscerns Nietzsche and Deleuze, so that whenever he says `Nietzsche', he also means `Deleuze', and 
vice versa. This is more than capricious indolence or lack of scholarly rigour on Laruelle's part. Since 
the Deleuze-Nietzsche tandem is used by Laruelle to index a specific variety of philosophical Decision, 
which is to say, a transcendentally rather than historically determined set of abstract conceptual 
structures -a system of a priori syntactical invariants rather than a historically identifiable body of 
doctrine- the proper names `Nietzsche and `Deleuze' are used by him indifferently. Cf. in this regard 
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an obviously non-mechanistic one, that of the generalised industrial machine 
and of the cog-man [l'homme-rouage] (in a non-metaphorical sense), that of 
`desiring-machines', and of the `mach_in_ic' as synthesis of hyletic syntheses, 
re-affirmation of the affirmation of relations of force, etc[.. J. "(Laruelle, 
1981, p. 79) 
The next chapter will set out a detailed examination of Deleuze's 
work, and specifically of his collaborations with Guattari, in order to try and 
clarify Laruelle's oblique critique of what he designates here as the `hyletic 
form of absolute idealism', and to show how, in spite of Deleuze & Guattari's 
virulently anti-phenomenological stance, the Decisional structure of their 
machinic materialism reinstantiates those three instances of materiological 
amphiboly identified earlier in the context of Henry's phenomenology. 
We shall proceed in two stages. We will first set out the 
preconditions for Deleuze & Guattari's materialist transvaluation of the 
transcendental in the Deleuzean critique of representation. Then we will try 
to show why Laruelle believes the price to be paid for Deleuze & Guattari's 
`machinic constructivism' -matter's becoming-thought and thought's 
becoming-matter within an all encompassing hyletic continuum- is ultimately 
a kind of absolute hyletic idealism. 
the `User's Guide' to Laruelle's Philosophies of Difference (Laruelle, 1986, pp. 5-14), wherein the 
99 
rationale for this flagrantly anti-scholastic methodology is explained. 
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CHAPTER 3 
DELEUZE & GUATTARI: ABSOLUTE 
HYLETICS 
Materializing the Transcendental 
The initiating gesture of Deleuze & Guattari's philosophical project 
consists precisely in the attempt to effect a materialist transvaluation of the 
transcendental. In Anti-Oedipus the relation between `deleuzoguattarian' 
schizo-analysis and the Kantian Critical apparatus is explicitly addressed: "In 
what he called the Critical revolution, Kant set out to discover criteria that 
were immanent to knowledge so as to distinguish a legitimate and illegitimate 
use of the syntheses of consciousness. In the name of a transcendental 
philosophy (immanence of the criteria) he denounced the transcendent use of 
these syntheses such as it appeared in metaphysics. In the same way, we must 
say that psychoanalysis possesses its own metaphysics, to wit, Oedipus. And 
that a revolution, but this time a materialist one, can only proceed through 
the critique of Oedipus and by denouncing the illegitimate use of the 
syntheses of the unconscious as revealed in Oedipal psychoanalysis, in such a 
way as to rediscover a transcendental unconscious defined through the 
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immanence of its criteria, along with a corresponding practise of 
schizoanalysis. " (Deleuze & Guattari, 1972, p. 89) 78 
Underlying this libidinal-materialist appropriation is the Deleuzean 
claim that, as far as the empirical realm is concerned, the business of a 
genuinely critical transcendentalism lies in articulating real conditions of 
ontological actuality rather than ideal conditions of epistemological 
possibility. Transcendental philosophy requires the critique of representation 
rather than its legitimation. Thus, for Deleuze, the transcendental is not a 
substantive philosophical thesis affirming the subordination of objectivity to 
subjectivity, ontology to epistemology, but rather a polymorphic method 
wherein subjectivity and objectivity are suspended as equivocal, pre- 
philosophical categories and immanence becomes the operative functional 
criterion. In order to clarify the full philosophical import of these claims, 
however, let's briefly recapitulate the Deleuzean critique of representation as 
set out in Difference and Repetition (1968) and The Logic of Sense (1969). 
781n upholding the rights of transcendental immanence against the claims of metaphysical 
transcendence, Deleuze & Guattari accord explicitly with the strictures set out by Kant: "We shall 
entitle the principles whose application is confined entirely within the limits of possible experience, 
immanent; and those, on the other hand, which profess to pass beyond those limits, 
transcendent[ ]Thus, transcendental and transcendent are not interchangeable terms. 
The principles of 
pure understanding which we have set out above, allow only of empirical, and not of transcendental 
employment, that is, employment extending beyond the limits of experience. A principle, on the other 
handd, which takes away these limits, or even commands us actually to transgress them, is called 
transcendent. If our criticism can succeed in disclosing the illusion in these alleged principles, then 
even these principles which are merely of empirical employment may be calledd, in opposition to the 
others, immanent principles of the pure understanding. " (Kant, 1929, A295-296/B352-353, p. 299). 
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The Deleuzean Critique of Representation 
Already in Difference and Repetition and The Logic of Sense Deleuze 
is explicitly striving to liberate a rigorously transcendental but sub- 
representational realm from what he takes to be the extraneous and 
transcendent set of phenomenological theses with which it had been saddled 
by Kant and Husserl. Against both, Deleuze argues that "The error of all 
efforts to determine the transcendental as consciousness is that they think of 
the transcendental in the image of, and in the resemblance to, that which it is 
supposed to ground. " (Deleuze, 1990, p. 105) A rigorously immanent 
deployment of the transcendental problematic, Deleuze maintains, should 
transform it into a philosophical method capable of suspending every 
remnant of transcendent empirical presupposition. Those presuppositions are 
grounded and spuriously legitimated, Deleuze argues, in the apparatus of 
representation, with its four cardinal hinges: identity in the concept, 
opposition in the predicate, analogy in judgement, and resemblance in 
intuition79. These representational `collars' at once shackle thought and 
predetermine the parameters of possible experience, confining philosophy 
within the bounds of a categorial grid excluding the anomalous and 
uncategorisable incidences of difference unsubordinated by conceptual 
79Cf. Deleuze, 1994, for instance pp. 29-35; pp. 137-138. 
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identity, external to the form of opposition, independent of analogy in 
judgement, and unrecognisable by intuition. Moreover, the representational 
grid staked out by these categorial syntheses is itself ultimately grounded in 
the form of the `I' (cogito or apperception) as paradigm of identification, 
condition of opposition, model of analogy and locus of intuition: The `I 
think' is the most general principle of representation - in other words, the 
source of these elements and of the unity of all these faculties: I conceive 
[through the concept], I judge [through opposition], I imagine, I remember 
[through resemblance], and I perceive [through intuition] - as though these 
were the four branches of the Cogito. " (Deleuze, 1994, p. 138) 
Thus, Deleuze, a keen reader of Hume, reminds us that the form of 
the Self as ground of representation is something that needs to be explained, 
not an incontrovertible Given from which all explanation must begin. To 
assume subjective consciousness as something from which philosophy must 
begin, as was once supposed of God, is, argues Deleuze, to yield too quickly 
to a latent dimension of crypto-theological superstition disguised beneath the 
empiricist prejudices of common sense. Deleuze's philosophical audacity lies 
in his willingness to try and effect the transcendental suspension or 
circumvention of the first person phenomenological perspective, along with 
the supposed indubitability of subjective individuation, as an extraneous 
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albeit particularly resilient form of dogmatic presupposition. This move is 
significantly more radical than the superficially similar but still 
phenomenologically rooted attacks on metaphysical subjectivism and the 
Cartesian theatre of representation80, for it effectively explodes the very 
kernel of subjectivity, subverting it at its originary root by dismantling the 
principle of ontological individuation through which it is constituted, rather 
than, say, merely questioning its substantive status as an ontologically 
separate realm, or highlighting the quasi-transcendental structure of aporia 
through which intentional consciousness as self-presence is simultaneously 
constituted and deconstituted at a point where subjective individuation has 
already been given as a discrete field". From a Deleuzean point of view, it 
matters little whether one posits consciousness as an internalised theatre of 
representation or an externalised set of intentional relations to the world; as 
long as the field of phenomenological investigation is delimited within the 
space of what Foucault called the `empirico-transcendental doublet' 82, it 
continues to perpetuate "the vicious circle which makes the condition refer to 
the conditioned as it reproduces its image. " (Deleuze, 1990, p. 105) 
800f the sort initiated by Nietzsche and Heidegger, and which subsequently became one of the few 
incontrovertibly central strands running through much twentieth-century philosophy, common to 
thinkers as otherwise dissimilar as Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty. 
81 Cf. for instance, Derrida's deconstruction of the Husserlian `living present' as locus of transcendental 
consciousness in Derrida, 1973. 
82Cf. Foucault, 1970, pp. 318-328. 
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So far then, it might seem as if Deleuze were doing little more than 
reiterating Henry's critique of the (Kantian/Husserlian) principle of empirico- 
transcendental parallelism. This impression, however, is misleading. Where 
Deleuze's materialization of the transcendental goes beyond anything 
envisaged in Henry's phenomenologisation of matter is in its explicit refusal 
to accept the form of the Self as absolute paradigm of all possible 
individuation83. If philosophical thought is to stop shamelessly reiterating the 
pieties of good sense and start undermining the orthodoxies of common sense, 
Deleuze insists, it must not shirk from positing a radical incommensurability 
between the individuated realm of subjective experience (whether it be that of 
intentional consciousness or that of sub-intentional enstasis) and the pre- 
individual domain which conditions that realm while bearing no resemblance 
to it. Consequently, Deleuze cannot remain satisfied with Henry's 
predominantly negative characterisation of transcendental immanence as sub- 
representational, un-conscious, and non-intentional. If it remains strictly 
incommensurable with the categories of representation it is because, pace 
Kant, it teems with a-categorial determinations and anomalous 
83The vital importance of Simondon's work for the Deleuzean critique of phenomenology cannot be 
overestimated (cf. Simondon, 1995). However trenchant his critique of ekstatic representation may be, 
never for one moment will Henry envisage undermining the principle of the unity of the phenomenon 
or abandoning the form of the Self as paradigm of individuation. Thus, whereas the figure of a 
radicalised Cartesianism provides the main resource for Henry's material phenomenology, Deleuze's 
transcendental materialism finds what may well be its chief philosophical inspiration in a cross- 
fertilization of Spinoza and Simondon. 
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differentiations; if it remains rigorously irreducible to the dimensions of 
consciousness it is because, pace Freud, it is cosmic, anonymous, and 
anorganic; finally, if it remains utterly heteromorphic vis a vis the form of the 
Self it is because, pace Henry, it is comprised of impersonal individuations 
and pre-personal singularities. This pre-individual, impersonal transcendental 
field sought for by Deleuze, constitutes the empirically inexhaustible realm of 
virtual singularities, `real without being actual, ideal without being abstract', 
nomadically distributed via the limitlessly productive, perpetually dynamic 
disequilibrium of an auto-differentiating, ontological 'heterogenesis': 
"Despite Sartre's attempts we cannot retain consciousness as a milieu while 
at the same time we object to the form of the person and the point of view of 
individuation. A consciousness is nothing without the form of the I or the 
point of view of the Self. What is neither individual nor personal are, on the 
contrary, emissions of singularities insofar as they occur on an unconscious 
surface and possess a mobile, immanent principle of auto-unification through 
a nomadic distribution, radically distinct fi°om fixed and sedentary 
distributions as conditions of the syntheses of consciousness. Singularities are 
the true transcendental events and Ferlinghetti calls them `the fourth person 
singular'. Far from being individual or personal, singularities preside over 
the genesis of individuals and persons; they are distributed in a potential ' 
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which admits neither Self nor I, but which produces them by actualising or 
realizing itse f although the figures of this actualisation do not at all 
resemble the realized potential. Only a theory of singular points is capable of 
transcending the synthesis of the person and the analysis of the individual as 
these are (or are made) in consciousness. We cannot accept the alternative 
which thoroughly compromises psychology, cosmology, and theology: either 
singularities already comprised in individuals and persons, or the 
undifferentiated abyss. Only when the world, teaming with anonymous and 
nomadic, impersonal and pre-individual singularities, opens up, do we tread 
at last on the field of the transcendental. " (Deleuze, 1990, pp. 102-103) 
The fundamental components for the kind of transcendental 
materialism that will be elaborated in the two volumes of Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia are already in place in this passage: the decomposition of the 
phenomenological perspective on the world (= dismantling of 
subjectification, signification, and interpretation, the three structural hinges of 
Oedipal representation); the emission of self-assembling virtual singularities 
by means of nomadic distribution upon an unconscious surface (= inscription 
of molecular intensities/machinic assemblages upon the body-without-organs 
or plane of consistency); the actualisation of an impersonal virtual 
unconscious through whose processual auto-differentiation or `heterogenesis' 
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the empirical realm is effectively produced as actual (=machinic construction 
of the real via connective, disjunctive, and conjunctive syntheses of desiring- 
production). 
This last feature in particular will prove absolutely central in Deleuze 
& Guattari's anti-phenomenological brand of machinic constructivism, 
wherein the transcendental is reconfigured in terms of primary processes of 
ontological production engendering a real no longer circumscribed by the 
categorial syntheses of representation. 
Machinic Constructivism 
If the immanence of the transcendental method requires the 
dissolution of the phenomenological perspective invariably tied up with the 
viewpoint of subjective individuation (a viewpoint, Deleuze insists, whose 
derivative character as constituted via representational mediation it is the task 
of a transcendental-materialist critique to expose by uncovering the 
ontogenetic realm of disintegrated singularities and impersonal multiplicities 
underlying representation), then philosophical method as such ceases to be 
instrumentalisable through the agency of an ex machina philosophical subject 
manipulating it from without. The transcendental immanence of philosophical 
method requires that the method become subject of the real as a function of 
the machinic unconscious 'itself. In other words, it is not the philosopher qua 
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subject who thinks the real; it is the real which singularises itself as an 
impersonal event of thought to which the philosopher is merely accessory. 
Thus, the full force of Deleuze & Guattari's hypercritical -and hence anti- 
representationalist- machinic constructivism becomes clear: in the materialist 
transvaluation of the transcendental, methodological immanence realizes 
itself through a limitless becoming-subject of the real in what Laruelle calls a 
`techno-ontological' or `hyletic' continuum: "It is this victory of method, its 
universal reign as a techno-ontological continuum, its becoming a thinking 
thought and a nature, simultaneously subject and substance, that we think 
under the preliminary title of [tile] transvaluation of the transcendental. " 
(Laruelle, 1981, p. 18-19. ) 
The deliberately Hegelian echoes in this Laruellean description of the 
`becoming-subject of method' should not be misinterpreted. We are 
emphatically not proposing some dubious assimilation of Deleuze & 
Guattari's thought to that of Hegel. If we invoke this Laruellean formulation 
here, it is in order to point to an illuminating analogy between the Hegelian 
and Deleuzoguattarian critiques of representational subjectivism: in both 
instances, it is not the philosophical subject who represents the real, but the 
real that thinks itself by means of the philosophical subject. The crucial 
difference being this: for Hegel, matter is internally animated by mind, and 
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the becoming-subject of substance already encompassed within Geist as 
absolute self-sundering or self-relating negativity, so that the apex of 
philosophical illumination comes with the realization that Spirit includes its 
own distinction from nature within itself84. But for Deleuze & Guattari, mind 
is a transcendent abstraction from matter, and the categorial distinction 
between `nature' and `culture' collapsed within the neutral univocity of an all- 
encompassing mechanosphere, so that the highpoint of philosophical 
meditation necessitates an ateleogical or `machinic' becoming-substance of 
the philosophical subject through the restitution of univocal being as plane of 
immanence. 
However, in order for philosophical thought to accede to its genuinely 
impersonal or pre-subjective transcendental dimension, in conformity with the 
Deleuzean commitment to this rigorously univocal ontological immanence, 
both the representational cleavage between subject and object, and the 
phenomenological intentionality binding thought and thing, noesis and 
noema, must be disqualified as instances of equivocal transcendence. For 
Deleuze & Guattari, philosophy only attains an authentically transcendental 
84 "The self-knowing Spirit knows not only itself but also the negative of itself or its limit: to know 
one's limit is to know how to sacrifice oneself. This sacrifice is the externalisation in which Spirit 
displays the process of its becoming Spirit in the form of its free contingent happening, intuiting its 
pure Self as Time outside of it, and equally its Being as Space. This last becoming of Spirit, Nature, is 
its living immediate Becoming; Nature, the externalised Spirit, is in its existence nothing but this 
eternal externalisation of its continuing existence and the movement which reinstates the 
Subject. "(Hegel, 1977, p. 492). 
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stance when it becomes able to set aside the categorial constrictions of 
representation as well as the equivocal structure of phenomenological 
intentionality, transforming thinking as such into a means for mapping the 
unrepresentable (i. e. virtual) regions of the real. It is no longer a question of 
the philosophical concept adequately representing the real (i. e. materiality-in- 
itself or the unrepresentable); it is rather a question of the concept becoming a 
material segment of the real -material in the transcendental as opposed to 
empirical sense-; a segment which is fully commensurate and entirely 
coterminous with materiality as intensively rather than extensively defined. 
The development of this transcendental continuity between `thought' 
and `matter' at the level of sub-representational immanence identified by 
Deleuze & Guattari, with the attendant characterisation of the real as an 
uninterrupted continuum of intensive materiality, a continuum within which 
philosophical thinking is itself inscribed, and whose `smooth space' it is the 
philosopher's task to map via the suspension of representational 
transcendence, can be charted through the two volumes of Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia85, right up to What is Philosophy?. Thus, in Anti-Oedipus, the 
auto-production of the real is characterised in terms of the passive syntheses 
of desiring-production (presumably by way of deliberate contrast to the active 
85Volume I: Anti-Oedipus , 
1972; Volume II: A Thousand Plateaus. 1980. 
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syntheses of apperception in Kant): "If desire produces, it produces the real. 
If desire is something that produces, this can only be production in reality 
and of reality... The real follows from it, it is the result of the passive syntheses 
of desire as auto production of the unconscious. " (Deleuze & Guattari, 1972, 
p. 34) In A Thousand Plateaus this production of the real via the auto- 
assembling of the machinic unconscious has become a function of rhizomatic 
proliferation. Philosophical thought is a rhizome-thought: "For both 
statements and desires the issue is never to reduce the unconscious or to 
interpret it or to make it signify according to the tree model. The issue is to 
roduce the unconscious, and with it new statements, different desires: the 
rhizome is precisely this production of the unconscious. " (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1988, p. 18) Finally, in What is Philosophy? Deleuze & Guattari 
explicitly equate their transcendental materialism with a radical form of 
pragmatic constructivism: a virtual chaos of material intensities (i. e. of 
impersonal individuations and pre-personal singularities) actualises itself in 
the philosophical concept as paraconsistent segment of the real, with the latter 
serving as immanent element of the concept (i. e. the plane of immanence or 
consistency upon which it is deployed): "A concept is a set of inseparable 
variations that is produced or constructed on a plane of immanence insofar 
as the latter crosscuts the chaotic variability and gives it consistency (reality). 
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A concept is therefore a chaoid state par excellence; it refers back to a chaos 
rendered consistent, become Thought, mental chaosmos. " (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1994, p. 208) 
The Hyletic Continuum 
It is now possible to begin to make a little more sense of Laruelle's 
claim that Deleuze & Guattari's machinic materialism constitutes a form of 
`absolute hyletic idealism'. If, for Deleuze & Guattari, intensive materiality 
becomes essentially auto-productive, self-constituting, self-synthesizing, then 
it is `materiality' as passive synthesis of (auto-)production, Laruelle argues, 
that has the power to "synthesize itself, to relate to itself by itself alone 
through an inclusive cut or difference. " (Laruelle, 1981, p. 78) This inclusive 
cut is epitomized by the Deleuzean characterisation of intensive materiality as 
inclusive disjunction86 of difference in degree and difference in kind, 
qualitative and quantitative, intensity and extensity, virtual and actual, etc87. 
86For Deleuze's account of intensive difference as `inclusive disjunction' of virtual and actual, cf. 
Deleuze, 1994, p. 239. Although the expression itself first appears in Anti-Oedipus (co-written with 
Guattari) and doesn't occur as such in Deleuze's earlier work, the concept of inclusive disjunction is 
clearly present throughout Difference and Repetition, specifically in the form of what Deleuze calls 
there an `asymmetrical synthesis' or `pathos of distance'. 
87Crucially however, this Deleuzoguattarian methodology of machinic constructivism as abstract, 
intensive, self-synthesizing process of transcendental materialization, simultaneously cutting across 
subject and substance, remains for Laruelle a variant on a quasi-universal structural invariant governing 
the constellation of contemporary theoretical problematics clustered around the philosophical motif of 
Difference: "We call infinite hyletic Flux, or hyletic Continuum, this process of the infinite synthesis 
and difference of opposites, the river into which all thinkings of Difference (including Heidegger, who 
reinscribes Difference in the Same) flow. This hyletic flux divides and produces itself, it carries out on 
itself cuts, divisions, an entire process of `differing', by means of techniques which it produces and 
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Moreover, Laruelle continues, in order to posit this co-incidence of 
matter (or `the real') and of its philosophical logos (or `the ideal') within the 
infinite hyletic continuum (or `chaos') transected by the philosophical 
concept, a non-representational form of materialism must proceed (as we 
noted above) by transcendentally suspending the validity of all 
phenomenologically given or representationally mediated instances of 
empirical transcendence, insofar as these remain subsumed beneath analogical 
and categorial relations of negation and exclusion. In other words, the passive 
syntheses (connective; disjunctive; conjunctive) of desiring-production 
through which the machinic unconscious produces itself can be identified 
only on the basis of an initial methodological reduction isolating the sub- 
representational and pre-phenomenological domain of transcendental 
immanence. Thus, strange as it may sound, for Laruelle, Deleuze & Guattari's 
materialism operates on the basis of an idealizing transcendental reduction of 
the phenomenological and representational realms: "One cannot raise the law 
of [hyletic] continuity to the level of principle, of an auto productive instance 
enjoying absolute autonomy, of a transcendental, rather than empirico-legal, 
continuity, without reducing all external, exclusive or transcendent instances 
which co-belong to it, and with which, as Same or instance of Repetition =Reproduction, it is 
coextensive. Here is where transcendental philosophy ends up with Nietzsche and Heidegger after the 
neo-Kantian interlude: with the constitution of a universal a priori which is at the same time or 
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of synthesis which are simply traced from the given: unity of the object, unity 
of experience under laws, unity of the understanding, of its categories and of 
the I think, unity of the ego, synthesis of the imagination, etc. (.. )The 
procedures for constituting a pure hyletic flux as auto-constitutive or causa 
sui, are thus those of a transcendental reduction, but one which is classical, 
which is to say idealizing. It renders synthesis immanent to itself, relative to 
itself or absolute -and thus cancels the external, coded or reified forms of 
unity, reducing them to the state of continuous cuts. " (Ibid, p. 79) 
Just what is meant by this last comment about the transcendental 
materialist reduction of all empirical instances to the status of `continuous 
cuts' will become clearer in the penultimate section of this chapter88. For the 
time being however, it is necessary to focus on the very specific character of 
the idealizing transcendental reduction through which Deleuze & Guattari 
isolate this absolute hyletic continuum. In fact, the absolute transcendental 
sphere isolated through this materialist reduction is none other than that of the 
plane of immanence upon which the philosophical Concept is to be deployed. 
simultaneously the material, the technical means, [and] the result of its becoming. " (Laruelle, 1981, 
p. 18). 
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The Plane of Immanence 
The plane of immanence is what remains after all empirico- 
transcendent instances of synthesis have been suspended or reduced; yet at the 
same time it is `prephilosophical' 89, or that which must be presupposed as 
`always already' in effect in order for the creation of a philosophical Concept 
to take place: "The concept is the beginning of philosophy, but the plane is its 
instituting. " (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 41) Moreover, if Deleuze & 
Guattari compare the instituting of the plane of immanence to a form of 
"groping experimentation" involving "dreams, pathological processes, 
esoteric experiences, drunkenness and excess"90, it is because a reduction 
which necessitates the simultaneous `bracketing' or casting aside of the Self 
as subject of experience, of the Object as locus of cognition, and of the World 
as horizonal backdrop, will be more akin to a form of radical cognitive 
experimentation rather than to a rationally orchestrated program of 
methodical doubt; a form of cognitive experimentation aiming at the 
subversion of all fixed and stable epistemic guarantors, rather than an instance 
of epistemological investigation hoping to excavate an indubitable basis for 
knowledge. Only such experimentation is liable to succeed in instituting the 
88Cf. infra, pp. 154-161. 
89 "Prephilosophical does not mean something pre-existent but rather something that does not exist 
outside philosophy, although philosophy presupposes it. " (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 41). 
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unenvisageable immanence of that prephilosophical plane concomitant with 
the essentially anomalous image91 of philosophical thought. 
Why describe this form of experimental reduction as `idealising'? 
Clearly, if the instituting of the plane requires the bracketing of all instances 
of transcendent synthesis such as that of Self, World, and Object, then this 
reduction cannot he equated with the kind of methodological voluntarism 
characteristic of Husserlian reduction. The latter can be described as 
idealising precisely insofar as it seeks to reduce the World and the Object on 
the basis of the transcendental Self; - the self as empirical instance is bracketed 
but not the form of subjective individuation as such. Husserl maintains 
subjective individuation as that absolute and irreducible `given' on the basis 
of which it becomes possible to isolate both the originary givenness of the 
World and of the Object. The thesis of the independent existence of 
objectively given entities is suspended in order to isolate the originary 
intentional syntheses through which those worldly objects come to be 
constituted as given in and through transcendental consciousness. 
By way of contrast, what is `idealising' about the Deleuzoguattarian 
reduction is that the plane is instituted not according to the form of absolute 
90Ibid., p. 41. 
91 The genuinely philosophical image of thought is `anomalous' or nomadic by way of contrast to those 
normative and sedentary images of thought regulated in conformity with the prejudices of good sense 
and common sense. 
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consciousness as 'seif-giving'92, but rather through the philosophical Concept 
as `self-positing' or as a relative-absolute which pre-supposes the plane in and 
through its own self-supposing or self-positing93: "Philosophy is at once 
concept creation and instituting of the plane[ .. 
]The plane is clearly not a 
program, design, end or means: it is a plane of immanence that constitutes 
the absolute ground of philosophy, its earth or deterritorialization, the 
foundation on which it creates its concepts. Both the creation of concepts and 
the instituting of the plane are required, like two wings or fins. " (Ibid., p. 41) 
Thus, the plane is instituted as limit or locus of absolute deterritorialization 
through the Concept that pre-supposes it; it is pre-supposed as that which 
institutes itself as absolute limit or ground for philosophy through its 
philosophical positing. The plane has to be philosophically constructed; yet it 
is also that which constructs itself through philosophy; it is at once `always 
already there' or pre-supposed; and something that has to be laid out or 
constructed; which is to say, posed. In other words, the plane is pre-supposed 
only insofar as it `will have been' posed; but posed only insofar has it `will 
920n the phenomenological requirement that absolute transcendental consciousness be `self-giving', 
which is to say, self-constituting, cf. supra, Chapter 2, pp. 66-70. 
93 "The concept is defined by its consistency, its endoconsistency and exoconsistency, but it has no 
reference; it is self-referential; it posits itself and its object at the same time as it is created. 
Constructivism unites the relative and the absolute. " (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 22). 
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have been' pre-supposed94: "[... ]even the prephilosophical ' plane is only so 
called because it is laid out as presupposed and not because it pre-exists 
without being laid out. " (Ibid., p. 78) As a result, the plane of immanence 
isolated through this transcendental suspension of categorial synthesis and 
representational transcendence is seif-synthesising, self-constituting: relative 
only to itself, immanent only to itself. Moreover, if this plane of immanence 
is immanent only to itself95 rather than to the Self, the World, or the Object, it 
is because it lays itself out through the self-positing of the philosophical 
Concept; thus, there is a sense in which it, just as much as the Concept, must 
also be said to be self-positing, self-constructing. And it is via forms of 
cognitive experimentation involving a total suspension of the apparatus of 
940ne will recognize here the distinctive temporality of the future anterior as index of the 
transcendental: for Deleuze, the time of transcendental immanence is the Aionic time wherein the 
immemorial and the unheard of, the unrememberable past and the unanticipatable future, coincide 
virtually. The plane of immanence is Aionic or virtual as that which simultaneously occupies the 
`already' and the `not yet'. Interestingly enough, the process whereby immanence is simultaneously 
posited and pre-supposed in the philosophical Concept is remarkably reminiscent of the interplay 
between positing and pre-supposing reflection as articulated in Hegel's `Logic of Essence': "Reflection 
thus finds before it an immediate which it transcends and from which it is the return. But this return is 
only the presupposing of what reflection finds before it. What is thus found only comes to be through 
being left behind; its immediacy is sublated immediacy"(Hegel, 1989, p. 402). Cf. op. cit. , especially 
pp. 399-408. As we shall see, if immanence is conceived of as that whose pre-philosophical immediacy 
must be posited and pre-supposed in the Concept, then its immediacy as unconditional exteriority for 
thought becomes the result of its having been `always already' sublated , or conceptually mediated, 
in 
accordance with a gesture of idealizing transcendence which is strikingly consonant with Hegel's 
absolute or `objective' idealism. 
95Cf. Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, pp. 44-49. We shall be highlighting the problematic character of 
Deleuze & Guattari's characterisation of immanence as `immanence-to-itself' below. Cf. supra, pp. 
136-142. 
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categorial representation, a systematic disordering of all the faculties96, that 
the philosopher must seek out that point of indiscernibility between the 
unenvisageable `prephilosophical' immanence which thought has always 
already pre-supposed, and the initiatory crystallization of the Concept through 
which that unenvisageable pre-supposition can be philosophically posed. 
The hyletic reduction effected by Deleuze & Guattari is idealizing 
then because it reduces transcendence on the basis of an immanence which is 
irreducible precisely insofar as it is self-presupposing or causa sui 97; a self- 
presupposing immanence that is fundamentally indissociable (because posited 
as presupposed and presupposed as posited) from the self-positing of the 
philosophical Concept. The hyletic reduction operates by isolating its pure 
transcendental residue in that point of indiscernibility between supposition 
and pre-supposition; Concept and plane of immanence. That point, that 
96For Deleuze's account of the manner in which a discordant use of the faculties engenders an 
anomalous or nomadic image of thought, shorn of the dogmatic prejudices of good sense and the 
restrictive concordances of common sense, cf. Deleuze, 1994, p. 143. 
971t is on account of this indiscernible coincidence of (or absolute hyletic continuity between) 
immanence as extrinsic ground for the Concept, and immanence as intrinsically pre-supposed in the 
Concept's self-positing, that the plane can function as an absolute, or self-constituting, hyletic residue. 
So it is with the plane of immanence or hyletic continuum as causa sui in mind that Laruelle writes: 
"As far as given synthesis is concerned, there is always some, and always too much, but the task of 
absolute materialism, which must, by virtue of this very fact, remain a hyletics, an identity of matter 
and logos, is to render that synthesis productive, capable of itself or cause of itself. The principle of an 
intensive rather than extensive material continuity is isolated through a reduction which one could 
with some justification entitle phenomenologico-transcendental because it isolates the residue of a 
matter -as hyle- in the instance of an absolute phenomenon or absolute objective appearance, and it 
identifies Being with that phenomenon as a whole. Within an immanent realm of this sort, the 
phenomeno-logical and the materio-logical remain exactly coextensive. " (Laruelle, 1981, p. 79) The 
plane of immanence is the hyletic continuum as absolute phenomenon; abstract or intensive materiality 
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indiscernible residue, is nothing but the plane as synthesis of synthesis; 
inclusive disjunction of positing and pre-positing. And this indiscernibility 
ultimately coincides with that between the supposition of thought and its 
unthinkable pre-supposition; for the plane of immanence is also characterised 
as "at the same time, that which must be thought and that which cannot be 
thought. It is the non-thought within thought [... J the most intimate within 
thought and yet the absolute outside [.. ] the not-external outside and the not- 
internal inside" (Ibid., p. 59). Consequently, the philosopher thinks on the 
basis of an unthinkable exteriority which lies at the heart of thought; an 
unenvisageable immanence upon which the anomalous image of 
philosophical thinking is deployed in the Concept. 
We cannot fail to notice here a triadic structure echoing that which we 
saw at work in Henry's phenomenologised immediation of thinkable (ekstatic 
intentionality of the videre) and unthinkable (absolute immanence of the 
videor)98. The plane of immanence is an absolute transcendental residue of 
the reduction of transcendence, but a residue posed as a pre-supposition for 
philosophical thinking in and through the self-positing of the Concept; a 
residue that is nothing independently of the operation of experimental 
construction by which it is laid out in and through the Concept. Thus, the 
as point of indiscernibility between the phenomeno- and materio-logical realms. It is the full body of 
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unthinkable is at once absolute limit and ground of deterritorialization, which 
is to say, deterritorialized earth or body-without-organs; and pre-supposition 
which is internally posited as unthinkable exteriority via the self-positing of 
thought in the Concept. Here we re-encounter that complex triadic structure 
which we will come to recognize as definitive of philosophical Decision for 
Laruelle: on the one hand, immanence as absolute deterritorialization, 
unthinkable Outside; on the other, philosophical thinking as reciprocal 
presupposition or indiscernibility of deterritorialization and 
reterritorialization, outside and inside, presupposed plane and conceptual 
supposition. Or again: on the one hand, immanence as full body of the Earth, 
limit of absolute deterritorialization, is of course the inclusive disjunction of 
the `not-internal' inside and the `not-external' outside; of relative supposition 
and absolute pre-supposition. While on the other, philosophy as 
indiscernibility of position and presupposition, thought and unthought, inside 
and outside, functions as the relation of relation and non-relation. For Deleuze 
and Guattari, immanence can be affirmed as absolute exteriority only insofar 
as it is indissociable from its presupposition in the Concept. In other words, 
immanence functions as limit of deterritorialized exteriority, or as Real, for 
thought only insofar as it has been ideally presupposed in the position of the 
the Earth; the Deterritorialized; Being as inclusive disjunction. 
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Concept; an auto-position according to which the latter operates as point of 
indiscernibility between -which is to say explicit mixture or hybrid of- 
thinkable and unthinkable; territorialization and deterritorialization; 
supposition and presupposition; transcendence and immanence; relative and 
absolute; etc. 
Thus, if Deleuze & Guattari' s hyletic reduction is idealizing it is 
because it establishes an ideal, self-constructing or self-assembling 
immanence as that absolute transcendental residue wherein physis and nous, 
hyle and logos, coincide99. The plane of immanence is Being as abstract or 
intensive materiality; the smooth space of nomadic distribution upon which 
the Concept is deployed as the aleatory %-ýyý point of indiscernibility inclusively 
disjoining -rather than dialectically synthesizing- an impersonal philosophical 
subject and a pre-individual intensive substance. Consequently, the reduction 
through which the plane of immanence is laid out establishes the hyletic 
continuum as that absolute transcendental residue or irreducible sub-jektum 
on whose basis the coextensiveness of the phenomeno-logos and the materio- 
logos in the philosophical Concept can be initiated. Having secured this 
transcendental coextensiveness, Deleuze & Guattari can proceed to map out 
98Cf. supra, Chapter 2, pp. 87-90. 
99 "The plane of immanence has two facets as Thought and as Nature, as Nous and as Physis. " 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 38). 
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the rhizomatic lineaments of nomadic distribution insofar as it now governs 
the smooth space of abstract hyletic continuity between `phenomenon' and 
'matter'. 
Thus, the plane of immanence transects the hyletic continuum; it 
`slices through the chaos' of intensive materiality100. As performed by 
Deleuze & Guattari, this methodological transection results in two 
fundamental features that we wish to focus on now. First, that of the 
constitutive aparallelism between smooth and striated, virtual and actual; the 
aparallelism between representational extensity and non-representational 
intensity circumscribed upon the plane of immanence and which can only be 
apprehended on the basis of reduction. Second, that of the process of nomadic 
distribution as operator of machinic conjunction through which the elements 
of the plane are distributed and the plane itself constructed. 
Parallelism and Asymmetry 
In Difference and Repetition Deleuze recuses the early Heidegger's 
inscription of ontico-ontological difference as Da-sein, along with the 
concomitant privileging of `being-in-the-world' as an integrated structural 
100 "The plane of immanence is like a section of chaos and acts like a sieve. " (Ibid., p. 42). 
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whole and transcendent horizon of pre-ontological understanding' 0 1. He 
thereby jettisons both what he considers to be the residual phenomenological 
isomorphy or parallelism between transcendental and empirical, Being and 
beings, in the project of a `fundamental' ontology; and the ontologically 
equivocal subordination of the `regional' to the 'fundamental'. For Deleuze, 
once the categorial filters of representational mediation have been 
transcendentally suspended, the ontic realm ceases to consist either of fixed, 
stable, self-identical entities amenable to representation, or 
phenomenologically apprehensible series of shifting perspectival 
adumbrations (Abschattungen; esquisses) encompassed within a unified 
eidetic horizon; there are only self-dissimilar, unrecognisable, unidentifiable 
dispersions of simulacra, shorn of all resemblance, whether it be to an 
originary model or another copy; differences which are neither different 
relative to another identity nor identical to themselves since they remain 
differences of differences of differences..., "demonic images, stripped of 
resemblance", images that have "externalised resemblance and live on 
difference instead. "102 
101 "The same attitude of refusing objective presuppositions, but on condition of assuming just as 
many subjective presuppositions (which are perhaps the same ones in another form), appears when 
Heidegger invokes a pre-ontological understanding of Being. " (Deleuze, 1994, p. 129) 
102Deleuze, 1994, p. 128. 
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Conversely, for Deleuze, intensive difference, the Being of simulacra, 
is not `a' difference but the sheer differing of differences; the Disparate or 
Unequal-in-itself' 03. The latter surges forth as that by virtue of which a 
difference is `made' or produced'°4 and simulacra given in their differing, 
says Deleuze, through an act of transcendental determination whereby a part 
of the virtual actualises itself. In Difference and Repetition Deleuze 
distinguishes a complex triad of interrelated terms here: the realm of 
problematic singularities or Ideas whose intensive differentiation renders the 
virtual entirely determinate; a dimension of differenciation in extensity which 
is actually determinable; finally, `different/ciation' as the determination of the 
determinable by the determinate through the chiasmatic explication of virtual 
intensities in actual extensity, and envelopment of extensive actuality by 
intensive virtuality. Thus, transcendental determination occurs via the 
simultaneous explication of the intensive in extensity and envelopment of the 
extensive by intensity. The catalyst for this reciprocal 
envelopment/explication of virtual and actual is the circumscription of a 
circuit of problematic virtualities in an intensive spatium as field of 
individuation. It this spatium as individuating threshold which functions as 
103Cf. Deleuze, ibid., pp. 222-223. 
104 "We must therefore say that difference is made, or makes itself, as in the expression 
'make the 
difference' [faire la difference]. " (Deleuze, ibid., p. 28). 
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the intensive determinant precipitating the process through which a part of the 
virtual actualises itself105. Consequently, although virtual differentiation 
determines actual differenciation, it is the process of intensive individuation 
as different/ciating integration of problematic disparity (i. e. as extensive 
integration of the Unequal-in-itself) which functions as the sufficient reason 
for the actualisation of the virtual' 06: "Individuation is the act by which 
intensity determines differential relations to become actualised, along the 
lines of differenciation and within the qualities and extensities it creates. The 
total notion is therefore that of indi-different/ciation" (Deleuze, 1994, 
p. 246). 
It is important to note then that, according to Deleuze, intensive 
individuation functions as the `sufficient reason' 107 for the process of 
actualisation precisely insofar as it is conceived in terms of this complex 
integration or chiasmic interpenetration of virtual intensity and actual 
extensity. Thus, Deleuze's conception of transcendental ontogenesis as 
process of `indi-different/ciation' is explicitly composite or hybrid in 
character. Moreover, the site of ontological `indi-different/ciation' as 
chiasmic locus for the interpenetration or envelopment of the virtual in the 
105 "Intensity is the determinant in the process of actualisation. " (Deleuze, 1994, p. 245). 
106For all the above cf. Deleuze, 1994, especially pp. 244-256. 
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actual and of the actual by the virtual is the plane of immanence. The latter is 
the transcendental element of their chiasmic indiscernibility, of their 
perpetually circuitous exchange: "The plane of immanence at once comprises 
the virtual and its actualisation, without there being an assignable limit 
between the two. The actual is the complement or the product, the object of 
the actualisation, but the latter has only the virtual as its subject. 
Actualisation belongs to the virtual. The actualisation of the virtual is 
singularity, whereas the actual itself is the constituted individuality. The 
actual drops out of the plane like fruit, whereas actualisation relates it back 
to the plane as to that which makes the object subject once again. " (Deleuze, 
1986, pp. 180-181). Consequently, every actualisation of a present 
communicates via a `wide' circuit of exchange with the virtual as 
heterogenetic totality or Aionic coincidence of an unrepresentable past and an 
unanticipatable future. At the same time, however, Deleuze also distinguishes 
the process of intensive individuation in terms of a `narrow' circuit of 
exchange binding the actual image of the object and its virtual counterpart as 
"unequal, odd halves"108. This is a circuit according to which individuation 
occurs as the process of temporalising crystallization through the actual or 
107 "The reason of the sensible, the condition of that which appears, is not space and time but the 
Unequal in itself, disparateness as it is determined and comprised in difference of intensity, in intensity 
as difference. " (Ibid., p. 222-223). 
108 Ibid., pp. 209-210. 
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present object's integration of that virtual half of itself which subsists in the 
absolute past. Accordingly, it is through the actual present's integration of its 
own unrepresentable virtual image that individuation occurs as that processual 
crystallization through which the passing of the present can take place: "This 
perpetual exchange of virtual and actual defines a crystal. It is upon the plane 
of immanence that crystals appear. Actual and virtual co-exist, and enter into 
a narrow circuit which brings us back continuously from one to the 
other[.. ]The two aspects of time, the actual image of the passing present, and 
the virtual image of the past conserving itself, distinguish themselves in 
actualisation even while having an unsinkable limit, but exchange themselves 
in crystallisation, to the point of becoming indiscernible, each borrowing the 
role of the other. " (Deleuze, 1986, p. 185). 
Thus, according to Deleuze's account of the relation between virtual 
and actual, the plane of immanence designates at once (as we saw above109) 
the site for that point of indiscernibility or indistinction between virtual (past) 
and actual (present) in the local circuit of crystallization or individuation; but 
also that of their unassignable limit, which is the unilateral or asymmetrical 
distinction between virtual and actual in the large circuit wherein the virtual's 
self-actualisation is the result of an individuating integration of problematic 
109Cf. supra, pp. 120-124. 
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differentiation. As a result, individuation as sufficient reason for the virtual's 
self-actualisation inscribes a circuitous loop; a relative asymmetrical 
parallelism between virtual intensity and actual extensity; a reciprocal co- 
implication whereby every actual differenciation of the virtual immediately 
implies a co-responding virtual differentiation of the actual. Crystallization as 
intensive individuation requires the initiation of a positive feedback loop from 
virtual to actual and back to virtual again, according to an ultimately 
autocatalytic process of ontological genesis. In this process, the plane of 
immanence describes an instantaneously reversible oscillation; inclining itself 
for that `transdescendence' l lo whereby the actual drops out from the 
processual boughs of intensive `different/ciation' as individuated fruit in the 
wide circuit of actualisation, only to immediately reverse the direction of its 
inclination in order to allow for that `transascendence' through which 
individuated actuality feeds back into the realm of virtual problematicity in 
the narrow circuit of crystallization via the intensive `in-different/ciation' 
which is continuously generating new virtualities for actualisation. 
As a result, the non-resemblance or heteromorphy between virtual and 
actual posited by Deleuze, would seem to be grounded in an ultimately 
reversible asymmetry. Bi-lateral reciprocity, and with it the immediately 
110Cf. Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 45. The distinction between `transascendence' and 
131 
circular reversibility between conditioned and condition denounced by 
Deleuze"', has been abolished. But Deleuze's reconfiguration of the 
problematic of transcendental genesis in terms of the ontogenetic production 
of that which is given as actual through the process of its ontological `in- 
different/ciation', obliges him to posit the indissoluble co-belonging or co- 
incidence of virtual production and actual product; the complex or 
differentiated unity of intensive individuation and individuated extensity. 
Deleuze has maximized the non-resemblance between conditioned and 
condition by way of the unilateral disjunction between virtual production and 
actual product, but he has not managed to sever a more deeply rooted 
parallelism between them; a parallelism of which the autocatalytic circuit 
`virtual-actual-virtual' is the most explicit indicator. 
Thus, Deleuze's transcendental empiricism, his insistence on `starting 
in the middle', with the weed rather than the root, in accordance with a 
rhizome-thought''2whie}i engenders the plane of immanence as site for the 
`in-between' or inclusive disjunction of virtual and actual, production and 
product, substitutes an asymmetrical parallelism for the symmetrical 
`transdescendence' comes from the work of Jean Wahl. 
111 Cf. supra, p. 104. 
112 "A rhizome has no beginning or end; it is always in the middle, between things, interbeing, 
intermezzo[.. ] The middle is by no means an average; on the contrary, it is where things pick up 
speed. Between things does not designate a localizable relation going from one thing to the other and 
back again, but a perpendicular direction, a transversal movement that sweeps one and the other 
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parallelism with which Kantian and Husserlian transcendentalism contented 
themselves. However, far from being the result of some lapse or 
inconsistency in Deleuze's ontogenetic approach, this parallelism is in fact the 
latent premise rendering that approach possible precisely insofar as it 
continues to conceive of the separation of transcendental and empirical, 
condition and conditioned, in terms of an essentially differential disjunction; a 
'between'. Like Heidegger before him' 13, Deleuze affirms non- 
representational difference as `the between', rather than binding it to the 
distinction between hypostatised terms. Nevertheless, the articulation of that 
`between' in philosophical thought remains structurally supervenient on an 
empirically given term. And the empirically available term which rhizomatic 
thinking relies upon as its point of leverage must invariably also be, by 
Deleuze's own light, the transcendent product, the residue, of a process of 
transcendental production. Thus, it is because of the constitutive ontogenetic 
fissure between its two `odd, unequal halves' -its virtual image and its actual 
image- that the actualised, individuated fruit can serve as the explicitly 
composite or hybrid crystal around which the plane of immanence as 
disjunctive interface between intensive virtuality and extensive actuality can 
be constructed. It is the object as fissure, as `in-between', that relays the 
away, a stream without beginning or end that undermines its banks and picks up speed in the middle. " 
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narrow circuit of indiscernibility between virtual and actual in individuation, 
and the wide circuit of unilateral distinction between them in actualisation, 
thereby providing the complex chiasmatic locus, the empirico-transcendental 
intersection on the basis of which the branchings of intensive in- 
different/ciation can be pre-supposed in the philosophical Concept. 
Accordingly, where phenomenology maintains the isomorphic 
symmetry between the two branches of the empirico-transcendental doublet, 
Deleuze prizes the forks of the coupling as far apart as is conceivable the 
better to affirm their non-symmetrical heteromorphy; their inclusive 
disjunction. But however valiantly he twists and distorts the tines, however 
ingeniously he coils them around one another so that intensive virtuality and 
extensive actuality become wrapped together in a distended double-helix of 
reciprocal presupposition, he cannot shatter the parallelism once and for all. 
And that helical spiral through which intensity envelops extensity whilst 
extensity explicates intensity is delineated by those `infinite movements" 14 
via which the plane of immanence effects the instantaneous oscillation 
between the self-actualisation of the virtual and the re-virtualisation of the 
actual. 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1988, p. 25). 
113Cf. Heidegger, 1969. 
114 "The plane envelops infinite movements that pass back and forth through it[... J"(Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1994, p. 36). Cf ibid, pp. 35-60. 
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Nowhere does this instantaneous interchange, and a fortiori, the 
constitutively hybrid or composite nature of the plane as virtual/actual 
interface, become more explicit than in Deleuze & Guattari's account of the 
relation between smooth and striated space in A Thousand Plateaus. There 
they write that "we must remind ourselves that the two spaces in fact exist 
only in mixture: smooth space is constantly being translated, tranversed into 
a striated space; striated space is constantly being reversed, returned to a 
smooth space f .. 
JBut the de facto mixes do not preclude a de jure, or abstract, 
distinction between the two spaces. That there is such a distinction is what 
accounts for the fact that the spaces do not communicate with each other in 
the same way: it is the de jure distinction that determines the forms assumed 
by a given de facto mix and the direction or meaning of the mix[.. ]" (Deleuze 
& Guattari, 1988, p. 475) 
Here, the de jure asymmetry, the non-reciprocity between smooth and 
striated, is invoked in order to account for the de facto reversibility 
concomitant with their empirical mixture; - i. e. the way in which a smooth 
nomadic space becomes striated and `sedentarised'; or the process of striation 
itself reimparts a smooth space. Since Deleuze & Guattari would vigorously 
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deny the accusation that they are simply tracing'' 5 or abstracting the de jure 
distinction from the de facto mixtures, presumably on the grounds that such a 
procedure would render the distinction into a transcendent, gratuitously 
reified ideality, we can only conclude that the empirical mixtures of smooth 
and striated, their de facto reversibility, are already included a priori in the de 
jure asymmetry as such. Which is to say that the former remains indissociable 
from the latter as a matter of principle; and these de facto striations of smooth 
space and smoothings of striated space, are necessarily inextricable from their 
de jure separation; their a priori asymmetry. In other words, the unilateral 
asymmetry or disjunction between sedentary striation and smooth nomadism; 
like that between extensity and intensity; molar and molecular; or actual and 
virtual; is subordinated to an overarching reversibility that encompasses both 
terms of the disjunction and guarantees their reciprocal communication at a 
level that is always transcendent to the terms themselves. And it is this 
I 
transcendence, this distance of survey or overview, which guarantees the 
reversibility, the unitary encompassing of symmetrical striation and 
asymmetrical smoothing; whilst also rendering the subtle form of empirico- 
transcendental parallelism perpetuated by Deleuze & Guattari possible. 
115For the distinction between representational tracing and rhizomatic mapping, cf. Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1988, pp. 12-13. 
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Moreover, it is the transcendence implied by this distance of survey 
or overview, the transcendence implied in this remove of unobjectifiable 
exteriority whereby virtual and actual, intensity and extensity, smooth and 
striated, are subject to unitary encompassment, which is responsible for 
reinjecting a subtler, more rarefied form of transcendence into the 
immanence which Deleuze & Guattari lay claim to. While the plane of 
immanence remains de . void of all reifiable instances of transcendence such as 
those subsumed under the generic rubrics of Self, World, and God, it 
nevertheless presupposes an unreifiable or unobjectifiable form of 
transcendence in the shape of a latent distance of transcendental 
objectivation' 16; a residual impersonal intentionality indexed by its definition I 
as `immanence to itself . For this `to' is not as innocent as it seems; it is 
symptomatic of the procedure by which Deleuze & Guattari are obliged to 
synthesize construction and intuition' 17; the positing and the pre-supposing of 
the plane; in and through the agency of the philosophical Concept in a manner 
that reinscribes unobjectifiable immanence within an equally unobjectifiable 
116Not to be confused with empirical objectification (i. e. reification; hypostatisation). 
117 "But there is no reason to oppose knowledge through concepts and the construction of concepts 
within possible experience on the one hand and through intuition on the other. For according to the 
Nietzschean verdict, you will know nothing through concepts unless you have first created them- that 
is, constructed them in an intuition specific to them: a field, a plane, and a ground that must not be 
confused with them but that shelters their seeds and the personae who cultivate them. Constructivism 
requires every creation to be a construction on a plane that gives it an autonomous existence. " 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 7). 
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but nevertheless `objectivating' transcendence' 18. This is a distance of 
objectivation as independent of the reified form of the Subject as it is 
irreducible to the figure of the World as horizon of intentional ekstasis. It is 
the unobjectifiable distance implied in the philosophical Decision through 
which immanence is posited as immanent in a gesture of thought. The 
simultaneous positing and pre-supposing of the plane through the Concept re- 
envelops immanence in the pure and empty form of transcendence as 
delineated by the `infinite movement' through which the plane achieves its 
immanence-to-itself. Thus, the `to' indexes the plane's infinite movement of 
folding as described in the instantaneously reversible oscillation between 
actualisation and virtualisation. Without that movement, without that infinite 
folding, immanence is no longer immanence to itself, for as Deleuze & 
Guattari insist "Transcendence enters as soon as the movement of the infinite 
is stopped" (1994, p. 47). 
Accordingly, it is through this instantaneous oscillation that 
immanence is effectively folded back upon itself in a movement that 
simultaneously envelops and is enveloped in the infinite speed of that finite 
118For the crucial distinction between unobjectifiable immanence and unobjectifiable transcendence; 
and the importance of disentangling the former qua index of the Real-in-itself, from the latter qua 
principle of an Ideal ontological objectivation (or phenomenologisation), cf. supra, Chapter 2, 
especially pp. 78-80 and 90-96. 
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movement according to which the Concept achieves its own self-survey' 19. 
For although the Concept surveys its components without transcendence or 
distance, the infinite speed of survey which renders it immediately co-present 
to all its components "requires a milieu that moves infinitely in itself -the 
plane, the void, the horizon" (Ibid., p. 36). As a result it remains ultimately 
inextricable from the infinite oscillatory movement, the `fractalisation', 
through which the plane both folds itself and enfolds thought in the Concept: 
"It is this fractal nature that makes the planomenon an infinite that is always 
different from any surface or volume determinable as a concept. Every 
movement passes through the whole of the plane by immediately turning back 
on and folding itself and also by folding other movements or allowing itself to 
be folded by them, giving rise to retroactions, connections, and proliferations 
in the ractalisation of this infinitely folded up infinity (variable curvature of 
the plane)" (Ibid., p. 39). Thus, if the plane indexes the Earth, the 
Deterritorialized, the Outside, as an "infinitely folded up infinity", then the 
singular surface of the Concept on the plane marks the folding of finite and 
infinite movement; the former's envelopment by the latter and the latter's 
explication by the former. As juncture for the finite folding of the infinite and 
infinite folding of the finite, the fold of the Concept is both constitutive of and 
119"The concept is in a state of survey [survol] in relation to its components, endlessly traversing 
them 
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comprised in the plane's fractal curvature; in other words, it simultaneously 
posits and pre-supposes it; constructs it and expresses it. And it is precisely 
insofar as it constitutes a fold that is also an enfolding of the plane, that the 
pre-supposing of the plane via the self-surveying Concept recomposes part of 
that objectivating (but unobjectifiable) transcendence through which 
immanence is infinitely folded back upon itself in this self-folding, 
fractalising curvature. 
It is the `to' in the formula `immanence to itself that expresses this 
unreifiable distance of objectivation, this movement of unobjectifiable 
transcendence through which the plane successfully purges itself of all reified 
transcendence in its infinitely self-folding fractalisation. Thus, in his `Reply 
to Deleuze' 120, Laruelle argues that as far as the invocation of immanence is 
concerned "The injunction to itself rather than to something else is certainly 
imperative, but it conceals an indetermination, an ultimate ambiguity. An 
amphiboly resides within the 'to' of `to itself', one which reintroduces the 
pure form of transcendence itself as distance or relation, as surface or 
universal plane, in the absence of reified instances of transcendence. The 
philosophically normal but theoretically amphibological concept of a plane of 
immanence signifies that the latter still orbits around the plane and as plane; 
according to an order without distance. It is immediately co present to all its components or variations, 
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still orbits around the to (to itself) as axis of transcendence. Immanence 
thereby remains objective even if it is without an object, it remains an 
appearance of objectivity and gives rise to a new image of the Real and of 
thought. Instead of being absolutely faceless, unenvisageable, it takes on the 
facial aspect of a plane, of a topology, of survey and contemplation. " 
(Laruelle, 1995b, pp. 63-65) 
This objectivation of immanence is, according to Laruelle, intrinsic to 
the structure of the philosophical Decision through which Deleuze & Guattari, 
like Henry before them, unwittingly posit immanence as self-giving according 
to a subtly idealizing gesture of objectivation; instead of accepting it as 
already given or as given-without-givenness; as rigorously unenvisageable 
and necessarily foreclosed to all conceptual position and pre-supposition. 
Decision posits unobjectifiable immanence in a gesture of objectivating 
transcendence. To decide in favour of' unobjectifiable immanence as Henry 
does, or as Deleuze & Guattari do (albeit in very different philosophical 
registers), is to effect its transcendent ontological objectivation. And in the 
context of Deleuze & Guattari's materialist Decision to equate the plane of 
immanence with intensive materiality, the result is yet another materiological 
idealization of matter itself. Thus, in seeking to affirm `matter' as 
at no distance from them, passing back and forth through them[... ] " (Ibid., p. 20-21). 
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unobjectifiable immanence, both Henry and Deleuze & Guattari end up 
affirming a Decisional hybrid of matter `itself and matter `as such'; a 
Decisional composite of the materially real qua unobjectifiable immanence 
and of the ontologically ideal qua unobjectifiable transcendence. 
By way of contrast, that on the basis of which we shall be attempting 
to release the identity of matter `itself from its materiological intrication with 
matter `as such' is an immanence that is not only unobjectifiable but 
foreclosed to all Decision, even to the Decision in favour of the 
unobjectifiable; - a non-Decisional immanence that is not so much 
undecidable as radically indifferent to the Decisional alternative between 
decidable and undecidable; just as it remains foreclosed to the alternative 
between thinkable and unthinkable121. However, we shall have to wait until 
Chapter 5 to see in what way the discovery that this immanence is already 
given necessitates reconfiguring the apparatus of materialist theory in order to 
invent a thinking that operates according to `matter's' immanent foreclosure 
to Decision. 
That immanence is amenable to a process of production, that it needs 
to be constructed, is the inescapable correlate of the Decision through which 
120Written as a critical rejoinder to Deleuze & Guattari's What is Philosophy? Cf. Laruelle, 1995b. 
121Rather than constituting the enstatic immediation of thinkable and unthinkable, as in the case of 
Henry. Cf. supra, Chapter 2, pp. 87-90. 
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Deleuze & Guattari re-envelop the unobjectifiable immanence of matter 
`itself in the unobjectifiable transcendence of matter `as such'. Since that 
process of machinic construction operates under the auspices of nomadic 
distribution, it is to an examination of the latter that we now turn in order to 
grasp the ultimate philosophical consequences of Deleuze & Guattari's 
objectivation of immanence. 
Nomadic Distribution 
Without oversimplifying the complexity of their thought too 
drastically, it's possible to discern two fundamental chains of terminological 
equivalences running through Deleuze & Guattari's work. On the one hand, 
we have `fuzzy sets' of distributed nomadic elements, what Deleuze & 
Guattari refer to as `zones of continuous variation' : assemblage; rhizome; 
plateau; Concept. On the other, we have a surface of nomadic distribution, or 
what Deleuze & Guattari call a transcendental field of machinic consistency: 
the body-without-organs or plane of immanence. Yet both of these would 
seem to be supervenient on a distributing principle as that which coordinates 
the distribution of the distributed. This principle of nomadic distribution is the 
syntactical operator of machinic synthesis. Deleuze & Guattari refer to it at 
various times as `conjunctive synthesis'; `aparallel evolution'; `double 
becoming'; `abstract line'; `nomos'. These are all names for the process of 
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machinic heterogenesis through which intensive multiplicities are assembled. 
And whereas the extensive manifold remains representational and thus 
quantifiable or denumerable, the characteristic feature of intensive 
multiplicities according to Deleuze & Guattari is their non-denumerability. 
Non-denumerable multiplicities are indexes of intensity as `the Disparate'; 
`the Unequal in-itself : the multiple ceases being attributable to any 
transcendent molar unity when it becomes autonomously substantive as a 
rhizome, a flat multiplicity of n-1 dimensions in perpetual heterogenesis 
produced through the power of continuous variation proper to `and' as 
operator of conjunctive synthesis: "What characterises the non-denumerable 
is neither the set nor its elements; rather, it is the connection, the `and' 
produced between elements, between sets, and which belongs to neither, 
which eludes them or constitutes a line of flight" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988, 
p. 470). 
Being as heterogenetic production, as rhizomatic becoming, is nothing 
but this process of differential coordination through which the non- 
denumerable is conjugated. `(A)nd' is the distributive tensor capable of 
effecting machinic assemblage and of releasing pure, virtual continuums of 
intensive variation. Instead of delineating the actual determinations of 
constant relations between variables, or tracing variable relations between 
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discrete, punctual constants, the abstract line122 of rhizomatic becoming 
conjugates heterogeneous variables by initiating a flux of continuous 
variation. So whereas systems of structural arborescence distribute variable 
relations between constants and constant relations between variables, in 
accordance with a fixed, sedentary coordination of identity and difference, 
continuous variation substitutes infinite differences of differences for finite 
constant difference and replaces a variability in extensity which remains 
subordinated to the power of the constant with an ungovernable, intensive 
differentiation which abolishes the constant, exceeds the sedentary 
distribution of identity and difference, and transforms the structural tree into a 
rhizome: "In this sense `and' is less a conjunction than the atypical 
expression of all the possible conjunctions it places in continuous variation. 
The tensor therefore is not reducible either to a constant or a variable but 
assures the variation of the variable by subtracting in each instance the value 
of the constant (n-1)" (Ibid., p. 99). In other words, every machinic 
conjunction of the form: `a and b and c... etc. ' simultaneously expresses an 
infinite disjunction: `neither a nor b nor c... etc. ' because it is continuously 
subtracting the value of the constant, so that the function through which the 
series `a+b+c+... n' is constructed becomes `n-a+(n-a+n-b)+(n-a+n-b+n- 
122 "There are no points or positions in a rhizome, such as those found in a structure, tree, or root. 
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c)+... etc'. By establishing this perpetual disjunction across a series of 
elements that are continuously varying according to the constancy of the 
function `n-l', the `and' as tensor of machinic synthesis simultaneously 
effects their infinite exclusive conjunction. 
Accordingly, a continuum of intensive variation is a rhizome line 
passing between two determinate points and constituting a block of becoming 
that is neither a relation of identification, analogy, or similitude; nor the 
reciprocal exchange of individual characteristics, but rather an event that is 
entirely distinct from, and irreducible to, the relation in extensity of the two 
terms between which it passes. Through this process of machinic 
heterogenesis or double-becoming, say Deleuze & Guattari, the reciprocal 
deterritorialization of separate terms creates an autonomous zone of virtual 
indiscernibility or continuous variation: the becoming-A of B and becoming- 
B of A does not result in another term C which would be a synthesis of A and 
B, but in an event of molecular transmutation, a non-localizable conjunction 
which sweeps away the fixed identity of both terms and carries each into 
micrological proximity to the other; a nomadic zone of intensive continuity 
wherein the border proximity AB remains distinct from, and irreducible to, 
either the contiguity or the distance between A and B. 
There are only lines. " (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988, p. 8). 
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Nomadic multiplicities `are' insofar as they are in perpetual 
heterogenesis through intensive variation. Thus, for Deleuze & Guattari, the 
notions of `becoming' and of `multiplicity' remain strictly inextricable if not 
indistinguishable from one another. `(A)nd', the tensor of nomadic 
distribution, expresses being as becoming precisely insofar as it is the 
operator of machinic construction, of rhizomatic conjugation, through which 
multiplicity bypasses the opposition of the One and the Multiple to become 
instead an autonomous ontological substantive; - but a substantive which 
subsists in a state of perpetual heterogenetic transformation: "A multiplicity is 
defined not by its elements, nor by a center of unification and comprehension. 
It is defined by the number of dimensions it has; it is not divisible, it cannot 
lose or gain a dimension without changing in nature. Since its variations and 
dimensions are immanent to it, it amounts to the same thing to say that each 
multiplicity is already composed of heterogeneous terms in symbiosis, and 
that a multiplicity is continually transforming itself into a string of other 
multiplicities, according to its thresholds and doors " (Ibid., p. 249). 
Moreover, it is also becoming as event that releases the hyletic 
continuum of intensive matter, the machinic phylum composed of impersonal 
individuations and pie-personal singularities: "The machinic phylum is 
materiality, natural or artificial, and both simultaneously; it is matter in 
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movement, in flux, in variation, matter as a conveyor of singularities(.. )" 
(Ibid., p. 409). Thus, the machinic phylum is materiality defined as perpetual 
flux, continuous variation, infinite becoming, nomadic distribution, etc. For if 
becoming constitutes multiplicity as an ontological substantive, conjugated in 
accordance with the `and' as tensor of continuous variation, then the latter, as 
operator of machinic synthesis, is ultimately synonymous with `materiality' 
as intensively defined. Consequently, for Deleuze & Guattari, `and' is as 
much one of the proper names for abstract materiality as are `the Earth', or 
`anorganic Life', or `the Deterritorialized'. This is important because it 
reveals how Deleuze & Guattari have ontologised matter, rendering it 
coextensive with the philosophical Concept, in and through the same 
procedure of transcendental reduction by means of which they sought to 
purge of it all representational mediation. 
Once again, we glimpse here the materiological amphiboly underlying 
Deleuze & Guattari's transcendentalisation of intensive materiality. Let us 
recall that materiological thinking, according to our characterisation of it, 
confuses the transcendental separation between matter `as such' and matter 
`itself, with an ontological disjunction between matter as representational 
phenomenon -i. e. extensity- and materiality as non-representational residue, 
or transcendental production -i. e. intensity; the Disparate; the Unequal-in- 
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itself. That is to say: materiology envelops the unobjectifiable immanence of 
the transcendental separation between the tel quel and the comme tel in the 
unobjectifiable transcendence of the ontological disjunction between the 
intensive and the extensive. In Deleuze & Guattari's case, that amphiboly is 
initiated through the very gesture whereby hyletic reduction engenders an 
instantaneously reversible asymmetry between the phenomeno-logos of 
representational extensity and the materio-logos of machinic intensity on the 
plane of immanence. 
It is this reversibility that makes of What is Philosophy? at once a 
materialist noology and a noological materialism. Where the categorial filters 
of representation inaugurated a mediatory transcendence vis a vis the chaos of 
intensive matter, the Concept `counter-effectuates' that chaos through the 
process of its own immanent auto-construction. Because the Concept is infra- 
representational, it is no longer immanent to matter (i. e. to the Real); it is 
immanently self-assembling in and through materiality (the Real) as such 
(positing and pre-supposing the plane of immanence). Thinking no longer 
represents the multiple; it constructs it. It ceases being cogitative, legislative, 
or reflexive, in order to participate in the self-effectuation of the Real qua 
intensive materiality. For Deleuze & Guattari, philosophical thinking consists 
not so much in forging concepts capable of `apprehending' pre-individual 
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singularities and asubjective individuations, but of engendering the 
impersonal singularisation of thought by counter-effectuating an intensive 
chaos in the Concept, thereby creating Concepts that are themselves chaoids, 
haecceities, plateaus; "self-vibrating regions of intensity whose development 
avoids any orientation toward a culminating point or external end" (Deleuze 
& Guattari, 1994, p. 22). Every Concept is composed of virtual singularities 
and conjugates lines of continuous variation according to their intrinsic 
compatibility, thereby rendering their grouping consistent and bringing about 
an intensive stabilization of the power (puissance) of thought. Concepts are 
rhizomes: smooth, singular continuums of nomadic distribution; plateaus of 
molecular becoming. They represent nothing, denote nothing, signify nothing. 
They are self-assembling, self-referential; positing themselves and their 
`objects' at the same time as they are created. They are virtual events: real 
without being actual; ideal without being abstract; incorporeal without being 
immaterial123. 
Yet given that Deleuze & Guattari insist that the plane of immanence 
is neither a Concept of concepts, nor a fundamental ground or principle of any 
sort, what then is the precise nature of the relation between Concept and 
plane? Concepts are events, but the plane is the `absolute horizon for all 
1230n all these points cf. Deleuze & Guattari, 1996, pp. 15-34. 
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events'; - they inhabit and compose it without dividing or interrupting its 
indivisible continuity. Concepts are absolute, self-contained surfaces or 
volumes composed through finite movements executed at infinite speed; 
whereas the plane is the boundless interweaving and reciprocal enfolding of 
the many different finite movements or becomings making up its endlessly 
variegated, differential texture, its fractal composition or `variable 
curvature' 124. vet tlae vhe itself is always singular, indivisible, `pure 
variation'. It is the `absolute horizon' that makes "the event as concept 
independent of a visible state of affairs in which it is brought about"125; the 
Rhizosphere of infinite machinic consistency with which every finite 
becoming intersects in its rhizomatic consistency. Thus, the plane constitutes 
the Eventum Tantum; the infinite Event enfolding but never encompassing all 
others. It is the Deterritorialized; the event of the Earth's infinite becoming. 
This infinite movement necessarily intersects with all finite movements, so 
that the plane's infinite enfolding, its fractal curvature, is constituted through 
the absolute but finite surfaces or volumes which compose it. 
As a result, if `and' is indeed one among the many names which 
Deleuze & Guattari use to describe abstract matter, then it not only functions 
as the tensor of nomadic distribution whereby the rhizome conjugates lines of 
124 Cf supra, pp. 137-139; and Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 39. 
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continuous variations; it is also an index of the disjunctive synthesis through 
which virtual intensity and actual extensity are inclusively disjoined on the 
plane of immanence. Consequently, if the plane of immanence is neither one 
nor many, it is because the folding of the infinite - `the' plane- repeats itself in 
every finite fold - `this' or `that' plane. `Each' plane is `the' plane. For the 
4 and' as distributive tensor entails that "Every plane of immanence is a One- 
All. it is not partial like a scientific system, or fragmentary like concepts, but 
distributive -it is an `each "'(Ibid., p. 50). Thus, the plane's infinite folding is 
simultaneously the generating tensor of the conjunctive synthesis which 
produces intensive becoming; and the singular event or continuum, the finite 
fold generated by t hat tensor, that folding, so that the former is continuously 
repeating and recombining itself as its own higher form by means of the 
latter. The hyletic continuum of impersonal individuations and pre-individual 
singularities constitutes itself through the machinic syntax of continuum/cut 
(continuum/coupure) -disjunctive synthesis- by in-different/ciating an 
immanence which is always already different/ciated; an immanence which is 
always a composite of virtual intensity and actual extensity; so that this 
infinite continuum repeats itself in every finite cut as the absolute differing of 
the Disparate or Unequal-in-itself. But because the cut, the moment of 
125Deleuze & Guattari, ibid., p. 36. 
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differing, is a means for this repetition, one passes in a continuous fashion 
from a singular continuum or cut ('an' abstract machine; `a' plane of 
immanence) to its absolute or Ideal form in the `and' as ontogenetic tensor of 
nomadic distribution ('the' plane; `the' hyletic continuum as One-All or 
Rhizosphere). Consequently, the `and' is at once the machinic phylum as 
Eventum Tantum, producing events, becomings, lines of continuous variation, 
etc.; but also an event, a becoming, a variation which is produced; thereby 
immediately re-producing itself through its product but always as its own 
Ideal, meta-immanent form. The `and' raises itself to its nth power as 
principle of its own Ideal repetition; it marks the indiscernible co-incidence of 
the hyletic continuum as One-All and of a continuum of continuous variation 
as haecceity. Accordingly, if the univocal immanence of intensive matter 
bypasses the opposition between the One and the Multiple, it is precisely 
because the plane is folded over itself: - infinitely self-folding; infinitely self- 
objectivating; causa sui. It is immanent to itself because it is its own meta- 
immanent, Ideal form. 
What makes it Ideal is the fact that the `and' as syntactical operator of 
continuous variation is always reconstituting itself as transcendental on the 
basis of a syntagmatic instance which is ultimately identified with its 
syntactical condition; a conditioned endowed by Deleuze & Guattari with the 
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power of transcending itself, not only toward but also as its own condition, 
thereby co-constituting the latter. Moreover, this ultimately transcendent 
continuity between becoming as infinite continuum and becoming as finite 
cut, between Rhizosphere and rhizome, is established on the basis of the 
plane's hybrid -i. e. empirico-transcendental- composition, and in accordance 
with that parallelism, that reversible asymmetry between actual extensity and 
virtual intensity, which we diagnosed earlier. The plane of immanence 
remains Ideal because it operates according to a logic of absolute self- 
relation: immanence is no longer attributive as immanence `to' a transcendent 
universal, but only at the cost of becoming this self-positing, self- 
presupposing hybrid of the transcendental and the transcendent -which is to 
say, of unobjectifiable immanence and unobjectifiable transcendence- , so that 
every continuous multiplicity, every molecular becoming is simultaneously 
virtual and actual, molecular and molar, smooth and striated, dividing itself 
interminably between these two states, passing from one to the other in a 
continuous circuit. As a result, Deleuze & Guattari's infinite hyletic 
continuum is perpetually obliged to re-affirm itself as transcendental, as 
unobjectifiably immanent, by means of its own Ideal repetition, its own 
unobjectifiable transcendence. It is causa sui: Ideal and self-positing126 
126It is this capacity for absolute `auto-position' which, as Laruelle himself puts it in Principe de 
154 
Hyletic Idealism 
Now at last, as well as beginning to appreciate the full import of 
Laruelle's characterisation of Deleuze & Guattari's machinic constructivism 
as a form of `absolute hyletic idealism', perhaps we are also in a better 
position to understand Laruelle's earlier cryptic remark127 concerning the 
status of all empirical instances as `continuous cuts' in the hyletic continuum. 
Every empirical instance, every finite cut, simultaneously indexes an infinite 
hyletic continuum; every concrete assemblage transcends itself as a 
continuous cut toward the infinite continuity of the plane of consistency. As a 
result, the plane of immanence bears all the topological hallmarks of a 
transcendental Möbius strip: a flat, single sided surface continuously twisting 
around itself through 180° so that it op-poses its inner and outer face to one 
another even as it renders both opposites virtually contiguous through the 
single surface by virtue of which they continue to flow smoothly into each 
other128. In the case of the plane of consistency, this infinite twisting whereby 
inner and outer face are adjoined without distance, coinciding on single 
Minorite, makes of the hyletic continuum the equivalent of a `transcendental Deduction in act' and 
hence a paradigmatic philosophical Decision (cf. infra, Chapter 5): "The limitless hyletic flux is 
doubtless perfect, it is at once (but this is not what is problematic about it from now on) hetero- and 
auto production of itself Causa sui. [It constitutes] a true transcendental Deduction in act because it 
synthesizes itself as `objective reality' (unity of the real and of ideal objectivity), legitimating itself and 
demonstrating its own objectivity to itself on the basis of criteria drawn from itself because they shift 
and transform themselves along with it. "(Laruelle, 1981, p. 88). 
127Cf. supra, p. 115. 
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continuous surface, is constituted through the `in-different/ciation' whereby 
virtual and actual are disjunctively conjoined in an instantaneously reversible 
exchange; - or through the movement of becoming in which the intensive and 
the extensive, the smooth and the striated, are inclusively disjoined. It is 
through this infinite torsion, this perpetual transversal communication 
between virtual and actual, that every finite cut in the hyletic continuum 
comes to represent an infinite continuum for another cut, and every real 
division becomes a means through which the indivision of an Ideal continuity 
continuously reaffirms itself. Consequently, as Laruelle puts it in Principe de 
Minorite: "Precisely because the cut is only ever a means at the hands of 
Repetition [i. e. the `and' as tensor of disjunctive synthesis- RB], one passes in 
a continuous manner from empirical cuts to ideal or hyletic cuts, from the 
empirical and transcendent to the ideal [i. e. transcendentally immanent-RB] 
form of division. This continuity of processes is the Idea as such; Repetition is 
the Idea or Being effecting its relation to the data of Representation through 
the cut constituted by Difference. Division simultaneously divides itself and 
divides experience. It forms a continuous line that re-turns in itself and whose 
every point adioins an empirical surface and an ideal surface, both of which 
are pure (still ideal). Being and Becoming, the flux and the cut, flow through 
128Laruelle explicitly discusses the transcendental topology of the plane of immanence in terms of the 
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experience whilst remaining irreducible to it, just as experience flows 
through the Idea, identifying itself with it, but precisely in an ideal mode. 
There is a prior identity, a precession of the Idea as the Same [i. e. the 
indivisible co-belonging -RB] of empirical and ideal cuts, and this prior 
identity is invested in experience as well as in the Idea. As a result, 
experience is no longer an ontic region opposed to the realm of the Idea, it is 
an ontico-ontological degree of the Difference/Idea complex, but one which is 
diluted, distended, depotentiated, disintensified' (Laruelle, 1981, p. 70). 
Thus, between the infinite Ideality of the ontological continuum and 
the finite actuality of the ontic cut, there is neither a straightforwardly 
representational identity nor a crudely categorial opposition; there is instead a 
hyletic indiscernibility; a machinic reversibility generated according to this 
Ideal contiguity of transcendental virtuality and empirical actuality on the 
plane of consistency. Perhaps the charge of idealism becomes readily 
comprehensible once we have understood how, within the ambit of Deleuze 
& Guattari's machinic materialism, there can be no possibility of 
distinguishing between the Idea of continuous multiplicity (i. e. the 
Rhizosphere) and its empirical actuality as exhibited in the heterogeneous, 
empirical manifold of rhizomatic assemblages. Deleuze & Guattari's 
Möbius strip in his `Reply to Deleuze', pp. 69-72. 
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materiology delineates the ontico-ontological disjunction between extensive 
actuality and intensive virtuality on the basis of a preliminary suspension, a 
methodological `sublation', of the representational distinction between the 
heterogeneous, empirical manifold of assemblages, and the homogeneous, 
transcendental continuity proper to the plane of consistency. In so doing 
however, they liquefy every singularity, haecceity, becoming, or event, into a 
virtual ontological equivalence with every other. Every event is dissolved into 
the universality of the Eventum Tantum; every cut in the phylum must also be 
continuous. This indiscernibility between One-becoming and All-becoming 
precludes the possibility of discovering a radically discontinuous manifold as 
index of a One that would never reconstitute itself as an All; or a cut that 
would not prove to be re-included a priori within the seamless, ideal 
continuity of the machinic phylum. It is the phylum's infinite and Ideal 
relational continuity129, its elision of the separation of matter 'itself' n the 
sovereignty of matter `as such' qua nomadic distribution as inclusive 
disjunction of representational extensity and machinic intensity, which 
inhibits the possibility of discovering an Identity proper130 to matter `itself, 
independently of the Idea and outside the Concept; according to the 
129As exhibited in the machinic syntax: continuum/cut/continuum/etc...; or virtual/actual/virtual/etc... 
130Since the Identity in question is non-ontological -non-unitary and non-consistent-, it 
invokes no 
surreptitious privileging of `propriety' or of `the proper' in any obviously deconstructible, 
ontotheological sense. 
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foreclosure of its immanence devoid of transcendence; in its multiplicity 
without Being. 
In obscuring the purely transcendental separation of matter `itself 
from matter `as such' through the ontological disjunction between virtual 
intensity and actual extensity, in deliberately maintaining an empirico- 
transcendental hybridisation of immanence, Deleuze & Guattari effectively 
perpetuate a more insidious phenomenalisation of matter; one which is 
asubjective and anobjective, neither noetically circumscribed by intentional 
consciousness nor horizonally encompassed within being-in-the-world, but 
one which is nevertheless coextensive with that pure and empty form of 
objectivating transcendence through which immanence or `matter' is 
simultaneously posited and pre-supposed in the Concept. Consequently, not 
only are those three amphibolies which we characterised as definitive of 
materiological thought in Chapter 1131 perfectly instantiated in Deleuze & 
Guattari's materialism; - machinic constructivism transforms those 
amphibolies into structurally necessary, explicitly constitutive features. What 
was unintentional amphiboly in the work of Henry becomes deliberate 
synthetic hybridisation in the case of Deleuze & Guattari. Thus, machinic 
constructivism deliberately synthesizes real, ontic immanence with ideal, 
131Cf. infra, Chapter 1, pp. 59-61. 
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ontological immanence; it explicitly replaces unilateral determination of the 
ideal by the real with an immediately reversible coincidence whereby every 
virtual different/ciation of the actual is indissociable from a reciprocal in- 
different/ciation of the virtual; finally, the radically unobjectifiable 
immanence of matter `itself is methodically and systematically reenveloped 
in the unobjectifiable transcendence of matter `as such' qua nomadic 
distribution. 
Accordingly, and in spite of the remarkable vigour and sophistication 
of Deleuze & Guattari's transcendental materialism, in spite of their 
exhilarating commitment to experimentation and invention, it would be a 
mistake to oppose, in a naive or ideological manner, their brand of machinic 
constructivism to the apparatus of Representation per se. Let us recall the 
remark by Laruelle that we cited above: "Repetition is the Idea or Being 
effecting its relation to the data of Representation through the cut constituted 
by Difference" 132. Remembering that, according to the account of Deleuze & 
Guattari's thought which we have just provided, `Repetition' as Idea or Being 
is none other than the `and' as tensor of continuous variation, and that the 
4 cut' constituted by Difference likewise finds expression in the `and' as 
inclusive disjunction of intensity and extensity; we see that it is the latter as 
132Cf. supra, p. 155. 
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`Being' or `Idea' which is perpetually reinscribing and reincluding 
representational extensity within the immanence of the hyletic continuum as 
its unavoidable complement of disintensification or depotentiation; its 
actualised residue; its fallen fruit. Thus, it is the transcendental topology 
proper to the plane of consistency as Möbius strip which ensures that there is 
-not only in fact but also by right- a constitutive continuity between 
representation and Concept; an a priori hybridisation of representational 
extensity and machinic intensity; of representational striation and nomadic 
smoothing. Deleuze & Guattari abolish the structures of categorial analogy, 
with its equivocal circumscription of extensive difference in the concept, in 
order to attain to the pure and empty form of Representation through the 
Concept's rhizomatic counter-effectuation -its simultaneous positing and pre- 
supposing- of intensive Difference as Being, as Idea. Machinic constructivism 
ditches representation qua equivocal analogisation of the real, the better to 
effectuate Representation qua univocal analogue of matter. 
Thus, in an ambiguity characteristic of the transcendental varieties of 
materiological thinking, only the localised, objectively unified representations 
of matter are dissolved and dismantled, the better to proceed to the 
transcendental identification of matter with that Ideal, unitary continuity 
guaranteed through an all embracing disjunctive synthesis. The hyletic 
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continuum is the Idea of matter `as such' qua universal tensor of nomadic 
distribution. But this position and pre-supposition of immanent materiality in 
and through the Concept, this machinic phenomenalisation of intensive matter 
`as such' in terms of the differential syntax of nomadic distribution, of the 
`and' as tensor of machinic synthesis, is in fact Representation, or the Idea, in 
its highest form, Representation raised to its own nth power. It guarantees the 
intensive continuity between thought and matter and establishes an 
instantaneous reversibility between the reality of/in the Concept and the 
Concept of/in the real. As a result, machinic materialism appears not so much 
as the immediate negation of empirical realism, but rather as its 
transcendental sublation. 
Transcendental Materialism versus Empirical Realism 
Gs 
As far 'the transcendental materialist is concerned, empirical realism is 
a prejudice concomitant with those forms of pre-philosophical naivety 
engendered in accordance with representational common sense and 
phenomenological doxa. The phylum's infinite continuity is perpetually 
liquefying the reified stolidity of empirical actuality. Machinic constructivism 
actively pulverizes the dogmas of empirical realism and the doxas of 
phenomenological experience by continuously reinjecting infinite movement 
into the hypostatised stasis of representational extensity. As we saw above, 
6 
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the discontinuity of empirical extensity is seamlessly re-integrated into the 
Ideality of the intensive continuum, but as a distillate -a `disintensification' 
or `depotentiation'- of an infinite movement of actualisation. In the words of 
Laruelle which we cited earlier133: "Experience is no longer an ontic region 
opposed to the realm of the Idea, it is an ontico-ontological degree of the 
Difference/Idea complex, but one which is diluted, distended, depotentiated, 
disintensified" (Ibid. ). 
However, as Laruelle himself rather caustically points out in his 
`Reply to Deleuze', this indiscernible contiguity between the transcendental 
ideality of virtual intensity and the empirical reality of actual extensity on the 
plane of consistency, relegating as it does `experience' qua empirical 
actuality to the status of a residue distilled from the process of becoming, 
entails a set of "(d)isastrous consequences for `empirical data' [donnees 
empiriques]: not only are they devoid of reality; they are above all 
necessarily conceived of as deficient or degraded, as a reification or 
`actualisation' of becoming. Their reality is an illusion, an appearance, a 
deficiency of their auto position in and through the strip [i. e. the Möbius strip 
or plane of consistency-RB]. That which is `auto' posited (just as one says 
`suicided'), and posited by that which is more powerful than it, the möbian 
133Cf. supra, p. 156. 
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form of all autoposition, is thus not posited in itself or by itself and is obliged 
to sever all continuity with its empirical 'double' or 'indication', or reckon it 
as a mere appearance. Such is the most general presupposition of all absolute 
idealism, and perhaps of all philosophy; an idealism which in this instance 
constitutes an equally absolute realism (`real without being actual; ideal 
without being abstract ). `experience' is in general, and from the very outset, 
reckoned as devoid of all reality" (Laruelle, 1995a, p. 76)134. 
What `reality' and which `experience' does Laruelle accuse Deleuze & 
Guattari of `suiciding' here? Representational reality? Phenomenological 
experience? Everything hinges on whether the accusation of `idealism' is 
made against machinic materialism - and, a fortiori, against philosophy - in a 
spirit of pious conservatism, on behalf of a representational realism and a 
phenomenological experience, or alternatively, in the name of an altogether 
134Interestingly, Laruelle's arguments here anticipate Badiou's in The Clamour of Being; to wit; that 
Deleuze's transcendental reduction of representational extensity on the plane of immanence entails a 
derealisation of the actual. Cf. Badiou, 1997b, passim, but especially pp. 65-81. In other words, both 
Laruelle and Badiou argue that, for Deleuze, actuality as product remains intrinsically subordinate to 
intensive virtuality as realm of machinic productivity. However, although we have been arguing here, 
along with Laruelle and Badiou, that there is a very strong sense in which Deleuze's philosophy is 
ultimately -albeit unconventionally- idealist in tenor, we do not believe that this constitutes an 
unpardonable indictment in and of itself. The real question, it seems to us, consists in asking whether or 
not Deleuze's peculiar brand of idealism is necessarily a bad thing. For insofar as it excoriates a certain 
dogmatic phenomenological realism, an excoriation which seems to us entirely consonant with the 
pulverizing of phenomenological reality effected by the natural sciences, Deleuze's hyletic idealism 
strikes us as entirely honourable. Where we find that idealism problematic -which is also the reason 
why we find the ramifications of Laruelle's critique particularly valuable- is on account of the residual 
dimension of quasi-phenomenological presupposition entailed by the indissociable coincidence of 
virtual and actual in Deleuze's thought. In other words, Deleuze does not go far enough in his 
suspension of all phenomenological presupposition: there is still a residual phenomenalisation of matter 
4 as such' entailed in Deleuze's objectivation of immanence through the positing and pre-supposing of 
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unrepresentable `reality' and a definitively unphenomenologisable 
`experience' 
. 
Since -as will hopefully become perfectly clear in the second half of 
this thesis- Laruelle has absolutely no interest in providing reactionary 
apologias, whether it be for the good-sense of representation, or for the Ur- 
doxas of phenomenology, it is necessary for us to provide a brief explication 
of the implicit but unstated series of argumentative steps which furnish the 
correct framework for understanding why the ` reality' and `experience' 
invoked by Laruelle in this protest against `idealism' are neither 
representational nor phenomenological. 
First, we need to clarify what exactly Laruelle means by the 
expression `empirical data' (donnees empiriques) when he claims that the 
continuum's absolute auto-position deprives the latter of their autonomy and 
reality because it turns the actual into a reified remainder, a residue leftover 
from the movement of infinite becoming. Fortunately, Laruelle supplies us 
with an explicit definition of what he means by `empirical data' -one which is 
neither representational nor phenomenological but overtly non-philosophical- 
in a text from 1988 (also ostensibly `about' Deleuze)135-: "By `empirical data' 
the plane; a `machinic' phenomenalisation of matter engendered as a result of immanence's idealization 
as an empirico-transcendental hybrid or composite. 
135The text in question, which appeared in issue number 5 of La Decision philosophique, the journal 
edited by Laruelle between 1987 and 1989, is entitled `Letter to Deleuze'. This `Letter', written by 
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I understand that which is posited by philosophical decision and by its 
sufficiency in order to affect the latter, in other words, that which is in the 
philosophical decision hyý moans of which it is also interpreted" (Laruelle, 
1988g, p. 102). 
How are we to interpret this definition ? Indisputably in this instance, 
some degree of familiarity with the non-philosophical context it presupposes 
is indispensable. Thus, for instance, we need to be aware of the fact that, as 
far as Laruelle is concerned, it is intrinsic to the structure of philosophical 
Decision insofar as it invariably instantiates an empirico-transcendental 
doublet that it incorporate or encompass a priori the empirical wing of the 
doublet as the necessary complement of factical contingency through which it 
achieves its own absolute auto-affection and auto-position. Accordingly, in 
this non-philosophical definition of `empirical data', the latter provide that 
initial leverage-point whose empirical presupposition is subsequently seen to 
way of reply to an unpublished missive in which Deleuze asked Laruelle "What distinguishes the One 
from Spinoza's substance? ", is one of those texts which Laruelle classifies among his explicitly 
experimental or `hyperspeculative' exercises in `philo-fiction'. In an obvious allusion to Spinoza's 
more geometrico , 
it responds to the Deleuzean query by elaborating a non-philosophical axiomatic in a 
series of numbered definitions running from 1.1 to 15.2. In spite of its considerable formal austerity, 
this particular text remains remarkably helpful because it furnishes us with explicit definitions of all the 
basic conceptual components of non-philosophical theory (at least in the form in which these existed in 
Philosophie H. Philosophie III purifies and refines all these components further still, sometimes adding 
new ones, but it does not make any significant retractions; -save for discontinuing Philosophie II's 
residually philosophical identification of non-philosophy with science). The contrast - which we are 
trying to highlight here- between `the empirical' qua intra-Decisional ideality and `the empirical' qua 
non-Decisional reality, occurs in definitions 5.1 and 5.2 respectively. 5.1 defines `empirical data' qua 
intra-Decisional component; 5.2 defines empirical data qua Decision itself as occasional cause or 
support for non-philosophical theory. Cf. Laruelle, 1988g. 
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have been retroactively posited a priori in and through an ultimately self- 
sufficient transcendental operation; - a structure we saw verified in Deleuze & 
Guattari's delineation of the methodological reduction whereby the actuality 
of the given comes to be seen as the result of a process of production -an 
actualisation-; but a process in which it is the initial presupposition of 
empirical extensity as enveloped in the plane of immanence -the suspension 
of its empirical autonomy- which allows for the uncovering of its conditions 
of production and its subsequent positing as a component in the philosophical 
Concept. Thus, the aleatory contingency of empirical actuality is posited by 
the Deleuzoguattarian Decision, in order to furnish it with an exploitable 
resource; a pseudo-heteronomous component which Decision will always 
already have pre-supposed. Empirical actuality effectively serves as the 
`vanishing mediator' in the circle of reciprocal position and presupposition 
between plane and Concept; a circle in which the empirical immediacy of the 
actual is invariably understood to have been `always already' transcendentally 
suspended and preserved; `sublated' as a posited intermediate; or as the 
product of an actualisation 136. 
Consequently, if philosophical thinking for Laruelle is necessarily and 
constitutively idealist in character -or formally idealising regardless of 
136Cf. supra, pp. 127-130. 
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whether or not it is recognized as explicitly or substantially idealist- it is 
because the intrinsically self-positing, self-presupposing structure of Decision 
-what Laruelle calls its `sufficiency'- guarantees that `empirical data' 
('actuality', `the given', etc. ), are always encompassed a priori as grist for the 
Decisional mill, so that they remain merely of the order of a pretext, an 
exploitable resource devoid of any real independence or autonomy, ready to 
be processed and integrated as a homogeneous structural component in the 
mechanism of Decision137. 
By way of contrast to this transcendental imperialism of Decision as 
practised in its autonomous, self-sufficient mode -the imperialism of 
transcendental sufficiency or absolute auto-position whereby the 
independence of the empirical is denied-, in the same text from 1988 which 
we have just cited, Laruelle defends the relative autonomy of a non- 
representational, non-phenomenological empirical instance by effecting the 
transformation of Decision itself -ergo, of intra-Decisional `empiricity' as 
representationally and/or phenomenologically defined- into an `occasional 
cause' or `material support' for non-Decisional theory: "By support or 
occasion, I describe those ideal or empirical data which are necessary as the 
137Clearly, the credibility of this account, which we shall return to in greater detail in Chapter 5, 
depends on the plausibility of the claim that all philosophy, whether it recognize it or not, and 
regardless of its stated antipathy to the term (e. g. the British empiricists; Hegel; Nietzsche; the later 
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material from which thought extracts real a prioris, in other words, that 
which existing in the philosophical decision, has its condition of reality in 
something else or in the real as last instance" (Ibid. ) 
Once again, this definition of the empirical as `support' or `occasion' 
is neither representational nor phenomenological but explicitly non- 
philosophical (which is to say, at once rigorously theoretical and radically 
universal): the empirical data that have their ideal but heteronomous existence 
as posited in and through Decision, have their real or relatively autonomous 
existence -their unrepresentable condition of reality, as well as their 
unphenomenologisable condition of experience- in the immanence of the 
Real as radically unobj ectifiable last-instance. 
Since, at this stage, it is still too early to attempt to provide all the 
necessary technical clarifications required for an exhaustive analysis of this 
non-philosophical translation of `empiricity', we can only hope to provide the 
reader with an anticipatory sketch of the transformation that has occurred in 
the shift from the philosophical to the non-philosophical perspective; a sketch 
whose initial aura of impenetrable obscurity will, we hope, become 
Heidegger; etc. ) is ultimately transcendental in the very broad, generic sense used by Laruelle; which is 
to say, essentially Decisional. 
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considerably diminished in the light of subsequent clarifications furnished in 
Chapter 5 of Part 11138. 
According to this sketch, where philosophical Decision invariably 
presupposes the autonomous, pseudo-immanent reality of empirical data, the 
better to dissolve the autonomy of that pseudo-immanent reality via the 
process of its ideal sublation in and through a self-positing transcendence; 
non-philosophy, in accordance with the radical autonomy of the Real qua 
n Given-without-giveness, recognizes the relative autonomy of an empirical 
realm now identified with Decision itself in its ideal, self-positing 
transcendence; - but does so the better to extract a set of real -i. e. non- 
representational and non-phenomenological- a prioris from that ideal, 
transcendently posited reality and experience. These non-Decisional a prioris 
determine-in-the-last-instance the Decision's own a priori idealisation of 
reality and experience139. In other words, by discovering the `real' or non- 
Decisional a priori for the `ideal', Decisional a priori, non-philosophy 
determines philosophical determination. It discovers the Real, radically 
unobjectifiable condition for Ideal objectivation. Thus, where materiological 
Decision undermines a certain restricted or localised form of representational 
138 For an explanation of philosophical Decision as relatively autonomous occasional cause for non- 
philosophical thinning, cf. Chapt, r 5, c specially pp. 249-251. 
139 Cf. infra, Chapter 6, pp. 301-305. 
170 
objectification and phenomenological presupposition, only to replace these 
with a subtler, unobjectifiable form of objectivation, a subtler, pre- 
phenomenological form of phenomenalisation; the non-Decisional 
transmutation of materiological Decision into an empirical occasion extracts 
from the latter the non-objectivating, non-phenomenalising i 40 a prioris 
determining these ultimate residues of objectivation and phenomenalisation 
themselves. 
Obscurity notwithstanding, we hope at least to have furnished the 
reader with some inkling of the manner in which a concept which in its 
ordinary philosophical usage invariably remains representational and/or 
phenomenological, is radicalised and generalised (i. e. universalised) non- 
philosophically so that it achieves a rigorously transcendental theoretical 
validity. It is crucial to notice the way in which this process involves a change 
of scale: the concept of the empirical instance is radically expanded from that 
of an intra-Decisional component whose representational and/or 
phenomenological pre-supposition involves at once an idealizing sublation of 
empirical autonomy and an empirico-ideal hybridisation of the 
140This is a particularly delicate point. We must distinguish between intra-Decisional 
phenomenologisation; Decisional phenomenalisation; and non-Decisional phenomenality. Although the 
a prioris of non-Decisional theory are neither straightforwardly phenomenological, nor 
phenomenalising in the subtler sense in which the empirico-transcendental or hybrid structure of 
Decision itself constitutes a phenomenalising principle, they are nevertheless `phenomenal-in-the-last- 
instance' insofar as they are determined by the immanence of Real as `the Phenomenon-in-itself', or as 
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transcendental; to that of Decision as such in its inviolable, self-sufficient 
integrity as an indecomposable structural whole. Thus, the non-philosophical 
definition of the empirical now encompasses the empirico-transcendental 
structure of Decision in its autonomous, self-positing sufficiency. But its 
autonomy as self-positing and self-giving is now merely conditional rather 
than absolute, for Decision is now given and posited as relative to the radical 
autonomy of a Real which is given-without-givenness and posited-without- 
position. Absolute auto-position is now heteronomously posited in its 
inalienable relativity to radical immanence: it has becomes relatively 
autonomous. 
Accordingly, if non-philosophy defends the inviolable integrity and 
relative autonomy of the empirical, it is precisely insofar as the empirical has 
now been definitively purged of every trace or residue of representational 
and/or phenomenological pre-supposition. Whereas the machinic materialist's 
critique of representational realism and phenomenological experience remains 
trapped in a double-bind, condemned to presuppose the irrecusable pertinence 
of empirical actuality in order to effect that transcendental suspension of its 
validity which is the prerequisite for uncovering its sub-representational and 
sub-phenomenological conditions of production; non-philosophy proceeds on 
`Phenomenon-without-phenomenalisation'. Cf infra, Chapter 6, p. 293; pp. 296-301; and Chapter 7, 
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the basis of a suspension of the empirical qua Decision that has always 
already been achieved; always already been realized in accordance with the 
inalienable immanence of the Real as ante-Decisional sine qua non for all 
Decision. Thus, non-philosophy presupposes nothing -certainly nothing 
empirical- unless it be the i. npredicable immanence of the Real as posited- 
without-position. Moreover, if the empirical presents itself, it presents itself in 
terms of nothing more substantial than an entirely contingent occasion or 
support for thinking. It is purged of all representational and 
phenomenological concretion, of all factical overdetermination, the better to 
be retained as an empty invariant, a purely formal structure of position and 
pre-supposition now amenable to a potentially limitless variety of structural 
reconfigurations. 
Significantly then, there is a sense in which the (non-representational) 
`reality' and (non-phenomenological) `experience' of the empirical which 
Laruelle defends against the idealism of the continuum's absolute auto- 
position are those of philosophical Decision itself as an empty formal 
invariant; as an occasion and support for a potentially infinite series of non- 
representational and non-phenomenological redescriptions through which the 
substance, tenor, and character of intra-Decisional `reality' as well as of intra- 
p. 360. 
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Decisional `experience' can be perpetually renegotiated beyond the limits of 
what is empirically pre-supposed and transcendentally posited as given within 
those ontological parameters governed by the sufficiency of Decision. For in 
the final analysis, the continuum's absolute, self-positing autonomy, the Ideal 
transcendental continuity through which machinic constructivism attacks the 
good sense of representational realism as well as the Ur-doxas of 
phenomenological experience, masks its amphibological structure, its 
empirico-transcendental hybridisation; and thus its ultimately empirical 
reliance on the data of representation and phenomenology; a reliance which 
procures their localised subversion at the cost of their global perpetuation. 
In order to clarify this latter point, let us reconsider those 
philosophical mechanisms through which machinic constructivism effects its 
critical subversion of representational reality and phenomenological 
experience. 
For Deleuze in Difference and Repetition and The Logic of Sense 141, 
the ruin of representation is effected in accordance with the Nietzschean logic 
of the dice-throw: the unconditional affirmation of Chance, of the Outside, as 
an incompossible or virtual whole -i. e. as a representational impossibility-, 
results in the philosopher's counter-effectuation of chaosmotic Chance as 
141 Cf. for instance Deleuze, 1994, pp. 198-200; & Deleuze, 1990, especially pp. 127-161. 
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event; an effectuation whereby the phenomenological `I' is cracked open and 
representational subjectivity exploded, releasing those impersonal 
individuations and pre-personal singularities that swarm through the cosmic 
fissure in the seif. ", '. t is this moment of Nietzschean affirmation -the auto- 
affirmation of impersonal Chance as an incompossible whole through the 
philosopher as purified automaton- which seems to coincide with the self- 
positing of the philosophical Concept, its counter-effectuation of intensive 
chaos, in What is Philosophy? 142. 
Crucially, for Deleuze, it is because thought's dice-throw is an 
affirmation of the event's unconditional exteriority that representational 
reality and phenomenological experience do not need to be deconstructed, 
since neither thought nor experience are necessarily `inscribed' within them: 
subjectification, signification and organization are no more than superficial 
overlays; sedentary arrests; temporary interruptions of infinite movement; - 
both `thought' and `experience' are already outside143. Thus, if rhizomatic 
thinking deploys itself immediately and unproblematically in the element of 
libidinal intensities, it's because it's already operating outside, carried along 
by that movement whose infinite speed allows it to evade the tri-partite 
142Cf. Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, pp. 159-160. 
143"One 
will never cease returning to the question in order to succeed in getting outside it. But getting 
outside never happens like this. Movement always occurs by itself, behind the thinker's back, or at that 
moment when he blinks. Either one is already outside, or it'll never happen. " (Deleuze, 1977, pp. 
7-8). 
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cloister of phenomenological subjectivation, linguistic signification, and 
corporeal organization. 
But in fact, things are not so simple, for as we have seen, machinic 
thought is not so much already Outside as in-between inside and outside; or 
rather `outside' precisely insofar as it is on the margin or cusp `between' 
virtual and actual; between smooth and striated. This problematises the 
machinic materialist's insistence that thought and experience are already 
operating in what Delewe calls `the great Outside' [le grand Dehors]; for if 
the thinking deployed upon the plane of immanence always starts in the 
middle, `in-between' virtual and actual, it turns out that this Outside is in fact 
always a hybrid or mixture of nomadic intensity and stratified (or 
`representational') extensity. As we saw above144, the immanence affirmed by 
the transcendental empiricist is constructed around that point of 
indiscernibility, that reciprocal exchange, between virtual and actual, so that 
the heteromorphy, or unilateral disjunction between nomadic intensity and 
stratified extensity, remains circumscribed within a unitary parallelism: the 
hyletic continuum's infinite movement encompasses at once the continuous 
variation of nomadic distribution; and the deceleration, the arresting of 
movement in stratified representation. 
144Cf. supra, pp. 129-131. 
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What then are the consequences of this continuity concerning the 
relation between representational reality and phenomenological experience on 
the one hand; and the destratified thought and experience of the Outside on 
the other ? Since, for machinic constructivism, the distinction between 
`appearance' and `reality' remains intrinsically representational, it is not so 
much a matter of denouncing subj ectivation, signification, and organization as 
illusory, but rather of effecting their transcendental circumvention by 
maintaining the infinite speed through which rhizomatic thinking accelerates 
beyond subjectification; and by perpetuating the infinite movement through 
which the plane of immanence liquefies all eruptions of reified transcendence. 
However, once again, things are not quite so simple. For hyletic 
continuity entails that the unilateral disjunction between representation and 
rhizome also necessitates their residual reciprocity, their constitutive 
hybridisation, so that infinite speed and absolute movement remain relative 
to the slow speeds and relative movements captured by stratic synthesis. 
Thus, the transcendental hybridisation through which the continuum is 
constituted means that the `absolute' movements of the plane maintain a 
constitutive reference to the relative movements of subj ectification, 
signification and organization: as with Henry, the absolute remains relative to 
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that from which it absolves itself145. As a result, the absolute Outside 
continues to remain liminal, occupying the borderline between the signifying 
and the asignifying, between the subjectified and the impersonal, precisely on 
account of its unconditional, self-positing continuity. 
This is the price to be paid for that necessary reversibility, that 
inevitable complementarity whereby all deterritorializations remain 
"inseparable from correlative reterritorializations"146. In other words, 
Deleuze & Guattari maintain a transcendental amphiboly between, on the one 
hand, a `reality' and an `experience' construed in terms of representation and 
phenomenology: i. e. subjectified, signifying, organized; and, on the other, the 
impersonal, asignifying, anorganic movements of a plane of consistency 
which supposedly knows nothing of those processes of sedentary 
stratification. But it is precisely insofar as this mixture of deterritorialized 
exteriority and reterritorialized interiority, this hybridisation of absolute 
impersonality and empirical subjectivity, fatally occludes the unrepresentable 
`reality' of an immanence which remains foreclosed to all objectivation; just 
as it obscures the unphenomenologisable `experience' of an immanence 
which is foreclosed to subjectification, signification and organization, that 
Laruelle accuses Deleuze & Guattari of idealism. 
145Cf. supra, Chapter 2, pp. 85-87. 
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It is in order to preclude the possibility of such empirico- 
transcendental hybridisation, that Laruelle, by way of contrast, will inaugurate 
an irreversible unilateral duality `between' a radically autonomous 
immanence; one that remains definitively foreclosed to all representation, 
phenomenologisation, or Conceptual pre-supposition; and a relatively 
autonomous empirical instance, constituted by the philosophical hybridisation 
of immanence and transcendence as such. The latter will serve as the 
occasional cause on the basis of which to effect the non-Decisional separation 
-the `dualysation'- of the machinic materialist's Decisional mixture of 
deterritorialized exteriority and reterritorialized interiority. 
Using this strictly unilateral separation between the radical autonomy 
of Real immanence and the relative autonomy of empirico-ideal 
transcendence as its basis, non-materialist theory proposes to maintain a 
distinction between the empirical and the transcendental that would neither 
reinstate an ontological dualism of subjective ideality and substantial reality; 
nor effect the ontological sublation of that dualism in the self-positing Idea147. 
The latter move invariably prefigures the collapse of the separation between 
matter `as such' and matter `itself in the hyle as ontological Idea. We have 
146Cf. for instance Deleuze & Guattari, 1988, p. 509. 
147This particular dilemma constituted a problem which, in one form or another, plagued much post- 
Kantian philosophy. We have in mind here Schelling's account of the development of post-Kantianism 
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already seen how hyletic idealism typically dissolves the distinction between 
matter as empirical datum and matter as ideal a priori by effecting their 
ontological reconciliation in the hyletic continuum as self-positing, self- 
presupposing Idea. 
Moreover, to the extent that it ends up reaffirming that sublation, there 
is a sense in which Deleuze & Guattari's materialism remains consonant - 
albeit in a particularly abstract fashion- with a certain underlying anti-Kantian 
thread uniting an otherwise utterly disparate set of philosophical 
problematics: like Hegel, Husserl, and Heidegger, each in their very different 
ways before them, Deleuze & Guattari unequivocally reject the premise of an 
irrecusable transcendental separation between thinking and being. This 
transcendental separation, lest we forget, is emphatically not ontological148, 
for Kant - through a concatenation of gestures he himself only dimly 
appreciated- effectively terminated the epistemic privileges of Cartesian 
subjectivity and the apof"iüs of ontological dualism -which is to say, the 
dualism of subject and substance- in the same move whereby he prepared for 
the separation of matter `itself from matter `as such'. Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
the ontological elision of Kant's transcendental distinction invariably results 
as set out in On the History of Modern Philosophy. Cf. Schelling, 1994, especially pp. 94-185. But cf. 
also Miklos Vetö's reconstruction of the post-Kantian problematic in Vetö, 1998 and 2000, passim. 
1480n this very point, cf. Allison, 1983, pp. 3-13 and passim . 
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in one or other variation on the theme of absolute idealism149. In Deleuze & 
Guattari's case, the result is probably the most philosophically sophisticated - 
hence, the most dangerously seductive- version of absolute idealism thus far 
achieved (one which, despite the oft-cited exoteric divergences, retains a 
certain esoteric affinity with that of Hegel150): it argues for the virtual 
indiscernibility, the inclusive disjunction, between the Ideal continuity of 
matter `as such' and the Real discontinuity of matter 'itself. 
Since Being as continuous variation, as infinite hyletic continuum, 
abolishes the separation of matter `itself from the Idea of matter in the 
perpetual becoming-matter of thought and becoming-thought of matter, it no 
longer makes sense, according to Deleuze & Guattari, to protest that there is 
an immanence irreducible to Conceptual pre-supposition, or a matter 
irreducible to Conceptual counter-effectuation. In aligning ourselves with this 
sort of protest we surely appear guilty of the worst form of pre-philosophical 
149positivism, for example, can be considered as an absolute empirical idealism. 
1501t is not difficult to reiterate the long litany of everything that supposedly serves to separate Deleuze 
from Hegel: the attack on the reactive character of negation; the critique of opposition as 
representational inversion of difference-in-itself; the emphasis on the externality of all relation; the 
suspension of teleological transcendence.. . etc. 
Nevertheless, it might be useful to remind ourselves of a 
certain tone of deliberate comic exaggeration in Deleuze's remorseless excoriations of Hegelianism; of 
a certain mischievous humour in the Deleuzean caricature of Hegel as punitive taskmaster for the 
interminable labour of the negative; despotic suzerain of mediation; shameless apologist for the 
Christian State; as well as in the Deleuzean execration of the dialectic as ultimate avatar of pious 
ressentiment, bad conscience, and all the rest. This diversionary smokescreen should not be allowed to 
obscure the possibility of a subterranean concordance between the Deleuzean and Hegelian doctrines of 
the self-positing Concept. Compare for example Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, pp. 15-34, with Hegel, 
1989, pp. 67-78. For an extremely interesting attempt at articulating the relation between Hegel and 
Deleuze using Kant as an intercessor, in a manner that is notably free of superficial ideological 
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naivety; the kind of naivety which Husserl denounced in the transcendental 
realism which he took to be concomitant with the scientist's `natural attitude', 
and which he dismissed as phenomenologically `counter-sensical' 1ýI 
Curiously then, and in spite of their avowedly anti-phenomenological 
materialism, Deleuze & Guattari would seem to invite the assent of 
phenomenological idealism when, presumably invoking the intensive power 
(puissance) of the Concept rather than the `sense-bestowing' (Sinngebung) 
power of consciousness, we imagine them arraigning the non-conceptual 
realism which insists on upholding the transcendental separation between 
matter `as such' and matter `itself as a species of transcendental idiocy152. 
Nevertheless, it is this idiocy, we wish to suggest, which ultimately indexes 
the unobjectifiable immanence of matter itself. 
However, lest the non-philosophical idiocy concomitant with the 
distinction between matter `as such' and matter `itself collapse back into pre- 
philosophical stupidity by way of an arbitrary Decision in favour of a 
hypothetically posited 'in-itself, we must explain how the transcendental 
condition on the basis of which we are articulating that distinction precludes 
prejudices, cf. Juliette Simont's Les `Fleurs Noires' de la logique philosophique. Essai sur la quantite, 
la qualite, la relation chez Kant, Hegel, Deleuze , Paris: L'Harmattan, 
1997. 
151 "The countersense only arises when one philosophises and, while seeking ultimate intelligence 
about the sense of the world, never even notices that the world itself has its whole being as a certain 
`sense' which presupposes absolute consciousness as the field where sense is bestowed[... ]" (Husserl, 
1982, p. 129). 
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the transcendent positing and presupposing of immanence through Decision. 
Specifically, the next chapter will suggest that as far as the transcendental 
separation of the tel quel from the comme tel is concerned, the only proper 
index of its ante-Decisional immanence resides in the performative 
consistency of material utterance (enonciation) and materialist statement 
(enonce); the rigorous, but non-logocentric co-incidence of materialist 
`saying' and `doing'. 
152 Both `idiom' and `idiocy', as Juan Diego Blanco observes, have their root in the Greek ICSIOý;, 
meaning `the proper' or `singular'. Cf. Blanco, 1997, p. 103. 
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CHAPTER 4 
FROM MATERIALISM `AS SUCH' TO 
MATTER ITSELF 
In the course of the last three chapters, we have been criticizing the 
materiological conceptualisation of matter `as such' on the basis of a 
hypothetical postulate: - the `transcendental realist' postulation of matter 
'itself'. Yet how can we be sure that this postulation does not in turn reinstate 
a conceptual equivocation ? That we are not reinscribing `matter itself in a 
concept in the very process of invoking it in discourse ? What theoretical 
conditions need to be met in order to ensure that the invocation of matter 
`itself does not collapse into a materiological circumscription of matter `as 
such' ? 
In this chapter we shall attempt to define these conditions by 
examining Section 27 of Le Principe de Minorite, entitled `Le reel contre le 
material isme et l 'idealisme' (`The real versus materialism and idealism' )153. It 
is in the argument of this brief but particularly complex section that Laruelle 
tentatively outlines for us the necessary preconditions for a truly non- 
materiological -which is to say, non-philosophical- materialism. By way of 
184 
contrast to those `constative' varieties of philosophical materialism 
circumscribing matter `as such' through Decision, non-philosophical 
materialism, we shall try to argue, must constitute a rigorously `performative' 
material theory, enacting a set of theoretical operations determined (in-the- 
last-instance) by `matter itself now characterised as immanently foreclosed to 
Decision. Where the sufficiency of the materialist Decision against idealism 
invariably envelops the ü nobj ectifiable immanence of matter `itself in the 
objectivating transcendence of matter `as such', thereby instituting an 
idealized materiality, a composite of real immanence and ideal transcendence; 
non-Decisional materialism, suspending the sufficiency of materialist 
Decision, will operate on the basis of an immanence which does not 
presuppose a transcendent Decision about the difference between materialism 
and idealism; -in other words, it shall operate in accordance with an 
immanence which is foreclosed to the transcendent distinction between 
material immanence and ideal transcendence. 
`Materialism'/ `Idealism' 
`Materialism' and `idealism', Laruelle reminds us, cannot be accepted 
as ready made or pre-given categories. Neither their content, nor the 
distinction between them is ever absolute or unvarying: - on the contrary, they 
153Cf. Laruelle, 1981, pp. 103-109. 
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are varyingly fulfilled and exemplified according to the vagaries of doctrine. 
Consequently, Laruelle continues, rather than ask what `materialism' and 
`idealism' are `in themselves', as if they were determinate doctrines, we 
should enquire into the immanent transcendental conditions in accordance 
with which these philosophical categories are generated or produced. Thus, 
instead of treating `materialism' and `idealism' as determinate doctrines, 
Laruelle suggests we try to uncover the genetic a priori 154 conditioning the 
production of `materialist' or `idealist' doctrine. In other words, rather than 
trying to identify the putative essence of `materialism' or of `idealism' via an 
empirical process of inductive generalisation which consists in abstracting 
from historically ccnti 11 , 11L systems of doctrine, Laruelle insists on the 
necessity of transcendentally deducing those a priori conditions of theoretical 
production determining the conceptual economies proper to `materialist' or 
`idealist' discourse quite independently of the particular system or doctrine 
produced. `Materialism' and `idealism' gain a specifically philosophical 
autonomy vis a vis the neighbouring domains of science and politics within 
which these discursive markers also circulate, when, rather than being 
considered as heteronomously conditioned doctrines, they achieve an 
1541n Chapter 6, we shall see how -unlike Husserl's- this `genetic a priori ' qua `non-conceptual 
symbol' will turn out to be real rather than ideal, and dualysing rather than unitary or synthetic. 
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autonomous `metatheoretical' status as immanent transcendental criteria 
conditioning philosophical doctrine. 
At the same time however, Laruelle points out that `materialism's' 
peculiar theoretical specificity comes from the way in which it not only 
indexes its own metatheoretical conditions of production, but also their a 
priori distinction from, and opposition to, the metatheoretical conditions 
proper to 'idealism'. This marks a crucial unilaterality in the economy of 
relation between the genetic a prioris proper to `materialism' and `idealism' 
respectively: the mode of theoretical production proper to `materialism' must 
generate or produce its own a priori distinction from that of `idealism', while 
the latter is not necessarily obliged to distinguish itself from the former155. 
Consequently, Laruelle concludes, in order to attain a rigorously 
transcendental criteria specifying the conditions of reality -as opposed to 
ideality or possibility- for materialist discourse, conditions precluding the 
materiological idealization of matter `as such', we must identify the real, 
genetic difference through which a theoretical utterance distinguishes itself a 
priori as intrinsically `materialist' -regardless of its stated meaning- vis a vis a 
modality of utterance which is a priori `idealist'- again, regardless of the 
utterance's meaning: "One simultaneously determines materialism's genetic 
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difference from idealism, and a real, otherwise-than-materialist conception of 
their a priori difference and its power of genesis. Against the empiricist 
mistake, which consists in injecting into these categories an 'immediate' 
content which is in reality already mediated, it is a question of thinking them 
at once in themselves and in terms of what is more important than them, their 
relation, and more important than their relation: their absolute difference" 
(Laruelle, 1981, p. 104. ). 
However, this genetic or `absolute difference' 156 conditioning the a 
priori distinction between the conditions of theoretical production appropriate 
to `materialism' and those appropriate to `idealism', cannot be located at the 
level of the doctrine which it conditions; it cannot be identified as a 
`materialist' or `idealist' statement of any kind. But if it cannot be 
characterised as explicitly `materialist' or `idealist' in its conceptual content, 
it must remain intrinsically non-conceptual; which is to say: a-signifying. 
Thus, the genetic a priori distinguishing `materialism' from `idealism' can 
155That is to say: it can, but for Laruelle this identification is not a prerequisite for the operational 
efficacy of idealism in the way in which it seems to be for all critical -post-Kantian- materialism. 
15613ecause Le Principe de Minorite remains a transitional work, preparing the non-philosophical 
perspective that will find its rigorous formulation in later texts, it is one in which Laruelle continues to 
operate within a predominantly philosophical register: hence the talk of an `absolute difference' 
between materialism and idealism. The critique of Henry's conception of `absolute immanence' in 
Chapter 2 already hilted at th way in vrhich, in Laruelle's non-philosophical work proper, the notion 
of `the absolute' comes to be identified with that of philosophical Decision as such in its pretension to 
pure, auto-positional and auto-donational sufficiency. In fact, as we shall see, it is by operating 
according to `matter itself as first name or non-conceptual symbol for radical immanence -one which 
is foreclosed to the transcendent distinction between `materialism' and `idealism'- that non-materialist 
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only reside in those distinct but non-conceptual or a-signifying modalities of 
utterance through which the conceptual significations of `materialism' or 
`idealism' are produced. 
Laruelle lists three varieties of categorial definition for `materialism' 
and `idealism'; definitions that, he believes, fail to provide a satisfactory 
account of this a priori genetic difference. The inadequacy of the first two, 
still operating at the level of empirical objectivity and conceptual content, 
should (we hope) be immediately apparent in the present context, thus 
requiring no further explication on our part. Laruelle passes them over 
without further comment. However, it is useful to list them here, not only in 
order to appreciate the superiority of the third vis a vis its immediate 
predecessors, but also to understand in what way the latter's ultimately 
unsatisfactory character hinges in large part on a residual form of empirical 
objectivation and conceptual idealization carried over from its predecessors. 
`Matter' and `Idea' , Laruelle 
insists, cannot be taken as indexes of: 
1. Supposedly given objectivities such as techno-economic production 
on the one hand; ideology on the other. 
2. Supposedly given conceptual significations, whereby, on the one 
hand, the concept of `Matter' combines general features of `materiality' 
theory allows at once for a unilateral duality -rather than an `absolute difference'- and an identity 
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abstracted from nature with empirical characteristics drawn from sense- 
perception; while, on the other, that of the `Idea' combines general features 
of `ideality' abstracted from culture with empirical characteristics drawn from 
`inner sense' or self-consciousness. 
3. `Discursive categories' which are supposedly produced rather than 
immediately given. Thus, in what Laruelle refers to as `structural Marxism' 
(i. e. Althusser157), `idealism' and `materialism' remain devoid of immediate 
conceptual signification, but are endowed with a `differential' meaning 
produced through the complex interplay of various theoretical and political 
positions. The meaning of `idealism' and `materialism' as discursive 
categories is produced via the differential combination and determination of 
these positions relative to one another. Thus, the difference between 
`materialism' and `idealism' is no longer articulated with reference to 
objectivities, or conceptual generalities, or even statements as such: it is now 
characterised in terms of a theoretical statement's relation to differential 
elements which are in themselves devoid of meaning, but which nevertheless 
determine the production of discursive sense. `Materialism' and `idealism' are 
no longer defined at the level of reified, determinable sense; they are no 
longer conceptually hypostatised in intraconsistent systems of discursive 
without synthesis, of `materialism' and `idealism'. 
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statement; they are now the result of differential relations between a- 
signifying modalities of utterance; the product of modes of discursive 
production which have no intrinsic meaning in themselves. 
This `structural Marxist' account clearly comes closest to grasping the 
necessarily a-signifying, non-conceptual character of the sought-for genetic a 
priori conditioning the intrinsic distinction between the modalities of 
`materialist' and `idealist' utterance. Consequently, Laruelle's objection to 
this structural Marxist account focuses on a single question: how can the 
sought-for genetic a priori be at once a-signifying and non-conceptual, whilst 
remaining intrinsically differential and constitutively relational, which is to 
say: dependent on an objectively ideal structure of signifying coordination 
between irreducible empirical elements? Although, the elements through 
which theoretical sense is produced are neither conceptual nor signifying in 
themselves, they remain empirically presupposed; they are already objectively 
given as subject to a determinate socio-economic articulation, and thus 
already mediated through various forms of conceptual presupposition. 
Structural relationality, Laruelle insists, reintroduces ideality, which 
invariably involves a residual dimension of transcendent objectivation and 
conceptual signification. The real, a priori, transcendental separation between 
157Laruelle provides no textual references, but cf. Althusser & Balibar, 1997, passim ; and Althusser, 
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`materialism' and `idealism' as intrinsically distinct modalities of theoretical 
utterance cannot be confused with the ideal, a posteriori and ultimately 
empirical differentiation between `materialism' and `idealism' as distinct 
discursive modalities produced through relations of reciprocal determination. 
Thus, although in the structural Marxist account, the distinction 
between `materialism' and `idealism' is neither supposedly given as 
empirically objective, nor supposedly given as a conceptual signification, it 
nevertheless remains empirical insofar as it is supposedly produced as given 
rather than being transcendentally producing or giving. Moreover, as far as 
Laruelle is concerned, structural differentiation cannot but presuppose a 
supra-conceptual ideality; it continues to operate within an ultimately Ideal, 
objectivating continuum of relation. Discrete differential elements remain 
subsumed within an all-embracing continuum of differential relativity: "In 
the primacy of `relations' (of production, of force, of texts, of power) which 
we took for materialism, and which is one in effect, that is to say, an offshoot 
of idealism, there is only a transfer of difference in and as the Idea, [j J an 
ultimate primacy of ideality over the real, of Being over the entity" (Ibid., 
p. 106). 
1996, pp. 161-224. 
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Thus, in structural Marxism, `materialism' and `idealism' lose their 
pseudo-absolute, empirically pre-given meaning as `theories in themselves', 
only to have that self-positing absoluteness now taken over by the differential 
complex of politico-economic relation through which they are produced; a 
relational continuum which is autonomous and no longer relative to its terms 
because it is relative only to itself; which is to say, self-positing. But this 
latter feature, as we saw in the case of machinic constructivism, is invariably 
an index of idealism. And in structural Marxism just as in machinic 
constructivism, if `materialism' and `idealism' are no longer hypostatised, 
ready-made doctrines standing in perpetual opposition to one another, it is 
because they now form instead a chiasmic nexus, each alternately serving as 
continuum or as cut, as relay or as interruption, for the other. Of course, it is 
this chiasmic nexus which now constitutes the ideal transcendental instance of 
materiality, the a priori dimension of hyletic synthesis through which 
`materialism' simultaneously distinguishes and relates itself to `idealism'; as 
if, Laruelle maintains, in the complex differential nexus out of which 
`materialism' and `idealism' are temporarily crystallized; "the `materialist' 
side or aspect of the assemblage, continuous point of dispersion of 
materialism and idealism, simultaneously inhibited, limited the idealist side 
or aspect, and re-joined, reconstituted a continuous system, an assemblage 
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that is necessarily `idealist' precisely insofar as it is an assemblage. Idealist 
to the second degree, to the nth degree. Generally, in the systems of 
Difference, materialism is merely idealism in the nth degree, in the `andth' 
degree, infinitely intensified. In raising ideality to the level of auto production 
in this circular fashion, which is to say, to the status of causa sui (`will to 
power), they [the systems of Difference-RB] confirm ideality through itself, 
rendering the genesis of ideality and of its forms impossible " (Ibid., p. 106- 
107). 
It seems then that in structural Marxism just as in machinic 
constructivism, the dogmatic empirical opposition between `materialism' and 
`idealism' becomes transcendentally suspended or reduced. The difference 
between them is produced, not given; it becomes a relative, contingent, 
aleatory product; the result of abstract processes of hyletic production. Thus, 
for the transcendental materialist, the abstract materiality of hyletic synthesis 
upon which all theoretical praxis is ultimately supervenient -whether that 
praxis be determined through differentials of socio-economic force in 
infrastructural production, or constituted through collective assemblages of 
enunciation in the machinic phylum158- entails that `materialism' and 
`idealism' considered as systems of signifying statement become materially 
158Cf. for instance Deleuze & Guattari, 1988, pp. 75-110. 
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equivalent at the level of a-signifying utterance; indifferently encompassed 
within an all-embracing continuum of self-differentiating hyletic production. 
One philosopher's putative `idealism' provides the basis for another's equally 
putative `materialism' 159. 
However, as we saw in the previous chapter, in absolutising abstract 
materiality in this way, in raising the hyletic continuum to the level of a causa 
sui, transcendental materialism collapses into an absolute hyletic idealism 
which effectively precludes the possibility of achieving a rigorously 
transcendental separation of `materialist' discourse from that of 'idealism'. It 
forecloses the possibility of discovering a genetic a priori which would 
distinguish the mode of utterance proper to `materialist' theory from that 
concomitant with 'idealism'. In absolutising hyletic continuity, transcendental 
materialism renders itself indistinguishable from absolute idealism. 
The Materiological Amphiboly of Utterance and Statement 
To appreciate this latter point, it is necessary to understand how, in 
Principe de Minorite as well as in Laruelle's later, explicitly non- 
philosophical work, `idealism' is no longer a system or a doctrine but a 
noological syntax: it is that thinking which asserts the irrecusable primacy of 
Relation; of the All as infinite, self-positing relation. It is a thinking that 
159Hegel and Marx being the most famous example of this particular syndrome. 
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proceeds in and through the absolute, self-positing element of an infinite 
relational continuum. But just as for Spinoza the idea of a circle is not itself 
circular160, for Laruelle, the transcendental condition that explains the genesis 
of relationality, and by implication, ideality, can be neither relational nor 
ideal. Relational ideality cannot account for its own genesis unless it be 
viciously. More precisely, the Idea as causa sui occludes the possibility of a 
rigorously theoretical account explaining the genesis and structure of 
relational ideality in non-ideal, non-relational terms 161. 
Transcendental materialism deliberately suspends the transcendent, 
empirical distinction between thought and thing, subject and substance. The 
problem however is this: if, according to the versions of transcendental 
materialism we have been discussing here, Matter is Relation, or infinite 
hyletic continuity, then it is one with the Idea of matter, with its Decisional 
circumscription as absolute, self-positing relationality. But then the critical- 
transcendental separation of ratter `itself from matter `as such' is dissolved 
160 «A true idea (for we have a true idea) is something different from its ideal (ideatum). For a circle is 
one thing, and the idea of one another; for the idea of a circle is not something having a circumference 
and a centre, as is a circle, nor is the idea of a body the body itself'. (Spinoza, Treatise on the 
Correction of the Understanding, VI, 33) Cf. Spinoza, 1923, p. 236. It is important to remember that 
Spinoza is not reiterating a banal categorial dualism of thought and thing. The idea/ideatum distinction 
is inter-attributive; and attributes, each equally expressing substance's infinite and eternal essence in a 
different way, are not categories. Although epistemically incommensurable, they remain ontologically 
indistinguishable. 
161 We shall see how throughout his non-philosophical work, Laruelle will insist on the necessary 
heterogeneity of transcendental theory vis a vis that which it is supposed to theorize. Thus, a 
transcendental theory of Decision cannot itself be Decisional. 
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along with the dogmatic-empirical distinction between subjectified thought 
and objectified thing. The result, as we know, is a form of absolute idealism 
in which there is no longer a real distinction, a radical separation, between 
`matter' and its Decisional circumscription in the philosophical Idea. 
More precisely, just as it posits its own presupposition, materiology 
deliberately reinscribes its own conditions of enunciation within the 
enunciated theory162. Like a serpent swallowing its own tail, it absorbs the 
real conditions of utterance for materialism within the ideal realm of 
materialist theory. However, in so doing, it insidiously subordinates the real, 
unobjectifiable condition for materialist utterance to the ideal, objectivating 
statements of materialist theory. It abolishes the representational codification 
of materialist doctrine, liquefying its hypostatisation in terms of signifying 
statements, the better to render the distinction between the transcendent 
ideality of statement and the immanent reality of utterance, the ideality of the 
enonce and the materiality of its enonciation, perfectly porous, not to say 
ultimately reversible, so that every utterance functions as a statement for 
another utterance and vice versa. Thus, as Laruelle puts it, the utterance's a- 
162This distinction between utterance and statement, enonciation and enonce, roughly corresponds - 
albeit at an entirely abstract, conceptual level- to what, in a completely different philosophical context, 
Levinas calls the distinction between ethical `Saying' and ontological `Said'. Cf. Levinas, 1990, 
especially pp. 16-20; 64-67; 78-86; and 239-253. However, whereas Levinasian `Saying' as epekeina 
tes ousias or `Good beyond being' is an index of unobjectifiable transcendence, the notion of 
`utterance' as used here obviously indexes unobjectifiable immanence. 
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signifying material immanence simultaneously serves as interruption and as 
relay, as cut and as continuum, vis a vis the statement's ideal, signifying 
transcendence. The materiality of utterance and the ideality of statement are 
hyletically synthesized, inclusively disjoined in the machinic phylum, flowing 
into one another in perfect intensive continuity. 
As a result, machinic constructivism effectively neutralizes the 
hermeneutical aporias of significational inscription. It successfully 
circumvents an interminable post-phenomenological negotiation with the 
metaphysical signifier predicated on the representationalist assumption of the 
linguistic sign's empirical reality by transcendentally suspending the 
equivocal dualism of signifier and signified. But it does so at the cost of 
effecting an idealizing sublation of the real distinction between the 
immanence of material utterance and the transcendence of materialist 
statement. 
How are we to prevent this slide from transcendental materialism to 
absolute idealism ? The solution to the problem requires a formulation of the 
critical-transcendental distinction between relational phenomenality and the 
unobjectifiable realm of the `in-itself that would not surreptitiously resurrect 
the transcendent distinction between thought and thing, subject and substance. 
Having seen how even an ostensibly anti-phenomenological instance of 
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materialist Decision involves a more subtle objectivation and 
phenomenalisation of matter `as such', it is clear that the solution to the 
problem can only reside in a non-Decisional reformulation of the critical- 
transcendental distinction such that it would now obtain between the realm of 
phenomenality qua objectivating Decision and the unobjectifiable dimension 
of the `in-itself' qua ante-Decisional immanence. Thus, the sought-for genetic 
a priori, the transcendental instance, separating the conditions of enunciation 
proper to materialist theory from those characteristic of idealism is no longer 
intra-philosophical, which is to say, Decisional. Moreover, it cannot even be 
characterised as `material' in that ontologically ideal sense through which 
materialist Decision reinscribes its own putatively real ontological 
presupposition within the charmed circle of its own idealizing auto-position. 
Every Decision in favour of materialism qua system or doctrine, carried out in 
accordance with the presumed self-sufficiency of Decision, remains formally 
idealizing and hence ultimately indiscernible from a Decision in favour of 
idealism. The real precondition for a rigorously `materialist' enunciation 
cannot itself be `material', short of reinstituting the idealist circle of auto- 
position. 
Accordingly, the separating instance, the genetic a priori, now passes 
between `materialism' and `idealism' qua intra-philosophical Decisions, and 
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a non-Decisional immanence which is indifferent or foreclosed to the 
transcendent distinction between `materialism' and `idealism', but which 
nevertheless provides a real or non-posited presupposition on the basis of 
which a non-materiological theory can effect the non-Decisional positing of 
`matter itself as first name or non-conceptual symbol163 for the 
unobjectifiable immanence of the 'in-itself'. 
The Decline of Materialism 
What are the consequences of this non-philosophical reformulation as 
far the relation between material utterance and materialist statement is 
concerned ? In what way does it avoid the materiological encompassment of 
the reality proper to material utterance within the ideality of materialist 
statement ? 
Crucially, in this reformulation, instead of perpetuating the 
materiological subordination of `matter itself' to the Decisional 
circumscription of matter `as such', we effect the subordination of 
materiological Decisionism to `matter itself as first name or non-conceptual 
symbol for that non-Decisional immanence which is the real determinant for 
163This is a real or non-Decisional positing (which we shall also refer to as a `cloning') - as opposed to 
an ideal or Decisional auto-position- of `matter itself'. Thus, our non-Decisional positing of the radical 
hyle as `first name' or `non-conceptual symbol' for radical immanence functions in such a way as to 
preclude the idealising elision of the separation between `matter itself and `matter as such', as well as 
preventing real immanence's re-envelopment in ideal transcendence. 
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all Decision. The next chapter shall explain the function of this non- 
conceptual symbol in the non-materialist axiomatic in considerable detail. For 
the time being, suffice it to say that it is as non-conceptual symbol for the 
unobjectifiable immanence of the `in itself', determining Decision without 
being determined by Decision in return, that the first name `matter itself (or 
the radical hyle, as we shall begin calling it in the next chapter) maintains the 
transcendental separation between Real immanence and Ideal Decision in 
such a way as to prevent the slide from transcendental materialism to absolute 
idealism. 
Thus, the genetic a priori through which the real conditions of 
enunciation for material utterance become radically separated from that ideal 
reversibility between the reality of utterance and the ideality of statement -that 
reversibility in accordance with which material utterance is perpetually 
reinscribed in materialist statement- is finally discovered when `matter itself 
is allowed to function as one among other possible first names for that 
unobjectifiable immanence in virtue of which utterance remains foreclosed to 
Decision, whether `materialist' or 'idealist'. Accordingly, transcendental 
materialism attains its rigorous performative consistency only when the a- 
signifying immanence of material utterance becomes liberated from the 
Decisional hybridisation of signifying statement and a-signifying utterance. 
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`Matter itself no longer designates ineffable transcendence. It is henceforth 
immanently separated -without a transcendent Decision of separation- from 
its Decisional hybridisation with the idealized phenomenality of matter `as 
such'. It is a non-conceptual symbol for the unobjectifiable immanence of a 
radically a-signifying utterance; one indexing an unequivocal performative 
consistency of saying and doing whilst remaining semantically in-consistent; 
which is to say, foreclosed to every form of conceptual or hermeneutic 
delimitation. 
It follows that in order to purge itself of the materiological 
hybridisation of signifying ideality and phenomenological intelligibility, 
transcendental materialism should be prepared to effect its own 
discontinuation as a system of signifying statements. Materialism must be 
willing to ruin the conditions of its own idealized theoretical intelligibility; to 
sacrifice its sufficiency and autonomy as a self-positing, self-presupposing 
mixture of asignifying utterance and signifying statement in order to achieve 
its ultimate theoretical vindication by enacting the rigorously transcendental 
separation of matter `itself qua first name for the reality of utterance's 
unobjectifiable foreclosure to Decision, from matter `as such' qua 
ontologically obj ectivated Decision. 
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This is what we shall refer to -following Laruelle- as `the decline of 
materialism'. It represents the culminating point toward which the previous 
three chapters have (we hope) been inexorably progressing. Materialism must 
first consent to its own liquidation as a Decisional category, deliberately 
eliminating that part of itself which consists of a system of doctrine or 
constative statement, the better to secure its ultimate theoretical vindication as 
a rigorously consistent form of performative utterance: "In order to stay 
faithful to its inspiration and achieve a definitive victory over idealism, 
materialism should first consent to its own partial liquidation -as category 
and statement-, it should consent to the subordination of its materialist 
statements to a process of utterance that is in itself material, relative or 
hyletic, then consent to stop conceiving of this utterance as an ideal, relative 
process. The decline of materialism in the name of matter, and of matter as 
hyle in the name of the real. No longer materialism, but a more secret 
knowing of matter, one which would no longer tread the luminous paths of 
the logos..., nor the amphiboly, the limitless fusion of ideality and the real in 
the hyle" (Ibid., p. 107) 
Here at last we find ourselves at the threshold of a rigorously non- 
Decisional theory of matter `itself :a non-materialist theory. That `more 
secret knowing of matter' invoked by Laruelle comes within our grasp once 
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both `materialism' and `idealism' -or, more exactly, the materiological 
hybridisation of `materialism' and `idealism' in the absolute autonomy of the 
hyletic continuum as self-positing, self-presupposing Idea- comes to play the 
role for us of an indifferent material index, an empirical support for a 
rigorously performative transcendental theory operating according to 
`matter's' foreclosure to `materialism' as well as 'idealism'. Whereas in 
materiological theorizing the ideality of statement invariably became co- 
constitutive of the reality of the utterance through which it was produced, the 
statements of non-materiological theory now allow themselves to be 
axiomatically determined by the unobj ectifiable reality of utterance -via the 
intervention of `matter itself as non-conceptual symbol- without presuming 
to co-constitute the reality of utterance in return. 
We have now identified the necessary (albeit not sufficient) conditions 
for a transcendental theory of `matter itself'. More exactly: we have begun to 
delineate the conditions for a thinking operating according to the 
unobjectifiable immanence of `matter itself as foreclosed to Decision; the 
conditions for a thinking that is no longer `of matter in the sense of 
attempting its Decisional objectivation, but `of matter in the sense of being 
adequate to matter's foreclosure to materiological determination. It is 
important to emphasize how the basic parameters for materialist theorizing 
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have been transformed: instead of effecting a materiological determination of 
matter in conformity with the idealizing elision of the transcendental 
separation between `matter itself and `matter as such', we are about to 
reposition ourselves so as to allow the unobjectifiable immanence of material 
utterance to determine thought through the non-Decisional positing of `matter 
itself as its non-conceptual symbol. In other words, we have shifted from a 
posture wherein thought and materiality (or the Real) are co-constituting or 
amphibologically coextensive, to one wherein matter determines thought 
without thought determining matter in return. Thought -specifically, the 
philosophical or materiological idealization of matter- will provide the 
empirical material from which the unobjectifiable immanence of `matter 
itself shall extract a non-materiological thinking; one that is unilaterally 
determined by the immanence of material utterance. Instead of idealising 
matter according to the arbitrary strictures of thought, we shall materialise I 
thought in accordance with matter's necessary foreclosure to thought. 
It is here that a further nuance explaining the requirement of a 
sufficient as well as a necessary condition for non-materialist theory is 
needed. For if `matter' is foreclosed to intentional objectivation, indifferent to 
thought, then how is it possible even to construct a thinking that would 
operate `according to' that radical foreclosure to thinking? Clearly, `matter 
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itself as first name for the unobjectifiable immanence of material utterance is 
characterised by a radical indifference to thought which withdraws it from the 
order of the problematisable. Radical immanence is non-problematic: it does 
not call for thinking, it does not petition Decision, it simply has no need for 
thought. But since there is thinking, or since philosophical Decision is the 
immediate, empirically given form within which thinking is already 
operating164, non-materialist theory will use the Decisional hybridisation of 
thought and matter, the materiological amphiboly of unobjectifiable reality 
and objectivating ideality, as its occasional but non-determining cause. That is 
to say, non-Decisional materialism will use thought's transcendence, its 
pretension to absolute, self-positing sufficiency (exemplified by the hyletic 
continuum's absolute auto-position) as the contingently given empirical 
occasion for thought's determination by the necessary but non-sufficient 
immanence of material utterance. The unobjectifiable immanence of utterance 
as necessary condition for theory does not need discursive objectivation, but 
since the form of philosophical thinking has, in a sense, `always already' 
articulated itself within that amphibological mixture of utterance and 
statement, the 
latter 
can be used as the occasional cause, the empirical 
support, for a thinking-in-accordance-with the unobjectifiability of utterance 
164 We will have more to say concerning this particular point in the next chapter's account of 
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taking that objectivating amphiboly, that Decisional hybridisation itself, as its 
object. 
The key difference is this: whereas materiological thought mistakes its 
own hybridisation of unobjectifiable immanence and objectivating 
transcendence for the Real (i. e. matter as Idea) because it believes that 
Decision is sufficient unto the Real, non-materiological thinking unilaterally 
determines the Decisional mixture of obj ectivating transcendence and 
unobjectifiable immanence on the basis of unobjectifiable immanence alone. 
It uses materiological Decision as the occasion for a non-materiological 
theory which lets the unobjectifiable immanence of material utterance 
determine or dualyse the materiological confusion of `matter itself and 
`matter as such' via the non-Decisional positing of `matter itself as first name 
for the unobjectifiable immanence which determines all Decision in-the-last- 
instance. 
Philosophical Summary and Transition to Non-Philosophy 
Let's briefly recapitulate the movement charted thus far in the four 
chapters that make up the first half of this thesis. We saw how the 
transcendental hypothesis of a critical/problematic separation between `matter 
itself and `matter as such' was turned into an ontological dualism of enstasis 
philosophical Decision . 
207 
and ekstasis in the material phenomenology of Michel Henry and subjected to 
an idealizing sublation in the absolute hyletics of Deleuze & Guattari. 
Henry's discovery of a quasi-radical or `enstatic' immanence remains vitiated 
by its phenomenologisation. By absolutising immanence as pure auto- 
affecting ipseity continuously absolving itself from transcendent 
objectification, Henry renders unobjectifiable immanence relative once more 
to the ekstatico-horizonal transcendence from which it distinguishes itself. 
Henry transcendently posits the unilateral asymmetry between enstatic 
immanence and ekstatic transcendence within the element of Decisional 
transcendence. Thus, Henry re-envelops immanence in transcendence through 
the very gesture whereby he attempts to render it radically autonomous. In the 
case of Deleuze & Guattari, immanence is withdrawn from the realm of 
phenomenological ipseity and shorn of the transcendent interruptions of Self, 
World, and Object only to be absolutised once again in a familiar 
philosophical gesture. Thus, although immanence is immanent only to itself, 
its auto-constructing character, its positing and presupposing in and through 
the philosophical Concept with which it remains coextensive, renders the 
immanence of intensive materiality into a paradigmatic instance of absolute 
idealist auto-position. 
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Moreover, this materiological hybridisation of unobjectifiable 
immanence and objectivating transcendence in both Henry and Deleuze & 
Guattari is more than an idiosyncrasy of doctrine. On the contrary, it is a 
necessary precondition for their Decisional circumscription of materiality in 
and through philosophical thinking. Thus, in this chapter we tried to show 
how materiological thinking operates by continuously reinscribing the 
unobj ectifiable materiality of asignifying utterance into the constative 
statements of materialist theory. It is in order to interrupt this self- 
presupposing circle of absolute auto-position and to forestall this idealizing 
elision of the distinction between the constative circumscription of matter `as 
such' and the radically immanent performativity of material utterance as 
index of matter `itself , that we proposed the drastic reorganisation of the 
syntax of materialist theory outlined above. Consequently, we have argued 
that it is only what we call `the decline of materialism' as such which 
promises to vouchsafe the triumph of materialism itself. More precisely: the 
decline of philosophical materialism as such coincides with the rise of non- 
materialist theory as non-materiological essence of materialism itself. 
In effect, the successful transition from the speculative materiological 
idealism of philosophical Decisionism `about' matter to a non-materialist 
axiomatic determined-in-the-last-instance by matter 'itself, entails replacing 
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the Decisional transcendentalisation of matter with a transcendental 
materialisation of Decision. Accordingly, in the second part of this thesis we 
shall be using materiological hybridisations of matter `as such' and matter 
`itself , as articulated in certain selected instances of philosophical 
materialism, as the empirical material from which we shall extract or clone 
the rudiments of a non-materialist axiomatic. Moreover, we shall do so 
through the non-Decisional positing of the radical hyle as non-conceptual 
symbol for the unobjectifiable immanence of material utterance. 
We are now ready to enter into the properly non-philosophical part of 
this thesis, in which we shall attempt to explain in what way this decline of 
materialism in the name of `matter itself promises an unexpected 
enlargement, rather than an impoverishment, of the possibilities of materialist 
theory. Focusing in particular on the constantly reiterated function of the 
prefix `non-' in non-materialist thought, the following chapter will begin to 
set out the methodology in accordance with which the non-materialist 
axiomatic shall operate. Subsequent chapters will explain in greater detail this 
new economy of non-philosophical relation between `the radical hyle' as non- 
conceptual symbol for unobjectifiable immanence; the hyletic continuum as 
occasional cause or empirical support for a unified theory of phenomenology 
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and materialism; and `the Alien-subject' as transcendental locus for the non- 
materialist identity of utterance and statement. 
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PART II 
THE NAME OF MATTER ITSELF 
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CHAPTER 5 
LARUELLE'S RAZOR 
"The apprenticeship of radicality is an ascesis of thought rather than 
a new position" (Laruelle, 2000a, p. 76) 
Throughout the preceding account of materiological idealism, we have 
continuously maintained that the materiological hybridisation of 
unobjectifiable immanence and objectivating transcendence remains an 
ineluctable structural feature of every materialism predicated on an 
immediate, quasi-dogmatic faith in the sufficiency of philosophical Decision. 
Materiological idealism is an inevitable consequence of this spontaneous 
belief that philosophical Decision is sufficient unto matter. And it is by way 
of contrast to this spontaneous philosophical faith in Decisional thinking that 
we have constantly invoked, and tentatively delineated, the possibility of a 
non-Decisional theory `of matter; a thinking that by suspending this belief in 
the sufficiency of Decision, would try to proceed instead in accordance with a 
non-Decisional positing of `matter's' foreclosure to Decision. What we call a 
non-Decisional materialism will suspend the spontaneous philosophical faith 
in the sufficiency of Decision to determine matter, the better to let Decision 
be determined by matter. 
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None of this will be clear however, until we have clarified what we 
mean by `philosophical Decision' and what we mean by `non-Decisional' 
thinking. Thus, it is now necessary to explain more fully our Laruellean usage 
of the `non-' prefix, in the hope that this explanation will serve to clarify the 
way in which our non-Decisional positing of the radical hyle as first name of 
`matter itself marks a profound change of posture vis a vis the materiological 
positing of matter as a hybrid of immanent reality and transcendent ideality. 
`Non-' 
The crucial, all-pervasive165 function of the prefix `non-' in Laruelle's 
thought provides the key to his entire theoretical enterprise. To understand 
what Laruelle means by `non-philosophy' is to understand what Laruelle 
entails in his rigorously idiosyncratic use of the prefix 'non-'. But that use can 
only properly be explained through an account of the structure which Laruelle 
refers to as `the philosophical Decision'. That is to say, the expression `non- 
philosophy' must be understood essentially as meaning `non-Decisional 
philosophy'. Over and above metaphysics, representation, logocentrism, and 
ontotheology, the philosophical Decision, Laruelle insists, is the universal 
structural invariant presupposed by any and every possible variant on the 
philosophical gesture as such, including the recent critiques or 
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deconstructions of representation and logocentrism themselves. Accordingly, 
if the singular import of Laruelle's thought is to be properly grasped, it is 
necessary that the `non-' in the expression `non-Decisional philosophy' be 
interpreted as the rigorous but anexact counterpart of the `non-' in the 
expression `non-Euclidean geometry' 166. By suspending167 the spontaneous 
philosophical faith in the sufficiency of Decision -as expressed in what 
Laruelle regards as the latent `Principle of Sufficient Philosophy' implicitly 
presupposed in every Decision- Laruelle initiates a philosophically 
unprecedented type of transcendental theory, one which takes the myriad 
Decisions of philosophical ontology itself as its basic empirical material. 
In suspending the sufficiency of Decision, the Laruellean `non-' 
suspends a specific structural condition that has hitherto served only to 
delimit and constrain the possibilities of thought. Thus, the `non-' is 
somewhat akin to the lifting of a speed restriction. It expresses the ascent168 
165 E. g. `non-phenomenology'; `non-epistemology'; `non-technology'; `non-psychoanalysis'; `non- 
religion'; `non-aesthetics'; `non-intuitive'; and perhaps most fundamentally `non-philosophy'. 
166 Cf. Laruelle, 1989, pp. 99-129. 
167 In a manner roughly analogous to the suspension of Euclid's fifth axiom concerning parallels 
carried out by Bolyai and Lobatchevski, then by Gauss and Riemann 
168 Although our use of the term `ascent' in this context is intended to echo the Quinean strategy of 
semantic ascent which involves the shift from first-order talk about things -object talk- to second-order 
talk about object-talk, an unbridgeable gulf nevertheless separates this Quinean strategy of 
metalinguistic ascent as strategic logical possibility (i. e. Decision) from what is, from a Laruellean 
perspective, the ineluctable character of `metatranscendental' ascent as index of an inalienable, non- 
logical (non-Decisional) reality. Furthermore, the non-philosophical suspension of the onto-logical a 
priori simultaneously neutralises and de-stratifies the hierarchical distinction between meta-language 
and object-language, thereby incorporating every variety of metalinguistic discourse within the bounds 
of its empirical material. These issues should become clearer in the next chapter when we discuss how 
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from the quasi-transcendental level of the ontological determination of 
exclusive conditions of possibility for experience (the philosophical 
Decision), to a 'hypertranscendental'169 or non-Decisional level determining 
the real equivalence of any and every possible ontological Decision 
concerning experience. Where Decisional thinking produces intelligible 
possibilities for cognition on the basis of that which is already empirically 
known as `real', non-Decisional thinking discovers un-intelligible 
possibilities for cognition on the basis of the Real as unknown. 
As a result, the Laruellean `non-' entails -as we will hopefully show- 
an unprecedented change of scale vis a vis the intra-Decisional units of 
ontological measure. In Decisional thinking, the internal structure of Decision 
functions as a systemic grid governing conceptual coordination, and hence as 
the implicit ontological yardstick in accordance with which every variety of 
philosophical perspective -whether it be `materialist' or `idealist'- seeks to 
Laruelle's thought both radicalises and generalises certain aspects of Quinean physicalism. For an 
account of semantic ascent as philosophical tactic cf. Quine, 1960, pp. 271-276. 
169 By `hypertranscendental' we mean the radically immanent but non-ontological instance capable of 
determining every transcendental instance of ontological determination. It should be emphasised 
however, that the term `hypertranscendental' is not one Laruelle has ever used or one he would be 
likely to favour precisely because he adamantly rejects any attempt to categorise non-philosophy as 
some kind of metaphilosophical enterprise. Such an enterprise would presuppose the validity of the 
eminently philosophical distinction between object-language and meta-language. But it is precisely 
these kinds of hierarchical division, Laruelle maintains, that are completely invalidated from within the 
unconditional immanence proper to the non-philosophical perspective. Laruelle refuses any attempt to 
conflate the real but non-Decisional dimension of transcendental immanence within which non- 
philosophical thinking operates, with the ideal, metastructural hierarchies of philosophy. He does so, he 
insists, because what philosophers call `transcendental' is merely a transcendent, metaempirical 
construct. 
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limn the grain and texture of the real. But in non-Decisional thinking, the 
absolute sufficiency of Decision becomes relativised vis a vis a radically 
autonomous invariant, and hence the internal structure of ontological 
Decision subjected to variation on the basis of its determination by that non- 
ontological invariant170. Thus, the absolute sufficiency of Decision as 
practised in its spontaneous philosophical mode becomes relativised, - it 
becomes one among a potentially infinite manifold of equivalent but 
incommensurable ontological Decisions each of which has been determined- 
in-the-last-instance by a radically autonomous but non-Decisional invariant. 
By separating non-Decisional immanence from Decisional transcendence, 
Laruelle's razor discontinues the auto-positional and auto-donational circle of 
Decision, and suspends the hallucinatory sufficiency through which Decision 
continues to function as a syntactical invariant for all philosophising. 
In order to clarify this function of the `non-' in the expression `non- 
Decisional materialism' this chapter will provide: 
1. a brief, general description of the structure of Decision in 
terms of its key characteristics of `auto-position/auto- 
170This is a controversial point in our mobilisation of non-philosophical theory, and one with which 
we believe Laruelle himself would in all likelihood probably disagree, insisting that the cloning or 
determination-in-the-last-instance of Decision does not constitute an intervention within the latter's 
internal structure. Thus, cf. for instance Laruelle, 1989, pp. 247-249. We shall consider the question 
concerning the peculiar nature of non-philosophical `agency' in our Conclusion; specifically, the sense 
in which the non-philosophical cloning of Decision does or does not constitute an intervention within 
Decision qua World. Cf. infra, pp. 430-440. 
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donation', wherein the `auto-' 
sufficiency of Decision. 
expresses the absolute 
2. an account of the link between the absolute sufficiency of 
Decisional auto-position/auto-donation and the structure of 
Decision as a transcendental deduction in effect. The latter 
explains what Laruelle takes to be the exclusive or totalising 
character of all philosophical Decision. 
3. an explanation of how the razor allows for what we shall 
describe as a `non-Decisional cloning of Decision'. The radical 
separation effected by the razor between Decision and non- 
Decisional immanence allows the former to function as the 
occasional cause for a non-Decisional thinking wherein 
immanence's foreclosure to Decision becomes effectuated as a 
determination of Decision in accordance with immanence. 
Once this has been done, it should hopefully be easier to understand 
the entirely positive character of our attempt to effect a `non-Decisional' 
suspension of the hallucinatory sufficiency of materiological Decisionism. 
We shall see how the expression `non-Decisional materialism' must be 
understood as shorthand for the `non-auto-positional/non-auto-donational' 
radicalisation of materialism; one that entails a generalisation of `materiality' 
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beyond the restrictive confines of its materiological circumvention within the 
viciously circular ambit of Decision. Which is to say: a `non-Decisional 
materialism' expresses the shift from the Decisional idealisation of matter, to 
the non-Decisional materialisation of Decision. 
The Structure of the Philosophical Decision 
A non-Decisional materialism does not negate the materialist Decision 
but radicalises its basic possibilities by suspending its constitutive pretension 
to unconditional, self-sufficient autonomy. But what is it in this 
unconditional sufficiency, this `auto-Decisional' materialism that warrants 
the need for a heteronomous, non-auto-Decisional suspension of its 
spontaneous autonomy ? 
Laruelle's answer is, at first glance, extremely simple: the autonomy 
grounding the possibility of all materialist thought expresses the materialist's 
philosophical faith in the supposition that the nature of matter can be 
sufficiently determined through a Decision, and hence, by implication, 
through thought, even in the limit-cases where it is decided that `matter 
itself must remain undeterminable, unthinkable or undecidable. 
This philosophical faith in sufficient determination finds expression in 
the two basic structural features of a Decision: it is self-positing (auto- 
positional) and self-giving (auto-donational). All philosophising, Laruelle 
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insists, begins with a Decision, with a division traced between an empirical 
(but not necessarily perceptual) datum and an a priori (but not necessarily 
rational) faktum, both of which are posited as given in and through a synthetic 
unity wherein empirical and a priori, datum and faktum, are conjoined. Thus, 
the philosopher posits a structure of articulation which is simultaneously 
epistemological and ontological, one which immediately binds and 
distinguishes a given empirical datum, whether it be perceptual, 
phenomenological, linguistic, social, or historical; and an a priori intelligible 
faktum through which that datum is given: e. g. Sensibility, Subjectivity, 
Language, Society, or History. 
What is crucial here is the way in which such a structure is 
immediately independent of yet inseparable from the two terms which it both 
serves to connect and differentiate. It is a basically fractional structure 
comprising two differentiated terms and their difference as a third term that is 
simultaneously intrinsic and extrinsic, immanent and transcendent to those 
two terms. Thus, for any philosophical distinction between two terms (or 
Dyad), such as, in the simplest possible case, knower and known, or perceiver 
and perceived, the distinction is simultaneously intrinsic and immanent to the 
identity of the distinguished terms, and extrinsic and transcendent insofar as it 
is supposed to remain genetically constitutive of the difference between the 
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terms themselves. For the division is inseparable from a moment of indivision 
(=One) guaranteeing the unity-in-differentiation of the Dyad of distinguished 
terms. The result is a composite structure wherein the condition that 
guarantees the coupling of the related terms -e. g. (and again in the simplest 
possible case) the knowing that binds knower and known, or the perceiving 
that binds perceiver and perceived- remains irrevocably co-constituted by the 
two terms it is supposed to condition and so implicitly contained within both. 
And because it is posited as given in and through the immediate distinction 
between empirical datum and a priori faktum which it is supposed to 
constitute, this structure ends up presupposing itself empirically in and 
through the datum which it constitutes, and positing itself a priori in and 
through the faktum which is posited by itl7l 
So insofar as the extrinsic genetic difference between condition and 
conditioned is already intrinsic to the identity of the conditioned, all the 
moments of a philosophical Decision remain irrecusably self-positing (or 
auto-positional) and self-presupposing (or auto-donational): a given datum 
achieves empirical manifestation by being posited a priori through some 
faktum which in turn is only articulated a priori insofar as it is empirically 
presupposed through some datum, and so on. In other words, every 
171 We saw a particularly sophisticated version of this structure at work in our account of the relation 
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philosophical Decision is a species of what Foucault called the 'empirico- 
transcendental doublet' 172, and as such remains a viciously circular structure 
that already presupposes itself in whatever phenomenon or set of phenomena 
it is supposed to explain. Consequently, there is a sense in which explanations 
of phenomena couched in terms of philosophical Decisions explain nothing 
because the formal structure of the explanatory theory, the explanans, already 
constitutes the content of the thing to be explained, the explanandum, and 
vice versa. Thus, a philosophical Decision is neither genuinely explanatory 
nor authentically theoretical vis a vis the phenomena it pretends to 
encompass: it is at once insufficiently heterogeneous vis a vis the phenomena 
in question and lacking in any rigorously theorematic consistency. 
At its most abstract then, a philosophical Decision is a Dyad of 
immanence and transcendence, but one wherein immanence features twice, its 
internal structure subdivided between an empirical and a transcendental 
function. It is at once internal to the Dyad as the empirical immanence of the 
datum coupled to the transcendence of the a priori faktum, but also external 
as that supplement of transcendental immanence required for gluing empirical 
immanence and a priori transcendence together. Every Decision divides 
immanence between the empiricity of a datum that it supposes as given 
between Concept and plane in Deleuze & Guattari. Cf. supra, Chapter 2, pp. 116-124. 
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through the a priori faktum, and a transcendental immanence which it has to 
invoke as already given in order to guarantee the unity of a presupposed 
faktum and a posited datum. It is as a result of this Decisional splitting of 
immanence that philosophy requires the latter to intervene both as the 
empirical corollary of transcendence and as the transcendental guarantor for 
the unity of a priori condition and empirically conditioned - or 'experience'. 
For crucially, in order to secure this coincidence of positing and 
presupposition, the reciprocal articulation of faktum and datum -the a priori 
positing of a datum and the empirical pre-supposing of a faktum- necessarily 
petitions a dimension of unobjectifiable immanence as already given 
(without-givenness), one which is itself neither posited nor presupposed. 
Thus, Decision simultaneously posits as given an objectivated immanence as 
a moment of dyadic division and assumes an unobjectifiable immanence as 
already given in order to ensure the indivisible unity of the Dyad. According 
to the complex structure of philosophical Decision then, the One as 
indivisible immanence is simultaneously internal and immanent, and external 
and transcendent, to the Dyadic division between immanence and 
transcendence. More precisely, the unobjectifiable immanence of 
transcendental Indivision is both constitutive of and co-constituted by the 
172 Cf. Foucault, 1970, pp. 318-322. 
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transcendent moments of dyadic Division between empirical objectivity and a 
priori conditions of objectivation. 
The Laruellean razor then will `cut' into this complex Decisional 
mixture of empirical immanence, a priori transcendence and transcendental 
immanence, separating the radically indivisible immanence of that which is 
already given independently of all Decision, from the Decision which uses it 
to secure the bond between an empirical immanence which it presupposes as 
given and an a priori transcendence which it posits as given. By 
discontinuing the reciprocity or reversibility which Decision introduces 
between that immanence which is already given (without-givenness) and that 
immanence which is empirically presupposed as given through the 
transcendence of an a priori positing, non-Decisional thinking inaugurates an 
irreversible separation between the radical indivision of unobjectifiable 
immanence on the one hand, and the Decisional hybridisation of 
unobjectifiable immanence, objectivating transcendence and empirical 
objectivity on the other. 
What prevents this `cutting' from amounting to yet another Decisional 
scission between immanence and transcendence is the fact that it constitutes a 
suspension of Decision effected on the basis of an immanence which has not 
itself been decided about; an immanence which has not been posited and 
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presupposed as given through some transcendent act of Decision, but already 
given independently of every perceptual or intentional presupposition, as well 
as from every gesture of ontological or phenomenological position. This is an 
immanence that does not even need to be liberated from transcendence 
because it is precisely as that which is already separated (without-separation) 
from the Decisional mixture of immanence and transcendence that it 
functions as the inalienable sine qua non for the transcendental synthesis of 
immanence and transcendence in Decision. Non-Decisional immanence does 
not absolve itself from Decision as did Henry's phenomenologised version of 
radical immanence. On the contrary, it causes Decision to absolve itself as 
absolutely transcendent in relation to it, even though the Decisional synthesis 
of immanence and transcendence petitions that immanence as its own sine 
qua non. It is foreclosed rather than opposed to Decision -which is to say: 
radically indifferent to the dyadic distinction between immanence and 
transcendence as well as to every other Decisional dyad such as for instance 
the one distinguishing the absolute from the relative. In other words, it is 
radically indifferent to all dyadic couplings of the form: 
thinkable/unthinkable; decidable/undecidable; determinable/undeterminable. 
At this juncture, it is important that we pause briefly in order to stave 
off in advance certain automatic but misguided philosophical objections. 
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Thus, for instance, one of the most frequently reiterated philosophical 
objections to radical immanence is the one which tries to argue that in 
characterising immanence as unobjectifiable or non-Decisional we have 
unwittingly allowed it to become co-constituted once again by the 
objectifiable or by Decision, reinscribing it in the dyad 
objectifiable/unobjectifiable or Decision/non-Decision. Objections of this 
type are mistaken on two counts. 
First, whereas philosophical thinking seems to assume a fundamental 
reciprocity or reversibility between conceptual description and ontological 
constitution, non-philosophical thinking operates on the basis of their 
radically irreversible duality. Thus, our characterisation of radical immanence 
as unobjectifiable does not constitute it as unobjectifiable. Radical 
immanence is ontologically foreclosed; which is to say that it remains non- 
constitutable not because it opposes or resists constitution but because it is 
foreclosed or indifferent to the dyadic distinction between description and 
constitution. it is that very foreclosure which guarantees that our discursive 
descriptions of radical immanence are adequate-in-the-last-instance to it 
without being constitutive of it. Moreover, that radical immanence is 
foreclosed to conceptual characterisation does not mean that it is 
unconceptualisable. On the contrary, it becomes limitlessly conceptualisable 
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on the basis of any given conceptual material precisely insofar as it already 
determines our descriptions of it as being adequate-in-the-last-instance to it, 
without any of our conceptual characterisations or linguistic descriptions 
becoming co-constitutive or co-determining of it. Thus, where Decisional 
thinking posits and presupposes a reversible equivalence between 
immanence's indivisible reality and the transcendent divisions of its own 
linguistico-conceptual idealisations of immanence, non-Decisional thinking 
installs an irreversible duality between them, so that immanence's indivisible 
reality unilaterally determines all the idealised divisions of linguistico- 
conceptual usage. 
Second, the separation between the Decisional and non-Decisional is 
not itself dyadic, which is to say, Decisional. To maintain that it is to fail to 
recognise the way in which that separation has already been effected in 
accordance with the nature of radical immanence as given-without-givenness 
or posited-without-position, quite independently of all Decision. Accordingly, 
it is imperative that we appreciate the peculiar radicality of the manner in 
which the `non-' as razor separates the Decisional from the non-Decisional. It 
is not two distinct `things' that are being separated. If it were, we would still 
be operating within the ambit of Decision. What the razor serves to separate is 
the realm of separabilityr its entirety (Decision) and the Inseparable as that 11.1. L 
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which is already separated prior to the need for a separating act. In other 
words, the razor separates Decisional separation (scission, distinction, 
differentiation, division, etc. ) from the Inseparable as that which is already 
separated independently of any separating gesture. 
Of course, it is intrinsic to the character of Decisional thinking that it 
remain incapable of acknowledging the fact that that separation is already 
realised, already achieved. It is precisely on account of radical immanence's 
foreclosure to Decision that Decision remains incapable of recognizing the 
former's radical, non-Decisional autonomy. But to insist that immanence's 
foreclosure to Decision amounts to another instance of Decisional division is 
to mistake immanence's non-Decisional suspension of Decision for an intra- 
Decisional opposition to Decision, or an anti-Decisional annihilation of 
Decision. By now however, the reader should be beginning to appreciate in 
what way immanence's foreclosure to Decision, as expressed by the `non-', 
cannot be reduced to either of these two philosophical alternatives. Instead of 
opposition or annihilation, the Laruellean `non-' promises an unprecedented 
radicalisation and universalisation of the possibilities of Decision. It cuts into 
the charmed circle of auto-positional and auto-donational sufficiency, 
subjecting Decisional autonomy to a process of radically heteronomous 
determination. In other words, the reciprocal articulation or tri-lateral 
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reciprocity between that which is empirically presupposed as given, posited a 
priori as given, and transcendentally invoked as already given -which is to 
say: the Decisional hybridisation of empirical objectivity, objectivating 
transcendence and unobjectifiable immanence- is to be replaced by a non- 
reciprocal separation or unilateral duality between unobjectifiable immanence 
as already given or radically separate -without the need for an act of 
Decisional separation- and the entire structure of self-positing, self- 
presupposing hybridisation on the other. 
It is important that we note the way in which the ubiquity of the 
adverb `already' functions as a marker of non-thetic immanence as such, as an 
index of an unconditionally given `real', one which has always preceded the 
need for any constituting process of `realisation'. This `already' indexes that 
which is non-Decisionally or non-thetically `given' independently of every 
operation of phenomenological `givenness' articulated through Decision. 
Thus, the use of `already' in all these descriptions is effectively shorthand for 
non-Decisional'. But since we have already identified the defining 
characteristic of Decision in terms of the structure of reciprocal articulation 
whereby the a priori posits its own empirical presupposition while the latter 
presupposes its own a priori position via their mutual and complementary 
auto-position/donation, then clearly the `non-' in the expression `non- 
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Decisional' must itself be understood as an abbreviation for `non-auto(- 
positional/donational)', where the prefix `auto-' is now seen as perfectly 
condensing the essence of Decisional sufficiency. For if, as Heidegger's own 
`turning' in thought (Kehre) attests173, every philosophical Decision carries an 
implicit ontological charge as a `de-scission' (Unter-schied) wherein Being 
operates as the One-of-the-Dyad -the indivisible division which discloses and 
withholds, joins as it dis-joins- , then as Laruelle points out, the self-positing, 
self-presupposing transcendence articulated in the Decisional `auto-' will also 
express the essence of all ontological transcendence insofar as it is 
Decisionally deployed: "To the extent that philosophy exploits 
`transcendence ' or `Being' in a privileged and dominant manner (... ) the 
essence of transcendence or Being according to their philosophical usage 
(... ) is the Auto, that is to say, the idea of philosophy's absolute autonomy in 
the form of a circle, of a self-reference such as becomes apparent in the 
dimensions ofAuto-donation and Auto position"(Laruelle, 1996, p. 284) 
Accordingly, we can now begin to discern a chain of equivalences 
whereby the Laruellean `non-'=`non-Decisional'=`non-auto-positional/non- 
auto-donational'. Thus, the `non-' effects a suspension of auto-Decisional 
173Cf. Much of Heidegger's remarkable Contributions to Philosophy revolve around a sustained 
meditation on the event of Being as Unterschied or `de-scission'. Cf. Heidegger, 1999, passim but 
especially pp. 60-71 for an explicit discussion of Decision and of the link between Being's `essential 
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transcendence on the basis of non-Decisional immanence. As a result, every 
term prefixed by the Laruellean `non-' will bear the hallmark of that which is 
unconditionally or radically given in and through non-Decisional 
immanence, rather than according to the double articulation of position and 
donation through the structure of Decision. Moreover, to the extent that the 
sufficiency of the Decisional `auto-` expresses the essence of ontological 
transcendence per se, the manifestation of a term in accordance with non- 
Decisional immanence shall effectively release that term's radically immanent 
non-ontological essence, its non-auto-Decisional Identity as cloned174 or 
determined-in-the-last-instance by radical immanence. 
Decision as Transcendental Method 
It is on account of this constitutively self-positing and self- 
presupposing aspect, Laruelle maintains, that every philosophical Decision 
recapitulates the formal structure of a transcendental deduction. In his article 
on `The transcendental method' in the Universal Philosophical 
Encyclopaedia175, Laruelle, having reiterated his conviction that the 
transcendental method represents a methodological invariant for philosophy 
swaying' as Ereignis and the `leap' or `crossing over' enacted by an `inceptual' (i. e. non-metaphysical) 
thinking between what Heidegger calls philosophy's `first' and its `other' beginning. 
174The notion of non-Decisional cloning will be explained below in the third section of this Chapter, 
pp. 245-258. 
175Edited by A. Jacob, Paris: PUF, 1989. Cf. Laruelle, 1989c. 
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both before and after Kant -one the formal features of whose functioning can 
be described independently of any determinate set of ontological or even 
epistemological p1esuppositiolns- goes on to identify the three distinct 
structural moments which he takes to be constitutive of philosophising as 
such: 
1. The analytical inventory of a manifold of categorial a prioris 
on the basis of the empirical reality or experience whose 
conditions of possibility one seeks. In Kant, this is the moment 
of the metaphysical exposition of space and time as a priori 
forms of intuition and of the metaphysical deduction of the 
categories as pure, a priori forms of judgment176. It 
corresponds to the moment of metaphysical distinction 
between conditioned and condition, empirical and a priori, 
datum and faktum. 
2. The gathering together or unification of this manifold of local 
or regional (i. e. categorial) a prioris into a form of universal 
Unity by means of a single, unifying, transcendental a priori. 
Whereas the form of every categorial a priori remains a 
function of the a posteriori, of experience, that of the 
176 Cf. Kant, 1929, B33-B116, pp. 65-119. 
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transcendental is no longer tied to any form of regional 
experience because it functions as that superior or absolute 
condition which makes experience itself possible. It is no 
longer the result of synthesis, but rather the pre-synthetic Unity 
that makes all a priori forms of synthesis themselves possible. 
This Unity is said to be `transcendental' then, because it is 
supposed to exceed experience absolutely, rather than merely 
relatively, in the manner of the metaphysical or categorial a 
prioris, which are always local, multiple, and tied to a specific 
region or form of experience. It transcends absolutely beyond 
the specific generic distinctions of the relatively transcendent, 
categorial a prioris that it ultimately grounds and unifies. 
Kant, famously, will locate this transcendental ground of the 
synthetic a priori in the indivisible Unity of pure apperception. 
Crucially, Laruelle points out, it is this very absoluteness 
required of the transcendental a priori which is compromised 
insofar as it remains tied in varying degrees, according to the 
philosopher in question, to one or other form of metaphysically 
transcendent empirical entity (e. g. Kant: the `I think' and the 
facultative apparatus; Husserl: the Ego of pure 
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phenomenological consciousness). Thus, the supposedly 
unconditional transcendence demanded of the transcendental 
remains fatally compromised precisely because the structure of 
transcendence invariably binds it to some reified, 
transcendent entity. 
3. The third and final moment is that of the unification of these 
modes of categorial synthesis with this transcendental Unity, 
but now understood in terms of their constitutive relation to 
experience through the offices of the latter. It is the binding of 
the metaphysical a priori to the empirical experience that it 
conditions via the transcendental Unity conditioning the 
possibility of the a priori itself. This, of course, is the stage 
corresponding to Kant's transcendental Deduction of the 
categories'77. It is the moment of transcendental synthesis, of 
reciprocal co-belonging, guaranteeing the immanence to one 
another of conditioning and conditioned, either in terms of the 
unity of possible experience (Kant), or of the Lebenswelt 
(Husserl), or of Being-in-the-World as Care (Heidegger). In 
177 Cf. Kant, 1929, A95-A130 and B129-B169, pp. 129-175. 
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any case it is that for which the moment of transcendental 
analysis functioned only as an enabling preliminary178. 
Laruelle's account of Deduction here deliberately invokes a 
Heideggerean resonance: Deduction constitutes the movement whereby the 
transcendent metaphysical scission of analytic division pivots back (Kehre)179 
toward empirical immanence via the binding function of transcendental 
Unity and its indivisible synthesis. Through Deduction the motion from the 
metaphysically transcendent categorial manifold to the transcendental Unity 
which makes that a priori manifold possible is turned back toward empirical 
experience in the shape of a transcendental synthesis binding the a priori to 
the a posteriori, the logical syntax of the ideal to the contingent empirical 
congruences of the real. In this way, Deduction simultaneously circumscribes 
the empirical insofar as it is concerned with its a priori condition, and 
delimits the transcendent by folding the a priori back within the bounds of 
empirical sense and forbidding metaphysical attempts to loose it from its 
moorings as defined according to the limits of possible experience. 
178Ibid., pp. 120-175. A case could be made for the schematism here as better exemplifying this 
unificatory function insofar as it is that which ultimately guarantees the categories' objective reality, 
over and above their merely formal or logical objective validity. 
1791n The Philosophies of Difference Laruelle will explicitly identify the Heideggerean shift from 
Being as ontico-ontological Differenz to the event of `Enowing' as Unter-schied with the Decisional 
transition from metaphysical to transcendental difference. Cf. Laruelle, 1986, pp. 48-120. On the 
Heideggerean notion of `turning' -or more precisely, what Heidegger calls a 'turn ing-in-enowning'-, cf. 
for example section 255 in Heidegger 1999, pp. 286-288. 
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Yet not only does Deduction explain the empirical reality of 
cognition, but also the transcendental reality of its a priori possibility. So 
Laruelle is entirely willing to concur with Kant's immediate successors in 
ascribing an unparalled philosophical importance to the notion of the 
synthetic a priori 180. But only if (as Schelling and Hegel rightly saw) the 
function of the latter is de-subjectivised and de-objectivised, or generalised 
beyond its Kantian reification in pure apperception. If interpreted in the 
broadest sense as an abstract philosophical mechanism, then Laruelle sees in 
it that which is simultaneously both the means and the end of transcendental 
Deduction per se, so much so that one or other version of the synthetic a 
priori as principle of the pre-synthetic Unity of the ideal and the real, of logos 
and phusys, can be seen to lie at the very heart of all Decision (so long, of 
course, as one continues to insist, as Laruelle does, on an irrecusably 
transcendental dimension as constitutive of every philosophical gesture per 
se). 
It is this indivisible synthesis operated through the offices of the 
transcendental a priori in Deduction, this an-objective, pre-subjective and 
thereby superior (which is to say, transcendental) reality proper to the Unity- 
in-difference of real and ideal which Laruelle will identify as the 
180 See for example Vetö, 1998, pp. 61-85 and passim; Schelling, 1993, pp. 95-163; Hegel, 1989, 
236 
consummating moment of Decision. It constitutes the transcendental 
Indivision (=One) which is simultaneously intrinsic and extrinsic, immanent 
and transcendent to the fundamental Dyadic scission of metaphysical faktum 
and empirical datum, condition and conditioned: "The telos of the 
transcendental is fulfilled by Deduction and this constitutes the real: not in 
any empirical or contingent sense, but in the superior or specifically 
philosophical sense which is that of the concrete synthetic Unity of the 
empirically real and of a priori or ideal possibility. " (Laruelle, 1989c1, 
p. 697) 
Only now does it become possible to appreciate the full import of the 
Laruellean claim that Decision presumes to co-constitute the Real. For the 
`reality' of the Real in question at the level of Decision is neither that of the 
empirically immanent res, nor that of the metaphysically transcendent and 
ideal a priori (Kant: reality defined as coextensive with the bounds of real 
possibility through the objective validity of the a priori conditioning possible 
experience), but rather that which conditions both. It is the reality peculiar to 
the transcendental as ubiquitous guarantor unifying, and thereby constituting, 
the possibilities of thought and experience at a level that remains both 
presubjective and anobjective, so that the principle is as valid for Nietzsche 
p. 209. 
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and Deleuze as for Kant and Husserl. This higher Unity of Decision is not 
only indissociable from the Unity of experience, it yields it, so that the latter 
is always structurally isomorphic with the former. Through the operation of 
Deduction, the Decision as indivisible division or One-of-the-Dyad is always 
coextensive with the a priori categorial manifold of experience. 
But this is not all. The philosopher reinscribes his/her own 
philosophical activity within the transcendental structure which renders the 
experience of that thought possible as a part of the real at a level that is 
simultaneously ontico-empirical and ontologico-transcendental (the 
Decisional hybrid or composite once again). More exactly, the syntax of 
Decision enacts or performs its own peculiarly transcendental reality in what 
effectively amounts to an operation of auto-Deduction possessing a tripartite 
structure: Decision is at once an empirical event of thought, some immanent 
being or some thing; but also a transcendent, onto-metaphysical thought of 
Being as Event; and finally that which transcendentally enunciates the Being 
of thought as Event of Being. This is the complex internal architecture proper 
to the Decisional `autos' as self-positing/self-donating circle or doublets 81. 
181 We have already seen this Decisional structure at work in the case of Deleuze & Guattari's machinic 
constructivism: the philosophical Concept's counter-effectuation of intensive materiality is at once 
extracted from an empirical state of affairs through which the philosopher is forced to think and 
transcendentally productive of Being qua Event. Cf. supra, Chapter 3, pp. 109-124 and 150-161. But 
perhaps it is best exemplified by Heidegger, who reinscribes the conditions for the genesis of the 
project of fundamental ontology within the structure of fundamental ontology itself. Thus, the 
238 
Two points need to be made here. First, the way in which Laruelle, in 
conformity with the characterisation of the non-philosophical ethos 
mentioned earlier, both radicalises and generalises the restricted 
Heideggerean/Derridean conception (and critique) of the metaphysics of 
presence, extending its scope beyond that of the `presence of the present' and 
a narrowly circumscribed domain of metaphysical thinking defined according 
to what, for Laruelle, remains an ad hoc, empirical (i. e. Decisional) definition 
of metaphysics. He does this by providing a non-Decisional identification of 
the `auto', one according to which it is identified with the essence of Decision 
as auto-positional and auto-donational sufficiency. As a result, the range of 
applicability for `auto' as a philosophical notion is generalised both beyond 
its metaphysical definition in terms of the substantivity or presence of that 
which is a `standing-alongside' or 'beside-itself -, and beyond what 
Heidegger calls its thoughtful or essential redefinition as `the Same', as the 
belonging-together of that which differs182. Consequently, the self- 
positing/self-presupposing structure of auto-Decision becomes applicable 
even to the thinking that tries to uncover the unpresentable conditions for 
philosophical project delineated in Being and Time encompasses its own conditions of possibility, as 
explicated in Dasein's shift from dispersion in average everydayness to the properly meta-physical 
appropriation of being-unto-death as its ownmost potentiality for being. Since it is via the latter that 
Dasein 's own being comes into question for it, fundamental ontology as theoretical project is 
ultimately supervenient on the existential ur-project delineated in being-unto-death. 
182 Cf. Heidegger, 1969. 
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presencing or retrieve the constitutive dimension of self-withholding in every 
self-disclosure of Being. 
Once again we witness a change of theoretical scale in moving from 
the philosophical to the non-philosophical level of description. The auto- 
nomy of Decision is defined purely in terms of its abstract theoretical essence 
independently of any set of assumptions about what can and cannot count as 
an instance of ontological reification, thereby becoming indifferently 
applicable both to presence, and to its unpresentable presencing, so that the 
auto-logical structure of self-position and self-presupposition pertains even at 
the level of Ereignis/Enteignis as unrepresentable disclosing-withdrawal of 
Being. Thus, from a non-Decisional viewpoint, there is no compelling 
theoretical reason to prefer Heidegger's retrieval of the unthought essence 
concealed within the Parmenidean ro avzo ('the Same')183 as non- 
metaphysical co-belonging of disclosure and withholding (unrepresentable 
advent of presencing), to the ontotheological interpretation of the `auto' as 
substantial metaphysical identity (reified presence). Both are entirely 
equivalent variants of a structural invariant: Decision as auto-presupposing 
composite of thinking and being. 
183For a suggestive indication of the profound link between the structure of the Parmenidean axiom 
('It is the same thing to think and to be') and the Kantian problematic of transcendental deduction, cf. 
Heidegger, 1968, p. 243. The latter seems to support Laruelle's claim that all Decision recapitulates a 
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The second point that needs to be made concerns philosophy's 
theoretical status (or lack thereof), and the precise character of what many 
will doubtlessly see as Laruelle's own excessive 'theoreticism'. It is on 
account of this auto-Deductive structure (which is to say, on account of the 
Principle of the Sufficiency of Decision which it serves to articulate) that 
philosophy itself (la philosophie) for Laruelle is not a theory but rather an 
activity whose claim to theoretical legitimacy is only ever assured by its 
performance; a game the rules for which are always effectively guaranteed 
through the very operation through which their stipulation is enacted. For 
Laruelle, the trouble with this constitutively performative dimension of 
philosophical activity; this Decisional auto-enactment in Deduction, lies not 
in this performativity (far from it) but in the way in which the latter invariably 
operates on the basis of an unstated set of constative assumptions which 
themselves only ever become performatively legitimated. In other words, 
philosophy is a hybrid of theory and practise: it is a theory whose cognitive 
possibilities are compromised through an extraneous set of practical 
exigencies, and a practise whose performative capacities are hindered by a 
needlessly restrictive system of theoretical presumptions184. The philosopher, 
process of transcendental deduction as a variant on the Unity-in-Difference of thinking and being or of 
ideal logos and real phusys. 
184-As soon as [philosophy] begins to be used as a material and an occasion, it loses its traditional 
finalities, all of which are based in a `spontaneous philosophical faith'. The latter forms a circle: it 
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in effect, never says what he/she is really doing, nor does what he/she is really 
saying. 
It is to this hybridisation of theory and practise, of the constative and 
the performative, of saying and doing, to which Laruelle objects, on the 
grounds that it needlessly constricts both the possibilities of saying and those 
of doing, of thought and of experience. Moreover, simply to affirm the 
differance between theory and praxis, constative and performative, as Derrida, 
for instance, seems to185, is to complacently re-affirm the philosophical 
Decision's constitutive, self-perpetuating embroilment in its own basically 
fractional, self-presupposing structure. 
By way of contrast, it is radical immanence as the already performed, 
as the Performed-without-performance186, which furnishes us with the non- 
Decisional essence of performativity. By using the razor to effect the non- 
Decisional separation or dualysation of these auto-Decisional hybridisations 
obliges one to practise philosophy for reasons that are external to it, whether they be ethical, juridical, 
scientific, aesthetic, etc.; but inversely, philosophy in turn uses these finalities the better to triumph and 
to affirm itself, on the basis of their subordination, as the only activity which is genuinely excellent, 
uncircumventable or `absolute'. All this prescriptive activity -whether it be ethical or pedagogical, 
etc. -, all this normative or auto-normative use of philosophy `with a view to experience', all of 
spontaneous philosophy's latent or explicit teleology, must be abandoned, which is to say, treated as a 
mere material and practised henceforth within these limits rather than destroyed. " (Laruelle, 1989, 
p. 27) 
185 Cf. Derrida, 1982. 
186 "It is this Performed, shorn of the fetishes of performativity and of activity and the causa sui in 
general, which invests thinking itself as identity (within its relatively autonomous order of thought) of 
science and philosophy, and more generally, of the theoretical and the pragmatic. We shall not say too 
hastily -confusing once again thinking with the Real- that the latter [this identity-RB] is performed 
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of the constative and the performative, of performance and performativity, on 
the basis of radical immanence as performed-without-performance, we will 
clone the identity (without synthesis or unity), and the duality (without 
reciprocity or relation) of theory and praxis, or of the constative and the 
performative, thereby emancipating the non-Decisional essence of theory as 
radically performative, at the same time as we liberate the non-thetic essence 
of praxis as rigorously cognitive. Non-philosophy is at once a radically 
theoretical praxis, and a radically performative theory. Moreover, we shall see 
in the next section how it is precisely insofar as we are already operating in 
accordance with the immanence of the Real as `already-performed' that we 
cannot help but say what we do and do as we say187. 
Finally, it is the auto-Deductive character of Decision, its self- 
legislating sufficiency, which explains the fundamentally unitary nature of all 
philosophical Decision. Perhaps the most important consequence of the auto- 
Deductive structure described above is that the transcendental isomorphy 
between the a priori conditions for thinking and for Being excludes de jure 
directly in-One, but that it is so only in the last instance by the One as the Performed itself. " (Laruelle, 
1996, p. 215). 
187We will also see later to what extent the non-materialist invalidation of the transcendent, 
phenomenological distinction between theory and experience, undermining as it does the quasi- 
sacrosanct status popularly accorded to a supposedly originary dimension of non-representational 
facticity or embodiment in much contemporary continental philosophy, resonates with the kind of 
militantly neuroscientific theoreticism espoused by philosophers like Paul Churchland. From a non- 
materialist perspective, with the exception of the radical hyle as Given-without-givenness, nothing, no 
residue of worldly, social, historical, or phenomenological experience is given without the intercession 
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the possibility of two Decisions (i. e. two Deductions) possessing an equally 
valid claim on the real. Philosophy as arena of Decision is necessarily the war 
of all against all. This claim seems to carry a peculiarly Levinasian resonance, 
but Laruelle seems less inclined to condemn war on ethical grounds as an 
originary evil, than to indict it on theoretical grounds simply because it 
presents us with an unnecessarily tedious and predictable spectacle: 
"Philosophy's closure, both within itself and in its own unitary or 
polemological multiplicity obliges it to exploit itself as a supposedly 
inexhaustible but fundamentally scarce resource. There is a scarcity of 
decision, one which is a consequence of its unity or circularity, its self- 
reference or self-sufficiency: all the various philosophies -the manifold of the 
Dyad- parcel out Unity, indivisible in itself, among themselves as their unique 
booty, and this scarcity is identical with the war which they all reciprocally 
wage on one another. " (Lat ueiie, 1909, p. 106) 
Thus, Laruelle insists that the root of philosophy's unitary 
presumption lies in this auto-Deductive syntax of Decision: there could never 
be, as a matter of philosophical principle, more than one way of validly 
effecting the transcendental synthesis of logos and phusys conditioning the 
possibilities of thinking and being to yield an ontologically a priori or 
of philosophical Decision. Cf. Laruelle, 1996, pp. 212-225, and infra, Chapters 7 and 8, where the 
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philosophical experience of reality, because the formal Unity of Decision 
transcendentally conditions the structure of what for philosophy is equivalent 
to the real. All substantive ontological multiplicity articulated through the 
hybridisation of immanence and transcendence remains syntactically 
circumscribed by the transcendental synthesis of Decision. Consequently, 
however much multiplicity a philosophy lays claim to at the ontic, or even 
ontological level, the formal structure of Decision invariably necessitates that 
what philosophy affirms as being irreducibly multiple and singular, is always 
the result of a pure synthesis of transcendental Unity and a priori 
multiplicity, of ideal syntax and real experience' 88. 
Such synthesis invariably bears two distinct but inseparable 
characteristics. First, the character of indivisible synthetic Unity or the fact 
that transcendental synthesis must equal One. There can only ever be one 
way in which the ontological reality of experience is transcendentally 
constituted. Second, the characteristic that what is to count as ontically real 
multiplicity will be defined a priori as a function of real possibility or 
ontological reality at the transcendental level. Thus, what counts as singular, 
manifold, aleatory and heterogeneous according to the structure of Decision 
ramifications of these claims will be examined in detail. 
188 Cf. in this regard Laruelle's account of the relation between Difference as ideal metaphysical 
syntax and as real transcendental experience in The Philosophies of Difference: Laruelle, 1986, pp. 37- 
92. 
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is invariably the result of a de jure indiscernibility or undecidability between 
the possibility of real experience as a priori manifold at the ontic level and 
the reality of ideal syntax as transcendental Unity at the ontological level. 
And it is this hybrid or mixture of syntax and experience, of ideal unity and a 
priori multiplicity, of ontological reality and ontically real, which Decision 
affirms as coincidence of the indivisible immanence of the Real qua One and 
the unencompassable transcendence of the Ideal qua Multiple 189. 
The Non-Decisional Cloning of Decision 
At this stage, we must address an obvious philosophical rejoinder to 
the account of Decision that we have just delineated. What kind of validity 
are these claims concerning the auto-Deductive character of Decision 
supposed to have? Aren't they simply wild, reckless generalisations? Clearly, 
from a philosophical perspective, Laruelle's assertions strain our credulity. 
On what possible basis can he presume to claim that all philosophical 
1891n Chapter 3 we saw with reference to the case of Deleuze & Guattari how this Decisional synthesis 
or `sublation' of the One qua Real and the Multiple qua Ideal inevitably reinscribes untotalisable 
multiplicity as indivisible Unity. Cf. supra, pp. 149-153. By way of contrast, it is by suspending the 
sufficiency of Decision and irreversibly dissociating the moment of transcendental indivision from that 
of metaphysical division, unilaterally determining the latter on the basis of the former but never vice 
versa, that non-materialism will hypothesize that there are in principle an infinite number of possible 
ways in which the ontic singularity of a phenomenon may be ontologically constituted, - a de jure 
infinite number of possible Decisions capable of conditioning a priori the reality of experience. This is 
(hyper)transcendental dispersion, the non-materialist radicalisation and generalisation of the notion of 
an a priori manifold, one which would make it impossible to reinsert the latter within any horizon of 
ontological differentiation. Cf. infra, Chapter 7, pp. 361-372, for our account of the a priori 
fractalisation of Decisionally articulated instances of ontological unity. 
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thinking is Decisional and that every Decision invariably repeats the structure 
of a transcendental Deduction ? 
It may be however, that such a question misconstrues the explanatory 
intent of the theoretical posture presupposed in all these descriptions of 
philosophical activity, and consequently fails to appreciate the way in which 
Laruelle's account functions as a transcendental hypothesis constructed in 
order to explain the possibility of that activity. We have already insisted that 
non-philosophy is not anti-Decisional: it is a theory and a practise for 
philosophy, an attempt to explain the autonomy of Decision heteronomously, 
which is to say, in non-Decisional terms. Moreover, we have already seen that 
the suspension of Decisional sufficiency on the basis of a non-Decisional 
immanence that is already given cannot be reduced to an anti-Decisional 
stance. Consequently, it cannot be confused with an immediately 
philosophical critique or denunciation of Decision. On the contrary, it is by 
thinking in accordance with radical immanence as utterly heterogeneous to 
Decision that we access the possibility of explaining Decision. 
Thus, the no n-philosophical description of auto-Decisional sufficiency 
is neither a critique nor a deconstruction: it is an explanatory hypothesis. The 
point is not to denounce, to delimit or to end all possibility of Decision, but to 
provide a heteronomous theoretical description of its functioning which 
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simultaneously promises to untether the possibilities of thinking from the 
narrow ambit of auto-Decisional sufficiency. Accordingly, the Laruellean 
description of auto-Decisional sufficiency in terms of a generalised process of 
transcendental Deduction is an explanatory hypothesis that Laruelle is 
prepared to adopt to see if it will yield fruitful results in the attempt to 
illuminate the functioning of Decision. And it is in The Philosophies of 
Difference -a text which is roughly contemporaneous with the account of 
Decision put forward in `The Transcendental Method'- that Laruelle submits 
this particular non-philosophical hypothesis to a process of experimental 
verification by applying it to a widely disparate set of philosophies, thereby 
testing its range of applicability and explanatory coherence with reference to a 
heterogeneous assortment of philosophical methodologies and 
problematics190. 
Moreover, this non-philosophical hypothesis about the essence of 
philosophical thinking is transcendental. That is to say: it accepts the 
separation between Decisional transcendence and non-Decisional immanence 
as already-given the better to allow for a transcendental effectuation of that 
190 Although we lack space for a proper examination of Laruelle's systematic adoption and testing of 
the auto-Deductive hypothesis for philosophy in The Philosophies of Difference, we feel that the 
ability to provide a unified, conceptually coherent explanation for what are habitually regarded as 
utterly disparate, not to say incommensurable, sets of philosophical data (Nietzsche, Deleuze, 
Heidegger, Derrida) tend, when coupled with the variety of penetrating insights and illuminating 
analyses which characterise the results yielded in the process of hypothetical experimentation, to 
validate the hypothesis' explanatory legitimacy. 
248 
separation in thought, an effectuation presupposed in its non-Decisional 
description of the essence of philosophy. For to theorize by means of the 
adoption of axioms, the construction of theorems and the experimental testing 
of explanatory hypotheses is already to engage in non-Decisional or non- 
philosophical thinking. Accordingly, the characterisation of Decision as auto- 
Deductive which we have just provided is already non-philosophical, and the 
account of philosophical thought put forward by Laruelle in `The 
Transcendental Method', must, along with all of his works since A Biography 
of the Ordinary Man, be read as intrinsically and unequivocally non- 
philosophical in character. 
That the very identification of philosophical thinking as intrinsically 
Decisional is already non-philosophical, which is to say, operating from a 
transcendental perspective for philosophy, is what now needs to be clarified. 
However, we must warn the reader that in the course of this clarification we 
shall be obliged to describe the workings of non-philosophical theory in some 
detail, thereby entering into a degree of technical intricacy'91 that he or she 
may find excessively convoluted, not to say tortuous. Although regrettable, 
that tortuousness is nevertheless unavoidable in the present circumstances. 
191 Some -although not all- of the details of the following account -specifically 
those concerning the 
theory of cloning- are drawn largely from Laruelle, 1996, pp. 34-38,162-168,225-228; 1999, pp. 
141- 
146; 2000a, pp. 56-75,226-238; 2000b, pp. 49-53; and 2000c, pp. 185-186. 
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The requirements of non-philosophical precision sometimes obviate the 
demands of philosophical clarity. 
The intelligibility of the claim that the non-philosophical description 
of philosophy is already transcendental requires an acknowledgement that the 
`perspective' of radical immanence (the vision-in-One) is already-given- 
without-givenness, prior to every auto-positional or auto-donational 
hybridisation of given and givenness, empirical and a priori, real and ideal. 
For the vision-in-One entails that the spontaneous philosophical presumption 
that every given presupposes an operation of givenness already be invalidated 
and suspended. As a result, the radical separation or unilateral duality of non- 
Decisional immanence as already-given and Decisional transcendence as 
mixture of given and givenness is itself already given-without-givenness: -it 
has already been performed (without the need for an act or Decision of 
performance). Which is to say: the real separation performed by the 
Laruellean razor is not between Decision and non-Decision but between the 
philosophical positing of the dyad `Decision/non-Decision' and the already- 
given or radically unilateral duality separating dyadic Decision from non- 
Decisional duality. 
But this means that even the absolute autonomy of Decision is 
nevertheless relative-in-the-last-instance to non-Decisional immanence. Thus, 
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the fact that the absolute sufficiency of Decision can only be posited-as-given 
by petitioning an immanence that is already-given renders that absolutely 
sufficient condition relative-in-the-last-instance to a radically necessary but 
non-sufficient condition. It renders the absolute, self-positing autonomy of 
Decision relatively autonomous vis a vis the radical autonomy of that which is 
already-given. Even the absolute autonomy of Decision remains relative to 
that radically autonomous last-instance which it petitions as already-given in 
order to effect its synthesis of ideal positing and real presupposition192 
Accordingly, the autonomy of Decisional sufficiency is never just 
given as an absolute `in-itself in terms of the metaphysical dyad `Decisional 
transcendence/non-Decisional immanence'. It is also already-given-in-One or 
given-without-givenness as a relative autonomy - which is to say, given as an 
occasional cause or empirical support for non-Decisional thinking. Crucially, 
this heteronomous or non-auto-donational giving of Decision as an occasional 
cause -the non-Decisional donation of its absolute autonomy as a merely 
relative autonomy-, lifts or suspends its pretension to absolute, self-positing 
sufficiency, thereby reducing it to the status of an indifferent empirical 
192 "Real immanence neither absorbs nor annihilates [Decisional] transcendence, it is not opposed to 
it, but is capable of `receiving' it and of determining it as a relative autonomy. Real immanence is so 
radical -rather than absolute- that it does not reduce the transcendence of the World -whether 
philosophically or phenomenologically-, it does not deny or limit it, but, on the contrary, gives it - 
albeit in accordance with its own modality: as that being-given-without-givenness of transcendence 
which, whilst remaining `absolute' or auto positional in its own register, acquires a relative autonomy 
with regard to the Real. "(Laruelle, 2000b, pp. 50-51) 
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material. Thus, the absolute autonomy of Decision -otherwise known by 
Laruelle as `The Principle of Sufficient Philosophy'- is suspended once it is 
understood that the supposedly unconditional sufficiency of Decision has 
already been given-without-givenness as no more than a relatively sufficient 
condition, an occasional but non-determining cause for non-Decisional 
thinking. 
Moreover, it is on the basis of Decision as empirical occasion that 
immanence's foreclosure to Decision can become transcendentally effectuated 
in thought. Consequently, the fact that Decision itself is already-given- 
without-givenness as a potential occasion or material for non-Decisional 
thinking -its pretension to absolute sufficiency already-suspended and 
reduced to a merely relative sufficiency-, explains how immanence's 
foreclosure to Decisional thinking may nevertheless become effectuated in 
thought on the basis of Decision. For with its pretension to absolute autonomy 
suspended, Decision as a relatively sufficient, but non-determining occasional 
cause becomes susceptible to determination by a radically necessary but non- 
sufficient cause: immanence as cause of determination-in-the-last-instance. 
And this determination of Decision as sufficient but non-necessary occasional 
cause, according to immanence as necessary but non-sufficient cause-in-the- 
last-instance, is performed by non-Decisional thought. This effectuation of 
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immanence's foreclosure to Decision in non-Decisional thought, or 
Decision's determination-in-the-last-instance through the non-Decisional 
effectuation of immanence in thought, is what Laruelle calls `cloning'. 
Here we arrive at the heart of non-Decisional thinking; that aspect of 
non-philosophy which is at once the most crucial but also the most difficult to 
understand as far as Decisional thinking is concerned. For doesn't this 
putative `effectuation' by thought of an immanence which is supposed to 
remain radically foreclosed to thought re-institute a reciprocity -and thereby a 
bi-lateral determination- between immanence and thought? 
In order to appreciate why this is not the case, it is important to 
remember that immanence's `foreclosure' to Decision simply means that it is 
separate-without-separation from every Decisional dyad, such as, for instance, 
the one distinguishing the thinkable from the unthinkable. Thus, immanence's 
foreclosure to the Decisional alternative between thinkable and unthinkable 
does not render it `unthinkable'. On the contrary: it is immanence's 
foreclosure to thought that allows it to use the Decisional hybridisation of the 
thinkable and the unthinkable -one which we have already seen exemplified 
in the work of Michel Henry193- as an empirical occasion from which to clone 
thought's transcendental Identity as determined-in-the-last-instance by 
193 Cf supra, Chapter 2, pp. 87-90. 
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immanence as that non-thinkable foreclosure which is simultaneously the 
already-thought. 
Accordingly, although Real immanence is foreclosed to thought as 
well as Decision, the fact that it nevertheless gives or manifests the thinking 
which is inscribed in Decision as an empirical occasion allows immanence's 
foreclosure to effectuate itself as thought; to clone itself as a transcendental 
Identity for non-Decisional thinking -one which Laruelle will call `the force- 
(of)-thought'-; but an Identity-(of)-thought which is now in its own turn 
foreclosed as transcendental, rather than as Real, to the Decisional distinction 
between thinkable and unthinkable which it uses as its material support. 
At this point, in order to minimize the potential for confusion, it is 
particularly important that we enforce a set of rigorous but non-philosophical 
distinctions between immanence qua Real foreclosure, Decision qua 
empirical occasion, and non-Decisional thought qua transcendental 
effectuation of the Real's foreclosure. Cloning allows Real immanence's 
foreclosure to Decision to become transcendentally effectuated as non- 
Decisional thinking on the basis of Decision as its empirical occasion, but it 
does so without reconstituting a philosophical dyad between `thought' and 
`Real', or between `transcendental foreclosure' and `Real foreclosure'. Thus, 
the distinction between the Real's radical foreclosure to all thought, whether 
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Decisional or non-Decisional, and non-Decisional thought's transcendental 
effectuation or cloning of the Real's foreclosure to Decision, is not a dyadic 
distinction between different, reifiable 'things'. Neither Real immanence, nor 
its transcendental effectuation, can count as philosophically distinguishable 
'things'. There is only one 'thing': Decision as empirical occasion. `Between' 
Real foreclosure and transcendental foreclosure there is neither identity nor 
difference but an Identity-of-the-last-instance. The Real's foreclosure clones 
itself as non-Decisional thinking's transcendental foreclosure to Decision on 
the basis of Decision as empirical occasion. Which is to say, the Real clones 
itself transcendentally for thought -as force-(of)-thought- as an identity- 
without-unity. Cloning describes the way in which the Real as an Identity- 
without-ontological consistency, an Identity foreclosed to all criteria of 
discrete, numerical unity, can allow for a limitless number of effectuations 
without numerical reduplication194. 
By the same token, it is important that we do not apply the term 
`unilateral duality' when speaking of the non-dyadic distinction or Identity- 
of-the-last-instance between immanence qua Real and immanence qua 
194This is what Laruelle describes as immanence's radically universal (but non-unitary or non- 
ontological) character as the already-given: its capacity to give (without-givenness) a de jure limitless 
variety of reciprocally exclusive and therefore ontologically unitary Decisions as mere occasions for 
thinking in accordance with the Real's non-unitary, non-ontological and non-consistent essence as an 
Identity-without-unity. Cf. Chapter 7, pp. 349-372; and Chapter 8, pp. 415-421. 
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transcendental. For it is the unilateral duality between Real immanence and 
Decision which becomes transcendentally effectuated or cloned as the 
unilateral duality between the non-Decisional clone and its Decisional 
occasion. Once again, in spite of appearances, non-philosophical theory 
operates with only one term: philosophical Decision qua empirical occasion. 
Instead of the Decisional triad of relations between empirical, a priori, and 
transcendental, we have a unilateral duality with only one term: that 
Decisional triad as an indivisible, empirical occasion. Neither the Real nor its 
transcendental clone constitutes a relational term. Consequently, the unilateral 
duality `between' Real and Decision is strictly indiscernible from -or is 
nothing over and above- its effectuation as the unilateral duality between 
Decision and non-Decisional clone. But its effectuation requires the occasion 
of Decision: the Real's foreclosure to Decision does not need to be thought -it 
is radically indifferent to all thinking- but if (and only if) Decision occasions 
it, that foreclosure is transcendentally effectuated or cloned as non-Decisional 
thought. Only on the basis of Decision as empirical occasion does the Real's 
radical foreclosure to Decision becomes effectuated as non-Decisional 
thinking in order to become transcendentally determining vis a vis Decision. 
Thus, the Real as foreclosed or as separate-without-separation from 
Decision is cloned as that force-(of)-thought which is separate-without- 
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separation or foreclosed to the Decision that serves as its empirical support. 
Because the Real's foreclosure to thought simply means that it is the 
necessary but non-sufficient condition for all thinking, the non-Decisional 
thinking operating according to the Real's foreclosure requires for its 
manifestation the occasion of Decisional thought as a contingent but non- 
determining factor. Accordingly, the inception of non-Decisional thinking's 
force-(of)-thought as that which effectuates the Real's foreclosure occurs 
without the inauguration of a bi-lateral reciprocity, a co- determination, 
between the latter and the former. 
This point is important enough to be worth labouring: the radical 
separation bet ww een 
immanence 
and Decision is not reduplicated but cloned as 
the unilateral duality between thought's non-Decisional Identity and the 
Decisional hybridisation of Real and thought which serves as its empirical 
support. For it is as this force-(of)-thought that the Real is able to determine 
Decision without Decision being able to determine the Real in return. 
Because Decision's non-Decisional Identity, its transcendental clone, is 
identical-in-the-last-instance with the Real, it functions as the determining 
instance, the organon, as which (rather than `through which') the Real 
unilaterally determines Decision. 
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In what way then do these extraordinarily convoluted explanations 
serve to mitigate the charge of arbitrariness levelled against the Laruellean 
account of Decision? To the extent that it is predicated upon the mobilisation 
of this difficult but remarkably sophisticated theoretical apparatus, and on the 
invocation of this non-philosophical force-(of)-thought, it would be premature 
simply to dismiss Laruelle's non-philosophical identification of the auto- 
Deductive essence of philosophical Decision as a gratuitous instance of 
philosophical generalisation. On the contrary, that identification seems to us 
to constitute a rigorously transcendental, albeit non-Decisional, hypothesis for 
the explanation of philosophical thinking. Although contingently occasioned 
by the Kantian paradigm of Decision, Laruelle's account constitutes a non- 
Kantian universalisation of Deduction. It sees the Kantian apparatus of 
Deduction `in-One' 
. 
It invokes the non-Decisional perspective upon 
philosophising concomitant with `the vision-in-One' -the reduction of `the 
history of philosophy' to the status of a contingent empirical material- in 
order to effect an authentically transcendental universalisation, rather than a 
metaphysical generalisation, of the Kantian paradigm as a hypothesis for the 
explanation of philosophising195. 
195 Compared to many of the currently available attempts to provide a universal schema which would 
encapsulate `the history of philosophy' in its essence -as exemplified, for instance, by the Heideggerean 
`history of metaphysics as forgetting of Being', the Levinasian alternation between ontological 
totalisation and ethical infinity, or even the Deleuzean contrast between sedentary State thinker and 
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This is the non-philosopher's force-(o f)-thought, and it is as the latter 
that an instance of Decision, in this case Kant's, serves merely as an occasion 
from which a transcendental Identity is extracted, one which will assume the 
status of a non-thetic axiom, or axiom given according to the One (i. e. 
without self-givenness) on whose basis a set of transcendental theorems can 
be elaborated in conformity with their determination-in-the-last-instance by 
that transcendentally axiomatic theoretical Identity'96. 
Consequently, the Laruellean procedure in dealing with philosophy 
can be seen as a variation on the following general non-philosophical 
injunction: `Let immanence be given-without-givenness. What follows for 
philosophy? ' Cloning allows this injunction to be satisfied in a limitless 
variety of ways, depending on which instance of Decision is to assume the 
status of a transcendental axiom through its being-given-in-One or without- 
givenness. In this particular instance, Laruelle's non-philosophical hypothesis 
for the purposes of providing a theoretical explanation of philosophy's 
Identity assumes the following form: `Let the Kantian distinction between 
metaphysical and transcendental deduction be given-without-givenness. What 
follows for philosophy? ' The result in this case is that the apparatus of 
anarchic nomad-, the Laruellean account of philosophical Decision displays a far greater degree of 
theoretical probity: it offers us a genuinely sophisticated, versatile and enriching explanation of 
philosophising. 
196 Cf. Laruelle, 1999, p. 140; and 1996, pp. 83,162-185,240. 
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Deduction is radicalised and generalised beyond the context of its narrowly 
Kantian application, in order to serve as a universally valid hypothesis 
capable of generating a legitimately theoretical explanation of the 
phenomenon in question: the philosophical Decision. 
Suspending the Parmenidean Axiom 
Doubtless, the persistent repetition of the `non-' prefix in Laruelle's 
work invites the suspicion that an entirely negative mode of determination, or 
a species of conceptual via negativa, has been substituted for positive 
characterisation. Such suspicions, although understandable, are nevertheless 
misguided. They fail to bear in mind the way in which Laruelle uses the `non- 
1 as a kind of auxiliary classifier or index for non-auto-Decisional radicality, 
one which always unleashes a dimension of positive characterisation already 
immanent in the terms and concepts to which it is applied. In this respect, its 
function is best understood as akin to the lifting of a speed restriction or the 
raising of a floodgate. Far from blanketly negating the term to which it is 
affixed, it actually suspends or disqualifies a precise set of conceptual 
strictures through which a determinate species of thinking (i. e. the auto- 
positional/auto-donational kind) superimposes certain systemically structured 
conditions onto the ineradicable simplicity of a phenomenon whose 
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parameters of immanent manifestation are as conceptually uncircumscribable 
as they are phenomenologically unencompassable. 
Thus, although it seems to deny, like Zarathustra's No197, Laruelle's 
`non-' is ultimately a No that performs the Yes. What it suspends is the self- 
imposed constriction of philosophical thought's auto-Decisional sufficiency, 
the charmed circle of its auto-positional and auto-donational autonomy. The 
cancellation of that sufficiency actually dissimulates an affirmation of the 
radically unconditioned; that which frees Decision from its absolute self- 
sufficiency by conditioning Decision without being conditioned by it in 
return. Accordingly, non-Decisional thinking reaffirms the ineradicable 
immanence of the phenomenon `itself' by suspending the hallucinatory 
character of its attempted phenomenologisation at the hands of Decision. 
As a result, the function of Laruellean razor might be summarized in 
the following way: it allows for the radicalisation and generalisation of every 
philosophical Decision on the basis of a last instance that is Undecidable only 
because it is the already Decided irreversibly determining every Decision; a 
last instance that is Undeterminable only because it is the already Determinate 
irreversibly determining or cloning whatever remains philosophically 
197Cf. Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, London: Athlone, 1983, pp. 171-186. 
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Determinable. Thus, the razor is the organon for the non-Decisional 
determination of Decision. 
Consequently, the razor provides us with that non-materialist force- 
(of)-thought through which we intend to clone matter's non-Decisional 
Identity from the Decisional hybrids of unobjectifiable immanence and 
objectivating transcendence. By suspending the illusion of absolute autonomy 
through which the materialist Decision believed itself sufficient to determine 
matter, we transform the materiological hybridisations of `matter as such' and 
`matter itself into an occasion for the non-materiological cloning of the 
radical hyle as a non-conceptual symbol for matter's radical foreclosure to 
Decision, for its non-materiological Identity as separate-without-separation. 
Moreover, implicit in this non-materiological use of Laruelle's razor is 
nothing less than a discontinuation or suspension of the Parmenidean axiom 
that we saw to be latent in the auto-Deductive structure of every philosophical 
Decision. That axiom posits the identity-in-difference, the reciprocal co- 
belonging or mutual pre-supposition of thinking and Being, Logos and 
Phusys, in the form of the Same as Decisional `auto'. Every Decision, viewed 
transcendentally in terms of its pretension to absolute sufficiency as auto- 
Deductive synthesis of the real and the ideal, or One-of-the-Dyad, effectively 
recapitulates the structure of the Parmenidean axiom: it posits the reciprocal 
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co-determination of thinking and Being. But in lifting this axiom, a non- 
Parmenidean thinking subordinates all thinking to a Real which is now 
foreclosed a priori to the dyadic distinction between thinking and Being, 
thereby suspending the Decisional determination of the Real in favour of a 
determination of Decision according to the Real's foreclosure: "Instead of 
supposing that thinking co-determines the Real as Being, it is the Real -but 
as One- which determines thinking through foreclosure (which is to say: 
without any reflexion whatsoever of the one in the other) rather than merely 
unilaterally or without reversibility. The formula for their relation is the 
following: `the One and thinking, or the One and Being, are identical but only 
in-the-last-instance. "' (Laruelle (ed. ), 1998, pp. 150-1). 
By severing the bi-lateral reciprocity that allowed for the reciprocal 
determinability, continuous reversibility and hence the merely synthetic or 
unitary disjunction between thinking and Being, the Laruellean razor opens 
up the possibility of discovering a Real without ontological Unity, a Real 
definitively shorn of every vestigial residue of ontological consistency. 
Accordingly, it is the Real as JIL'orccloscd to those dyadic syntheses of thinking 
and Being which guarantee ontological consistency; the Real as an Identity 
foreclosed to Decisional unity, rather than as auto-Decisional synthesis of 
ideal unity and real multiplicity, which, through its universal giving of 
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Decision as a determinable occasion, indexes a genuinely unencompassable, 
utterly inconsistent manifold of radically indivisible divisions'98. Thus, in 
Chapter 7 we shall see how this non-Decisional cloning of the Real as 
separate-without-separation uses the Decisional hybridisation of identity and 
duality, of real indivision and ideal division, in order to engender Identities- 
without-unity which are simultaneously dualities-without-synthesis; each 
radically universal without being generic, irreducibly individual without 
being ontologically individuated, and no longer circumscribable within the 
horizons of objective disclosure'99. 
For the time being however, having (we hope) somewhat clarified the 
function of the Laruellean razor qua instrument for the non-Decisional 
cloning of Decision, let's see if we can provide further elucidation of this 
important but undeniably difficult idea by putting forward a concrete 
exemplification of it, using as our material the Decisional distinction between 
`matter as such' and `matter itself with which we began. 
198 Cf. infra, Chapter 6, pp. 312-313. 
-'2. 199 Cf. infra, Chaptcr 7, pp. 351 3 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE RADICAL HYLE AS FIRST NAME OF 
MATTER 
We are now ready to see in what way the Laruellean razor can allow 
us to use the Decisional distinction between `matter as such' and `matter 
itself as the basis for their non-Decisional separation. In other words, we are 
going to use the Decisionally posited distinction between `matter as such' 
and `matter itself as the occasion for a non-Decisional positing of `matter 
itself in its radically immanent Identity as already-separate or separate- 
without-separation. 
Because it is carried out in accordance with the radicality of 
unobjectifiable immanence -the vision-in-One as given-without-givenness- 
this non-Decisional positing of `matter itself envelops four distinct but 
indissociable aspects: 
1. A radically performative200 aspect as the identity-(o f) -utterance 
through which the radical hyle is posited as a non-conceptual 
symbol for `matter itself. 
200 The performative dimension of non-philosophical thought is explicitly discussed in Laruelle, 1985, 
pp. 198-202; 1989, pp. 169-171; 1996, pp. 204-225 & 231-235; and Laruelle (ed. )1998, pp. 155-158. 
However, it is important to remember that all of Laruelle's works subsequent to Principes de la Non- 
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2. A radically subjective201 aspect in the Alien-subject of the non- 
Decisional theory through which this positing is performed. 
3. A radically axiomatic202 aspect in accordance with which non- 
materialism posits matter's non-intuitive and non-conceptual 
Identity. 
4. Finally, a radically phenomenal203 aspect in the dimension of 
non-intuitive or non-phenomenological phenomenality proper 
to the register of theorematic descriptions following from the 
axiomatic positing of the radical hyle. 
This latter aspect is particularly important with regard to countering 
certain spontaneous but shortsighted philosophical objections to the non- 
materialist suspension of the materialist Decision, viz., that it represents a 
peculiarly sterile, inconsequential, and ultimately impotent way of operating. 
For it is in virtue of this dimension of non-intuitive phenomenality that the 
non-materialist axiomatic endows thinking with an unprecedented universal 
Philosophie, i. e. those in which he effects the non-philosophical axiomatisation of a specific 
philosophical material -exemplified in Laruelle, 2000a, and 2000b- are nothing but detailed and 
extended descriptions of this non-Decisional performativity in effect. 
201For Laruelle's account of the non-philosophical subject as a transcendental Stranger (Etranger) for 
the World of philosophical Decision, cf. Laruelle, 1995, especially Chapters I and II, pp. 60-169; 1996, 
Chapter III, pp. 95-143; 2000a, pp. 249-285; 1999, pp. 146-148; and Laruelle (ed. ) 1998, pp. 64-66. 
202 The theme of a transcendental axiomatisation of philosophical Decision is omnipresent throughout 
Philosophie III, but cf in particular Laruelle, 1995, pp. 138-143; 1996, pp. 240-242; 1999, §2.1.6., 
p. 140; 2000a, pp. 71-98; 2000b, pp. 74-78; and Laruelle (ed. ), pp. 33-35. 
203Although always implicit in the premises of the non-philosophical project, the notion of a 'non- 
intuitive' or `non-phenomenological' phenomenality has only recently been explicitly thematised by 
Laruelle. Cf. Laruelle, 1999, § 3.1.4., p. 141; 2000a, pp. 231-235; and 2000c, pp. 186-187. 
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scope. Non-materialist thinking posits the Identity of `matter itself as 
foreclosed to Decision; which is to say that it posits the Identity of matter as 
foreclosed to conceptual circumscription or as being intrinsically without- 
concept. But it is as a result of this foreclosure that non-materialist theory is 
able to discover and to operate within unheard-of parameters of phenomenal 
descriptions for `matter itself , unconstrained by the bounds of 
phenomenological -which is to say, neurophysiological -possibility204. The 
non-materialist axiomatic engenders modalities of theorematic description for 
`matter itself qua radical hyle which are each incommensurable at the 
phenomenological level but phenomenally equivalent insofar as all are 
determined as adequate-in-the-last-instance to the radical hyle as 
phenomenon-without-logos. Thus, its cognitive capacities unhampered by the 
twin constraints of empirical physiology and human-being-in-the-world, the 
Alien-subject of non-materialist theory accesses a genuinely transcendental - 
which is to say, rigorously universal or extra-terrestrial- dimension of 
phenomenal 'experience'. This is non-materialist gnosis as that `more secret 
knowing of matter' which was hinted at earlier by Laruelle himself205 
Lastly, and before we proceed, it is important to remind the reader 
that, as we describe in turn each of these three aspects of the non-Decisional 
204 Cf. infra Chapter 7, but especially Chapter 8, pp. 415-421. 
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positing of `matter itself, he or she should note the way in which, at each 
stage of the description, this non-Decisional procedure engenders a 
transparent -but obviously non phono-logocentric206- coincidence of saying 
and doing. In other words, at each stage of the description, we are doing what 
we describe and describing what we are doing. This is the simplest index of 
what we mean by a thinking in accordance with radical immanence. 
The Radical Hyle as Non-Conceptual Symbol for the Identity 
of Utterance 
Our non-Decisional cloning of materialist Decision involves releasing 
matter's non-materiological Identity as transcendentally foreclosed to the 
materiological hybridisation of `matter as such' and `matter itself. But since 
matter's foreclosure to Decision also entails its foreclosure to conceptual 
circumscription and symbolic representation, the operation of cloning will 
necessitate suspending the materiological faith in the sufficiency of 
conceptual circumscriptions and signifying representations `of matter. In 
other words, we are about to discontinue the materiological amphiboly of 
utterance and statement; the amphiboly whereby the unobjectifiable 
205 Cf. supra, Chapter 4, p. 202; and Laruelle 1981, p. 109. 
206Because of its non-auto-positional and non-auto-donational character, this non-Decisional Identity 
of saying and doing -or of statement and utterance- cannot be equated with the phono-logocentric unity 
of signifying speech and phenomenological sense as deconstructed by Derrida via his reading of 
Husserl. Cf. Derrida, 1973. 
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conditions of utterance are perpetually reinscribed within the objectivating 
ideality of statement207. For by suspending the sufficiency of materialist 
Decision we suspend the sufficiency presumed in any and every conceptual 
symbolisation of matter `as such'; which is to say, every discursive 
circumscription of matter `itself by means of signifying statements. 
Accordingly, the non-Decisional cloning of materialist Decision will 
necessitate subordinating all those conceptual symbolisations `of matter 
which are inseparable from the putative sufficiency of matter's Decisional 
determination to the non-Decisional positing of an improper first-name or 
non-conceptual symbol enacting matter's foreclosure to conceptual 
symbolisation. Instead of matter's supposedly-sufficient determination via the 
materiological hybridisation of ontological concept and signifying symbol, in 
conformity with the Decisional amphiboly of linguistic description and 
ontological constitution, it is now matter in its foreclosure to conceptual 
symbolisation and linguistic signification, matter as first-name or non- 
conceptual symbol, that will transcendentally determine -or give-without- 
givenness- its own nomination and symbolisation. 
Thus, it is important to bear in mind that in suspending the 
spontaneous philosophical faith in the sufficiency of Decision, we also 
207 Cf supra, Chapter 4, pp. 194-199. 
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suspend the presupposition that all thinking is necessarily sustained by the 
complex, tripartite structure of the philosophical logos. That structure effects 
the transcendental synthesis of thought, word and thing: conceptually posited 
ideality and linguistically presupposed reality are reciprocally articulated and 
synthesised through the petitioning of the logos as the already-given Unity of 
thinking, speaking, and being; the identity-in-difference of conceptual 
position, linguistic presupposition, and ontological manifestation. Thus, the 
philosophical logos as Decisional `autos', absolute auto-position/auto- 
donation, or identity-in-difference of thinking and Being, performs an 
ontologically disclosive function in which the linguistic sign is necessarily 
incorporated. It is this onto-logical unity of conceptualisation and 
signification that is supposed to furnish thinking with its sine qua non. This 
is the presupposition which sustains the philosopher's spontaneous 
confidence in the irrecusable empirical reality of the signifier as well as his 
trust in the co-constitutive reciprocity between language and Being. 
It is this amphiboly of thought and language, concept and sign, which 
has been suspended along with the sufficiency of Decision. The onto-logical 
unity of conceptualisation and signification remains enveloped within the 
auto-donational/auto-positional structure of philosophical Decision that we 
have non-Decisionally suspended and reduced to the level of empirical 
270 
occasion for a thinking in which the amphiboly of description and 
constitution is no longer operative. In separating `matter itself from its 
Decisional hybridisation with `matter as such', we effect an irrevocable 
separation between matter as the already-constituted determinant of 
description, and description as a mere determinable occasion. This separation 
of description and constitution involves the positing of a non-conceptual 
symbol enacting matter's foreclosure to ontological constitution. The non- 
conceptual symbolisation of matter reduces the amphiboly of concept and 
sign, the reciprocal articulation of philosophy and language, to the level of a 
neutral, non-constitutive symbolic support208 for thought; one from which it is 
possible to clone a radically performative term or symbol which will enact, 
rather than designate or refer to, matter's foreclosure to conceptual 
symbolisation. Thus, the non-materiological identification of matter as 
already-separate-without-separation from the mixtures of name and concept, 
of the performative and the constative, consists in the axiomatic positing of a 
208 "There are two paradigmatic uses of language: as logos, which is to say, as ether of Being and 
faktum for philosophy, as language endowed with the power of disclosure and transcendence; or as 
symbolic (which is to say, irreducible to the logico-linguistic signifier) whereby it serves as a support 
for pure theoretical representation, but no longer as faktum. The status of language shifts from that of 
horizon, instrumental circuit for thought, polysemic or disseminatory resource, to that of functioning as 
a `mere' support, one which no longer enjoys a supposedly originary continuity with the dimension of 
theoreticity. The words, the statements, and even the themes of philosophy give rise to now inert, 
philosophically sterile symbols, but symbols that are combined or assembled according to a priori 
rules which are those of pure theoretical representation, of the theoreticity of all possible 
theory. "(Laruelle, 1991, p. 201) 
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first-name or non-conceptual symbol which enacts the foreclosure through 
which matter determines Decision in-the-last-instance209. 
The radical hyle is the first-name or non-conceptual symbol that we 
have chosen in order to designate matter's foreclosure to the materiological 
hybridisation of conceptual symbolisation and linguistic nomination. 
Moreover, it is clear that in this particular instance, our cloning of the 
Identity of `matter itself' sa hyle devoid of all ontological consistency and 
hyletic continuity has been occasioned by our earlier descriptions of the 
hyletic continuum as infinite, self-positing synthesis of unobjectifiable 
materiality and objectivating ideality210. Thus, the radical hyle is our non- 
conceptual symbol for the unobjectifiable immanence of `matter itself in its 
foreclosure to ideal continuity and ontological consistency. And it is as a non- 
signifying symbol cloned from the hyletic continuum qua Decisional hybrid 
of ontological constitution and linguistic nomination that the radical hyle is 
non-Decisionally posited or given-without-givenness in its foreclosure to the 
209 "A first name is not only posited-as-first in the order of thought in general, it is also -here at least- 
the object of an act-of-position but one that is determined-in-the-last-instance by its 'object', and hence 
adequate in this manner to [its object] as given-without-givenness or posited-without-position. Such 
first names are not ancient proper names now philosophically treated as also being first (in the 
manner of the philosophical 'axiomatic) '. They are identically and intrinsically proper and first, 
devoid of all ontico-metaphysical primacy. Here the name is only proper(to) itself but in the manner of 
an identity given to it only in-the-last-instance, and one which, according to this use, does not fall 
within the purview of a deconstruction. "(Laruelle, 2000a, p. 72) 
210 Cf. supra, Chapter 3, pp. 113-161. 
272 
idealised consistency of conceptual symbolisation as well as to the idealised 
continuity of ontological objectivation. 
Accordingly, the radical hyle211 is neither a symbol nor a name in the 
conventional philosophical senses of those terms. It does not `stand in', via a 
relation of designation or reference, for some putatively extra-linguistic or 
supra-conceptual reality. Likewise, it is not a metaphysically proper name, in 
the sense of a sign bearing an exclusive or intrinsic proprietary relation to 
some absolutely present entity or transcendental signified. But neither is it an 
instance of the differance or cross-contamination between signifier and 
signified, word and object, thought and thing. On the contrary, the radical 
hyle enacts its own foreclosure to the materiological amphiboly -which 
includes the differance -between signifying transcendence and transcendental 
signified. Whereas differance qua Undecidable remains bound to the 
metaphysical opposition from which it absolves itself as a metaphysically 
indeterminable oscillation between empirical signifier and transcendental 
signified, the radical hyle is the non-Decidable as foreclosed to the 
philosophical dyad `decidable/undecidable' whose validity differance 
continues to presuppose even in order to disrupt it. Hence, the Identity of the 
211 Hence the fact that we refuse to distinguish -as would be customary in this very instance- between 
its use and its mention by adorning it with inverted commas. The reason being that this is a 
philosophical distinction which presupposes the validity of the signifying use of language which we 
have already suspended. 
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radical hyle as non-conceptual symbol is that of the non-Decidable as already- 
decided determinant for the undecidable differance between signifier and 
signified. The radical hyle is the non-Determinable as the already-determined 
which determines the onto-logical amphiboly of description and constitution. 
Thus, the radical hyle can be understood neither as a nomination of 
`matter' qua transcendental signified, which is to say, transcendent 
metaphysical reality; nor as a conceptual materialisation, in the manner for 
instance in which the Deleuzoguattarian Concept counter-effectuated an 
intensively defined materiality212. It is neither an empirical conceptualisation 
of matter nor a transcendental materialisation of the concept213. It is a non- 
conceptual symbol for `matter itself in its Identity as already-manifest- 
without-manifestation and foreclosed a priori to the materiological differance 
that tries to substitute an undecidable mixture of statement and utterance for 
the hyle's radically immanent Identity as that which is already-uttered or 
uttered-without-statement. 
Accordingly, instead of Deciding that `matter itself is 
unconceptualisable because it is the enstatic immediation of materiality as 
excluding the ekstatic distinction of thought and thing -an exclusion which 
212 Cf. supra, Chapter 3, pp. 108-124. 
213Although it is by operating according to the radical hyle's foreclosure to materialist Decision that 
we effect a transcendental materialisation of Decision qua empirical occasion. The point being that the 
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reincludes the unthinkable within thought214; or Deciding that it is 
conceptualisable but only via the sublation of the distinction between `matter 
as such' and `matter itself -a sublation which renders thought and materiality 
co-constitutive215; we clone the radical hyle as a first-name for `matter itself 
now considered as already-given, already-manifest, and foreclosed to the 
distinction between the conceptualisable and the unconceptualisable. 
This non-Decisional positing of the radical hyle as non-conceptual 
symbol for `matter itself in its Identity as already-uttered constitutes the `first 
ultimation' in the inception of a non-materialist axiomatic. The radical hyle is 
non-Decisionally presupposed as given-without-givenness through an act of 
axiomatic positing; it is posited-without-presupposition as a first-name for 
radical immanence. Consequently, the radical hyle enacts the immanent 
Identity of material utterance as already-uttered, an Identity-(of)-utterance 
which cannot be conflated with the materiological nomination of `matter' as a 
mixture of objectivated reality, objectivating ideality, and unobjectifiable 
immanence; a hybrid which, as we saw in Chapter 4, perpetually reincludes 
the unobjectifiable immanence of material utterance within the objectivating 
transcendence of materialist statement. 
non-philosophical materialisation of Decision constitutes a radical universalisation of the philosophical 
materialisation of the concept. 
214Cf. Chapter 2, pp. 87-90. 
215 Cf. Chapter 3, pp. 154-161. 
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But this means that the act of non-Decisional positing or first 
ultimation described above, whereby the radical hyle is posited-without- 
position as the first-Harn e of-f matter, is immanently determined-in-the-last- 
instance by the radical hyle itself. If this is so, it is important to see why this 
does not repeat the auto-positional and auto-donational sufficiency whereby 
Decisional thinking posits its own presupposition. For in this instance, the 
positing of the radical hyle as already-given is merely contingently 
occasioned by the sufficiency of the materiological Decision. Which is to say 
that this positing is itself determined by the radical hyle insofar as the latter 
has already-given Decision as an occasion for thinking and been cloned as an 
Identity for thought on that basis. In other words, the act of non- 
materiological positing -the axiomatic ultimation- described above remains 
non-constitutive or non-determining vis a vis the immanence of the hyle 
considered as already-given. Thus, the manner in which `matter itself qua 
radical hyle determines its own naming as a non-conceptual symbol on the 
occasional basis of its materiological nomination `as such' must be sharply 
differentiated from the manner in which, for instance, the plane of immanence 
is presupposed as given through the self-positing of the philosophical 
Concept216. For in the latter case, the presupposition of the plane via the 
216 Cf. supra, Chapter 3, pp. 116-124. 
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Concept and the positing of the Concept on the basis of the plane remain co- 
constitutive, whilst in the former, the fact that the radical hyle is already- 
foreclosed to constitution determines its nomination as foreclosed without 
that nomination determining or constituting that foreclosure in return. 
Accordingly, the non-materialist ultimation of the radical hyle as non- 
conceptual symbol discontinues the materiological auto-position through 
which the obj ectivating transcendence of materialist statement reinscribes the 
unobjectifiable immanence of material utterance. The materiological 
reversibility between nomination and constitution has been suspended and 
reduced to the level of an occasion. The first ultimation of non-materialist 
thinking is itself determined (in-the-last-instance) -i. e. non-Decisionally 
cloned- from materiological Decision by the radical hyle despite the fact that 
we have been speaking as if it were `we' who were deciding to clone the 
Identity of the hyle from Decision. `We' are, but only as the non- 
philosophical or Alien-subject whose `decision' has already been determined 
in accordance with the Kyle's foreclosure. Decisional thinking has already 
been given as a mere occasion and determined or cloned as a non-Decisional 
effectuation of the hyle's foreclosure. And the latter is non-Decisionally 
posited through an axiomatic ultimation determined by the radical hyle itself. 
Consequently, the conditions for this non-Decisional positing are immanently 
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determined-in-the-last-instance by the radical hyle itself. For it is the radical 
hyle which immanently determines the conditions for its cloning on the basis 
of Decision by effectuating itself as this radically subjective force-(of)-non- 
materialist thought. 
The non-materialist's force-(of)-thought consists in enacting this 
performative nomination of the radical hyle as first-name for the Identity of 
`utterance itself ,a nomination that consists in the immanent coincidence of 
saying and doing. By operating in accordance with the immanence of the 
radical hyle as that which is already-uttered (without-statement) and already- 
performed (without-performance) by virtue of its foreclosure to the 
materiological hybridisation of utterance and statement, non-materialist 
thinking cannot help but say what it does and do as it says. Moreover, as we 
mentioned above, this performative consistency of saying and doing 
concomitant with the non-materialist's force-(of)-thought is radically 
subjective in character. 
The Alien-Subject 
For although the radical hyle is foreclosed to thought -whether 
phenomenological or materiological, Decisional or non-Decisional-, that 
foreclosure is transcendentally effectuated on the occasional basis of the 
materiological Decision as an immanent Identity for non-materiological 
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thought. It is cloned as a non-materialist force-(of)-thought. And this force-of- 
thought is synonymous with the radically immanent subjectivation of non- 
materiological thinking. Although `the Stranger' (l 'Etranger) is Laruelle's 
preferred term for designating the universal subject of non-philosophical 
theory, we shall mark its occasional specificity here by referring to the 
radically immanent subject of non-materialist thinking as `the Alien'. The 
name is intended to invoke neither an empirically determinable quality of 
foreignness, nor visions of some phantasmatic speculative hybrid, but rather a 
radically transcendental and therefore rigorously unenvisageable 
exteriority217; an exteriority which is identical with the non-materialist's 
force-(of)-thought. 
Whereas `the Other' as paradigm of phenomenological alterity - 
exemplified in the work of the later Levinas218- is an absolute alterity of 
infinite transcendence simultaneously constituting and deconstituting 
intentional consciousness, but by that token one which is still 
217 In order to diminish the aura of gratuity surrounding our choice of nomination, it might be apposite 
to recall one of Laruelle's most spontaneous, but also most suggestive, characterisations of non-thetic 
transcendence (the precursor to the non-auto-positional transcendence of the Stranger-subject) in one of 
the interviews contained in 1991's As One (En Tant Qu'Un): "Non-thetic transcendence is `the Alien', 
an absolutely faceless monster, a rigorously faceless alterity"(p. 224). The `non-thetic transcendence' in 
terms of which Laruelle characterised the non-philosopher's force-(of)-thought throughout Philosophie 
11 prefigures the non-auto-positional transcendence or distance in terms of which he will characterise 
the Stranger qua transcendental clone in Philosophie III. More recently, Laruelle has sketched the 
lineaments of a unified theory of philosophy and science-fiction -or philo-fiction- on the basis of a 
radically immanent Identity of alterity which he sees as science-fiction's defining affect and which he 
qualifies as that of the Alien-without-alienation. Cf. Laruelle, 2000d and infra, Chapters 7 and 8. 
218 Cf. for instance, Levinas, 1990. 
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phenomenologically posited and presupposed as given through the offices of 
Decision, the unobjectifiable transcendence of the Alien-subject constitutes a 
non-phenomenologisable exteriority, one which is given-without-givenness 
because it is the transcendental effectuation or cloning of the radical kyle' s 
foreclosure to the apophantic logos. Thus, the Alien-subject is foreclosed to 
the phenomenological delimitation of absolute alterity as infinitely other 
relative to intentional consciousness because it is foreclosed not only to all 
intentional apprehension but also to all Decisional dyads of the sort 
conscious/unconscious, objectifiable/unobjectifiable. The latter serve merely 
as its occasion or empirical support. 
Consequently, rather than merely constituting an alterity-to- 
consciousness, the Alien-subject constitutes a radically unobjectifiable 
exteriority for the World of auto-Decisional sufficiency in its entirety. Where 
Levinas's phenomenological paradigm of alterity centres around the absolute 
transcendence of the infinitely Other as epiphenomenal trace and ethical 
enigma -an absolute transcendence which, for reasons with which the reader 
is now beginning to become familiar219, remains relative to the immanence of 
the intentional consciousness from which it absolves itself-, the Alien-subject 
219Recall the critique of the notion of the `absolute' as intrinsically relational in our discussions of 
Henry's as well as Deleuze & Guattari's versions of immanence (cf. supra Chapter 2, pp. 
85-87 and 
Chapter 3, pp. 176-177), as well as the account of Decision as absolute-auto-position (supra 
Chapter 5, 
pp. 218-245). 
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effectuates a radical transcendence not `to' but for the phenomenological 
realm in its entirety which serves as its occasional support, and this precisely 
insofar as it remains rooted in-the-last-instance in the immanence of the hyle. 
That is to say: the Alien's non-Decisional transcendence is given-without- 
givenness or cloned in accordance with immanence and on the occasional 
basis of Decisional transcendence but as a radically subjective force-of- 
thought which is now Alien for the World of Decisional transcendence; - 
Alien for the Decisional realm wherein phenomenological ideality and 
materiological reality are ultimately coextensive. It is a non-auto-positional 
and non-auto-donational transcendence rooted in the non-Decisional 
immanence that determines it, but occasioned by the Decisional 
transcendence that merely overdetermines it. 
Thus, the Alien as subject of non-materialist theory remains 
irreducible to every variety of Worldly alterity, be it phenomenologically or 
materiologically defined. At the same time however, we shall see how it 
functions as the rigorously transcendental prototype -or more precisely, 
xenotype- for those somewhat clumsily delineated versions of unenvisageable 
alterity groped after but misprised in the more adventurous varieties of 
speculative science-fiction; - misprised precisely insofar as they continue to 
rely on incongruous juxtapositions of empirically heterogeneous predicates 
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which remain `figurable' through the empirical imagination and therefore 
ultimately envisageable by consciousness220. Not only does the Alien-subject 
remain unenvisageable as an ethical enigma for phenomenological 
consciousness; it remains 'unfigurable' even as a monstrous, trans-categorial 
hybridisation of terrestrial predicates. The Alien-subject's force-(of)-thought 
constitutes an immanently transcendental, but non-phenomenological 
transcendence; a transcendence which is foreclosed a priori to the parameters 
of human being-in-the-world and to the ambit of terrestrial experience. 
Operating in accordance with the radical hyle's foreclosure to the 
materiological mixtures of objectivating phenomenality and unobjectifiable 
materiality, it uses those mixtures as an occasional basis and the hyle as its 
Unknown but determining cause, in order to clone un-intuitable axioms for 
the phenomenal description of `matter itself from the realm of 
phenomenological empiricity. 
However, before proceeding with instances of the aforementioned 
descriptions, deduced by the Alien-subject from the radical hyle's non- 
phenomenological foreclosure, it is important to specify in what way the 
cloning of the Alien-subject remains irreducible to the phenomenological 
2201n Chapter 7 we shall discuss the example of the `non-rabbit' as instance of an entity-without-unity 
cloned from the World of thetic-auto-position. The `non-rabbit' provides the rigorously cognitive 
`xenotype' for a recurrent trope in Lovecraftian fantasy: - that of the unnameable, unenvisageable 
'Thing'. 
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presupposition of subjectivity. For whereas phenomenological subjectivity is 
merely supposed-as-given via a mixture of a priori positing and empirical 
presupposition, the Alien-subject is given in a stringently transcendental 
fashion, in accordance with the radical hyle's foreclosure to all 
phenomenological givenness, as the subject of its own theory. That is to say: 
it performs its own cloning in accordance with the positing of the radical hyle 
as its non-Decisional cause and on the basis of materiological Decision as its 
empirical occasion. Accordingly, the Alien-subject enacts its own theoretical 
explanation. For it is nothing but the immanent description of its non- 
sufficient or hetero-deduction as an instance of thinking necessarily 
determined by the radical hyle but contingently occasioned by Decision's 
empirical existence. 
Thus, there is nothing either irrecusable or even necessary about this 
instance of thought's transcendental subjectivation, as opposed to the manner 
in which phenomenology requires some residue of transcendental 
subjectivation, some minimal degree of ipseity (supposedly non-Cartesian or 
post-metaphysical in nature) as an uncircumventable prerequisite for the 
possibility of phenomenality221. Although occasioned by phenomenological 
221Typically, much post-Heideggerean phenomenology denounces `metaphysical subjectivism' 
(supposedly running from Descartes to Nietzsche), the better to render the phenomenon of 
individuated sentience ever more irreducible to the vulgar prejudices of egological substantialism, 
which is to say, ever more unobjectifiable and divorced as a matter of principle from the possibility of 
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Decision as the transcendental effectuation of the hyle's determination of 
Decision, the Alien-subject remains foreclosed to the ambit of the 
phenomenologisable precisely insofar as the latter remains encompassed 
within the Decisional structure which serves as its empirical support. As the 
transcendental determinant for the phenomenologically circumscribed 
experience that serves as its occasion, the Alien-subject cannot be confused 
with some putatively necessary structural feature intrinsically conditioning 
the possibility of that empirical experience. On the contrary, the radical 
exteriority through which the Alien-subject determines Decision remains 
extrinsic to the relatively autonomous reality and consistency of Decision, and 
to the domain of phenomenological experience encompassed within it. Thus, 
the Alien-subject is a radically extrinsic determinant for the 
phenomenological domain, rather than some absolutely intrinsic feature of it. 
That domain, and the Decision through which it is articulated, continues to 
enjoy a relative autonomy as an empirically determinable occasion222. For 
although the Alien-subject transcendentally effectuates the hyle's 
integration into the body of the natural sciences. Most recently for instance, Jean-Luc Marion has 
sought to effect a bold and ambitious crystallisation of what he sees as the central phenomenological 
problematic running from Husserl and Heidegger through to Henry and Levinas -that of the 
phenomenon's phenomenality or givenness- by attempting to emancipate ipseity's originary, pre- 
subjective givenness in its passivity as `the devotee of donation' [1'adonne de la donation] from the 
constrictive grip of the Cartesian cogito, the Kantian `I think', the Husserlian `Ego', and even 
Heideggerean `mineness' [Jemeinigkeit]]. Cf. Marion, 1997, esp. Book V, pp. 343-373. 
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determination of phenomenological Decision, this is an entirely contingent 
effectuation, occasioned by the fact that materiological Decision has already 
been given-without-givenness as a mere support for non-phenomenological 
thinking. 
Moreover, this non-sufficiency of the Alien-subject, concomitant with 
the non-phenomenological donation of empirical contingency as an 
occasional but non-determining cause for thinking, is irreducible to the 
phenomenological presupposition of facticity. For the phenomenological 
subject, facticity is a transcendentally constitutive factor, whereas for the non- 
phenomenological subject, occasion is a determinable empirical material. And 
whereas the phenomenological subject remains a subject of `experience', that 
is to say, encompassed within the ambit of Decision; the Alien-subject is 
exclusively the subject of transcendental theory, that is to say, the 
heterogeneous determinant of Decision and of phenomenological experience 
as circumscribed within the ambit of Decision. Thus, with the radical hyle as 
its determining cause and phenomenological Decision as its occasion, the 
non-sufficiency proper to the Alien-subject guarantees that its transcendental 
effectuation is at one with its explanation. 
222Cloning guarantees the radical autonomy of the Real in its foreclosure to Decision, the relative 
autonomy of Decision qua empirical occasion, and the relatively radical autonomy of the 
transcendental as that which effectuates the Real's foreclosure for Decision. 
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Accordingly, there is a sense in which, although not causa sui, the 
Alien-subject is self-explanatory. As we mentioned above, it `exists' or is 
effectuated as the radically immanent performance of its own theory. It is 
constituted as the non-Decisional separation, the performative dualysation, of 
`matter itself and `matter as such' that we have just described and enacted. 
Once again, however, non-philosophical precision demands that we 
complicate this schema. For in fact, rather than simply separating `matter 
itself from `matter as such', the structure of the Alien-subject enacts the non- 
Decisional separation between the radical hyle as non-conceptual Identity of 
`matter itself, and the materiological mixture or hybridisation of `matter 
itself and `matter as such' -which is to say, the hyletic continuum described 
in Chapters 3 and 4 of Part I- ;a hybridisation now reconfigured as a strictly 
unilateral Duality between the hyletic continuum as empirically determinable 
occasion, and the Alien-subject as transcendental determinant for that 
occasion. As a result, the structure of the Alien-subject spans the Identity of 
the radical hyle -but an Identity which is now shorn of the presupposition of 
ontological unity-, and the unilateral Duality of the Alien-subject and its 
occasional cause -a duality which no longer constitutes a dyadic distinction 
because the Alien-subject transcendentally determines the hyletic continuum 
in accordance with the radical hyle without the continuum either determining 
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or constituting it in return. It is as this coincidence of an Identity-without- 
synthesis (or `unidentity') and a Duality-without-distinction (or 
`unilaterality') that the Alien-subject's foreclosure to its occasioning cause - 
the hyletic continuum- transcendentally effectuates the radical hyle's 
foreclosure to ontological Decision. 
In light of its unusual difficulty, it is worth pausing a while longer to 
recapitulate once more the complex structure of the Alien-subject, in the hope 
that reiteration might provide a modicum of clarification. This is crucial to 
our entire enterprise, since it is in the name of the Alien-subject that 
everything described so far has also been performed. 
The Alien-subject's non-ontological `existence', its effectuation as the 
separation of radical hyle and Decision, amounts to a cloning of matter's 
foreclosure to Decision as the unilateral duality between the Alien-subject's 
own positing of the radical hyle, and the hyletic continuum -the 
materiological Decision- as that which has occasioned that positing. 
Remember that `matter itself is no longer some ineffable, transcendent 
philosophical `thing' for us, and that the radical hyle is no longer an attempt 
to conceptualise the ineffable but merely a non-conceptual symbol for 
matter's foreclosure to Decision, a foreclosure which is now effectuated in 
non-materialist thinking through the Alien-subject's positing of the non- 
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conceptual symbol enacting that foreclosure. Accordingly, the Alien-subject 
is nothing but the unilateral duality between that symbol's foreclosure to 
conceptualisation, and the conceptual symbolisations that have occasioned the 
non-Decisional positing of that foreclosure. Or again: it is at once the non- 
Decisional positing of the radical hyle's non-conceptual Identity, and the 
Duality between that non-Decisional Identity and the Decision which has 
occasioned it. 
Thus, with its pretension to absolute, self-positing autonomy 
suspended, the hyletic continuum enjoys a merely relative autonomy as the 
indifferent material support for the Alien-subject's effectuation of the hyle's 
foreclosure to ontological continuity and conceptual consistency. In other 
words, the materiological idealisation of `matter itself' as become 
materialised through the Alien-subject's effectuation of matter's foreclosure 
to idealisation. Which is to say that materialism's transcendental 
determination of `matter itself' as itself become transcendentally determined 
-materialised-, but now as a mere occasion for describing matter in 
accordance with matter's foreclosure to determination. Even more 
significantly, this transcendental materialisation of materialist Decision 
occurs or `exists' in the form of a radically subjective separation between the 
immanence of matter's non-ontological reality and the transcendence of 
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materialism's ontological ideality. For it is the structure of the Alien-subject 
which articulates this unilateral separation between radical hyle and hyletic 
continuum. Accordingly, where the hyletic continuum incorporated 
philosophical subjectivity within materiality, but only at the cost of 
reincorporating materiality within the ambit of philosophical subj ectivity223, it 
is by separating the radical hyle from the hyletic continuum qua self- 
presupposing structure of philosophical subjectivity that the Alien-subject 
materialises the latter. Materialism subjectivates matter philosophically by 
repressing subjectivity; non-materialism materialises subjectivity by 
rendering philosophical subjectivation empirical. In other words, where 
philosophical materialism surreptiously phenomenologises matter by 
inscribing it in Decision qua hybrid of objectivating transcendence and 
unobj ectifiable immanence, non-philosophical materialism materialises 
phenomenology by separating or dualysing that hybrid through the structure 
of the Alien-subject, thereby reducing the phenomenologising Decision to the 
level of an empirically determinable occasion. Thus, in non-philosophical 
materialism, the materialising instance is radically subjective. 
Ultimately, if the Alien-subject remains incommensurable with every 
phenomenologically grounded paradigm of subjectivity -whether it go by the 
223 Cf. supra, Chapter 3, pp. 154-161. 
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name of `Dasein', `Life' or `adonne' - it is on account of this radically 
materialising function as that which separates `matter itself in its foreclosure 
to phenomenologisation from the materiological hybrids of unobjectifiable 
materiality and objectivating phenomenality. Significantly, the radical hyle's 
foreclosure to materiological conceptualisation is mirrored -or better cloned- 
in terms of the Alien-subject's foreclosure to, or radical exteriority for, the 
phenomenological World. It is by virtue of this radical exteriority that the 
Alien-subject is able to describe the radical hyle according to its foreclosure 
to materiological conceptualisation in ways that fall outside the 
phenomenological parameters of human-being-in-the-world. Thus, the Alien- 
subject functions as the performative locus for a radically counter-intuitive or 
non-phenomenological axiomatisation of `matter itself, an axiomatisation 
that generates a radically immanent but intrinsically abstract or theoretically 
determined phenomenalisation of `matter itself'. 
The Non-Materialist Axiomatic 
In Chapter 4224, we cited three versions of the distinction between 
`materialism' and `idealism' -and by implication, three varieties of definition 
for the concept of `matter'-, and argued that all three were insufficient 
because they relied on intuitive or semi-intuitive idealisations of matter `as 
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such'; idealisations that led to a basic indiscernibility between the theoretical 
postures of materialism and idealism. Implicit in this argument was the 
suggestion that every intuitive or semi-intuitive conceptualisation of matter 
`as such' should be abandoned in favour of a stringently theoretical and 
therefore non-intuitive definition of `matter itself ; one carried out on the 
basis of a rigorously transcendental separation between the theoretical 
postures proper to materialism and idealism respectively. 
Let's quickly remind ourselves of the way in which these intuitive or 
semi-intuitive idealisations of matter operate. The first two straightforwardly 
conflate `matter itself with `matter as such' by way of a spontaneous 
hybridisation of concept and empirical intuition, whilst the third, and more 
sophisticated, proposes an absolutely idealising sublation of concept and 
intuition, or of matter `as such' and matter 'itself, by identifying `materiality' 
with its differentially produced determination within an ideal continuum of 
signifying relations. 
Thus, `: raffe: itself' cannot be characterised in terms of: 
1. A supposedly given objectivity such as techno-economic 
production. 
224 Cf. supra, pp. 188-190. 
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2. A supposedly given conceptual signification whereby the 
concept of `matter' combines general features of 
`materiality' abstracted from nature with empirical 
characteristics drawn from sense perception. 
3. A supposedly produced rather than immediately given 
`discursive category'. `Matter' remains devoid of immediate 
conceptual signification, but is endowed with a determinate 
theoretico-discursive potency on the basis of the 
`differentially' produced signifying force that it comes to 
acquire through the complex interplay of various theoretical 
and political positions. The meaning of `materialism' as 
discursive category is produced via the differential 
combination and determination of these positions relative to 
one another. 
It is by way of contrast to these variedly proportioned materiological 
hybrids of empirical intuition, conceptual symbolisation, and signifying 
ideality that we intend to use our non-Decisional postulation of the radical 
hyle in its immanent Identity as non-conceptual symbol as the first ultimation 
in a rigorously non-intuitive materialist axiomatic. Thus, having carried out 
our first ultimation of Elie radical hyie through the auspices of the Alien- 
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subject, we are now in a position to begin formulating axiomatic definitions 
and deducing transcendental theorems which have likewise been posited- 
without-presupposition by the Alien-subject in accordance with the radical 
hyle's foreclosure to conceptual symbolisation and phenomenological 
intuition. Consequently, rather than being supposedly sufficient conceptual 
determinations, or supposedly sufficient phenomenological intuitions of 
`matter itself, both axioms and theorems will be determined as adequate-in- 
the-last-instance by the radical hyle as that which enacts matter's foreclosure 
to all determination or intuition. That is to say, rather than conceptually 
corresponding to the radical hyle, or phenomenologically apprehending it, 
these definitions and descriptions are now simultaneously non-conceptual 
adequations and non-phenomenological manifestations, determined by the 
radical hyle as adequate to it but only in-the-last-instance225. 
In Philosophy and Non-Philosophy Laruelle provides us with a matrix 
of ten characterisations of radical immanence selected from what he reminds 
us must remain by rights a strictly limitless variety of possible definitions226 
We will appropriate eight of them here, modifying them slightly for our own 
purposes, as the founding axioms for our non-materialist theory of `matter 
225With the suspension of the Principle of Sufficient Determination -the belief that Decision is 
sufficient to determine the Real- the bi-lateral correspondence between thought and Real is replaced by 
an Identity-of-the-last-instance only, and transcendental truth becomes adequation-without- 
correspondence. Cf. Laruelle, 2000a, pp. 239-241; and 2000b, pp. 89-92. 
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itself . All eight are instances of axiomatic position -rather than conceptual 
constitution- performed by the Alien-subject and determined-in-the-last- 
instance by the radical hyle itself: 
1. The radical hyle is the phenomenon-in-itself as Already-Given, 
the phenomenon-without-phenomenality, rather than the 
supposedly-given immediacy of phenomenon and 
phenomenality. 
2. The radical hyle is the Already-Imprinted prior to every 
supposedly original imprint. 
3. The radical hyle is that in and through which we have been 
Already-Grasped rather than any originary faktum or datum 
by which we suppose ourselves to be grasped. 
4. The radical hyle is the Already-Acquired prior to all cognitive 
or intuitive acquisition, rather than that which is merely 
supposed-as-acquired through a priori forms of cognition or 
intuition. 
5. The radical hyle is the Already-Inherent before all the 
substantialist forcings of inherence, conditioning all those 
226 Cf. Laruelle, 1989, pp. 41-45. 
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6 
7. 
supposedly-inherent models of Identity, be they analytic, 
synthetic, or differential. 
The radical hyle is the Already-Undivided rather than the 
transcendent Unity which is supposed-as-undivided by 
philosophers. 
The radical hyle is the Already-Full anorganic body within 
which we see and assemble all of the universal figures and a 
priori dimensions through which every figure or body in the 
world is assembled, constructed, and supposed-as-full. 
8. The radical kyle is the postural Identity of thought as Already- 
Achieved rather than a conceptual unity supposed-as-given 
through synthetic position. It is that real, postural Identity 
through which thinking is already fi°ee of the posited, ideal 
norms of transcendent exteriority, of the rules of speculative 
figuration and imagination, of the constraints of the World and 
the codes of philosophy. 
According to this axiomatisation, both the phenomenological and the 
materiological idealisation of `matter itself are immediately discounted. With 
axiom 1, we see that the radical hyle cannot be conflated with the 
phenomenologically presupposed immediation of phenomenon and 
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phenomenality (Henry), while with axiom 7, we see that it cannot be confused 
with the materiologically presupposed anorganic body-without-organs of 
intensive materiality (Deleuze & Guattari). `Matter itself has been radicalised 
and generalised qua radical hyle in a manner that is simultaneously 
irreducible to the norms of phenomenological intuition and to the codes of 
materiological conceptualisation. With the suspension of materiological 
sufficiency it is now `matter itself qua radical hyle which determines-in-the- 
last-instance the syntactical a prioris and transcendental codes governing 
philosophical conceptuality, as well as the modalities of phenomenological 
intuition and the parameters of phenomenal manifestation. Thus, the non- 
materialist axiomatic engenders an immanently transcendental dimension of 
non-intuitive phenomenality according to the radical hyle's twofold character 
as a phenomenon-without-logos and a matter-without-concept. We shall call 
this dimension of non-intuitive or non-phenomenological phenomenality 
axiomatically determined according to the radical hyle, the non-thetic 
universe. And in order to explore some of the ramifications of axioms 1,7 
and 8 for non-materialist thought, we will consider the way in which 
thinking-in-accordance-with the radical hyle's determination of Decision 
engenders a non-thetic universe within which the distinction between theory 
and experience is inoperative. 
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Non-Intuitive Phenomenality 
1. Theory and experience 
Phenomenology reconfigures Kant's transcendental difference 
between phenomenon and thing-in-itself in terms of the distinction between 
phenomenon and phenomenality. Thus, phenomenology abandons Kant's 
critical hypothesis of the thing-in-itself as that which delimits the parameters 
of human cognition by being transcendentally separated from the bounds of 
phenomenal immanence. Ironically, it does so on the grounds that the 
postulate of the thing-in-itself represents a residual form of metaphysical 
dogmatism. But without the implicitly sceptical hypothesis of the `in-itself, 
the radical, corrosive kernel of the critical philosophy is lost, leaving only the 
reactionary complacency of its idealist husk. Transcendentalism degenerates 
into a pious apologia for the pre-established harmony whereby human 
consciousness enjoys unconditional access to `the things themselves', now 
identified solely with intentional phenomena227. The critical asymmetry 
between phenomenon and `in-itself is replaced by the transcendental 
parallelism between phenomenon and phenomenality. Thus, for 
phenomenology, phenomenon and phenomenality are intuitively given 
227"An object existing in itself is never one with which consciousness or the 
Ego pertaining to 
consciousness has nothing to dd'; ", Lere are any worlds, any real physical things whatever, 
then 
y tic 
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together in the immanent indivisibility of an intrinsically pre-theoretical 
immediacy. 
Non-materialism, however, dualyses the phenomenological 
parallelism between the immanence of the phenomenon and the 
transcendence of phenomenality into a non-phenomenological separation 
between the immanence of the radical hyle as `the phenomenon-in-itself, or 
the phenomenon-without-phenomenality; and the transcendence of 
phenomenological Decision as the phenomenality which the latter now 
determines-in-the-last-instance. Moreover, by effecting this non- 
phenomenological dualysis of phenomenon and phenomenality, the Alien- 
subject destratifies the latent structural hierarchy through which the 
phenomenological Decision implicitly subordinated the ontic phenomenon to 
its ontological phenomenality. Since it is this subordination, ratified through 
the hierarchical parallelism constitutive of Decision as empirico- 
transcendental doublet, which also serves to enshrine the distinction between 
the pre-theoretical immediacy of phenomenological experience, and 
theoretically mediated philosophical experience, the dualysation of the former 
implies the dualysation of the latter. For since the indivisible parallelism of 
phenomenon and phenomenality constitutes the pre-theoretical immediacy 
the experienced motivations constituting them must be able to extend into my experience and into that 
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proper to `experience' as characterised by phenomenology, whilst their 
distinction is a function of philosophically mediated `theory', then the 
phenomenological presupposition of an indivisible parallelism between ontic 
phenomenon and ontological phenomenality also enshrines a hybridisation of 
phenomenological experience and philosophical theory. 
Thus, in a complex gesture that should be familiar to us in light of our 
earlier analysis of philosophical Decision228, phenomenology posits the a 
priori distinction of phenomenon and phenomenality, whilst presupposing 
their empirical immediation. That is to say: it posits their indivisible pre- 
theoretical i. -mmediacy t hough a gesture of theoretical mediation, and 
presupposes that their theoretical distinction is already articulated in 
experience. Accordingly, by dualysing the phenomenological hybridisation of 
phenomenon and phenomenality, which is to say, the presupposition of their 
intuitively given, indivisible immediacy, the Alien-subject also dualyses the 
amphiboly of phenomenological experience qua pre-theoretical immediacy 
and philosophical theory qua conceptual mediation. The Alien-subject now 
articulates the unilateral duality between the radical hyle as the phenomenon- 
in-itself, a phenomenon which is foreclosed to theory, rather than pre- 
theoretical, and phenomenological Decision as dimension of theoretically 
of each Ego[... J"(Husserl, 1982, pp. 106 and 109 respectively). 
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determinable phenomenality. Thus, the Alien-subject enjoys a non- 
phenomenological existence as the transcendental theoretical determination of 
empirical phenomenality according to the phenomenon's foreclosure to 
theory. As a result, the Alien-subject's transcendental exteriority, its non- 
phenomenological transcendence as the determinant for phenomenological 
Decision, constitutes a cloning, a determination-in-the-last-instance of 
phenomenological Decision in terms of a theoretically determined or non- 
intuitive phenomenality. The Alien-subject exists as the (practico-)theoretical 
effectuation of the hyle's determination of phenomenality; an effectuation 
occasioned by phenomenology but one for which the transcendent distinction 
between the pre-theoretical immediacy of phenomenological experience and 
the mediation of philosophical theory is no longer operative or pertinent. That 
distinction has been reduced to the level of an indifferent empirical support. 
However, the 
Allen-subject is not merely the subject `of non- 
philosophical theory, in the sense of being a subjective agent distinct or 
separable from theory qua objective instrument. Its non-phenomenological 
existence is essentially and irrecusably theoretical by virtue of being 
determined or cloned according to the radical hyle as an effectuation of non- 
intuitive phenomenality. Thus, the Alien-subject `lives' or `experiences' this 
228 Cf. supra, Chapter 5, pp. 218-230. 
300 
non-intuitive or non-thetic mode of phenomenality as incommensurable, 
unintuitable and unintelligible for the phenomenologically articulated 
parameters of human-being-in-the-world. The Alien-subject `of non- 
materialist theory experiences a phenomenality-without-phenomenology, a 
phenomenality which is more rigorously fundamental or archi-originary, but 
also more genuinely universal than every species of phenomenological 
experience. Where the lived experience attributed to the phenomenological 
subject is at once immanently lived and transcendently surveyed at one 
remove by the philosopher whose experience of pre-theoretical immediacy is 
simultaneously posited as immediate through Decision, the `lived experience' 
of the Alien-subject remains unconditionally performative, non-reflexive, and 
non-thetic, precisely insofar as it is theoretically constituted, rather than a 
spontaneously presupposed hybrid of theory and experience. 
Accordingly, for the Alien-subject of non-materialist theory, the 
phenomenological hybridisation of experience and theory, which is to say, the 
reciprocal presupposition and co-positing of empirical immediacy and 
transcendental mediation (empirical experience of immediacy posited in and 
through theory, thcorctical mediation presupposed in and through empirical 
experience) as articulated in the empirico-transcendental parallelism which 
binds phenomenon and phenomenality, becomes the basis for a radically 
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immanent or non-thetic theoretical experience (rather than an experience `of 
theory); one which is equally and simultaneously a radically experiential 
theory (rather than a theory `of experience). 
2. The six-dimensions of Decision 
Moreover, as far as the internal structure of phenomenological 
Decision is concerned, the empirico-transcendental parallelism binding 
phenomenon and phenomenality remains inseparable from the abstract 
structural isomorphy between the phenomenological dimensions of 
experience and the six transcendental a prioris that Laruelle identifies as the 
invariants of all Decision229. That structural isomorphy yokes together three 
distinct pairs of doubly articulated or reciprocally presupposing a prioris for 
position and donation. Thus, the positional dimension of Decision comprises 
three structural moments: 
1. The Transcendence or scission between condition and 
conditioned, a priori faktum and a posteriori datum. 
2. The Plane or latent horizonal frame within the parameters of 
which the division is carried out. 
229Laruelle sets out his transcendental analytic of Decision in Chapter VI of The Principles of 
Non- 
Philosophy. In light of its extraordinary technical complexity, and for the purposes of coherence, we 
have considerably simplified and schematised that analysis here, focussing only on the 
dimensional a 
prioris and ignoring the other, equally fundamental components of Decision. Cf. Laruelle, 
1996, 
pp. 281-346, but especially pp. 285-288 
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3. Finally, the moment of Unity as indivisible contraction of the 
dyad of Transcendence and Plane, the Unity through which a 
determinate entity or thing is crystallized as objective noematic 
correlate of position. This last is the moment whereby position 
posits itself. 
The donational dimension in turn comprises three corresponding 
moments: 
1. Affection as the donation of an empirico-regional datum, the 
putatively real transcendence of the initial, extra-philosophical 
given. 
2. The Reception of the formal codes of the philosophical as such 
in its specificity vis a vis all other forms of experience or as 
regulative or normative ideal given for thinking, paradigmatic 
horizon for the cognitive processing of experiential data. 
3. Finally, Intuition as unity of the dyad of Affection and 
Reception, synthesis of the regional, extra-philosophical given 
and of the universal philosophical form as paradigm for the 
reception of experience. This is the moment through which 
donation donates or gives itself. 
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These three reciprocally paired moments of position and donation are 
the invariant structural hinges through which every Decision framing the 
phenomenological parameters of experience is articulated. Thus, an extra- 
philosophical Affection is posited through meta-physical Transcendence, 
while meta-physical Transcendence is given as extra-philosophical Affection; 
pre-philosophical Reception is posited through an ontological Plane, while 
this ontological Plane is given as a pre-philosophical Reception; and 
philosophical Intuition is posited through a transcendental Unity while 
transcendental Unity is given as philosophical Intuition. 
The Alien-subject exists as the de-hybridisation or dualysation of 
these six reciprocally presupposing dimensions of Decisional auto-position 
and auto-donation. It suspends the circular loop of bi-lateral determination 
through which the positional a prioris are constituted as a function of a 
corresponding a priori donation, and the donational ones constituted as a 
function of a corresponding a priori position. The Alien-subject simplifies or 
irons out these multifarious foldings and doublings whereby the cardinal 
hinges of phenomenological position and donation remain reciprocally 
enfolded and doubled up within one another. It effects a radically 
heteronomous or unilateralising determination of this bi-lateral Decisional 
autonomy, extracting or cloning the non-auto-positional/non-auto-donational 
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essence from each of these auto-positional/auto-donational a prioris. It 
separates Affection from Transcendence, Reception from Plane, and Intuition 
from Unity, cloning these bi-lateral dyads as unilateral dualities. Thus, it 
determines or articulates them non-phenomenologically as Identities-without- 
unity and Dualities-without-distinction. 
Asa result, the sedirnented structural hierarchy whereby Decision 
superimposes a phenomenologising frame for every phenomenon, an 
ontologising horizon for every entity, and objectivating conditions for every 
object, is unstacked, desedimented and steamrollered out into an immanent 
continuum of non-intuitive or theoretically determined phenomenality 
wherein thought operates independently of the conditions of consciousness, 
words function independently of the conditions of language, and experience is 
given independently of the conditions of perception. Through their 
unilateralisation or dualysing separation within the elemental immanence of 
the Alien-subject, the meta-physical Transcendence of extra-philosophical 
Affection, the ontological Plane of pre-philosophical Reception, and the 
transcendental Unity of philosophical Intuition attain their non-auto- 
Decisional -which is to say, non-phenomenological- 
Identity as unilateral 
dualities, as the simultaneity of identity-without-synthesis and duality- 
without-distinction. They are lived-in-One by the Alien-subject and 
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experienced non-phenomenologically through its unilateralising structure as a 
Transcendence free of its constrictive relational residue of meta-physical 
scission or ekstasis; as a Plane devoid of the counterpoises of ontological 
ground and horizonal enclosure; and as Unity without synthesis or objectivity, 
as the transcendental Entity = x, the immanent noumenon or thing-in-itself, 
definitively shorn of the ontological apparatus of categorial determination. 
3. The transcendental prosthetic 
The Alien-subject's immanent medium of phenomenal manifestation 
is that of this non-intuitive phenomenality determined in accordance with the 
radical hyle. It exists as Alien for the phenomenological realm insofar as it is 
determined in accordance with the non-phenomenological essence of 
phenomenality. Thus, the effectuation of the Alien-subject as dualysation of 
phenomenon and phenomenality frees non-materialist thinking from the 
parameters of phenomenological intuition as well as from the codes of 
materiological conceptuality. Moreover, by dualysing the auto-positional and 
auto-donational structure of phenomenological Decision and articulating this 
non-intuitive dimension of phenomenality, the Alien-subject functions as a 
theoretical vehicle providing unprecedented opportunities for cognitive 
experimentation. In fact, it furnishes the non-materialist axiomatic with a 
theoretical organon whose function might be likened to that of a 
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transcendental prosthetic. As organon for the non-materialist axiomatic, the 
Alien-subject uses phenomenological Decision as its occasional material in 
order to construct theorematic descriptions of `matter itself determined-in- 
the-last-instance by the radical hyle; - thus, it uses phenomenological Decision 
in a way which precludes the possibility that the parameters of 
phenomenological intuition become constitutive or determining for a 
transcendental theory `of matter. In effect, the Alien-subject amplifies 
cognitive capacities by intervening directly at what is, from a philosophical 
perspective at least, the `metatranscendental' level of the phenomenological 
syntheses conditioning the possibilities of experience. 
However, it is this transcendent distinction between `experience' and 
`theory' in their phenomenological acceptation that becomes inoperative 
when viewed from the radically external, `utopian' perspective of the Alien- 
subject. Such a distinction was only tenable so long as it was possible to hold 
on to a division between some putatively pre-theoretical (i. e. pre-Decisional) 
realm of experiential immediacy and a theoretically articulated dimension 
specifying the ontological pre-conditions for the experience of immediacy 
(i. e. a Decision). But it is the very possibility of such a distinction that 
becomes untenable once the Principle of Sufficient Philosophy has been 
suspended and the rigorously transcendental stance of the Alien-subject 
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effectuated. There can be no such thing as `experience-in-itself before the 
advent of phenomenological Decision, just as there can be no such thing as 
Decision-in-itself, given independently of the radical hyle, unless it be by 
virtue of philosophical illusion. Experience defined in terms of pre- 
theoretical, intuitive phenomenological immediacy, of Consciousness or 
Subjectivity, remains, like Perception, Language, or History, an auto- 
positional, auto-donational ontological construct, the product of a Decision. 
Thus, it is possible to provide a non-materialist generalisation of Kant: 
the Alien-subject as organon for a transcendental determination that is real-in- 
the-last-instance but non-phenomenological reduces all phenomenological 
ontology to the level of empirical Idealism. Phenomenological ontology itself 
now becomes a contingent item of empirical data for non-materialist theory. 
That is to say: whereas for Kant, the ideal conditions for the possibility for 
experience were also the ideal conditions for the possibility of the objects of 
experience230, for non-materialism the real, non-phenomenological conditions 
for the reality of a theory of experience (i. e. for the determination of 
phenomenological Decision in accordance with the radical hyle) now 
determine the phenomenological conditions of empirical experience (i. e. of 
consciousness, perception, etc., insofar as these are all encompassed as a 
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function of Decision). `Consciousness', `perception', `language', `history', 
and all those other Decisionally circumscribed generalities supposedly 
intrinsic to the possibility of what we think, see, feel, and hear, are empirical 
idealisations, convenient speculative fictions gratuitously erected and 
maintained on the basis of philosophical Decision (the latter being a 
rigorously universal structure which, as we shall see later, ultimately 
encompasses capital and the apparatuses of socio-economic production231). 
But through the Alien-subject these generalities, along with the Decisions by 
means of which they are sustained as hybrids of empirical presupposition and 
ideal positing, can be dualysed and reconfigured as unilateral Identities. 
4. The non-thetic universe 
Accordingly, every phenomenological Decision reconfigured in terms 
of the non-thetic a prioris of donation and position unleashes a dimension of 
unconditional possibility, a transcendental continuum of radically immanent 
virtuality now definitively untethered from the philosophical moorings that 
tied it to empirical actuality. Non-materialism refuses the ontological 
constraints that obliged Deleuze to postulate a merely relative asymmetrical 
parallelism between virtual and actual, one whereby every actual 
230,, We then assert that the conditions of the possibility of experience in general are likewise 
conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience, and that for this reason they have objective 
validity in a synthetic a priori judgement" (Kant, 1929, p. 194, A158/B197) 
231Cf. our Conclusion, infra, pp. 422-430. 
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differenciation of the virtual immediately implies a virtual differentiation of 
the actual, and hence the initiation of a positive feedback loop from virtual to 
actual and back to the virtual again, according to an autocatalytic process of 
ontological genesis232. By reducing every Decision, and thus the entire realm 
of phenomenological experience concomitant with it, to the level of a neutral 
and indifferent symbolic support for the Alien-subject, the non-materialist 
axiomatic installs a strictly irreversible and aparallel asymmetry between the 
empirical dimension of phenomenological experience and the non-intuitive 
xenotype which the Alien-subject clones or effectuates using Decision. 
Accordingly, the dimension of non-intuitive phenomenality 
effectuated by the Alien-subject constitutes a rigorously transcendental 
dimension of virtuality; one wherein possibility is no longer a function of 
empirical actuality. The Alien-subject's transcendental exteriority vis a vis the 
empirical realm which serves as its occasional support precludes its 
reincorporation within the ambit of empirical possibility. In Philosophy and 
Non-Philosophy Laruelle calls the dimension of radical virtuality concomitant 
with the Alien-subject's non-intuitive phenomenality `the non-thetic 
universe'. The latter is "is lived before the advent of a horizon or project, in 
the form of a manifold of singular points of transcendence, a manifold of 
232 Cf. supra, Chapter 3, pp. 129-131. 
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affects of universality, now apprehended as the phenomenal content of that 
which science calls `objectivity' [... I it constitutes a manifold of real, 
primitive transcendence, shorn of all external Unity and of all finality[... ] a 
manifold of radical or individual possibles. These possibles are well and truly 
universals, but devoid of position, devoid of space even if it be pure, and 
devoid even of intensity. The hybrid of the particular and the universal is 
broken, science [i. e. non-philosophical thought-RB] finally accedes to a 
universal liberated from its limitation in the particular, and even from its 
limitation in the `individual'. Precisely because the universal now derives 
from the individual in the rigorous sense and no longer co-determines it, it is 
beyond its restricted and transcendent forms. This is the most universal 
experience of the universal or the possible: when the latter is no longer 
condemned to go by way of its own self-representation or hybrid states. " 
(Laruelle, 1989, p. 200) 
The non-thetic universe is the transcendental dimension of non- 
intuitive phenomenality effectuated through the existence of the Alien- 
subject. In its simplest, most invariant form, it comprises the Affect of 
Transcendence without horizonal enclosure, the Reception of a Plane without 
ontological ground and the Intuition of a Unity without objective 
determination. It is by virtue of its effectuation of the non-thetic universe that 
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the Alien-subject functions like a transcendental prosthetic amplifying the 
possibilities of thought and allowing for a non-phenomenological 
universalisation of materialism; a universalisation whereby materialism is 
allowed to access matter's non-phenomenological exteriority as thing-in- 
itself, as Entity finally released from the parameters of phenomenological 
intuition and the codes of materiological conceptualisation. Thus, if the non- 
thetic universe can be said to correspond to the Alien-subject's noetic 
dimension of transcendence as unilateralising duality, then the strictly 
unobjectifiable exteriority of the Entity is its noematic correlate, that which 
the Alien-subject experiences as the non-intentional correlate or unilate for 
the foreclosure of the radical hyle. The non-materiological Entity is the 
transcendental xenotype for matter's unobjectifiable exteriority, but a 
radically phenomenal exteriority cloned from the phenomenological 
hybridisation of obj ectivating phenomenality and objective phenomenon. This 
is the rigorously cognitive prototype for the non-phenomenological exteriority 
hinted at or evoked, but only ever caricatured, in the hyperbolic constructs of 
Lovecraftian fantasy and science fiction233. 
233Cf. for instance the short-story -favoured by Deleuze & Guattari in A Thousand 
Plateaus- `Through 
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5. Non-materialism and gnosis 
The non-materialist axiomatic represents a variant of what Laruelle 
calls `the vision-in-One'. The latter, Laruelle insists, is a third kind of 
knowledge that is almost the opposite of Malebranche's vision-in-God: it 
remains radically singular, finite, and non-paradigmatic234. Non-materialism 
reduces or suspends what Laruelle refers to as the `Greco-unitary' 
epistemological paradigm and ascribes to it the status of an occasional 
material or empirical support for an an-archic or gnostic model of 
cognition235. Gnosis can never become epistemically normative or 
paradigmatic precisely LJ;,; aus:, it remains radically singular and ontologically 
unencompassable in each and every instance. Laruelle's `One' -i. e. radical 
immanence- never reconstitutes an `All', and the radical hyle which non- 
materialist thinking clones from the hyletic continuum as philosophical 
hybridisation of singularity and multiplicity is not merely another version of 
the body-without-organs. Similarly, the non-thetic universe cloned in 
accordance with matter's foreclosure to ontological unification is not simply 
another version of the plane of immanence. Since what Laruelle refers to as 
the Gates of the Silver Key' in H. P. Lovecraft Omnibus I: At the Mountains of Madness, London: 
HarperCollins, 1993, pp. 505-552. 
234 C£Laruelle, 1991, p. 19. 
2351n his brief but poetic rumination on gnosticism, Jacques Lacarriere constantly highlights its 
militantly an-archic, anti-authoritarian aspect. Cf. Laccarriere, 1989. Jonas's (1991) classic study, for 
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`the One-without-Being' (l 'Un-sans-l 'Etre) never under any circumstances 
constitutes an instance of ontological unity or totality, there can never be one 
One but only an indenumerable plurality of Ones, an unencompassable non- 
ontological manifold of 'indivi-dualities': Identities-without-unity which are 
simultaneously Dualities-without-distinction. The non-Decisional separation 
of radically indivisible immanence and radically transcendent division 
releases their unilateral duality: unobjectifiable indivision is now the 
condition that causes or engenders unencompassable division. Immanence's 
uni-laterality brings forth a radically dispersive manifold of utterly 
discontinuous universes. This unilateral duality of indivision and division 
cannot be synthesised through Decision. Identity and Duality cannot be 
reintegrated into the Decisional synthesis of the One and the Multiple. Their 
unilateral separation as Identity-without-unity and Duality-without-difference 
precludes the bilateral onto'logical reciprocity between Unity and Difference, 
a reciprocity perpetuated through the unitary structure of philosophical 
Decision and one which invariably leads to the ontological reinscription of 
multiplicity as unity236. 
Thus, the manifestation of a non-thetic universe of theorematic 
description for the radical hyle engenders a unilateral duality of `matter itself 
its part, underlines gnosticism's profoundly anti-anthropocentric character as religion of an alien god, 
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and materialist Decision; a duality that forecloses the possibility of 
reinscribing matter within Decision. Nevertheless, and despite philosophical 
appearances, the hypo-thetical positing of matter's foreclosure to Decision 
remains perfectly compatible with the scientific-materialist assignation of a 
univocal ontological consistency to matter. It is not an ontological thesis 
about the constitution of matter but a transcendental hypothesis enforcing the 
distinction between matter's description and its constitution, specifically one 
which seeks to discontinue the philosophical amphiboly of phenomenological 
description and ontological constitution. The guiding hypothesis for non- 
materialist thinking is simply that matter's univocal ontological consistency - 
about which non-materialism has nothing to say- cannot be decided on the 
basis of phenomenological evidence since it is multiply instantiable in a 
manifold of phenomenologically incommensurable registers of phenomenal 
description. In this sense, non-materialism is a critical hypothesis that seeks 
to purge transcendental materialism of its residual phenomenological 
empiricism. 
That this critical hypothesis also constitutes a gnosis of matter is 
something that can be appreciated only once one has understood that gnosis 
represents a species of practico-theoretical description rather than of ethico- 
while Filoramo (1992) provides a more prosaic but nevertheless indispensable scholarly synopsis. 
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ontological dogma. Non-materialist gnosis is an-archic insofar as it dualyses 
every unitary ontological arche or principle according to the rigorously 
unilateral and irreversible order of the non-materialist axiomatic. As 
performed by the Alien-subject, the gnosis of `matter itself' onsists in the 
articulation of a non-intuitive universe for the theorematic description and 
phenomenalisation of the radical hyle; a universe of theorematic description 
whose conceptual codes and phenomenological dimensions -as circumscribed 
through the Affect of Transcendence, the Reception of the Plane and the 
Intuition of Unity- are simplified, which is to say, unidentified and 
unilateralised-, thereby engendering an an-archic, paraphenomenological 
chaos wherein thought is loosed from the conditions of intentional 
consciousness, words are freed from the strictures of linguistic signification, 
and entities liberated from the armature of ontological coordination. 
Gnosis allows ontologically extraterritorial individuals -Alien- 
subjects- to proceed in an orderly but irreversible manner from the fixed 
phenomenological organisation of empirical ideality to a transcendental 
chaos237 of unencompassable cognitive possibility. And by reducing 
236 Cf. in particular Chapter 3, pp. 154-161; and Chapter 5, pp. 243-245. 
237Non-philosophical `chaos' is neither mere disorder nor something which falls within the purview of 
non-linear dynamics. Whilst the former remains encompassed within the unitary philosophical dyad 
`order/disorder', the latter, for all their unpredictable complexity, are mathematically well regulated 
systems of phenomena produced through the recursive reiteration of homothetic invariants (cf. Gleick, 
1998). For Laruelle, by way of contrast, the term `chaos' designates that unencompassable or dispersive 
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phenomenological Decision to the status of idealised empirical fiction. non- 
materialism invites individuals to submit transcendent ontological generalities 
to a set of precise, systematic (but non-systemic), yet utterly heterogeneous 
variations, thereby extracting from the latter an immanently transcendental 
and radically universal dimension of phenomenality which remains strictly 
incommensurable with the phenomenological realm which supports it. 
More interestingly perhaps, through the non-materialist axiomatic, the 
Alien-subject operates directly at what a philosopher would call the 
`metatranscendental' level at which the phenomenological parameters and 
cognitive architecture of all cultural software remains determinable, thereby 
suspending the contingent epistemic armature which an aleatory evolutionary 
history, allied to a random set of sociocultural practises, have grafted onto the 
intrinsic plasticity of our neurophysiological apparatus238. Perceptual 
intuition, whether empirical and a posteriori, or phenomenological and a 
priori, is now entirely incorporated within the Decisional ambit that serves 
merely as the occasion for the Alien-subject's descriptions of the radical hyle. 
Accordingly, this non-intuitive generalisation of matter coincides 
with materialism's non-Decisional universalisation beyond the bounds of the 
manifold of unilateral dualities manifested in accordance with immanence's radically inconsistent 
Identity. Cf. infra, Chapter 7, pp. 361-372; Chapter 8, pp. 419-421; and also Laruelle, 1992, passim. 
238Cf. Chapter 8 where the theme of neurophysiological plasticity will be explored via the work of 
Paul Churchland. 
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anthropocognitive. For the charmed circle of philosophical auto-position 
perpetuated a reciprocity between the empirical and the transcendental 
whereby matter and thought remained either co-constitutive or co-extensive. 
The price for the spontaneous sufficiency of philosophical materialism was a 
circumscription of `matter itself within the restricted ambit of conceptual 
position and phenomenological donation as delineated according to the 
arbitrary empirical vagaries of the philosopher's speculative imagination. 
Thus, implicit in materiological Decisionism is an uncritical faith in the 
sufficiency of the philosophical imagination, one that seems to disregard the 
latter's entirely arbitrary character. Yet if the history of philosophy teaches us 
anything, it is that the philosopher's speculative imagination is always 
empirically limited. In other words, implicit in the speculative materialist's 
confidence in the sufficiency of Decision is the quasi-idealist assumption that 
an arbitrarily selected epistemic apparatus is sufficient to grasp matter `itself', 
irrespective of the biologically delimited parameters of human sapience. By 
our lights, natural science gives us every reason to doubt this239. 
Consequently, there is a sense in which, philosophical appearances 
notwithstanding, the asceticism of non-materialist theory and practise accords 
more readily with natural science than do the speculative indulgences of 
239Cf. our brief comments concerning the philosophical ramifications of string theory in our 
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philosophical materialism. For it is in accordance with its refusal to 
subordinate science to philosophy that non-materialist thinking, on the basis 
of matter's radical autonomy, now recognises science's claim to a relatively 
absolute autonomy which is the equal of philosophy's, and that it attempts to 
reconfigure the apparatus of materialist theory in such a way as to grant the 
latter a measure of transcendental independence vis a vis the limits which an 
empirically overdetermined set of cognitive faculties impose upon the 
speculative imagination. 
That science stands on an equal footing with philosophy, that 
philosophy -like mathematics or logic- is merely part of the abstract wing of 
the empirical sciences, is a central tenet of philosophical naturalism, and 
specifically of the `naturalised epistemology' formulated by V. V. O. Quine 
and championed by Paul Churchland. The next two chapters will try to 
recapitulate and to clarify the fundamental components of the non-materialist 
stance by comparing and contrasting them with certain of the central 
philosophical doctrines which characterise the vigorously naturalistic brand of 
materialism exemplified in the work of Quine and Churchland. 
Our aim is to show how two apparently irreconcilable, not to say 
contradictory theoretical trajectories leading out of the Kantian problematic - 
Introduction, supra, p. 21. 
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Quinean naturalism and Laruellean hypertranscendentalism- display an 
unexpected degree of theoretical convergence by virtue of their shared 
antipathy to phenomenology. Thus, Quine's is an anti-phenomenological 
naturalism, while Laruelle's is an anti-phenomenological transcendentalism. 
In the following chapter, we will see how the hypertranscendental register of 
non-materialist theory not only accords with Quine's anti-transcendental and 
anti-phenomenological naturalism, but also how it radicalises and generalises 
certain of its theses -specifically those of the inscrutability of reference, of 
ontological relativity, and of the indeterminacy of translation. 
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CHAPTER 7 
BEHOLD THE NON-RABBIT 
This ehaYt, r ýýill discuss the reýation between individuation, theory, 
and experience, and will examine the way in which these concepts are 
intertwined in the work of Kant, Quine, and Laruelle. More precisely, we will 
be foregrounding the theme of individuation but only in order to use it as a 
lens through which to focus on the way in which the relation between theory 
and experience is understood by these three thinkers. 
By `individuation' we mean the problem which can be summarized 
in the question: how is it that something comes to be counted as `one' ? In 
this regard, Leibniz's famous claim according to which "That which is not 
one being is not a being" encapsulates an entire ontological tradition. But is it 
possible to think `something' without having thereby immediately counted it 
as `one' thing ? Taking this question as a starting point, our aim in 
considering the issue of individuation here is twofold. First, to look at one 
way to which this traditional (but largely unstated) conceptual equivalence 
between `being' and `being-one', or between entity and unity, has figured as 
an uncircumventable precondition for ontology. Second, to suggest some of 
the ways in which the assumption of that precondition might be challenged or 
321 
undermined. In order to do this we will chart a trajectory through three 
distinct theoretical stances concerning individuation. We will begin with the 
Kantian account, according to which an invariable transcendental paradigm 
for objective individuation is available. Then we'll move on to consider the 
more sceptical, Quinean stance, whereby far from being universal and 
paradigmatic, individuation is actually a matter of linguistic convention, 
hence epistemically relative, and ultimately ontologically indeterminate. 
Finally, we will conclude by trying to elucidate the Laruellean suggestion that 
only a strictly transcendental determination of the singular can sever the link 
between entity and unity, thereby guaranteeing the de-objectification and de- 
phenomenologisation of the singular. 
We would also like to suggest that the first and second of these 
theses concerning individuation can be roughly correlated with certain more 
or less generic philosophical postures, in order to give some inkling of the 
peculiar way in which Laruelle's own non-philosophical stance constitutes 
neither a negation nor a synthesis of the Kantian and Quinean postures, but 
something like their radicalisation and generalisation. 
Thus, in the first section of the paper, we will see how Kant, the 
idealist, mobilizes an invariant transcendental criterion guaranteeing the 
objective unity of individuation. In the second, we shall examine the way in 
322 
which Quine, the materialist, undermines the assumption that any such 
transcendental guarantor for individuation exists. In the third and final 
section, however, we hope to show how Laruelle -circumventing both the 
idealist and the materialist schemas- effectively generalises Quine's 
materialist subversion of objective unity by radicalising Kant's transcendental 
method. Accordingly, it is by way of a concurrent radicalisation of 
transcendental determination and generalisation of empirical under- 
determination that the Laruelle-inspired or non-philosophical materialism we 
are attempting to articulate here proposes to sever the presumed link between 
entity and unity. 
Consequently, the `non-rabbit' mentioned in the title of this chapter is 
not an `anti-rabbit' or a `not-rabbit' but an entity without unity. We have 
already seen how the prefix `non-' -whether in `non-rabbit' or `non- 
philosophy'- is not to be understood negatively or privatively240. It has a very 
specific technical sense as an abbreviation for `non-Decisional', which, as we 
saw earlier, is in turn shorthand for `non-auto-positional' and `non-auto- 
donational'. Thankfully, for present purposes, these somewhat cumbersome 
locutions can be usefully compressed into the far more economical `non- 
thetic': it will be a `non-thetic rabbit' that is in question here. Thus, one of the 
240 o 21113 233n 21cn Cf. supra, Chapter c ý, NY. ý1ý ýý0 and 215,91,2160. 
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key claims we would like to make in this chapter is that although a `non-thetic 
rabbit' is effectively unobjectifiable, it is neither ineffable nor inconceivable. 
We now know that neither objectification nor phenomenologisation can 
presume to exhaust the entire available spectrum of immanent phenomenal 
manifestation. So not only does a `non-thetic rabbit' remain entirely 
immanent, precisely articulated within the bounds of conceptual thought, it 
also remains available to perception; - albeit only with the crucial proviso that 
the empirical parameters of the human sensory apparatus become 
theoretically reconfigured in accordance with certain transcendental strictures 
(we will return to this latter point in the final section of this chapter). 
Hence the use of the word `behold' in the title of this chapter: the 
non-rabbit is entirely immanent, entirely manifest, in spite of the fact that is 
neither a unitary nor an intentional phenomenon. In this regard, the 
overarching aim of this exercise in comparative analysis is to clarify and to 
elucidate the crucial but difficult notion of a `non-phenomenological 
phenomenality'. io sum up very briefly: in Husserl's case, the 
phenomenological definition of phenomenality designates a mode of 
manifestation defined in terms of its immanence to intentional 
consciousness241, while in (the early) Heidegger's case, it designates an 
241Cf. for instance Husserl, 1982. 
324 
apophantic mode of manifestation defined in terms of an ekstatic structure of 
ontological transcendence articulated through Dasein's being-in-the-world242. 
The non-phenomenological definition, however, refers to a non-intentional, 
non-apophantic, and non-worldly mode of phenomenal manifestation defined 
exclusively in terms of its immanence `in' theory. It refers to a constitutively 
theoretical mode of phenomenality. So because it is an intrinsically 
theoretical phenomenon - one, moreover, entirely devoid of apophantic 
intelligibility, intentional unity or worldly horizonality by virtue of its 
constitutively theoretical status - the non-rabbit will only become manifest 
according to the strictures of a non-empirical, non-intuitive, or theoretically 
determined phenomenality, as opposed to those of consciousness, sensibility, 
or being-in-the-world. 
Kant 
In all three of the thinkers under consideration here, there's a complex 
interrelation between individuation, theory and experience. But perhaps most 
significantly, all three are concerned with undermining the basically 
Cartesian 
notion that there exists some kind of essentially pre-theoretical 
immediacy 
through which `consciousness' -supposing there to be such a thing- enjoys 
privileged access to phenomena or `things themselves'. If they 
have anything 
242Cf. Heidegger, 1962. 
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at all in common, it's this basic refusal to have any truck with the homely 
phenomenological faith in the pre-theoretical experiential immediacy of `the 
things themselves'. 
Kant, for instance, denies the fanciful notion that we have privileged 
introspective access to the contents of our own heads. As far as the 
investigation into the conditions of possibility for experience is concerned, 
introspection provides no more of a solid basis than wand dowsing. The 
transcendental difference between phenomenon and in-itself cuts all the way 
into the subject: empirical consciousness is just as conditioned, just as 
determined, as every other kind of objective phenomenon. Moreover, as the 
ultimate ground for the possibility of transcendental synthesis, pure 
apperception maintains a formal, impersonal and objective status which 
precludes its identification with the personal subject of empirical 
consciousness; although transcendentally immanent to experience it is never 
given in experience, it remains external to inner sense: "The transcendental 
unity of apperception [... J is therefore entitled objective, and must be 
distinguished from the subjective unity of consciousness, which is a 
determination of inner sense" (Kant, 1929, B139, p. 157). Consequently, the 
experience into whose conditions of possibility Kant is investigating is neither 
the `lived' experience of phenomenological consciousness, nor the putatively 
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private realm of subjective qualia, but the universal cognitive experience 
whose structures are mapped out in the theories of Euclid and Newton. Kant 
is laying out transcendental conditions for the possibility of a single, 
universal but ultimately impersonal objective experience as theoretically 
articulated by Euclid and Newton, rather than as phenomenologically 
apprehended or `lived' by a conscious subject: 
"There is one single experience in which all perceptions are 
represented as in thoroughgoing and orderly connection, just as there is only 
one space and one time in which all modes of appearance and all relations of 
being or not-being occur. When we speak of different experiences, we can 
refer only to the various perceptions, all of which, as such, belong to one and 
the same general experience. This thoroughgoing synthetic unity of 
perceptions is indeed the form of experience; it is nothing else than the 
synthetic unity of appearances in accordance with concepts. " (Kant, 1929, 
Al 11, p. 138). 
For Kant, this `synthetic unity of appearances in accordance with 
concepts' provides the transcendental basis for the universal cognitive 
experience whose invariant features are delineated in Euclidean geometry 
and Newtonian physics. These invariants constitute the universal laws in 
conformity with which all possible appearances are woven together into one 
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unified, cohesive whole. Moreover, Kant claims that "The unity of 
apperception is thus the transcendental ground of the necessary conformity to 
law of all appearances in one experience"(Ibid., A127, p. 148). If this is so, it 
follows that pure apperception, the indivisible integer of categorial 
judgement and transcendental synthesis, is the formal principle grounding the 
synthetic unity of appearances, and ultimately the universal, impersonal, and 
objective principle in which the nomological consistency of all appearances 
finds its basis. Which is to say that pure apperception is in fact the subject of 
Euclidean and Newtonian theory: it is the transcendental guarantor for the 
possibility of the nomological consistency of appearances as set out in 
geometry and physics. Thus, Kant is attempting to define conditions of 
possibility for experience in accordance with a specific set of theoretical 
strictures which carve out certain necessary and law like invariances through 
which that experience is structured. Pure apperception, the wellspring of the 
synthetic a priori, is the cardinal hinge bridging the divide between the empty 
logical necessity of the analytical a priori and the contentful empirical 
contingency of the synthetic a posteriori. In doing so it ensures the 
transcendental isomorphy of theory and experience. But how then does pure 
apperception serve to articulate the link between theory, experience, and 
individuation? 
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To answer this question, it is imperative we bear in mind Kant's 
crucial distinction between combination or Verbindung as function of the 
transcendental imagination, and unity or Einheit as rooted in the pure 
understanding. Thus, Kant writes: "Combination is representation of the 
synthetic unity of the manifold. The representation of this unity cannot, 
therefore, arise out of the combination. On the contrary, it is what, by adding 
itself to the representation of the manifold, first makes possible the concept of 
the combination"(Ibid., B131, p. 152)243. The synthesizing function Kant 
ascribes to the transcendental imagination would not be possible, he argues, 
unless that combinatory activity was rooted in an essentially pre-synthetic or 
indivisible integer of transcendental unity proper to the pure understanding. 
This unity, of course, is provided by transcendental apperception. And it is 
precisely insofar as it first makes possible the a priori combination of the 
manifold in pure intuition that apperception provides the transcendental 
ground binding together subjective individuation and individuated objectivity. 
This is why, as Kant famously maintains: "the conditions of the possibility of 
experience in general are likewise conditions of the possibility of the objects 
of experience"(Ibid., A 158/B 197, p. 194). Because apperception is 
indissociably correlated with the pure and empty form of objectivity in 
243For a brilliantly innovative reading of Kant exploring the ramifications of this fundamental 
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general - the transcendental object =x-, it yields the isomorphic reciprocity 
between representing subject and represented object which grounds the 
possibility of empirical experience. It is thereby the universal synthetic 
principle out of which both subjective and objective individuation are 
crystallized. For although `unity' is one of the categories of quantity and 
hence one of the twelve determinate modalities of objective synthesis, it is 
finally apperception which furnishes the qualitative unity from which 
objective synthesis originarily arises as a mode of categorial judgement. In 
this regard, pure apperception is the ultimate determining instance for 
individuation, and the schematism and the principles of the pure 
understanding merely provide supplementary details concerning the a priori 
structures of spatio-temporal combination into which appearances which have 
already been individuated through apperception become woven in order to 
produce an intra-consistent network for cognitive representation. 
It comes as no surprise then to find that Kant's account of 
individuation is basically hylomorphic. Pure apperception is the indivisible 
paradigm of formal unity stamping an essentially amorphous manifold of 
spatio-temporal presentation with its individuating seal. It would be a 
mistake, however, to regard that unity as merely subjective in character, for as 
distinction between Verbindung and Einheit, cf. Alain Badiou, `L'ontologie soustractive de Kant' in his 
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Kant repeatedly insists, it is from the indivisibility of pure apperception that 
the representing subject and the represented object both derive. Thus, Kant's 
account of individuation necessitates a transcendental isomorphy between 
subjective and objective unity. In fact, subjectivation, objectivation, and 
individuation all become virtually indistinguishable processes inasmuch as 
apperceptive synthesis exhausts the possibilities of phenomenal 
manifestation. As far as Kant is concerned, to be something is to be an object 
of possible experience, and pure apperception is the ultimate transcendental 
determinant for all possible experience. Consequently, although Kant's 
transcendentalism critically undermines the idea that consciousness is the 
domain of a privileged pre-theoretical immediacy - for that idea conflates 
conscious experience of phenomena with experience of `things-in- 
themselves' -, not only does Kant fail to critically examine the link between 
entity and unity, he reinforces it by identifying the notions of phenomenon 
and object, thereby subordinating both to the indivisible transcendental bond 
between subjective and objective unity. In short, the Kantian rabbit-entity is 
one with which we are all perfectly familiar: it is an objectively individuated, 
three dimensional physical phenomenon persisting in time and locatable by 
reference to an entirely-determinate system of spatio-temporal coordinates, its 
Court Traite d'Ontologie Transitoire: Badiou, 1998, pp. 153-165. 
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objective contours fixed through a stable set of spatial boundaries and a 
homogeneous segment of temporal continuity. 
What then can we conclude about the relation between individuation, 
theory and experience in Kant ? We have already mentioned how, because of 
its universal, impersonal and objective character, the unified experience 
correlated with pure apperception is that whose invariant, law like features are 
jointly delineated by the theories of Euclid and Newton. Clearly then, Kant's 
entire transcendental project is intimately bound to the presupposition of an 
immanent, already constituted system of scientific theory. The substantive 
character of the synthetic a priori judgements whose formal possibility Kant 
is trying to uncover is, to all intents and purposes, defined by Newton and 
Euclid. The empirical immanence of an experience whose universally 
necessary features are jointly described in Euclidean geometry and Newtonian 
physics defines the parameters of possible experience for which Kant seeks to 
provide a transcendental ground. Borrowing a useful schema from Deleuze 
and Guattari, we might say that the transcendental and the synthetic a priori, 
critical philosophy and science, are wedded together and doubly articulated in 
a relation of reciprocal presupposition. Thus, Kant's Critical project 
presupposes an empirically immanent scientific theory of experience, for 
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which he then tries to provide an a priori but nevertheless transcendentally 
immanent epistemological footing. 
However, as subsequent scientific developments have all too clearly 
shown, this relation of presupposition remains fatally one-sided. It is Kant's 
transcendental philosophy which presupposes the empirical immanence of 
scientific theory and a scientific delineation of the synthetic a priori in the 
shape of an already extant system of apodictic mathematical and scientific 
truths; not, as Kant mistakenly believed, empirical science which presupposes 
a transcendental basis. This one-sidedness is a consequence of the 
unmistakeably transcendent character of Kant's transcendental a priori. And 
given the extent to which the internal coherence of the critical project as a 
whole hinges on the 1st Critique's crucial distinction between the 
transcendental and the transcendent244, this is deeply problematic for Kant. 
More than one commentator245 has remarked how, by simply tracing 
transcendental conditions from the empirically conditioned, and 
superimposing the presumed unity of pure apperception onto the synthetic 
combinations of the empirical manifold, Kant merely constructs a redundant, 
244 Cf. Kant, op. cit., A295-6/B352-3, pp. 298-299. 
245Dufrenne, Deleuze and Foucault have made this particular criticism almost ubiquitous in recent 
years, but Miklos Vetö reveals the extent to which it had already been more or less explicitly 
formulated by many of Kant's contemporaries and immediate successors: e. g. Haaman, Fichte, 
Schelling, Hegel. Cf. Veto, 1998. In view of the now elephantine proportions of secondary literature on 
Kant, many more names could doubtless be added to this list. 
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2nd order abstraction which, far from explaining them, simply reproduces the 
formal features of empirical generality at a higher level. Consequently, the 
supposedly transcendental reciprocity between critical philosophy and the 
scientific mapping of experience is only operative from the perspective of the 
former. 
The trouble with Kant's transcendentalism can be summarized in the 
following way: in principle, the empirically immanent bounds of possible 
experience, its universal, law like features as laid out in the theories of Euclid 
and Newton, are supposed to be transcendentally girded, necessarily rooted in 
the constitutive structures of cognition by those forms of a priori synthesis 
grounded in the immanence of pure apperception. But in fact they are not, as 
the discoveries of Lobatchevski, Riemannand Einstein (among others) showed 
only too clearly, revealing to what extent Kant's transcendental girding was 
flimsy, makeshift, and expedient, its foundations far too shallowly excavated. 
Kant's critical project remains trapped within the ambit of the empirico- 
transcendental doublet as circumscribed through the structure of philosophical 
Decision. It is only by presupposing science as empirically given that Kant is 
able to posit the a priori conditions through which the empirical comes to be 
constituted as given. Because of this Decisional structure, Kant's 
transcendental a priori ends up floundering in extraneous metaphysical 
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transcendence: neither rigorously transcendental, nor authentically immanent 
vis a vis the empirical domain of possible experience mapped out in scientific 
theory. 
Quine 
Interestingly enough, this relation of double articulation and 
reciprocal presupposition between philosophy and science is also one of the 
most striking features of Quine's work, albeit reconfigured in a vigorously 
naturalistic, anti-transcendental fashion. Quine's demolition of the analytic- 
synthetic distinction246 invalidates the Kantian conception of the 
transcendental and liquidates the very notion of the synthetic a priori. For 
Quine, truth is immanent and disquotational247, while reference remains a 
strictly intra-theoretical relation; thus, there is no difference in kind between 
truths of logic and truths of fact, only a difference of degree measured in 
terms of their susceptibility to empirical refutation. Consequently, there is no 
gap to bridge between essence and existence, logic and fact, judgement and 
experience; and no justification whatsoever for positing a transcendental 
isomorphy between representing and represented through the good offices of 
246 Cf. Quine, 1961, pp. 20-46. 
247 "Where it makes sense to apply 'true' is to a sentence couched in terms of a given theory and seen 
from within that theory, complete with its posited reality... To say that the statement 
'Brutus killed 
Caesar' is true, or that `The atomic weight of sodium is 23' is true, is in effect simply to say that 
Brutus 
killed Caesar or that the atomic weight of sodium is 23. " (Quine, 1960, p. 24). 
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a synthetic a priori. Quine's dissolution of the analytic/synthetic distinction 
necessitates abandoning the idea that the possibilities of empirical experience 
can be delimited through certain a priori epistemic structures possessing an 
inviolable formal necessity. As far as Quine is concerned, there simply are no 
purely a priori formal structures constraining the bounds of possible 
experience. Which is to say that the possibilities of scientific theory are 
continuously being reconfigured in accordance with real occurrences in the 
world, rather than eternally fixed according to ideal structures in the subject. 
Thus, although Quine's empiricism operates on the basis of a 
presupposition of immanence defined in terms of an already extant body of 
scientific theory, in a manner initially analogous to Kant's, he refuses the 
Kantian dissociation of philosophical epistemology from science in the shift 
to a transcendental epistemological register. This is Quine's thesis of the 
reciprocal containment of epistemology and ontology248. With the denial of 
analytic/synthetic distinction and the dissolution of the synthetic a priori goes 
the idea that there can be a first philosophy providing transcendental grounds 
for scientific theory. Not only does philosophical epistemology presupposes 
scientific ontology -ultimately the ontology of microphysical states provided 
by physics; the epistemological investigation into the genesis of scientific 
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ontology must be carried out within the conceptual framework provided by 
that fundamental physical ontology. There can be no transcendental 
bracketing or suspension of the natural scientific attitude. Thus, the 
fundamental methodological presupposition underlying Quine's empiricism is 
the espousal of an uncompromisingly physicalist ontology. And the 
physicalist holds that there can be no difference in the world that would not 
ultimately prove reducible to some physical difference explainable in terms of 
the distribution of elementary particles. As a physicalist Quine insists that 
"nothing happens in the world, not the flutter of an eyelid, not the flicker of a 
thought, without some redistribution of microphysical states. " (Quine, 1981, 
p. 98) Consequently, although epistemology can investigate the process of 
scientific theory formation, it must do so from a vantage point included within 
that scientific theory. The ontological framework provided by the physical 
sciences provides the basis for epistemology even as the latter investigates the 
genesis of the former. Thus, for Quine, science's empirical immanence 
functions like a kind of transcendental presupposition for epistemology. 
Where Kant sought to ground scientific ontology in transcendental 
epistemology, Quine grounds a naturalized epistemology in the 
transcendentally immanent ontology provided by physics: "my position is a 
248For an account of this thesis' fundamental importance in Quine's thought, and for an exemplary 
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naturalistic one; I see philosophy not as an a priori propaedeutic or 
groundwork for science, but as continuous with science. I see philosophy and 
science as in the same boat -a boat which, to revert to Neurath 's figure as I 
so often do, we can rebuild only at sea while staying afloat in it. There is no 
external vantage point, no first philosophy. "( Quine, 1969, pp. 126-127) 
It is this idea that the boat of empirical science functions as an 
inalienable presupposition for philosophy -in other words, that it functions as 
a real, rather than ideal, condition of possibility- which permits us to qualify 
it with the otherwise resolutely un-Quinean epithet of 'transcendental'. But 
note that what we are calling `transcendental' here, in the context of Quine's 
allusion to Neurath's boat, is neither the wood from which the ship's planks 
have been hewn, nor any specific feature concerning the shape and structure 
of those planks: this was Kant's mistake. It is simply the fact that philosophy 
begins as `always already' inscribed within a complex global network of 
intricately interrelated conceptual presuppositions. There is always some 
fundamental theory of the world keeping the possibility of philosophical 
investigation afloat. Without it, philosophy could not even begin to operate. 
Moreover that global web of belief, that intricate network of 
conceptual presupposition, is irreducible to the perspective of first-person 
exposition and defence of Quine's philosophy in its systematic consistency, see Roger Gibson's, 
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subjectivity. For although the fabric and tissue of the web are woven -via 
intricate micrological processes of probably unimaginable complexity- in the 
course a vast and ongoing collective cultural enterprise, it is scientific praxis 
that constructs and articulates its interconnecting nodes. Scientific theory 
furnishes the abstract logical filters, syntactical connectives, and conceptual 
joints which ensure the cohesive articulation of the whole. And science, as an 
impersonal theoretical praxis intrinsically embedded within a collective socio- 
cultural enterprise, is too variegated, heterogeneous and complex a 
phenomenon to be ascribed a unique and invariable essence. The structure of 
scientific praxis remains irreducible to the sum of individual scientific 
subjectivities that compose its parts. Thus, science as abstract, impersonal 
socio-historical structure cannot be phenomenologically encompassed. To 
attempt to bracket or reduce science, to try to ground our global theory of the 
world, painstakingly accumulated through millennia of collective cultural 
evolution, in individuated subjectivity is not only to try reduce the whole to 
the sum of its parts; it is to believe that one can generate the whole, along 
with its inconceivably intricate structural articulation, on the basis of one of 
its microscopic parts. From a Quinean perspective, to try to ground science in 
Enlightened Empiricism. C£ Gibson, 1988. 
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subjectivity is not just to indulge in asinine philosophical solipsism; it is to 
commit a rudimentary category mistake. 
Accordingly, for Quine, it is science that functions as an irreducible 
sine qua non for philosophical subjectivity, and not the reverse. In this regard, 
it may be that Quine's doctrine of disquotational truth, his intra-theoretical 
account of word-world correspondence, and his commitment to the 
methodological primacy of a physicalist ontology, although all resolutely 
anti-Kantian in inspiration, amount to something like a reconfiguration of the 
notion of transcendental immanence, rather than its simple obliteration. What 
is certain is that it is Quine's radical empiricism and his physicalism that 
underlie two of his most provocative doctrines: indeterminacy of translation 
and ontological relativity. One frequently sees both doctrines dismissed out of 
hand, largely by those failing to appreciate the way in which they are 
underwritten by the quasi-transcendental methodological primacy Quine 
ascribes to his presupposition of an unequivocally physicalist ontology. 
Nevertheless, it is this methodological presupposition that provides the 
theoretical basis for Quine's epistemological behaviourism. According to the 
latter, a scientific theory is primarily a structurally intraconsistent system of 
sentences, and the appropriate focus of epistemic analysis as far the empiricist 
philosopher is concerned is linguistic utterance as instance of publicly 
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observable behaviour. Consequently, a rigorously naturalistic epistemology 
will, as a matter of principle, forgo all references to subjectivity, whether it be 
in the shape of appeals to phenomenological introspection or latent mental 
processes, in order to recast epistemology in a explicitly behaviourist mode. It 
will then be seen to consist for the most part in a study of the relation between 
patterns of sensory stimulation and dispositions to overt verbal behaviour as 
observable in a particularly sophisticated species of biological organism - i. e. 
homo sapiens. More precisely, it will seek to establish a correlation between 
the various modalities of sensory input and the various patterns of linguistic 
output exhibited by those organisms. In the context of a behaviourist 
epistemology, the cognitive subject is merely the functional black box 
relaying input and output, and the precise nature of the mechanisms 
mediating between sensory input and linguistic output, or between stimulus 
and science, remains a matter for neurophysiological investigation rather than 
phenomenological speculation. 
The startling and far-reaching consequences of Quine's 
epistemological behaviourism become apparent in the test case of radical 
translation. The radical translator has to decipher what is presumably an 
instance of ostensive definition in the case of an entirely alien language. Thus, 
the alien utters the phrase `Gavagai! ' while ostensively indicating a passing 
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rabbit. But as far as behavioural evidence is concerned, the translator is no 
more empirically justified in concluding that the alien is indicating an 
individual rabbit, than he would be in concluding that the native was actually 
pointing to an undetached rabbit-part, or a temporal segment in the history of 
a rabbit, or the instantiation of rabbithood, and so on. The alien's behavioural 
disposition to utter the phrase `Gavagai! ' and point a tentacle whenever a 
rabbit hops by will be the same whether he `means' to indicate a rabbit, a 
rabbit-segment, or an undetached rabbit-part. Consequently, Quine argues, 
there is nothing in principle to prevent a pair of rival translators from 
constructing two mutually conflicting manuals of translation for the alien 
tongue, both of which would be completely compatible with the totality of 
the alien's speech-dispositions, providing a smooth sentence to sentence 
mapping between English and alien sentences, yet both entirely incompatible 
with one another, inasmuch as one translates `Gavagai! ' with `Lo, a rabbit! ', 
while the other translates it with `Lo, an undetached rabbit part! '. 
Now the point, Quine argues, is not that radical translation is 
epistemologically underdetermined and that we lack enough evidence to 
discover what the alien `really' means. It is that translation is ontologically 
indeterminate and that there is nothing to discover about meaning, no fact of 
the matter about what the alien `means' for the translator to be right or wrong 
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about: "The discontinuity of radical translation tries our meanings: really 
sets them over against their verbal embodiments, or, more typically, finds 
nothing there. "(Quine, 1960, p. 76) 
If `Gavagai! ' doesn't mean anything, Quine insists, it's because `Lo, a 
rabbit! ' doesn't mean anything either. There simply are no such things as 
`meanings' 
. For the truth is that indeterminacy of translation begins at home. 
Thus, Quine's epistemological behaviourism and his principled 
disqualification of the `first person point of view' applies even in the case of 
our own native language: we could suspend our habitual practise of 
homophonic translation when conversing with other English speakers and, by 
systematically reinterpreting words and sentential constructions, construe 
utterances such as `there's a rabbit' as being `about' rabbithood or 
undetached rabbit parts while still respecting all the available empirical facts 
about behavioural predispositions. 
Moreover, this holds even in the case of the individual speaker: I 
could systematically reconstrue even my own utterances and conclude that the 
word `rabbit' as I use it is actually true of rabbit parts or rabbit stages. Or, and 
perhaps even more interestingly, that the word `I' as `I' use it actually refers 
to some other entity. Quine's hostility to the phenomenological superstitions 
enshrined in `the first person point of view' is utterly uncompromising: not 
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even my own utterances can have any determinate meaning for me. The 
assumption that speakers enjoy privileged access to their own 
phenomenological states is no more than a widespread but scientifically 
unwarranted cultural prejudice. Since truth is disquotational and the reference 
scheme governing a language's ontological commitments remains relative to 
a translation manual, the ontological commitments of my own assertions 
remain inscrutable even to myself 
This is Quine's doctrine of the inscrutability of reference, which 
shades off indiscernibly into that of ontological relativity. The latter provides 
the basic theoretical underpinning for the thesis of translational 
indeterminacy. It states that ontologies are not fixed and absolute but aleatory 
and relative: different theories will have different ontological commitments 
insofar as the range of bound variables over which the sentences of a theory 
must quantify will vary according to the kind of entities required to stand in 
as values of those variables in order for the sentences of the theory to be true. 
Rabbits and undetached rabbit parts are alike, Quine suggests, insofar as the 
question of their existence or non-existence only makes sense within the 
context of the relevant world-theory. But it is important to stress that as far as 
Quine is concerned, there can be no fact of the matter concerning `what there 
really is' independently of any and all theory. The criterion according to 
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which rabbits afford greater epistemological convenience as theoretical posits 
in the context of our own particular world-system remains an instrumental 
one: it so happens that we, as biological organisms striving to organize the 
raw flux of sensory input, have so far found it simpler and more profitable to 
formulate our accounts of those sensory stimulations and successfully predict 
their future occurrence by explaining them in terms of rabbits rather than 
undetached rabbit-parts. Beyond this purely instrumental criteria and the 
immanence of the world-theory we happen to inhabit, there is no higher court 
of ontological appeal, and ultimately no answer to questions about whether 
the world `really' consists of rabbits or rabbit-stages since "it makes no sense 
to say what the objects of a theory are, beyond saying how to interpret or 
reinterpret that theory in another. "(Quine, 1969, p. 50) Accordingly, there is 
no right or wrong way in which to carve up the world independently of the 
best available theory, and what counts as the `best' theory for an organism is 
simply a function of adaptational efficiency. 
Moreover, given that Quine believes that the best ontology is that of 
the best unified science, and that he also believes that physics offers the 
widest-ranging avenue for the projected unification of the natural sciences, it 
follows that, as far as Quine is concerned, physics should be afforded pride of 
place at the heart of our scientific system of the world. By systematically 
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reconstruing and reinterpreting quantificational predicates, apparent 
divergences in the ontologies of the various sub-systems of science can be 
eliminated, thereby maximizing the potential convergence of those discrete 
scientific regions with a view to a seamlessly unified, universal physical 
theory. Whenever possible, Quine maintains, we should strive for physical 
reduction, or at least re-identification: - substituting a frugal ontology of 
microphysical objects for our luxurious ontology of bodies and substances, 
eliminating these microphysical objects in favour of regions of pure space- 
time, and ultimately abandoning the latter in order to replace them with 
corresponding classes of quadruple numbers as specified within the bounds of 
arbitrarily adopted coordinate systems, thereby arriving at the austerely 
minimalist ontology of pure set theory. 
Given that our own scientific system of the world already exhibits this 
high degree of functional plasticity, it would be churlish to impose fixed 
ontological parameters onto the process of radical translation. When 
confronted with an alien it may be more convenient to assume that its 
ostensive practises more or less coincide with our own, and that it 
individuates things in the world very much like we do. Quine's point is that 
although such assumptions are pragmatically warranted, they will always 
remain ontologically indeterminable insofar as they exceed all possible 
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epistemological, which is to say behavioural, evidence; - the only empirically 
legitimate evidence as far as Quine is concerned: 
"Such is the quandary over `gavagai'. where one gavagai leaves off 
and another begins. The only difference between rabbits, undetached rabbit 
parts and rabbit stages is in their individuation. If you take the total scattered 
portion of the spatiotemporal world that is made up of rabbits, and that which 
is made up of undetached rabbit parts, and that which is made up of rabbit 
stages, you come out with the same scattered portion of the world each of the 
three times. The only difference is in how you slice it. And how to slice it is 
what ostension or simple conditioning, however persistently repeated, cannot 
teach. "(Quine, ibid. pp. 31-32) 
Thus, what the indeterminacy of translation really boils down to is an 
indeterminacy of individuation. Although the total scattered portion of the 
spatiotemporal world comprising rabbits, rabbit parts and rabbit stages, is 
ultimately `one and the same'249, the fact remains that at the local level, there 
will always be a greater number of undetached rabbit-parts present than single 
rabbits, an even greater number of temporal segments in the history of a 
249Although, strictly speaking, from a Quinean perspective, to say that it remains `one and the same' is 
problematic insofar as it erroneously suggests we might have some means of accessing this scattered 
portion of the spatiotemporal world independently of our habitual practises of ostensive individuation 
as nested within the overarching world-theory we happen to inhabit. As we'll see shortly, it's this 
possibility of gaining theoretical access to a pre-individuated ontological realm which becomes feasible 
in the context of Laruelle's work, in spite of the fact that it remains a strictly incoherent notion for 
Quine. 
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rabbit than undetached rabbit parts present, but conversely, only a single 
rabbithood present whenever a multiplicity of rabbits, rabbit stages or rabbit 
parts are present. The truth is that this incommensurability at the global level 
of that which ostension counts as one remains inscrutable at the local level of 
behavioural equivalence for ostensive indication, in other words, inscrutable 
at the level of the way in which ostension count something as one. This is 
because, for Quine, there is no 'thing-in-itself, nothing left over once you've 
subtracted the how of ostensive individuation from the what which is 
supposedly being pointed to. There simply are no facts of the matter - i. e. no 
behavioural, and ultimately no physical facts - about what we `intend' to 
single out when uttering `Lo, a rabbit !' and pointing, or to tell us whether 
we are indicating rabbits, rabbit stages, or rabbithood. 
Individuation is indeterminate, and the reference of our singular terms 
inscrutable, argues Quine, because there are no entities there for us to scrute 
in the absence of a global theory fixing the conventions for ostension and 
specifying determinate criteria for the individuation of entities. Unless it's 
determined in the context of an overarching background theory, reference is 
indeterminate and being inscrutable. Hence the famous Quinean formula: `to 
be is to be the value of a variabýe'. Reference as a basic ontological relation 
between word and world cannot be construed in a transcendent and extra- 
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theoretical fashion, because only the presupposition of physics as the most 
fundamental and all-encompassing available system of global ontology can 
provide the immanent, empirically legitimate condition of possibility for 
defining that relation. And herein lies the potent anti-phenomenological thrust 
of Quine's radical empiricism: if practises of ostension and criteria for 
individuation are relative to theory, so are all those perceptual or 
phenomenological `experiences' subsequently attributed to the 
epistemological subject as a function of those theoretically grounded 
conventions and criteria. Change the translation manual and the customary 
rules of homophonic equivalence whereby your utterances are habitually 
mapped onto the familiar lexicon of standard English, their reference fixed in 
conformity with the conventional criteria of ordinary usage, and you 
effectively reconfigure the phenomenological furnishings of your own being- 
in-the-world. Rabbit-stage qualia will be substituted for rabbit qualia. 
Accordingly, Quine's epistemological behaviourism and his sceptical 
stance toward the conventions of propositional attitude ascription and the 
ontological trappings of folk psychological discourse, as crystallised in the 
indeterminacy of translation250, provide us with as an explicitly materialist 
2500f course, there are many who view the indeterminacy of translation as a reductio of Quine's 
epistemological behaviourism, protesting that such a profoundly counter-intuitive doctrine could not 
possibly be correct. Appeals to the incontrovertible obviousness of first-person phenomenology 
invariably figure largely in protests of this sort. An altogether more interesting and less-question 
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variant on what was most valuable in Kant 
supposition that we possess unmediated 
the transcendental critique of the 
access to our own first-person 
phenomenological awareness as though it were something immediate and `in- 
itself, and the latent implication that there simply is no `experience in-itself 
since experience is conceptually defined and `always already' theoretically 
articulated. It is this idea of a transcendental suspension or bracketing of the 
realm of phenomenologically defined immediacy in its entirety, coupled with 
the possibility of a subsequent theoretical reconfiguration of what counts as 
experience, which links Laruelle's work to that of Kant and Quine. 
Laruelle 
Laruelle is interested in clarifying the notion of a transcendental 
presupposition for philosophical thought. In other words, he's interested in 
clarifying the notion of transcendental immanence that, we suggested, was 
already operative in the thought of Kant and Quine. But unlike Kant, Laruelle 
is trying to define this notion of transcendental immanence in terms of a real 
rather merely ideal presupposition for experience. And unlike Quine, he 
refuses to identify this real presupposition with an already extant body of 
empirical science. This is because he thinks that both Kant's synthetic a 
begging critique comes from Donald Davidson, a philosopher much influenced by Quine. In 'On the 
Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme' Davidson criticizes Quine for holding on to a `third dogma' of 
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priori, as rooted in pure apperception, and Quine's epistemological 
behaviourism, as rooted in his physicalism, are ultimately equivalent gestures 
of transcendence, that is to say, philosophical Decisions about what should 
count as an inevitable presupposition for philosophy. Thus, what Laruelle is 
after is a precondition for philosophy that is real without being empirically 
determinate and capable of assuming a transcendental function without 
becoming ideally transcendent. The question then is: can we discover this real 
but non-empirical presupposition, this unconditional immanence that is 
always already presupposed by philosophy, without having to make a 
philosophical Decision about its character? For by immediately characterizing 
its own precondition philosophically, Decision institutes a vicious circularity 
whereby philosophy's minimal precondition or sine qua non always turns out 
to be already philosophical. But is there some ultimate presupposition for 
philosophical thought that would not turn out to be posited as presupposed 
through Decision? 
We know that Laruelle believes he has discovered this non-Decisional 
precondition for philosophising, and that defining it as the authentically 
ineliminable sine qua non for all philosophical thought is a matter of 
purifying the notion of immanence of every residue of ideal transcendence 
empiricism; the dualism of conceptual scheme and sensory content which he sees as mirroring the 
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and empirical determination. For the philosophical presupposition of 
transcendental immanence, whether as ideal (Kant) or as real (Quine), 
invariably renders it immanent to something. Thus, for Kant, the 
transcendental qua ideal synthetic a priori is immanent to possible 
experience, while for Quine the transcendental qua real physical theory of the 
world is immanent to empirical science. Accordingly, in order to safeguard 
immanence's autonomy and prevent its contamination through transcendent 
ideality and empirical reality, Laruelle must achieve a seemingly impossible 
feat: he has to separate immanence qua immanence from immanence qua 
transcendental without differentiating them as two distinct 'things'. 
Immanence must be capable of fulfilling a transcendental function without 
becoming transcendental. The function of the transcendental entails a relation 
of determination (whether this be one of conditioning (Kant), constitution 
(Husserl) or production (Deleuze)), a relation that would compromise the 
radical autonomy of the immanence Laruelle seeks. Accordingly, in order not 
to render immanence relative to that which it transcendentally determines, 
Laruelle will carefully distinguish immanence as a necessary but negative 
condition, as sine qua non for the relation of determination, from its 
effectuation as transcendentally determining condition insofar as this is 
Kantian dualism of concept and intuition. Cf. Davidson, 1984. 
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contingently occasioned by the empirical instance that it necessarily 
determines. Immanence is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the 
determination of philosophy because it requires the supplement of 
philosophical thought as a contingent occasion in order to fulfil its necessary 
determining function vis a vis philosophy. Consequently, whereas 
transcendental immanence is merely posited-as-presupposed through 
philosophical Decision, Laruelle will separate or dualyse the two moments of 
Decision, so that non-Decisional immanence is first presupposed -without 
being posited- in its radical autonomy as immanence, which is to say, as 
foreclosed to Decision, the better to be occasionally posited -without being 
presupposed- as a transcendentally foreclosed but nevertheless determining 
condition for philosophical Decision. 
Accordingly, unlike Kant and Quine, Laruelle separates the gesture of 
presupposition from that of position at the same time as he separates 
immanence from its transcendental effectuation. First, immanence is 
presupposed (without-position) in its foreclosure to Decision as utterly empty 
and transparent, void of any and every form of predicative content, whether it 
be empirical or ideal. It is presupposed as the minimally necessary 
precondition for thought, as a negative or empty condition, rather than a 
positive, ontologically sufficient or substantive state of affairs. Which 
is to 
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say that it is presupposed as foreclosed to the advent of ontological Decision 
concerning that which is or the way in which what is (i. e. foreclosed to the 
possibility of articulating the distinction between essence and existence). 
Second, and only by virtue of being presupposed as this necessary but non- 
sufficient condition, immanence is posited (without-presupposition) on the 
occasional basis of Decision, as transcendentally necessary for Decision. Only 
on the occasional basis of philosophical Decision can immanence be posited 
as transcendental and thereby become positively effectuated as a necessary 
condition for Decisional thought. 
What are the consequences of this delicate procedure? The most 
important for our present purposes is that whereas the Decisional mixture of 
presupposition and position invariably hybridises immanence's conceptual 
definition with its ontological constitution, Laruelle manages to characterise it 
as foreclosed to definition as well as constitution. Immanence `itself is a 
radically autonomous instance that simply has no need for definition or 
constitution. Immanence `itself remains foreclosed to conceptual 
symbolisation and ontological predication, and therefore independent of the 
Decisional mixture of description and constitution. 
We might almost be tempted to say that in invoking immanence 
`itself , Laruelle is defining it substantively, were it not for the fact that once 
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immanence is thought in and by itself, it can no longer even be characterised 
as substantively immanent to itself. This is what separates Laruelle from 
Deleuze and Henry251: the conviction that once immanence has been purged 
of every residue of transcendence, it is no longer possible to say of it, as 
Deleuze and Henry do in their very different ways, that it's immanent to 
itself, because that `to' still maintains a modicum of reflexive folding, a 
doubling up, a residual intentionality252. If immanence is to be unconditional 
it must remain non-thetic: neither immanence `in' itself nor immanent `to' 
itself, but rather non-thetic-immanence 'itself. 
Moreover, it is through this intransitive `bracketing' or suspension of 
intentional relationality and reflexive doubling, that the non-thetic suspends 
the premise of unitary ontological consistency. Because the Laruellean 
invocation of immanence is no longer defined as an identity `to' something, 
not even to itself, it becomes the immanence of an Identity without 
consistency and without unity. Laruellean immanence is the radical or the 
One-in-One, the One-without-Being (l'Un-sans-l'Etre), rather than the 
absolute as transcendence or One-beyond-Being (l'au-dela de l'Etre or the 
epekeina tes ousias). Accordingly, the non-thetic immanence of what Laruelle 
251Cf. supra, Chapters 2 and 3. Whereas both Deleuze and Henry define immanence philosophically 
(Decisionally) as an absolute, Laruelle defines immanence non-philosophically (non-Decisionally) as 
the radical. 
252 Cf. Laruelle 1995a, and supra, Chapter 3, pp. 136-141. 
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calls `the One' or `the Real' becomes an index of radically singular but non- 
consistent Identity, an identity shorn of the presumption of ontological unity. 
And it is this suspension of thetic positing, of intentional correlation and 
transitivity, which the `non' in `non-thetic immanence' imparts to thought 
insofar as it begins to t?: in ' as T aruelle puts it, according to, or on the basis 
of radical immanence as its real, yet non-ontological, presupposition. This has 
four very important consequences as far as our consideration of the relation 
between individuation, theory, and experience is concerned; consequences 
which we shall now proceed to elaborate on in turn. 
First consequence: immanence -which is to say, the radical hyle-, 
through its foreclosure to Decision, causes253 the phenomenological World to 
distinguish itself as absolutely transcendent in relation to it, while it remains 
without relation to that World's unilaterally thetic transcendence. However, 
the latter provides the empirical occasion for a transcendental clone that 
articulates or exists as the unilateral duality between the hyle's non-thetic 
immanence and the thetic transcendence of the phenomenological realm. This 
transcendental clone is a non-thetic model of thetic transcendence. In other 
words, non-thetic immanence has as its (non-intentional) correlate (or uni- 
late, as Laruelle says) not the World of phenomenological transcendence but 
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the radical, non-phenomenological exteriority of the Alien-subject; an 
unencompassable exteriority which exists as a fathomless well or abyss of 
non-thetic transcendence into which absolutely everything drops: subjectivity, 
objectivity, and all extant horizons of phenomenological disclosure. Yet we 
know it is this dimension of non-thetic transcendence, the exteriority of the 
Alien-subject as effectuation of the radical hyle's foreclosure to 
phenomenological Decision, which provides the vehicle for non-materialist 
thought. Thus, Alien-subjectivity is articulated as a unilateral duality 
separating the radical hyle qua phenomenon-in-itself from the 
phenomenological distinction between phenomenon and phenomenality. Of 
particular importance for us here is the way in which the hyle's transcendental 
modelling or cloning as sine qua non for thought -a modelling contingently 
occasioned by the World's transcendence- engenders a (practico )theoretical 
-rather than phenomenological- instance of immanent subjectivation. Thus, in 
being transcendentally effectuated or cloned as Alien-subject, the radical hyle 
becomes the subject of transcendental theory according to its foreclosure to 
phenomenological consciousness and without becoming immanent `to' 
subjectivity or consciousness. 
253 "Causes-only-in-the-last-instance"; i. e. according to a novel, non-metaphysical characterisation of 
the notion of cause as neither formal nor final, neither efficient nor material. 
357 
Consequently, from a Laruellean perspective, the radical exteriority 
through which the Alien-subject of non-phenomenological theory comes to be 
constituted is neither an empirical fact given `in' experience, nor a necessary 
precondition for the givenness `of experience: it is a radically transcendental 
and therefore exclusively theoretical organon for the determination of 
phenomenological experience; an organon devoid of every residue of 
phenomenological determination or intra-worldly experience. This last point 
is particularly crucial: the non-phenomenological subject does not `do' theory 
as if it were already a pre-existing agency pragmatically engaged `in the 
world' prior to and independently of being a theoretical instance for the 
world; its `being' is exclusively that of theory, its articulation is exhaustively 
theoretical, and it is nothing apart from that theoretical effectuation254. The 
only authentically immanent articulation of the Subject for Laruelle is 
effectuated in the structure of the transcendental clone suspending, modelling, 
and ultimately reconfiguring the World's thetic transcendence. It is the 
World as structure of phenomenological transcendence in toto that is now 
reduced to the status of theoretical 'object': - a merely occasional support or 
material for theory. 
254 Cf. Laruelle, 1999, pp. 146-147. 
358 
Second consequence: through this dimension of radical exteriority or 
non-thetic transcendence which constitutes the structure of theoretical 
subjectivity, Laruelle effects a transcendental dilation of the empirical realm; 
one which, like Quine but for very different reasons, discontinues the 
possibility of presupposing a phenomenological distinction between 
experience and judgement, fact and essence, a posteriori and a priori. In 
emancipating the pure and empty form of the transcendental, Laruelle extends 
the bounds of empiricity beyond the phenomenological parameters of what 
it's possible to define as empirical relative to a subject. Which is to say that 
everything becomes indifferently empirical: - not just rabbits and rabbit-parts, 
but the a priori criteria of individuation for rabbits and rabbit-parts. Once the 
rigorously transcendental viewpoint of the Alien-subject has been effectuated, 
then according to the latter's radically universalising perspective qua `vision- 
in-One', all phenomenologically rooted distinctions between proprietary 
proximity and expropriatory distance, or between a (so-called) concrete 
subjective immanence and a (so-called) abstract objective transcendence 
become completely invalidated. Everything is at once univocally concrete or 
equivalently phenomenal in its non-thetic immanence and indifferently 
abstract or utterly excarnate in its non-thetic transcendence. Which is to say 
that according to the Alien-subject's radically non-worldly theoretical 
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perspective, there's no distinction in phenomenal or perceptual status between 
being hit by a brick and constructing a proof for Cantor's continuum 
hypothesis. Envisaged according to radical immanence, or `seen-in-One', a 
bunny-rabbit has exactly the same phenomenal status as an axiom of set 
theory, and a particle accelerator has exactly the same phenomenal status as a 
toothache. 
Third consequence: a thinking operating on the basis of non-thetic 
immanence isn't about anything: - it's non-intentional, intransitive. It is (as 
Beckett famously remarked apropos of Finnegan's Wake) that `something' 
itself. Because transcendental theory is Subject without being dependent on 
any empirically given instance of subjectivity, non-materialist thinking is 
neither grounded in a conscious subject nor dependent on an intentional 
object. Like Kant, Laruelle includes the subject of consciousness within the 
realm of empirically determinable objectivity. So Laruelle's non- 
philosophical version of transcendental theory does not depend on a subject of 
consciousness because it remains rooted in the foreclosure of radical 
immanence as the non-conscious cause that determines that theory-in-the- 
last-instance. Moreover, and by the same token, it has no intentional object 
either because it constitutes itself on the occasional basis of those a priori 
theories of objectivation -i. e. philosophical Decisions- which function as 
its 
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empirical material255, rather than relative to an already objectivated or 
empirically determinate phenomenological field. This is why it operates in an 
exclusively transcendental as opposed to phenomenological register: it relates 
to theories of objects rather than to objects themselves, the point being that 
from the viewpoint of radical immanence, the possibility of establishing a 
phenomenological distinction between `objects' and `theories of objects' 
becomes completely invalidated. That distinction is now supplanted by a 
transcendental Identity of phenomenological-object and objectivating-theory 
that is itself radically phenomenal (non-phenomenological) or non-thetically 
immanent in-the-last-instance. 
In this respect, Laruelle can be seen to be radicalising the combined 
Kantian and Quinean critiques of the idea that our experience is of things-in- 
themselves, defined independently of theoretical mediation. There are no pre- 
theoretical experiences of rabbits-in-themselves, only an experience 
constructed through theories of rabbithood. But in another respect, Laruelle 
vigorously reinstates the thing-in-itself: for this is exactly what non-thetic 
immanence is. We have already seen how, once it ceases being defined 
privatively as a limiting concept, it becomes possible to redefine the thing-in- 
itself positively as an unconditionally immanent phenomenon, or as the 
255 C£ Laruelle, 1996, pp. 32-34. 
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phenomenon-in-itself =X 256. It is this philosophically oxymoronic definition 
of the Real that serves as the impetus for the Laruellean shift to a non- 
philosophical register; - that is to say, one which takes conceptual accounts of 
objectivation themselves, rather than objects, as its empirical material. And it 
is radical immanence's unconditionally positive phenomenal transparency as 
the phenomenon-in-itself (which Laruelle also calls `the One' or `the Real'), 
rather than the kind of negatively defined noumenal opacity characteristically 
ascribed to the in-itself by philosophers, which makes of it the unknown but 
determining cause in accordance with which the Real qua phenomenon- 
without-phenomenality can be limitlessly redescribed using philosophical 
theories of phenomenality as a merely occasional index. This process of 
redescription is the business of non-philosophical theory. 
Fourth consequence: the redescription at issue involves thinking the 
Identity -but an identity-without-unity- and Duality -but a 
duality-without- 
distinction- of the Real qua phenomenon-in-itself or immanent cause of 
thought, and of the Ideal qua phenomenological objectivation or individuating 
schema for the scattered portion of the spatio-temporal world indexed by the 
256 Cf. our earlier definition of the radical hyle as phenomenon-without-phenomenality, supra, 
Chapter 
6, p. 293 and pp. 296-301. Laruelle himself makes this point explicitly in 
Principes de la Non- 
Philosophie: "The Real is rather like Kant's `thing-in-itself': unknowable and even unthinkable, 
but 
with this difference: it is constituted by a foreclosed immanence rather than 
by transcendence (it is the 
One rather than the Other), and consists in an experience or cognition of the third 
kind; - the vision-in- 
One. " (Laruelle, ibid., p. 271). 
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`Gavagai! ' or `Rabbit! ' occasioning occurrence. In other words, the non- 
phenomenological redescription of phenomenologically articulated cognition 
strives to construct a theoretical clone of the "Gavagai! " occasioning 
occurrence by producing the concurrent Identity (without-synthesis) and 
Duality (without-difference) of the latter's indeterminable reality as a pre- 
individual "thing" or phenomenon-in-itself, and its phenomenologically 
determinable ideality as individuated entity. Thus, the non-phenomenological 
redescription of phenomenologically articulated rabbithood will strive to 
liberate the rabbity-occurrence's pre-individual or non-ontological257 
character, which is to say, its non-thetic essence, in terms of the radically 
immanent Identity (without-unity) and radically transcendent Duality 
(without-difference) proper to the rabbity-occurrence as simultaneity of a 
determinate but unobjectifiable reality and a phenomenologically 
determinable or objectivated ideality. In other words, it is a question of 
dualysing the phenomenological hybridisation of individuating 
phenomenality and individuated phenomenon in terms of a unilateral duality 
whereby an individual-without-individuation now determines the 
hylomorphic dyad of individuating form and individuated matter as the 
unidentity and unilaterality of a matter-without-form, or individual-without- 
257`Non-ontological' insofar as phenomenology tends to identify `being' qua 
`essence of 
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individuation, and a form-without-matter, 
individual. 
or individuation-without- 
It is Gilbert Simondon who, in his seminal work258, originally 
identified the fundamental circularity in all hylomorphic accounts of 
individuation. That circularity derives from their retroactive imposition of the 
characteristics of constituted individual unity back onto the pre-individual 
conditions of ontological individuation. Pre-individual being will never be 
conceptually conceived, Simondon argued, so long as the only available 
theoretical schema is that of the basically Kantian model according to which 
the unity of the concept is mirrored in the object and that of the object in the 
concept, thereby presupposing the isomorphy of thought and thing at the level 
of individuation. However, Simondon not only diagnosed the problem, he 
also suggested an alternative: 
"The individuation of the real external to the subject is grasped by the 
subject thanks to the analogical individuation of cognition in the subject; but 
it is through the individuation of cognition rather than through cognition 
alone that the individuation of those beings which are not subjects is grasped. 
Beings can be known through the cognition of the subject, but the 
manifestation' with transcendental phenomenality. Cf supra, Chapter 2. 
258 Cf. Simondon, 1995. 
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individuation of beings can be grasped only through the individuation of the 
subject's cognition" (Simondon, 1995, p. 34) 
Thus, the only to way to grasp pre-individual singularity, Simondon 
suggests, is through the pre-individual singularisation of thought. Simondon's 
philosophical quest to articulate the conditions for a thought of pre-individual 
being provides us with a useful (albeit tangential as far as Laruelle himself is 
concerned) way of delineating some of the novel conceptual possibilities 
opened up by non-phenomenological thought. The latter furnishes us with the 
relevant methodological apparatus required in order to effect the 
transfiguration of transcendental cognition demanded for the successful 
realization of the former. What the theoretical grasp of individuation as pre- 
individual ontological process demands is a suspension of phenomenological 
intuition, a dissolution of intentional correlation, and a dualysis of the 
hylomorphic synthesis of individual phenomenon and individuating 
phenomenality (insofar as it is the temporalising function of phenomenality 
which singularises or individuates the temporal phenomenon). The Laruellean 
apparatus effects the relevant transformation by discontinuing all vestiges of 
merely analogical equivalence or representational isomorphy between 
individuated cognition and individuated being, as well as all 
phenomenological correlation between individuated consciousness and 
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individuated phenomenon. This severance is to be effected through the 
medium of non-phenomenological cognition as articulation of unilateral 
duality rather than unitary synthesis between individuation and individuated. 
Thus, by way of contrast to the unitary intentional consistency of 
phenomenological adumbrations (Abschattung), this duality is effectuated in 
thought according to the radical inconsistency of the phenomenon `itself as 
an individual-without-individuation. And instead of phenomenologically 
presupposing the intuition or `perception' of the individuated phenomenon as 
encompassed within a unitary horizon of intentional adumbration, it is the 
phenomenological phenomenon as hylomorphic synthesis of individuated 
phenomenon and individuating phenomenality which is dualysed as a 
phenomenologically unencompassable unilateral duality, a dispersive 
singularity, in accordance with the phenomenon `itself as individual- 
without-individuation. Thus, the inconsistent transparency of the phenomenon 
`itself qua individual-without-individuation determines or dualyses 
individuated phenomena as identities-without-synthesis and dualities-without- 
difference. 
In this regard] let's consider once more the case of radical translation. 
In order to grasp the `Gavagai! ' occasioning occurrence without 
presupposing that the alien shares in our own familiar ostensive practises or 
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that it subscribes to our conventional criteria for individuation, we would 
have to become capable of accessing the `Gavagai! ' prompting event in its 
pre-individuated ontological heterogeneity. This would entail achieving some 
kind of cognitive access to the 
I 
-occurrence without presupposing a 
determinate individuating schema; in other words, accessing it as equally and 
simultaneously comprising rabbithood, rabbit-parts, rabbit-segments, and so 
on. Such a feat of cognitive redescription requires the effectuation of a non- 
intentional or non-unitary syntax -a unilateralising syntax or uni-tax- at the 
level of the non-phenomenological theory which takes the phenomenological 
hybridisation of individual and individuation as its empirical material, the 
better to extract from the latter the -occurrence's unilateralised or 
dispersive identity, its unidentity and unilaterality as phenomenon-in-itself: 
neither rabbit-object nor rabbit-segment nor rabbit-part, but the transcendental 
determinant, the non-individuated precondition, for these and all other rabbit- 
individuating schemas. Thus, the indivi-dualisation of non-phenomenological 
cognition in accordance with its cause (the individual-without-individuation) 
results in the de-individuation or dualysation of its empirical support (the 
rabbit-individuating schema) as unilateral duality of individuated 
phenomenon and individuating phenomenality. Non-phenomenological - 
LLIIi 
which is to say, non-materialist- theory grasps the ' --occurrence in 
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its non-thetic universality according to a mode of non-intuitive, or 
theoretically determined phenomenality, a phenomenality determined 
independently of any and every empirically determinate modality of 
perceptual intuition or phenomenological manifestation. 
Moreover, if the putatively invariant or pseudo-transcendental 
parameters of phenomenological individuation remain entirely arbitrary and 
contingent, and if there are as many possible modalities of immanent 
phenomenalisation as there are possible transcendental redescriptions of 
individuation, it is because the indivisible immanence of the phenomenon 
`itself -the radical hyle- remains commensurate with a radically 
heterogeneous and phenomenologically unencompassable manifold of 
potential modes of individuation. That is to say, any given schema for 
individuation, any given phenomenological hybrid of individuated 
phenomenon and individuating phenomenality, can be dualysed in accordance 
with the Identity of the phenomenon `itself qua individual-without- 
individuation in a. limitless variety of mutually incommensurable ways, 
leading to an unencompassable manifold of alternative modes of 
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individuation -which is to say, of entification and phenomenalisation- each of 
them identical-in-the-last-instance with the individual `itself 259. 
To understand this notion of a transcendental manifold of registers of 
phenomenalisation entails making sense of Laruelle's conception of an 
immanent but theoretically malleable manifold of basically in-consistent 
space-times. Unfortunately, however suggestive, Laruelle's indications in this 
regard are frustratingly sketchy260. Nevertheless, in light of the foregoing 
account, there are a few positive claims we can make concerning the nature of 
this malleable, inconsistent space-time within which the non-thetic or pre- 
individuated rabbit gaily capers and gambols. Given the immanence of the 
phenomenon 'itself, which is its cause-in-the-last-instance, and given the 
various phenomenological schemas of rabbit-individuation, which are its 
empirical support, a non-phenomenological modelling of `rabbithood' will 
strive to extract or clone a non-thetic xenotype from the thetic schematisations 
of the individuated rabbit-phenomenon which serve as its empirical support. 
The complex structure of this xenotype as transcendental clone spans its 
unidentity as radically immanent indivision and unilaterality as radically 
259Cf. supra, Chapter 6, pp. 312-314. It would be interesting to ask whether the status of this 
transcendental manifold of modalities of phenomenalisation is to be regarded as potentially or actually 
infinite. To the best of our knowledge, Laruelle himself leaves the issue unresolved. In this regard, 
some kind of dialogue between Laruellean non-philosophy and Cantorian set-theory seems necessary. 
The latter would prove a fascinating albeit profoundly difficult enterprise. 
260 See for instance the tantalising but inconclusive remarks in Laruelle, 1992, pp. 210-214. 
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transcendent division. Which is to say that the non-thetic or non- 
phenomenological essence of the rabbit `itself spans its radical immanence as 
individual-without-individuation and its radical transcendence as 
individuation-without-individual. Thus, the rabbit xenotype comprises the 
pre-individuated or non-consistent essence of the rabbit's immanent 
phenomenal identity as simultaneously 
Mwfy 
rabbithood, and so on. As a result, the -occurrence's non-thetic 
xenotype indexes its singular but pre-individuated nature as inconsistent 
Entity=x; a theoretically immanent but unobjectifiable phenomenal entity 
which has been subtracted from the retentional and protentional syntheses of 
temporal presentation, as well as from all intuitive forms of spatial presence. 
It is as coincidence of an identity-without-unity and a duality-without- 
difference, of a singular indivision and a universal division, that the 
-occurrence constitutes a dispersive singularity, neither 
homogeneous in space nor continuous through time. 
In Theory of Identities261, Laruelle characterises this theoretical 
reconfiguration of Decisionally circumscribed spatio-temporal phenomena in 
terms of a process of a priori fractalisation. The latter is to be understood in 
terms of the proliferation of inconsistent, discontinuous and mutually 
rabbit-part, rabbit-segment, 
261 Cf. Laruelle, 1992, Part II, pp. 133-232 
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incommensurable phenomenalisations of the `same' occasional phenomenon: 
its reiterated `irregularisation' as determined by a transcendentally homothetic 
invariant rupturing the spatio-temporal consistency in accordance with which 
intentional consciousness continuously reinscribes phenomena within the 
horizon of a potential phenomenological unity262. Yet paradoxically, it is the 
phenomenon `itself through its invariant but inconsistent non- 
phenomenological transparency, which conditions this fractalisation. 
Accordingly, insofar as the severing of the bond between entity and unity is 
inseparable from the theoretical effectuation of the phenomenon's 
inconsistency as fractalising a priori, it is the latter's non-phenomenological 
inconsistency which guarantees the transcendental equivalence or universal 
translatability263 of all these mutually incommensurable instances of spatio- 
temporal phenomenalisation. Thus, it is as a direct consequence of the 
dimension of universality proper to non-intuitive phenomenality insofar as it 
effectuates immanence's radically inconsistent univocity, that all Decisionally 
262 Cf. Laruelle, ibid, pp. 153- 232. 
263 The idea of non-philosophy as universal medium for the translation of all philosophical languages 
into one another is a recurrent theme in Philosophie III. In Principes de la Non-Philosophie, for 
instance, Laruelle writes: "It is thus through this theoretical usage, through this transcendental theory 
of private philosophical languages (these being at once general and total), and on the basis of this 
non-linguistic identity of language, that the problem ofphilosophical translation can be posed in terms 
of a translation of philosophical languages 'into' one another, which is to say, 'into-the-One-in-the- 
last-instance', rather than in terms of a translation between philosophies carried out under the 
ultimate authority of philosophy. Non philosophy is this translation of Kant 'into' Descartes, of 
Descartes 'into' Marx, of Marx 'into'Husserl, etc.; which is to say, under the condition of the vision-in- 
One as un-translatable Real. "(1996, p. 273) More recently, the topic of the non-philosophical 
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circumscribed spatio-temporal phenomena can be subjected to a process of 
theoretical fractalisation rendering them at once stringently individual and 
universally translatable. 
Consequently, and as we suggested earlier264, non-phenomenological 
theory could be said to function like a kind of transcendental prosthetic for 
conceptual cognition, emancipating it from the functional specificities of the 
human sensory apparatus and the constraints of empirical sensibility, the 
better to provide it with a rigorously theoretical mode of cognitive access to 
the authentically universal realm of pre-individual phenomena. Moreover, in 
providing this non-phenomenological amplification of cognition, a non- 
materialist axiomatic determined according to the radical hyle as Identity of 
the phenomenon `itself might be said to operate somewhat like a universal 
organon for radical translation, allowing creatures with otherwise utterly 
disparate sensory modalities and incommensurate individuation criteria to 
communicate via a cognitive vocabulary shorn of all contamination by 
empirically overdetermined conceptual schemes. Thus, the non- 
phenomenological `indivi-dualisation' of phenomenality through 
transcendental theory liberates the phenomenal target of cognition (e. g. the 
translation of philosophy has provided the theme for an unpublished conference paper entitled 
'Translated From the Philosophical'. Cf. Laruelle, 2001. 
264 Cf. supra, Chapter 6, pp. 305-308. 
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-occurrence) from its circumscription within the empirical ambit of 
a determinate set of basically anthropocognitive perceptual modalities. 
What then is a `non-rabbit'? 
It is the transcendental coincidence of an individual phenomenon that 
no longer presupposes an individuating logos, and an individuating matter 
that is no longer posited on the basis of an individuated concept. More 
precisely, it is the unilateral duality of an unobjectifiably immanent 
phenomenon, one that has not been posited by means of an individuating 
phenomenality, and a unobjectifiably transcendent phenomenality, one that 
has not been presupposed through an individuated phenomenon265. It is a 
xenotype: an unenvisageable, unfigurable yet radically immanent theoretical 
phenomenon. 
But what then is non-materialism that it is able to reconfigure the 
parameters of perception in so drastic a fashion as to allow for the 
apprehension of such phenomena? 
A transcendental adrenochrome266. 
265Thus, non-philosophy dualyses the phenomenological amphiboly of unobjectifiable immanence and 
unobjectifiable transcendence identified earlier. Cf. supra, Chapter 2, pp. 89-92. 
266'Adrenochrome': mythical hallucinogen, of reputedly terrifying potency, supposedly synthesized 
from the living body's pituitary gland. The aftermath of an adrenochrome binge is described in Hunter 
S. Thompson's Fear and Loathing in Las Vegas (London: Paladin, 1972): "The room looked like the 
site of some disastrous zoological experiment involving whiskey and gorillas. The ten foot mirror was 
shattered, but still hanging together -bad evidence of that afternoon when my attorney ran amok with 
the coconut hammer, smashing the mirror and all the lightbulbs [... ]The bathroom floor was about six- 
inches deep with soap bars, vomit, and grapefruit rinds [... ]crude pornographic photos, ripped out of 
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In the next Chapter, we will use Paul Churchland's eliminative 
materialism as the basis for further exploration of the hallucinatory 
ramifications of non-materialist thought; specifically, the way in which the 
philosophically unprecedented degree of phenomenological plasticity it 
allows ultimately engenders a transcendental chaos of epistemic possibility. 
magazines like Whores of Sweden and Orgies in the Casbah[... ] were plastered on the broken mirror 
with smears of mustard that had dried to a hard yellow crust... and all these signs of violence, these 
strange red and blue bulbs and shards of broken glass embedded in the wall plaster... No, these were 
not the hoofprints of your average god-fearing junkie. It was too savage, too aggressive. There was 
evidence in this room of excessive consumption of almost every type of drug known to civilized man 
since A. D. 1544. It could only be explained as a montage, a sort of exaggerated medical exhibit, put 
together very carefully to show what might happen if twenty-two serious drug felons -each with a 
different addiction- were penned up together in the same room for five days and nights without 
relief. "(pp. 167-172). 
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CHAPTER 8 
PHENOMENOLOGICAL PLASTICITY AND 
EPISTEMIC CHAOS 
"Our epistemic situation I assert, is one in which even the humblest 
judgement or assertion is always a speculative leap, not just in its assertion 
over its denial, but also in the background conceptual framework in which 
that judgement is constituted, in preference to the infinity of other conceptual 
frameworks that one might have used instead. " (Churchland, 1989, p. 278) 
The claim that there is no difference in kind between perceptual 
judgements and theoretical judgements plays a crucial role in Paul 
Churchland's eliminativist program. Bluntly put, Churchland's argument runs 
as follows: if one accepts the rigorously naturalistic conception of human 
beings as a particularly sophisticated species of information processing 
system267, and if there exists a univocal continuity, rather than a categorial 
divide, between so-called concrete perceptual immediacy and supposedly 
abstract conceptual mediation, then nothing precludes in principle the 
possibility that our basic perceptual capacities can be revised or transformed 
267Among the precursors for Churchland's unrepentantly naturalistic approach to human sapience are 
figures such as Quine (1960), Smart (1963), Wiener (1967) and Sayre (1976). For a summary of the 
Quinean approach, cf. supra, Chapter 7, pp. 334-349. 
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simply by reconfiguring the conceptual frameworks within which they are 
nested. In other words, there is nothing intrinsically natural or necessary about 
the world we perceive or the way in which we perceive it. Both are ultimately 
theoretical constructs. 
The critique of perceptual immediacy (or sense-certainty, as Hegel 
called it) is certainly nothing new in philosophy. Where Churchland differs 
from philosophers like Hegel, Wittgenstein, or even Quine (by whom he has 
certainly been influenced), is in rooting the mechanism of theoretical 
mediation firmly in the physical structure of the brain, rather than in self- 
consciousness or sets of discursive practises. According to Churchland's 
neurocomputational physicalism, it is the brain, not the mind, which 
represents the world. And insofar as the brain is just one part of the physical 
world representing another, there are no differences in kind between the 
neurological representer, the neurocomputational representation and the 
electrochemical input which is represented: all three are merely different 
moments in a homogeneous physical continuum of informational transfer. It 
is because of this uninterrupted material continuity that, for Churchland, the 
brain itself comes to figure as an abstract theoretical mediator, an essentially 
plastic locus of informational processing. But before examining Churchland's 
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arguments in favour of phenomenological plasticity in greater detail, we need 
to recapitulate the basic premises of the eliminativist program. 
Eliminativism and Folk Psychology 
Eliminativism is routinely dismissed as a particularly virulent, wildly 
implausible brand of rabidly neurocentric reductionism. But contrary to 
popular prejudice, Churchland's reductionism does not entail the claim that 
cognitive structures are neurologically hard-wired. The driving idea behind 
Churchland's eliminativism is quite the reverse: almost all of the brain's 
cognitive capacities are learnt, and next to none of them are hard-wired. 
However, Churchland's is not a Humean `blank-slate' epistemological 
empiricism, for he readily acknowledges the existence of certain high-level 
epistemic invariants or neurocomputational metastructures ('ampliative 
coding layers' as he calls them) conditioning the information processing 
function; metastructural invariants whose functioning could be characterised 
as a priori relative to the low-level input data they serve to structure and 
synthesize268. Such high-level neurocomputational a prioris remain a 
prerequisite for sophisticated cognition. 
268`For many reason then, this [Churchland's `Parallel Distributed Processing' or `connectionist' 
model of cognition-RB]is not a Humean concept empiricism. According to Humean empiricism, we are 
forever tied to immediately given peripheral sensory simples. According to connectionism, by contrast, 
the whole point of a hierarchy of ampliative coding layers is precisely to transcend the limitations of 
our peripheral sensory coding. It is to try to `look past' the teeming noise and perspectival 
idiosyncrasy of one's peripheral sensory input representations to the more stable and more predictive 
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Nevertheless, although so deeply embedded within the brain's 
neurological configuration as to count as nominal invariants, even these 
neurocomputational a prioris are acquired rather than innate. Which is to say 
that they have been gradually inculcated during the formative stages of the 
organism's development by virtue of its continuous immersion in a vast 
sociolinguisitic habitus; a conceptual habitus which has in turn been shaped 
over long stretches of socio-cultural evolution. Like Quine then269. 
Churchland maintains that there is merely a difference in degree rather than in 
kind between a priori and a posteriori, or between the abstract, metastructural 
invariants that condition the structures of information processing, and the 
structured or processed data themselves. And as a result, for Churchland, 
even those epistemic structures that seem most neurologically ingrained are 
the result of a complex process of exogenous conditioning exercised by a 
bewildering variety of factors and influences extending well beyond narrowly 
neurophysiological limits. These factors include fluctuating environmental 
forms' that lie beyond the mercurial sensory surface, stable forms that are always only partially and 
imperfectly reflected within that sensory surface, universal forms that might be differently but quite 
successfully reflected in a variety of alternative sensory manifolds[... ]I agree with Plato that seeing 
past the ephemeral is the first goal of learning, and I agree further that it is precisely the `abstract 
forms' that allow us to make any sense of the relentless flux of the ephemeral. The principal difference 
between me and Plato concerns the location of those forms (they are inside the head) and their genesis 
within us: they are gradually sculpted de novo, by a deeply sublinguistic process, in the course of 
extended interactions with the environment. "(P. M. Churchland, 1996, pp. 281-282) 
269Cf. supra, Chapter 7, pp. 334-339. 
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conditions, changing socio-historical custom, and accelerating technological 
evolution. 
Accordingly, if the brain is a neurocomputer, Churchland maintains, 
then it is a flexible, massively parallel distributed processor, rather than the 
kind of chronically inflexible serial processor privileged by classical Al. The 
model of the brain favoured by Churchland is that of a complex, non-linear 
system; a neurological network capable of spontaneous self-regulation by 
tuning into new patterns of sophisticated cognitive discrimination without the 
benefit of prior programming; radically reconfiguring its own cognitive 
parameters in order to adapt to new input and unexpected circumstances. It is 
this capacity for spontaneous readjustment in the face of the unanticipated and 
the unforeseen which endows the human brain with its high degree of 
functional plasticity. Moreover, Churchland suggests, the brain's remarkable 
capacity for cognitive plasticity tends to be overlooked by philosophers who 
mistake neurocomputational expediency for neurological necessity, thereby 
severely underestimating the extent to which many of what are assumed to be 
basic features of consciousness are in fact a function of determinate varieties 
of neurocomputational processing; processes which -once again- have 
themselves been learnt. Thus, if consciousness is a neurocomputational 
phenomenon, then what philosophers take to be its necessary conditions, 
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constitutive features, or invariable characteristics, may in fact be entirely 
contingent properties, representing little more than a tiny fraction of the 
range of cognitive possibilities available to the human brain. 
Accordingly, if there are no invariable phenomenological facts about 
the world, Churchland continues, it's because underlying all such facts are 
just varying neurocomputational encodings of electrochemical information. 
This is the point at which Churchland most emphatically rejects the notion 
that natural language possesses any kind of uncircumventable epistemological 
status. Not only are linguistic structures not hard-wired in the brain270, 
language itself is neither a constitutive nor even a basic feature of human 
cognition. Language as a medium for social intercourse has engendered a 
theory in terms of which humans understand themselves and the world around 
them. That theory is folk psychology271. As a theory, folk psychology 
operates by quantifying over272 propositional attitudes such as beliefs, desires, 
intentions, fears, hopes, wishes, etc. Moreover, Churchland argues, following 
Sellars273, not only did the theory's longstanding practical success as a social 
instrument for publicly predicting and explaining communal human 
behaviour precede its adoption in subjective self-description, thereby 
270Pace Chomsky and the Chomskyan brand of cognitivism championed by Fodor, Lepore, and others. 
271For a canonical expression of Churchland's view of folk-psychology cf. 
`Folk Psychology' in 
P. M. Churchland & P. S. Churchland, 1998, pp. 3-15. 
272 Cf. supra, Chapter 7, p. 343. 
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conditioning its now automatic use in first-person introspection; it is this 
universal adoption of folk psychological discourse in subjective reports 
which, more than any other factor, has subsequently and illegitimately 
endowed it with, a quasi-sacrosanct status, lending it an aura of incorrigible 
authenticity which obscures its theoretical status and entirely conventional 
origin: "a spontaneous introspective judgement is just an instance of an 
acquired habit of conceptual response to one's own internal states, and the 
integrity of any particular response is always contingent on the integrity of 
the acquired conceptual framework (theory) in which the response is framed. 
Accordingly, one's own introspective certainty that one's mind is the seat of 
beliefs and desires may be as badly misplaced as was the classical man's 
visual certainty that the stagy flecked sphere of the heavens turns dail " Y. 
(Churchland, 1989, p. 3) 
As a result of folk psychology's socio-cultural institutionalisation, the 
panoply of beliefs, desires, intentions, fears, hopes, wishes, etc., laid claim to 
in introspective judgement, have -along with all the other phenomenological 
entities mobilized in folk psychological discourse- taken on an inviolable aura 
of subjective and objective reality, in a manner similar to that once claimed 
on behalf of the flatness of the earth. Nevertheless, Churchland suggests, it 
273 Cf. Sellars, 1997. 
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may be that conscious beings are the least well placed to understand 
consciousness, that they have least access to information about the 
theoretically structured processes underlying perceptual immediacy; much in 
the same way in which, prior to the invention of the telescope, inhabitants of 
the earth's surface were the least well placed to appreciate either the true 
character of the earth's shape or the reality of astronomical motions. 
Consequently, Churchland argues, there are perfectly good scientific grounds 
for insisting that, just as the earth is not flat, denizens of folk psychological 
discourse such as beliefs, desires, intentions, etc., may not actually exist, and 
that as a result, folk psychology is an entirely false theory, and hence ripe for 
elimination. 274 
A crucial nuance in Churchland's eliminativist argument needs to be 
underlined here. Churchland does not deny privileged introspective access per 
se; he does not deny that our minds seem to be the seat of beliefs, desires, and 
intentions, or the authenticity of our phenomenological experience when we 
lay claim to experiencing fears, hopes, wishes, etc. Churchland is 
emphatically not a philosophical behaviourist in the way in which perhaps 
274Churchland cites three basic reasons for the elimination of folk-psychology: 1. the significant 
number of phenomena for which folk psychological theory is incapable of providing either a coherent 
explanation or successful prediction (brain damage, mental illness, scientific discovery, artistic 
creativity); 2. its theoretical stagnation, its failure to evolve, develop, or change in accordance with the 
rapidly accelerating rate of cultural evolution; 3. its increasingly isolated and anomalous character vis a 
vis the corpus of the natural sciences, its conceptual irreducibility to the emerging discourse of 
cognitive neuroscience. 
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Quine is. What he does deny however is the putatively pre-theoretical 
immediacy attributed to such phenomenological experiences and to the 
introspective j udgemenis associated with them. In other words, it is not 
phenomenological seeming which he questions, but the reliability of that 
seeming as an evidential guide for gauging the actual cognitive processes 
through which that seeming is produced. Consequently, Churchland wishes to 
drive a critical wedge between the legitimate incorrigibility of 
phenomenological experience qua authentic seeming, and the pseudo- 
incorrigibility of the folk psychological trappings used in the theoretical 
articulation and description of those processes through which that 
phenomenological seeming is produced. The eliminativist's contention is that 
folk psychology's cultural enshrinement, its unrivalled social investiture as 
the privileged descriptive medium used for accounts of human sapience has 
resulted in mistaking an artificial theoretical construct for an intrinsically 
necessary feature of all possible phenomenological experience. By explicitly 
underlining the theoretical character of folk psychological discourse as a 
socially enforced construct, eliminativism seeks to undermine both the 
assumption that the linguistic infrastructure of folk psychological theory has a 
proprietary entitlement to characterisations of consciousness; and that it is the 
only possible medium for phenomenological description: "Our self- 
383 
understanding, I continue to maintain, is no different in character from our 
understanding of any other empirical domain. It is speculative, systematic, 
corrigible, and in principle replaceable. It is just not so specifically linguistic 
as we have chronically assumed. "(Churchland, ibid., p. 112) 
Neurocomputational Plasticity 
Thus, Churchland proposes to replace the dominant folk psychological 
theory of sapience, according to which consciousness is seen as an 
intrinsically linguistic medium structured through the `sentential dance' of 
propositional attitudes, with a new theoretical model drawing on the 
resources of connectionist neuroscience, in which cognition is understood in 
terms of resolutely non-linguistic patterns of neuronal vector activation275 
According to this new paradigm, the internal kinematics of cognition find 
expression in activation patterns across populations of neurons, rather than in 
sententially articulated propositional attitudes, while the dynamics of 
cognition reside in vector-to-vector transformations driven by learned 
configurations of synaptic connection, rather than in deductive inferences 
governed by relations of logical entailment from one sentential structure to 
another. So while the brain's basic unit of representation is the activation 
275For a useful precis of the vector activation paradigm in neuroscience cf. particularly pp. 41-42 in 
Paul Churchland's, `Activation Vectors vs. Propositional Attitudes: How the brain represents reality' in 
P. M. Churchland & P. S. Churchland, 1998, pp. 39-44, 
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vector, its fundamental computational operation is the vector-to-vector 
transformation, as performed on those configurations of neuronal activation. 
Crucially, according to this paradigm, a `theory' is no longer to be 
understood as a linguaformal system of propositional attitudes connected to 
one another by relations of logical entailment. It is no longer a linguistically 
encoded structure of beliefs that `such and such is the case' or judgements 
that `if x then y' articulated within the sentential parameters of propositional 
attitude ascription. A `theory' is now a network or brain's specific 
neurocomputational configuration in vector activation space. More precisely, 
it is a determinate partitioning of a brain's vector activation space into a 
manifold of protoLypicai divisions and sub-divisions relative to typically 
reiterated inputs. Interestingly, according to this neurocomputational 
reduction of theoretical cognition, the presumption that there exists a 
significant difference in kind between an individual concept and a theory 
must be abandoned: both are just prototypical partitions of vector space 
endowed with a greater (theory) or lesser (concept) degree of substructural 
complexity276. 
Consequently, Churchland continues, the sheer quantity of distinct 
concepts/theories that the human brain is capable of embodying according 
to 
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this neurocomputational paradigm will be gargantuan: "If we assume that the 
human brain is a multilayered network of interconnected units, we can 
uniquely specify its current position in conceptual space by specifying the 
individual strengths or weights of its myriad synaptic connections[ .. 
]That 
configuration of weights can be directly represented by a specific point in a 
multidimensional space, a space with a distinct axis in each of the brain's 
1014 synaptic connections[. .. ]For a human brain, therefore, this `weight 
space', as it is called, will have fully 1014 dimensions with at least 10 possible 
positions along each. Its volume is almost unimaginably vast -at least 101014 
functionally distinct positions [i. e. 10 to the power of 100,000,000,000,000 
distinct concepts/theories-RB]" (Churchland, ibid., 1989, pp. 231-232)277 
However, it is important not to conflate weight space with vector 
space. While the weight configuration uniquely determines the partitioning of 
276"This account does put single concepts and entire theories on the same footing: a theory is just a 
highly structured prototype"(P. M. Churchland, 1998, p. 283) 
277Interestingly, this suggestion is made purely on the basis of empirical fact. For the `unimaginably 
vast' space of conceptual possibility referred to above is defined by Churchland in conformity with the 
physical structure of the brain and on the basis of the range of individually specifiable synaptic 
configurations -i. e. distinct patterns of neuronal vector activation or individual representations- 
available within the finite parameters of human neurophysiology. So while it is certainly true that there 
may be some fundamental physical constraints delimiting the range of possible perceptual experience 
for humans, nevertheless, Churchland insists, even within the bounds of those physical limitations 
constraining the manner in which the human organism is able to process information (e. g. the ear's 
limited auditory range, the eye's limited capacity for registering electromagnetic radiation, etc. ), that 
vast space of as yet unexplored conceptual possibility obtains. Moreover, further augmenting this 
already huge space of possibility is the fact that human sensory modalities have and will continue to 
undergo profound physical modification and amplification as a result of technological intervention. 
Thus, even those basic constraints which organic structure imposes upon our processing of physical 
information are neither definitive nor irrevocable. 
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vector space, only the latter, Churchland reminds us, is to be identified with 
the theory or conceptual scheme in terms of which the brain represents the 
world: "People react to the world in similar ways not because their 
underlying weight configurations are closely similar on a synapse-by-synapse 
comparison, but because their activation spaces are similarly partitioned. 
Like trees similar in their gross physical profile, brains can be similar in their 
gross functional profiles while being highly idiosyncratic in the myriad 
details of their fine grained arborisation"(Churchland, 1989, p. 234). Thus, it 
is by acquiring a determinate configuration in synaptic weight space that a 
brain comes to achieve a specific prototypical partitioning of its vector 
activation space. And it is this partitioning of vector space, rather than that 
configuration of synaptic weights, which is the neurocomputational index for 
the theory in terms of which the brain represents the physical world. 
Moreover, since, for Churchland, a theory simply is a specific 
partitioning of vector activation space, and since all incoming sensory stimuli 
are afferently processed through a specific configuration of vector coding, 
there can be no difference in kind between the perceptual processing of 
sensory information going on at the physical boundaries of the organism via 
the nervous system's afferent nerve endings, and the conceptual processing of 
symbolically encoded information going on in the depths of the cerebral 
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cortex via the same nervous system's `higher' cognitive functions. Perception 
and conception are neurocomputationally continuous; which is to say that 
they run seamlessly into one another, conjoined through the univocal 
informational continuum linking electro -chemical stimuli to 
neurocomputational processing278. 
But if sensory perception is on a par with theoretical conception, it 
follows that the parameters of perceptual sensitivity will be supervenient on 
the discriminatory prowesses of our neurologically embodied theoretical 
frameworks279. Consequently, not only is all observation theory-laden; it is 
constitutively theoretical; so much so that a change of neurocomputational 
theory transfigures the parameters of our perceptual capacities along with 
those of our cognitive frameworks. Thus, Churchland maintains, we can 
change what we perceive by changing the theoretical framework -i. e. the 
prototypical partitioning of our vector activation space- that determines the 
manner in which our nervous systems process perceptual information; such 
as, for instance, whether it individuates on the basis of rabbits or undetached 
278"The 
only place in the network where the weights need play no role is at the absolute sensory 
periphery of the system, where the external stimulus is transduced into a coded input vector for 
subsequent delivery to the transforming layers of weights. However, at the first occasion on which 
these preconceptual states have any effect at all on the downstream cognitive system, it is through a 
changeable configuration of synaptic weights, a configuration that produces one set of partitions on 
the activation-vector space of the relevant layers of neurons, one set out of millions of alternative 
possible sets. In other words, the very first thing that happens to the input signal is that it gets 
conceptualised in one of many different possible ways. " (Churchland, 1989, p. 189). 
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rabbit-parts280. In other words, as far as Churchland is concerned. 
phenomenology is a function of neurophysiology. 
Accordingly, concomitant with the brain's almost inconceivable 
neurocomputational density is an extreme phenomenological plasticity. Just 
as the domain of cognitive possibility is no longer coextensive with the 
narrowly linguaformal ambit of sentential structure and propositional form, 
the realm of phenomenological possibility is no longer necessarily fixed once 
and for all in conformity with the morphological specificities of the organism. 
Thus, contra Fodor, Churchland insists that perceptual processing is not 
physiologically encapsulated, which is to say, immutably specified and 
insulated from theoretical penetration281. Apparently incommensurable 
perceptual modalities can be made to function as an analogue of the other: the 
physiological modalities of perception are neurocomputationally continuous; 
that is, fluid and endlessly transformable: "In recent centuries most humans 
have learnt to perceive speech not just auditorally but visually: we have 
learned to read. And some have learned to perceive speech by touch. they 
read Braille. And some of us have learned not just to hear music, but to see it., 
we have learned to sight read musical notation. Now, neither the eyes nor the 
279 Specifically, on the range and degree of fine-grained perceptual discrimination that the brain 
is 
capable of effecting in conformity with the prototypical partitioning of its vector activation space. 
280 Cf. supra, Chapter 7, pp. 340-348. 
281 Cf. Churchland, 1989, pp. 255-279. 
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fingers were evolved for the instantaneous perception of those complex 
structures and organizations originally found in auditory phenomena, but 
their acquired mastery here illustrates the highly sophisticated and decidedly 
supernormal capacities that learning can produce in them. And if these 
capacities, why not others? "(Ibid, p. 265)282 
Accordingly, not only does the neurocomputational perspective lead to 
an appreciation of the constitutively theoretical character of perceptual 
immediacy and insight into those neurocomputational processes through 
which phenomenological `seeming' is produced. It also describes the ways in 
which perceptual `seeming' can be theoretically manipulated through 
neurocomputational intervention, and thus how, by amplifying the human 
organism's perceptual capacities via technological prostheses, the parameters 
of our phenomenological seeming can be reconfigured so that we become 
phenomenological mutants or perceptual aliens: "we begin to become such 
mutants or aliens [... J when we change our sensory modalities by augmenting 
them with unusual instruments, such as phase-contrast microscopes, deep-sky 
telescopes, long-baseline stereoscopes, infrared scopes, and so forth. And the 
282 Churchland's thesis of `diachronic interpenetration' between perceptual modalities could be seen as 
an empirical analogue for what Deleuze in Difference and Repetition called the `transcendental' or 
`discordant' use of the faculties: "The transcendental operation of the faculties is a properly 
paradoxical operation, opposed to their exercise under the rule of a common sense. In consequence, 
the harmony between the faculties can appear only in the form of a discordant harmony, since each 
communicates to the other only the violence which confronts it with its own difference and 
its 
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metamorphosis is complete when, after years of professional practise, we 
learn to see the world appropriately and efficiently with these new senses. 
This learning requires both that we suppress certain habits of processing 
`natural ' to the naked eye and to the familiar world of middle-sized material 
objects, and that we learn to process the retinal data in novel ways, ways that 
are appropriate to the unfamiliar features one perceives by these novel means 
(e. g. interference patterns, diffraction rings, dark nebulae, fusion planes, 
temperature gradients, etc. ). "(Ibid., p. 259) 
Vector Coding: From Superempirical Virtue to 
Transcendental A Priori 
Nevertheless, in spite of appearances, a transcendental dimension is 
also operative in Churchland's seemingly wholly empirical or naturalistic 
modus operandi. To understand how this is the case, it is necessary to 
appreciate the two-tiered relation between Churchland's vector activation 
paradigm and the linguaformal or folk psychological accounts it is intended to 
displace. On the one hand, : hurchland explicitly or empirically posits the 
explanatory excellence of the vector activation model on the grounds of what 
he calls its `superempirical virtues' (conceptual simplicity, explanatory unity, 
divergence from the others[... ]There is therefore something which is communicated from one 
faculty to 
the other but it is metamorphosed and does not form a common sense. "(Deleuze, 1994, pp. 
145-146). 
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theoretical cohesiveness). On the other, that excellence is implicitly or 
metaphysically presupposed as though its function were that of a 
transcendental a priori. 
Thus, although Churchland's PDP (parallel distributed processing) 
model of cognition remains explicitly representational -with propositional 
attitudes being supplanted by activation vectors- it is one wherein 
representation no longer operates under the normative aegis of truth-as- 
correspondence. In lieu of truth, Churchland proposes to discriminate between 
theories on the basis of what he calls the `super-empirical' virtues of 
ontological simplicity, conceptual coherence, and explanatory power: "As I 
see it then, values such as ontological simplicity, coherence and explanatory 
power are among the brain's most basic criteria for recognizing information, 
for distinguishing information from noise"(Ibid., p. 147)283. But as a result, 
Churchland is obliged to ascribe degrees of neurocomputational adequation 
between representation and represented without reintroducing a substantive 
difference between true and false kinds of representation. For by 
Churchland's own lights, there are no substantive, which is to say, 
283 "Ceteris paribus, an activated prototype [i. e. an explanation] is better if it is part of the most unified 
conceptual configuration[... ]networks that have formed the simplest or most unified partitions across 
their activation space are networks that do much better at generalising their knowledge to novel cases. 
Very briefly, they do better at recognising novel situations for what they are because they have 
generated a relevantly unified similarity gradient that will catch novel cases in the same subvolume 
that catches the training case. "(P. M. Churchland, 1998, p. 286) 
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ontological, differences between theories: all theories, including folk 
psychology, consist in a specific partitioning of a brain's vector activation 
space284. Yet there is a noticeable tension between Churchland's insistence 
that theories are to be discriminated between solely on the basis of differences 
in degree of superempirical virtue, rather than in representational kind, and 
his conviction that the PDP paradigm which reveals this underlying 
neurocomputational univocity common to all representations exhibits such an 
elevated degree of superiority vis a vis folk psychology in the realm of 
superempirical virtue as to necessitate the latter's elimination. As a result, the 
case for eliminativism oscillates between the claim that it is entirely a matter 
of empirical expediency285, and the argument that seem to point to the a priori 
necessity of eliminating folk psychology by invoking the PDP paradigm's 
intrinsically metaphysical superiority. It is this tension between 
eliminativism's avowals of empirical humility and its unavowable 
metaphysical presumptions, which we now propose to examine in greater 
detail. 
284 "FP [folk-psychology], like any other theory, is a family of learned vectorial prototypes, prototypes 
that sustain recognition of current reality, anticipation of future reality, and manipulation 
of ongoing 
reality" (P. M. Churchland, 1998, p. 15) 
285 "Whether FP [folk-psychology]is false and whether it will fail to reduce are empirical 
issues 
whose decisive settlement must flow from experimental research and theoretical 
development, not from 
any arguments a priori" (P. M. Churchland, 1998, p. 10) 
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Thus, on the one hand, since such `folk-semantical' notions as those of 
`truth' and `reference'286 no longer function as guarantors of adequation 
between `representation' and `reality', as they did in the predominantly folk 
psychological or linguaformal acceptation of theoretical adequation -which 
sees the latter as consisting in a set of word-world correspondences-, there is 
an important sense in which all theoretical paradigms are 
neurocomputationally equal. They are equal insofar as there is nothing in a 
configuration of synaptic weights or a partitioning of vector space per se 
which could serve to explain why one theory is `better' than another. All are 
to be gauged exclusively in terms of what Churchland calls their 
superempirical virtues; viz. according to the greater or lesser degree of 
efficiency with which they enable the organism to adapt successfully to its 
environment. 
In other words, if all `theories' are instances of vector activation, and 
if the vector activation paradigm -to which all other theoretical paradigms 
reduce according to Churchland- dispenses with the notion of theoretical 
`truth', then we are obliged to stipulate that theories be judged 
286 "[... ]the folk-semantical notion of 'reference' is without any real integrity. Reference is uniquely 
fixed neither by networks of belief, nor by causal relations, nor by anything else, because there 
is no 
single uniform relation that connects each descriptive term to the world in anything 
like the fashion 
that common sense supposes" (Churchland, 1989, pp. 276-277) 
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pragmatically287 in terms of the greater or lesser degree of adaptational 
efficiency with which they enable the organism to flourish. Thus, Churchland 
is perfectly explicit in explaining why he considers the vector activation 
paradigm of cognition to be `better' than its folk psychological rivals, and his 
neurocomputational pragmatism proposes a perfectly precise formula for 
gauging theoretical excellence. Global excellence of theory is measured by 
straightforwardly pragmatic virtues: maximal explanatory cohesiveness vis a 
vis maximal empirical heterogeneity purchased with minimal conceptual 
expenditure. One theory is `better' than another when it affords greater 
theoretical cohesiveness along with greater explanatory unity whilst using 
fewer conceptual means to synthesize a wider assortment of data. 
But the trouble for Churchland is that it remains deeply unclear in 
precisely what way the extent of an organism's adaptational efficiency, as 
revealed by the 
degree to which its representation of the world exhibits the 
superempirical virtues of simplicity, unity, and coherence, could ever be `read 
off its brain's neurocomputational microstructure. In what sense precisely are 
theoretical virtues such as simplicity, unity, and coherence necessarily 
287"[... ]if we are to reconsider truth as the aim or product of cognitive activity, I think we must 
reconsider its applicability right across the board[... ]That is, if we are to move away from the more 
naive formulations of scientific realism, we should move in the direction of pragmatism rather than 
positivistic instrumentalism[... Jit is far from obvious that truth is either the primary or the principal 
product of [cognitive] activity. Rather, its function would appear to be the ever more finely tuned 
administration of the organism's behaviour. " (Ibid., p. 149-150). 
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concomitant at the neurological level with an organism's reproductively 
advantageous behaviour? Churchland simply states that the aforementioned 
virtues are already a constitutive feature of the brain's functional architecture 
without offering anything in the way of argument regarding how and why it is 
that a neural network's learned configuration in synaptic weight space is 
constrained as a matter of neurocomputational necessity by the imperatives of 
unity, cohesion and simplicity288. Perhaps Churchland's reticence in this 
regard is a matter of caution. For in order to make a case for the 
neurocomputational necessity of superempirical virtue, Churchland would 
need to demonstrate that the latter are indeed strictly information theoretic 
constraints intrinsic to the vector coding process, as opposed to extrinsic 
regulatory considerations contingently imposed on the network in the course 
of its ongoing interaction with the environment. However, in pursuing this 
particular line of argument, Churchland immediately finds himself 
confronted with a choice between two peculiarly unappealing alternatives. 
The first alternative follows inescapably from the fact that, by 
Churchland's own admission, the process of informational transduction via 
which the brain processes incoming stimuli is physically demarcated by the 
288Indeed, Churchland frequently adduces empirical data that would seem to imply the opposite: viz. 
his discussion of the ways in which a network can stop learning by becoming trapped within a merely 
local minimum in its global error gradient. Cf. Churchland, 1989, pp. 192-194 
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boundaries of the organism289. Beyond those boundaries lies `information-in- 
itself . Thus, if Churchland tries to integrate the superempirical virtues into 
the neurocomputational process by pushing the brain's vector coding activity 
out beyond the physical boundaries of the organism so that they become 
constitutive features of the world, he is forced into the uncomfortable position 
of having to claim that the physical world is neurocomputationally 
constituted. The result is a neurocomputational transcendentalism: the brain 
represents the world but cannot be conditioned by the world in return because 
the latter will `always already' have been neurocomputationally represented. 
We end up with a thoroughgoing neurocomputational idealism whereby the 
brain constitutes the physical world without it being possible to explain either 
how the brain comes to be part of the world, or even indeed how the world 
could have originally produced the brain. 
Alternatively, instead of trying to achieve a neurocomputational 
reduction of the superempirical virtues by projecting the brain's vector coding 
activity out onto the environing world, Churchland can abjure the notion of an 
absolute physical boundary between information-in-itself and as already 
coded by the brain's prototypical vector partitions in order to allow the 
physical world to reach `into' the brain, thereby allowing a pre-constituted 
289 Cf. supra, footnote 278, p. 387. 
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physical reality to play an intrinsic role in neurological activity. But in 
widening the focus of his epistemological vision in this way, Churchland will 
be obliged to abandon the representationalist dualism of brain and world and 
to forsake his deliberately neurocentric perspective in order to adopt a more 
global or meta-neurological -which is to say, meta-physical- vision of 
materialism; one in which `materiality' is endowed with a far greater degree 
of abstract, substrate independent functional univocity. Clearly however, with 
the shift to a non-representationalist materialism and the abstract, functional 
definition of `matter' as that which is capable of encompassing a 
heterogeneous variety of incommensurable physical processes, the categorical 
distinction between processor and processed, network and world, becomes 
entirely redundant. Since this is the very distinction that lies at the heart of 
Churchland's commitment to neurological reductionism, and the one that 
underwrites all his arguments for eliminativism, we cannot expect Churchland 
to find this second alternative any more appealing than the first. 
Thus, Churchland cannot effect a neurocomputational reduction of 
superempirical virtue without engendering a neurological idealism, and he 
cannot reintegrate the neurocomputational brain into the wider realm of 
superempirical virtue without abandoning eliminativism altogether. 
Nevertheless, let us, for the sake of argument, put the former of these two 
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difficulties aside for the moment and suppose that Churchland were to 
manage a successful but non-idealising neurocomputational reduction of 
superempirical virtue. The trouble then is that in arguing that simplicity, unity 
and coherence are constitutive functional features of the brain's 
neuroanatomy, Churchland is but one slippery step away from claiming that 
brains represent the world correctly as a matter of evolutionary necessity; i. e. 
that they necessarily have `true' representations. Unfortunately, this is 
precisely the sort of claim that Churchland had sworn to abjure: "Natural 
selection does not care whether a brain has or tends towards true beliefs, so 
long as the organism reliably exhibits reproductively advantageous 
behaviour"(Churchland, 1989, p. 150) 
Consequently, everything hinges on whether the superempirical 
virtues are a precondition or a by-product of the organism's reproductively 
advantageous behaviour. Churchland implies the former, on the basis of what 
appears to be a latent brand of neurocomputational idealism, whereas all 
available empirical (i. e. evolutionary) evidence290 seems to point to the 
latter, 
and hence towards a less neurocentric, less stridently representationalist 
version of materialism. From the perspective of the latter, that successful 
networks do indeed tend to exhibit these superempirical characteristics as a 
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matter of empirical fact is uncontroversial; but it is a fact about cognitive 
ethology, which is to say, a fact which makes sense only within the 
macrophysical purview of evolutionary biology and in the context of the 
relation between organism and environment; rather than a fact obtaining 
within the microphysical or purely information theoretic ambit of the brain's 
neurocomputatio nal anatomy. That the macrophysical fact has a 
microphysical analogue, that the ethological imperative is neurologically 
encoded, is precisely what we might expect having suspended the premise of 
an absolute representational cleavage between the micro- and macro-physical 
dimensions, and accepted the extent to which these must remain not only 
physically conterminous, but bound together by reciprocal presupposition. 
Thus, considered by itself, the neurocomputational encoding of 
superempirical virtue is not enough to vindicate Churchland. For 
Churchland's account is predicated on the idealist premise that 
neurocomputational representation is the necessary precondition for 
adaptational success, that neurocomputational function determines-in-the-last- 
instance evolutionary ethology, whereas it seems to be adaptation which 
grounds representational efficacy. Consequently, and in the absence of some 
non question-begging account as to how macrophysical facts pertaining to 
290Monod, 1974; Kauffman, 1993,1995; and Dennett, 1995, all provide instances of such supporting 
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evolutionary ethology are ultimately supervenient on microphysical facts 
about the brain's functional neuroanatomy, it seems that the superempirical 
virtues Churchland invokes in order to discriminate between theories must 
remain extra-neurological characteristics; characteristics which reveal 
themselves only in the course of an ethological analysis of the organism's 
cognitive behaviour within the world, rather than via a neurological analysis 
of the brain's microstructure. 
Accordingly, the tension between eliminativism's avowals of 
empirical humility and its latent metaphysical pretensions reveals itself when 
it becomes apparent that the pragmatic or superempirical virtues in terms of 
which Churchland proposes to discriminate between theories cannot be 
accounted for exclusively in neurocomputational terms. They seem to exceed 
the neurocentric remit of the neurocomputational economy. And it is in trying 
to accommodate them that Churchland begins unwittingly to drift away from 
the rigidly empirical premises that provide the naturalistic rationale for 
eliminativism towards a metaphysical stance wherein the vector coding 
paradigm begins to take on all the characteristics of a transcendental a priori. 
As a result, the tenor of the argument for the elimination of folk psychology 
shifts from that of empirical assessment to that of metaphysical imperative. 
evidence. On the whole, we take the claim that adaptation grounds representational efficacy, and not 
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For presumably, were Churchland correct in maintaining that the 
superempirical virtues of ontological simplicity, conceptual coherence, and 
explanatory power are, as he puts it, "among the brain 's most basic criteria 
for recognizing information, for distinguishing information from noise", then 
a conceptual framework as baroque, as incoherent and as obfuscatory as folk 
psychology is supposed to be would have been eliminated as a matter of 
evolutionary routine, and Churchland would be spared the trouble of 
militating so brilliantly for its displacement. If superempirical virtues were 
already endogenously specified and intrinsic to the brain's 
neurocomputational microstructure, then it would presumably be a matter of 
neurophysiological impossibility for an organism to embody any theory 
wholly lacking in these virtues. Paradoxically, it is the eliminativist's 
supposition that the former are intrinsically encoded in the brain's cognitive 
microstructure that ends up considerably narrowing the extent for the degree 
of superempirical distinction between theories and ultimately undermining the 
strength of the case against folk psychology. Thus, although Churchland's 
trenchant critique of philosophies which insist on transcendentalising folk 
psychology as an epistemological sine qua non strikes us as entirely 
admirable, we fear that, whatever else is wrong with it, folk psychology 
the reverse, to be reasonably uncontroversial. 
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cannot be as chronically deficient in the superempirical virtues as Churchland 
requires in order to render the argument for its elimination incontrovertible; 
certainly not deficient enough to explain why eliminativism insists on 
ascribing such a dramatic degree of superempirical superiority to the vector 
activation paradigm. 
Thus, even as it continues to insist that all theories are 
neurocomputationally equal inasmuch as all display greater or lesser degrees 
of superempirical distinction, eliminativism insinuates that the vector coding 
paradigm is nevertheless more equal, more pragmatic, more superempirically 
virtuous than all previous folk psychological paradigms of cognition. What 
underlies this claim to radical superiority? Given that Churchland seems to 
accept Quine's thesis that theories are underdetermined by empirical 
evidence291, the superiority of the vector activation paradigm cannot be held 
to reside in any precisely quantifiable increase in the efficiency with which it 
enables the human organism to process information. For according to 
Churchland, there can be no absolute -which is to say, theory neutral- measure 
of superiority when we compare the degree of adaptational efficiency 
bestowed upon organisms by the theories they incorporate. By transforming 
the data it purports to explain, every theory moves the empirical goalposts as 
291Cf. for example Churchland, 1989, pp. 139-151. 
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far as adaptational efficiency is concerned292. Thus, it is perfectly possible to 
envisage the possibility of `subtler', or more `refined' versions of folk 
psychological theory endowing organisms with all the additional 
discriminatory capacities, conceptual enhancements and explanatory 
advantages of the PDP paradigm favoured by Churchland293. 
But if this is this case, it suggests that, for Churchland, the putative 
superiority of the vector activation paradigm is `meta-empirical' in a sense 
which is more than pragmatic and quite irreducible to those super-empirical 
virtues in terms of which Churchland discerns theoretical excellence: a sense 
which is transcendentally a priori and meta-physical rather than merely 
super-empirical. Which is to say that Churchland holds the PDP paradigm as 
irrecusably superior to all available linguaformal alternatives simply because 
he implicitly supposes that it alone is capable of furnishing a genuinely 
universal explanation of cognition, one which metaphysically encompasses 
all others. Thus, all theories are equally instances of vector activation; but the 
292Thus, Churchland invokes Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity to underline the extent to which 
"new theories often bring with them a novel and proprietary vocabularyfor describing the observable 
world, a vocabulary that can augment or even displace the old observational vocabulary" 
(P. M. Churchland, 1998, p. 18) 
293Churchland himself frequently uses the argument that Ptolemaic astronomy could have happily 
continued `explaining' and accommodating recalcitrant astronomical data by piling virtual epicycle 
upon virtual epicycle. Cf. for instance, Churchland, 1999, p. 767. 
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vector activation theory of vector activation is more equal because it is 
revealed as the properly transcendental precondition for all the others294. 
Accordingly, the PDP paradigm is at once the latest in a historically 
embedded empirical sequence; and the latent precondition for a rigorously a 
priori explanatory account of the veritable character of the succession of 
paradigms encompassed in that sequence. The vector activation paradigm is 
the universal prototype of which all other models of cognition are merely 
instantiations. In Hegelese, we might say that the latter are instances of vector 
coding in themselves, but not yet in and for themselves. For Churchland 
explicitly claims that he has found the veritable material instantiation of what 
Kuhn called a `paradigm'295: this is precisely what a network's prototypical 
partitioning of vector activation space is. And we should also bear in mind 
that a paradigm in Kuhn's sense -just as in Churchland's meta-physically 
transformed sense- is more than just an empirical datum; it is a quasi- 
transcendental faktum296. Thus, a network's prototypical vector configuration 
is at once an empirical fact, and the precondition for anything's coming to 
count as an empirical fact, for it is that which defines a priori the parameters 
294Perhaps the properly transcendental potency of the neurocomputational paradigm is additionally 
compromised by the fact that it continues to be loosely clothed in natural language rather than 
stringently encoded in vector algebraic dress. 
295Cf. Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1962, and Churchland, 1989, p. 191. 
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for all perceptual judgement. In other words, Churchland's 
neurocomputational paradigm of cognition operates like an empirico- 
transcendental doublet: it is at once given empirically as an intra-historical 
datum; but also, and in the very same gesture, posited as an a priori, supra- 
historical faktum which furnishes us with the genuinely universal explanatory 
precondition for our ability to recognise and explain that historical sequence 
of paradigm shifts for what they were: changing configurations in synaptic 
weight-space. Which is to say that, in spite of its considerable intra- 
philosophical radicality, eliminativism is ultimately an instance of 
philosophical Decision like any other. 
Epistemic Engines and the Transcendental Function 
We have seen that there is an entirely positive or constructive 
dimension to Churchland's eliminativist program, one that describes how 
`phenomenological mutation' can be effected technologically, through the use 
of empirical prostheses at the level of the individual organism. What we wish 
to focus on now is the possibility of radicalising and generalising this 
particular aspect of eliminativism by way of non-materialist theory. What if it 
were possible to effect a more rigorously universal instance of 
phenomenological mutation than that envisaged by Churchland at the level of 
296For an account of the faktum/datum dyad as intrinsic to the structure of philosophical 
Decision, cf. 
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the individual brain? A global as opposed to empirico-regional 
phenomenological mutation would have to be effectuated by intervening 
directly at the transcendental level of the philosophical Decision via which 
Churchland chooses to subordinate folk psychology to his own 
neurocomputational perspective. Where the eliminativist Decision empirically 
presupposes and metaphysically posits the informational continuum whereby 
neurocomputational conception determines phenomenological perception, 
non-materialism proposes to radicalise and generalise eliminativism by 
cloning a transcendental, which is to say, radically discontinuous and non- 
neurocomputational determinant for phenomenology at the global or 
transindividual level using Churchland's neurophenomenological hybrid as its 
occasion. That determinant will be we what we shall call the transcendental 
function. 
Thus, what we wish to propose is a non-materialist universalisation of 
the materialist paradigm that views the phenomenon of sapience primarily in 
terms of information processing. To do this we will focus on the final chapter 
of Churchland's 1979 work Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind, 
wherein Churchland sets out the rudiments for what is supposed to 
be a 
universal -which is to say, non-neurocentric or substrate-independent- 
supra, Chapter 5, pp. 218-223. 
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definition of cognitive activity. By examining Churchland's naturalised 
version of epistemic universality, we hope to effect a non-materialist 
radicalisation/generalisation of the information-processing paradigm in terms 
of which materialism proposes to define cognition. 
1. The natural science of epistemic engines 
The challenge for a rigorously naturalistic materialism lies in 
articulating a universally valid model of epistemic activity free of 
anthropomorphic parochialism. But `universally valid' is just a euphemism 
for `normative', and philosophical orthodoxy stipulates that it is precisely the 
normative (universally necessary) characteristics of cognitive activity that 
cannot be accounted for naturalistically. Accordingly, the idea of a normative 
yet rigorously naturalistic epistemology would seem to be oxymoronic. How 
then is the claim to universal epistemic validity to be accommodated within a 
purely naturalistic framework? 
In Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind, Churchland offers as 
a provocative response the suggestion that science itself is capable of 
providing philosophy with the necessary resources for constructing a notion 
of epistemic normativity. Thus, like other naturalistically minded 
philosophers before him297, Churchland approaches cognition via the 
297We have already named figures such as Quine, Smart, Wiener, Sayre and 
Dennett. 
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mobilisation of a conceptual vocabulary drawn from information theory 
because he believes the latter provides the resources for a rigorously 
naturalistic yet universally valid or normative paradigm of sapience298. That 
vocabulary is attractive because it operates at a level of abstraction which 
manages to circumvent anthropocentric prejudices about supposedly 
necessary and sufficient conditions for sapience; - conditions usually based on 
folk psychology and/or the assumption of entrenched categorial divisions 
between organic and inorganic, animate and inanimate. Thus, in the closing 
pages of Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind, Churchland sketches 
298At this juncture an important heuristic point needs to made. As Kenneth Sayre points out in his 
useful entry on the subject in Routledge's recent Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, many philosophical 
appropriations of information theory remain fraught with confusion and misunderstanding. In its most 
obvious manifestation, the confusion consists in recklessly assimilating Shannon's strictly 
mathematical or quantitative definition of `information' to its semantic or qualitative counterpart as 
used in everyday discourse. Cf. Sayre, `Information Theory' in Volume 4 of The Routledge 
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, general editor E. Craig, London: Routledge, 1998, pp. 782-786. But 
while acknowledging the extent to which philosophical mobilisations of information theory remain 
problematic, we believe it is important to distinguish between the illegitimacy of the wholesale 
misappropriation of a theory, and the legitimacy of a merely tactical or localised deployment of 
portions of its vocabulary. Accordingly, we do not believe Churchland's mobilisation of a vocabulary 
drawn from information theory amounts to a misappropriation. Terms such as `information processing', 
`transmitter', `receiver' and `noise', are deployed with considerable skill and economy in order to 
illuminate a philosophical argument. The fact that in appropriating those terms for philosophical 
purposes, Churchland employs them in a loose and more or less metaphorical fashion relative to the 
degree of literal precision with which they are applied within the ambit of scientific theory does not 
automatically invalidate his use of that vocabulary. Since he never pretends to be providing a stringent 
application of information theory, his philosophical use of its vocabulary cannot and should not be 
judged by the austere standards of rigorous scientific exactitude. Consequently, and since we see no 
real justification for embroiling ourselves in issues of often overwhelming mathematical difficulty, we 
will forgo a systematic analysis concerning the technical pertinence of Churchland's chosen 
vocabulary. Perhaps this is regrettable, for uniquely among philosophers of mind, Churchland can lay 
claim to having the requisite conceptual apparatus which would permit of a rigorous or non- 
metaphorical application of information theory. Unlike the folk psychological model of cognition, the 
neurocomputational paradigm seems (prima facie at least) perfectly consonant with Shannon's strictly 
mathematical/quantitative definition of information. A configuration in synaptic weight-space 
is 
radically unlike a propositional attitude in that it admits of an entirely literal, rather than metaphorical, 
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the rudiments of a thoroughly naturalised version of normative epistemology 
by alighting on the notion of `informational reservoir' as a way of 
characterising entities in terms of their susceptibility for registering 
information regardless of their standing vis a vis the categories of animate and 
inanimate, or organic and inorganic. All entities, Churchland suggests, 
irrespective of the details of their physical constitution, can be considered as 
informational reservoirs and situated within a universal informational 
continuum in terms of the degree of efficiency with which they absorb 
information. `Information sponges' are those that score highest within this 
continuum: "One need only suppose the overt behaviour of such 
informational sponges to be a systematic function of their information- 
bearing states to have outlined a conception of the internal activities of 
natural fauna that owes nothing to our usual cognitive concepts, and which 
places us on a continuum with animals, trees, and ultimately even 
beaches. "(Churchland, 1979, p. 143) 
Accordingly, the naturalisation of epistemic normativity may be 
brought about by identifying the entirely abstract, substrate independent realm 
of computational algorithms corresponding to those processes via which 
sponges are able not only to absorb information from their environment but 
physical quantification. Cf. J. R. Pierce (1965) for an extremely clear but also technically precise 
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also to modify behaviour according to the information registered. These 
algorithms are `epistemic engines' : abstract functional mechanisms 
mediating between informational input and behavioural output in such a way 
as to allow entities to learn from their environment. The naturalisation of 
epistemic normativity, Churchland continues, will be achieved in the form of 
a `natural science of epistemic engines', and will proceed by cataloguing the 
variety of algorithmic mechanism through which `information sponges' 
become able to spontaneously modify behavioural output by successfully 
extracting a surplus value of information from registered input. All that is 
required for this, Churchland insists, is a certain plasticity in the functional 
relations between sensory input and motor output299. Those functional 
relations must be able to change as a `more or less' determinate function of 
certain sensory consequences engendered by their prior occurrence. Thus, a 
specific kind of motor response will be made either more or less likely to 
recur when prompted by an identical input as a function of the positively or 
negatively reinforcing inputs that the initial response elicited: "What this will 
layman's introduction to information theory. 
299This reference to motor output does not indicate that Churchland has already presupposed those 
locomotive capacities which are characteristic of organisms. The algorithmic function will correlate 
environmental input and behavioural output even in the absence of all recognisable sensory and/or 
motor capacities. Even thermostats and beaches instantiate epistemic algorithms; the former by 
registering differences in ambient temperature; the later by registering climactic conditions (shifting 
sand, bird footprints, etc. ) In the case of a beach, the registering of informational input remains 
insufficient to engender a significant behavioural output. Nevertheless, the beach still instantiates an 
algorithm; albeit one whose epistemic content would be formulated in natural language as: "Stay here". 
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produce is a sequence of functional relations betwixt input and output, a 
sequence wherein the modifications from element to element are themselves 
the output of a second-order function, a function whose inputs are actualised 
stimulus response pairs from the first function, plus whatever `reinforcing' 
states their actualisation elicits. "(Ibid., p. 143) 
Epistemic engines `learn' via a process of blind mechanical recursion 
which takes hardwired pairs of stimulus-response function plus their positive 
or negative reinforcement as the first-order input for a second-order function, 
whose output in turn provides the input for a third-order function, and so on. 
Accordingly, Churchland's natural science of epistemic engines is an attempt 
to delineate the iterative algorithmic mechanisms whereby entities are able to 
construct models of their environment -'internal' representations of the world- 
and distil information from input signals without the benefit of putatively 
`higher' cognitive powers and in the absence of all appeals to consciousness, 
intentional states, propositional attitudes, etc. For what this nested sequence 
of functional relations engenders is a self-correcting measuring instrument 
which calibrates the precise degree of cognitive discrepancy between 
environmental input and behavioural output. That discrepancy is distilled as 
the output of the second-order function that has for its input actualised 
stimulus-response relations paired with their positive or negatively 
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reinforcing states. A more fine-grained calibration of the discrepancy and an 
additional extraction of information are achieved when that second-order 
output in turn results in a motor response coupled with a reinforcing state that 
provides the input for a third-order function. The process is reiterated until the 
system finally achieves consistently positive reinforcements of its behavioural 
responses to environmental stimuli; which is to say, until it has achieved the 
optimum degree of representational adequacy vis a vis its environment. 
As a result, for Churchland, epistemic engines provide a universally 
valid exemplar -a normative paradigm- for the process through which 
cognitive information is filtered from environmental noise. By winnowing out 
the information latent in all background noise, epistemic engines provide an 
example of the way in which "information can emerge from the background 
'noise' in which it is buried once the more prominent regularities in that 
`noise' have been discriminated and subtracted from the incoming 
signal. "(Ibid., p. 149) Moreover, Churchland continues, the pertinence of this 
recursive algorithmic process need not be restricted to epistemic evolution 
in 
individuals; its normative force derives from its genuinely universal salience 
as a substrate independent characterisation of epistemological 
development. 
Accordingly, Churchland insists, the science of epistemic engines promises to 
provide a rigorously naturalistic account for "the phenomenon of paradigm 
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articulation, and of cumulative tradition, and even the possibility of 
intellectual revolution"(Ibid. ) 
However, whereas the myopic parochialism endemic to folk 
psychological formulations of epistemic normativity encourages their 
exclusionary imperialism vis a vis alternative cognitive possibilities, the 
substrate independent character of naturalised normativity encompasses 
incommensurabilities at the level of individually incorporated epistemic 
regimes. Thus, once naturalised and grounded in the rigorously universal 
algorithmic machinery of epistemic engines, epistemological normativity 
becomes perfectly compatible with cognitive discontinuity: "Within the 
framework of a well chosen first regime the iterative process of winnowing 
out ever more subtle information can continue for indefinite lengths of time. 
On the other hand, the primary regime that receives the strongest initial 
reinforcement may turn out in the long run not to be the most revelatory of 
the subtlest regularities. It may turn out that the residual deviations from 
reality start to get larger and more chaotic again [... J and it may be that no 
regime of which [the creature] is capable will find sufficient reinforcement to 
stick Faced with chronic anomalies along these lines [what one] needs is a 
hardwired system for reacting to such crises, where the reaction consists in 
dismantling whatever hierarchy [... J is already in place. The creature can 
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then begin from scratch with a new basic regime[ ... 
]that may allow it to 
penetrate reality more deeply than did the basic regime it has just 
overthrown. "(Ibid., p. 150) 
In subsequent work, Churchland will identify the `hardwired' 
apparatus whereby a fruitless or inefficient epistemic function can be 
dismantled with a reconfiguration of synaptic weights. Thus, although this 
sketch for a natural science of epistemic engines predates Churchland's 
espousal of the PDP paradigm by some years, there is an important sense in 
which it remains perfectly consonant with it: epistemic engines can be seen as 
the forerunners of prototype vectors300. Moreover, if, for Churchland, 
epistemic engines are precursors to prototype vector partitionings, then they, 
like the latter, must be seen as the ultimate determinants for epistemological 
discontinuity and phenomenological mutation within a fully naturalised 
epistemology. Yet at the same time, it seems that in embracing the PDP 
paradigm, Churchland has partially abjured the aspiration to the dimension of 
substrate independent universality that seemed intrinsic to the notion of an 
300Significantly, in discussing the relation between the perspective adopted in Scientific Realism and 
his later neurocomputational stance, Churchland points out that the book was deliberately conceived 
and written around the final chapter `Sentential epistemologies and the natural science of epistemic 
engines'. Cf. Churchland 1998a, pp. 900-903. However, at the same time Churchland puzzlingly 
undercuts the universality ascribed to epistemic engines in that chapter by stating that the latter calls for 
a "naturalized, brain based, sub-sentential epistemology" (our emphasis, op. cit., p. 900), whereas there 
seems to be no suggestion whatsoever that epistemic engines need be brain based in that chapter. 
Indeed, from our point of view; the peculiar interest of the epistemological program delineated in the 
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epistemic engine. For although the space of phenomenological possibility 
concomitant with neurocomputational plasticity is enormous, it remains 
entirely neurocentric, which is to say, empirically overdetermined. 
Consequently, from our point of view, it is precisely insofar as the 
algorithmic machinery of epistemic engines allows for an entirely abstract or 
meta-empirical dimension of phenomenological plasticity, that the shift from 
a natural science of epistemic engines to a neurocomputational perspective 
signals Churchland's retreat from the quasi-transcendental, substrate 
independent domain of epistemological universality to the empirically 
constricted realm of neurocentric provincialism. 
2. From epistemic algorithms to the transcendental function 
Our non-materialist radicalisation of epistemic normativity will 
proceed by dualysing the philosophical dyads that constrain Churchland's 
search for a universal epistemology in order to uncover a rigorously 
transcendental, and thereby genuinely substrate independent universal 
algorithm for cognition. From a non-philosophical perspective, two 
dyadic 
structures circumscribe Churchland's attempted universalisation of epistemic 
function: that of registered information and information-in-itself or noise on 
the one hand; and that of stimulatory input and behavioural output on 
the 
chapter in question derives primarily from its aspiration to a substrate 
independent, non neurocentric 
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other. We shall dualyse both and separate the identity of `noise itself' rom its 
epistemological hybridisation with information, as well as that of `input 
itself from its behaviourist hybridisation with output. Instead of positing 
noise as given a priori in and through the empirical presupposition of 
registered information, we presuppose it as already given-without-givenness, 
or as 4 noise itself using Churchland's epistemological hybridisation of 
information and noise as our occasion. Likewise, instead of empirically 
presupposing stimulatory input through the a priori positing of behavioural 
output, we presuppose an invariant input as already-given-without-givenness 
or as a radical constant on the basis of Churchland's behaviouristic 
hybridisation of input and output. On the basis of these two dualysations we 
can posit two additional axioms in addition to those eight in terms of which 
we characterised the radical hyle earlier301: 
9. The radical hyle is Noise-without-information, noise itself in 
its foreclosure to the epistemological calibration of the 
discrepancy between information and noise. 
10. The radical hyle is the Unknown as unvarying input, the 
Unknown as the radical invariant engendering limitless 
perspective. 
301 Cf. supra, Chapter 6, pp. 293-294. 
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transcendental variation in its cognitive output on the 
occasional basis of an empirically variable epistemic function. 
Thus, by way of these two axioms, non-materialism posits-without- 
presupposing the radical hyle as that last-instance which is also the 
transcendental determinant for Churchland's sought-after universal epistemic 
function302. It is in accordance with the radical hyle as that invariant which is 
`noise itself, that we can clone a rigorously transcendental and thereby 
genuinely universal function for materialist epistemology using the 
algorithmic machinery of the epistemic engine as our empirical variable. 
Where the epistemic algorithm calibrates the cognitive discrepancy between 
sensory input and motor output by filtering information from environmental 
noise, we clone a non-epistemic function, which is to say, a transcendental 
algorithm for the determination of that epistemic algorithm, by separating- 
without-separation noise `itself in its Identity as radical invariant 
determining-in-the-last-instance all empirically variable calibrations of 
informational output in its distinction from noise-laden input. That 
transcendental algorithm now constitutes an authentically universal, non- 
epistemological function wherein noise `itself becomes the ultimate 
determinant for all epistemically calibrated information. 
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In other words, instead of using epistemic enginery to constantly re- 
extract an informational surplus value from environmental noise, we use the 
former as the empirical occasion from which we clone a transcendental 
function wherein noise `itself in its foreclosure to information determines 
every conceivable epistemological ratiocination of information and noise. 
The empirical discrepancy between information and noise as calibrated by the 
epistemic algorithm has been radicalised -i. e. dualysed- as a unilateral or non- 
epistemological separation between noise `itself qua determinant for a 
rigorously universal or non-epistemic transcendental function, and noise `as 
such' in its epistemological ratiocination vis a vis information. This radical 
separation is effectuated as a universal but non-epistemological algorithm 
whereby Noise qua radically unknowable constant=x is cloned on the basis of 
epistemic enginery qua empirical variable or occasional data in the form of a 
transcendental function. The transcendental function effectuates the 
unknowable constant on the occasional basis of the epistemic variable. It is 
the determination of empirical cognition in accordance with noise's 
foreclosure to all epistemic ratiocination. Whereas the epistemic function 
calibrates the difference between information and noise, known and unknown; 
the non-epistemic function effectuates the identity of the unknown as that 
302For Laruelle's account of non-philosophical cloning as effectuation of a transcendental 
function, cf. 
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which determines the known. Thus, the transcendental function is the varying 
effectuation of cognition under the unvarying condition of the unknown. 
Moreover, whereas the epistemic algorithm is at least co-constituted 
by the empirically determinate pairings of input-output function through 
which it is instantiated, and hence at least co-determined by its empirical 
substrate, this non-epistemic or transcendental algorithm unilateralises its 
epistemological substrate as a merely occasional cause; it unilaterally 
determines it as an entirely neutral or indifferent material support. As a result, 
the transcendental function is effectuated as the non-hylomorphic duality of 
an uninstantiable form and an uninformable material; it `exists' as the strictly 
unilateral duality of transcendental determinant and empirically determinable 
material. It is the identity-without-synthesis and duality-without-distinction of 
noise `itself in its epistemological foreclosure and noise as epistemically 
calibrated through its empirical admixture with information. Accordingly, it is 
as an effectuation of Noise's radical autonomy that the transcendental 
function enjoys a relatively radical autonomy or independence vis a vis the 
absolutely relative dependence of the epistemic function that serves as its 
empirical occasion. 
Laruelle, 2000a, pp. 275-280; 2000b, p. 76; 2000c, pp. 184-185. 
420 
Thus, where the natural science of epistemic engines encompassed 
cognitive discontinuity at the empirical level, the transcendental science of 
non-epistemic functions gives rise to an unencompassable manifold of 
cognitive discontinuity at the universal level. A non-materialist epistemology 
uses the epistemic algorithms furnished by a fully naturalised epistemology in 
order to clone a series of radically universal, non-epistemological functions 
and engender universes of unintuitahle cognitive variation; universes wherein 
the frequencies of information, the codes of cognition, and the parameters of 
phenomenality are reconfigured in accordance with Noise as unknown, or as 
phenomenon-in-itself, in order to be reconstituted independently of the 
bounds of perception and beyond the remit of stimulus-response functions. 
For the transcendental function is lived-in-One: it is articulated as an Alien- 
subject. The transcendental function manifests an alien Universe of cognition; 
one that is determined by an unknown constant on the basis of an epistemic 
variable. The result is a phenomenological plasticity which is no longer 
neurocomputationally calculable; a cognitive mutability whose variability 
exceeds even the vast space of neurocomputational possibility because it is 
now rooted in Noise as radically inconsistent yet invariable phenomenon, and 
manifested as a transcendental chaos303 of unencompassable epistemic 
303Cf. supra, footnote 237, p. 315. 
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variation. In the final analysis, the transition from the epistemic discontinuity 
embraced in Churchland's philosophical naturalism, to the epistemic 
inconsistency defined by non-philosophical materialism, is the move from 
empirical anarchy into universal chaos. 
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CONCLUSION 
PHILOSOPHY, CAPITALISM, NON- 
MATERIALISM 
K is the World 
What is non-materialism good for? What does it change or manifest 
that a spontaneously practised materialist Decision could not change or 
manifest far more efficiently? What effectiveness does the effectuation of 
non-materialist thinking have? In the final analysis, isn't the non-materialist 
theory we have been labouring to formulate a sterile, fruitless, and ultimately 
pointless intellectual indulgence? 
These are perfectly valid philosophical objections; and ones against 
which non-philosophy is defenceless. Nevertheless, if non-philosophy is 
defenceless against such philosophical objections, it is because it does not 
need to defend itself against them, having already suspended their pertinence 
and validity. To understand non-philosophy is to understand why it does not 
need to justify itself philosophically, in terms of its `effectiveness', or lack 
thereof, as defined in accordance with the criteria of philosophical efficiency. 
Thus, although all the foregoing criticisms are in some regards undeniable, 
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there is also an overriding sense in which they are strictly worthless. Non- 
philosophy is rigorously pointless, sterile, useless, and everything else which 
philosophical teleology deems reprehensible. Non-philosophy is a- 
teleological, which is to say, intrinsically ineffectual, so long as `effectivity' 
continues to be measured philosophically in terms of thought's effectiveness 
vis a vis the putatively extra-philosophical reality of the world. 
Yet this is the very standard of `effectiveness' which non-philosophy 
refuses. For in suspending the Parmenidean axiom, non-philosophical 
thinking suspends the philosophical conflation of reality `as such' with the 
Real `itself and thereby the postulate of dyadic reciprocity between thought 
and the Real (which Laruelle calls `the Principle of Sufficient Philosophy'). It 
suspends the idea that philosophical Decision constitutes an immediate 
intervention vis a vis the Real and that Decision is at once constituted by, and 
constitutive of, the Real 'itself. More precisely, by suspending the conflation 
of reality `as such' with the Real 'itself, non-philosophy suspends the 
supposition that there is no Real `itself independent of reality `as such', or as 
defined through philosophical Decision304. For even in those cases where it 
pretends to be perfectly `realist' and claims to acknowledge the autonomy of 
an extra-philosophical `reality' -whatever that may be-, it is still by way of 
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Decision that philosophy decides that reality exists independently of 
Decision. Extra-philosophical `reality' is always philosophically 
characterised. Consequently, whether `realist' or `idealist' in tenor, 
philosophical thinking begins by identifying extra-philosophical reality with 
the Real 'itself, in order to secure the premise that the Real -which is to say, 
reality- is always already philosophisable. 
Accordingly, non-philosophical thinking can be characterised in terms 
of two indissociable operations: the acknowledgement that immanence qua 
Real `itself is already separate (without-separation) from the extra- 
philosophical reality posited and presupposed through Decision; and the 
suspension of the unitary presumption that everything is always already at 
least potentially philosophisable305. There is something that remains 
foreclosed for philosophy; which is to say, there is a non-philosophisable 
instance which philosophy presupposes but remains incapable of 
acknowledging. This is what we, along with Laruelle, have been calling `the 
Real' or `immanence' qua Given-without-givenness. 
304As instanced, for example, by Henry's conflation of immanence `as such' qua absolutely 
unthinkable with immanence `itself qua radically foreclosed for thought. 
Cf. supra, Chapter 2, pp. 89- 
92. 
305"Not everything is philosophisable, that is my good news. The 
first two things which are not are 
man and science, which are one and the same thing. This is what allows 
for the delineation of a science 
of philosophy. A supremely paradoxical project perhaps, 
but one which is the only way of knowing 
what one is doing when one decides to philosophise. " (Laruelle, 
1991, p. 246) 
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Thus, instead of immediately presupposing that thought and reality, 
philosophy and world are necessarily bound together in a unitary 
philosophical dyad, instead of presupposing the identity-in-difference of 
thinking and being, non-philosophy suspends that presupposed immediacy on 
the basis of the unilateral duality whereby the Real in its foreclosure to 
philosophy is already separated (without-separation) from philosophical 
Decision as dyadic hybrid or unitary synthesis of thinking and being, 
philosophy and world, ideality and reality306. By acknowledging that there is 
a radically autonomous, non-philosophisable Real that is already separate 
from extra-philosophical reality, this unilateral duality suspends the auto- 
positional and auto-donational sufficiency whereby Decision presumes to 
reinscribe the Real within the World's philosophically circumscribed reality. 
Yet it is through that suspension that Decision `itself qua reciprocal 
hybridisation of thinking and being is finally manifested in its radically 
immanent, which is to say, intrinsically non-Decisional Identity. For in 
acknowledging the Real `itself as radically separate from extra-philosophical 
reality `as such', and recognising that, unlike the latter, the former remains 
foreclosed to 
L%eV1J1V (tc constitution, to determination), the non- 
philosophical suspension of philosophical sufficiency simultaneously 
306 Cf. supra, Chapter 5, pp. 230-245. 
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neutralises and legitimates Decision. Thus, it is via the transcendental 
suspension of philosophy's conflation of reality with the Real that the 
philosophical postulate of a bi-lateral reciprocity between philosophy and 
extra-philosophical reality becomes transcendentally ratified. Consequently, 
non-philosophy `brings forth' or manifests Decision's immanent, non- 
Decisional Identity as dyadic synthesis or identity-in-difference of the 
philosophical and the extra-philosophical. And in so doing, it acknowledges 
the relative autonomy of philosophy's auto-Decisional sufficiency as 
absolute, self-positing Transcendence; which is to say, as World. Non- 
philosophy identifies philosophy with Decision, and Decision with the World. 
Accordingly, for non-philosophy, philosophy is the World. Far from 
suppressing or shackling philosophy, the non-philosophical suspension of 
Decision's self-positing/self-presupposing sufficiency finally makes manifest 
philosophy's radically immanent Identity as that which is `at one' with the 
World. It provides a rigorously transcendental deduction of the philosophical 
Decision's objective validity vis a vis extra-philosophical reality307. Thus, by 
suspending the premise that the Real is philosophisable, non-philosophy 
acknowledges rather than denies the philosophical presumption that the 
World's extra-philosophical reality is philosophisable. As a result, it is by 
307Cf. supra, Chapter 5, pp. 234-237. 
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withdrawing the Real from the ambit of philosophy that non-philosophy 
grants philosophy everything; which is to say, reality or the World. 
The World is Capitalism 
The consequences of this non-philosophical identification of 
philosophy with the World are far-reaching: "It is no longer possible to posit 
`history', or `society', or `the economy', or `capitalism' in a straightforward 
and abstract fashion as though they were objects devoid of a superior 
ideological representation, which is to say, objects devoid of their possible 
philosophisable meaning. "(Laruelle, 2000b, p. 142) Accordingly, amongst 
other things, non-philosophy utterly reconfigures the relation between 
philosophy and capital. `Capital' can no longer be naively posited or 
immediately presupposed as though given independently of its Decisional 
mediation. So long as it continues to be posited and presupposed in and 
through the auspices of philosophical Decision, `capital', along with all other 
instances of putatively independent or `concrete' extra-philosophical reality, 
will always already have been subjected to a superior, meta-empirical 
ideological gloss; an a priori, ideological investiture. Thus, instead of 
positing and presupposing capital as an already idealised, extra-philosophical 
reality, non-philosophy manifests or gives philosophy and capital together, 
independently of their auto-Decisional givenness, according to their double 
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articulation or reciprocal presupposition as an identity-in-difference, an 
indivisible unitary dyad. 
As a result, in universalising philosophy qua Decision, non- 
philosophy universalises capital qua object of philosophy. More exactly, by 
dualysing Decision qua self-presupposing hybrid of philosophical ideality and 
extra-philosophical reality, ontological fundament and ontic region, and 
thereby releasing their identity-without-synthesis and duality-without- 
distinction -their unidentity and unilaterality-, non-philosophy constructs a 
unified but non-unitary theory for the relation between the philosophical and 
the extra-philosophical; which is to say, for the relation between philosophy 
and capital. Where Marxism proposed. a philosophically restricted -which is to 
say, intra-Decisional- universalisation of capital in the form of Capitalism, the 
non-philosophical universalisation of philosophy qua World proposes to 
radicalise and generalise that philosophical universalisation of capital in the 
form of a unified theory of philosophy qua World and capital qua Capitalism. 
The result is the transcendental universalisation of that empirical 
universalisation; which is to say, the non-philosophical uni(-)versalisation of 
Capitalism qua World. Accordingly, capital's genuinely transcendental, non- 
philosophical identity is not merely as Capitalism; it is as unidentity and 
unilaterality of philosophy and capitalism, or as World-Capitalism: 
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"Just as philosophy is not merely one form of thought among others 
but rather one that lays claim to a foundational position and a legislative 
authority over all other thought, and thereby one for which a specific status 
must be set aside -even if only with respect to that claim 's entirely 
symptomatic reality-, we must (it is not just a historico-factual 
acknowledgement) posit capital as a hypothesis which is universal because 
uni-versal; as a self-encompassing which is simultaneously an encompassing 
of every economico-socio308 phenomenon. Capital -a phenomenon said to be 
`economic' and/or social, historical, etc. - gives rise to capitalism when, in all 
rigour, it is no longer considered factually and empirically within society and 
history, and becomes a uni(-)versal hypothesis as is, for its part, the 
philosophical Decision[ .. 
]Just as the philosophy form was that according to 
which `every thought or knowledge is philosophisable', similarly, `every 
economico-socio-historical phenomenon is a phenomenon of 
capitalism. "(Ibid. rp. 146-147) 
Thus, just as philosophy's transcendental identity, delineated via its 
hypo-thetical (non-Decisional) universalisation as encompassing all cognitive 
phenomena and manifested in the form of the 
Principle of Sufficient 
Philosophy, is not itself philosophical, capitalism's transcendental 
identity, 
308Laruelle deliberately writes `economico-social' rather than the customary 
`socio-economique' in 
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delineated via its hypo-thetical universalisation as encompassing all socio- 
economic phenomena and manifested in the form of the Principle of 
Sufficient Economy, is not that of capital. By suspending its spontaneously 
philosophical, auto-Decisional position/presupposition, non-philosophy 
manifests or `brings forth' capital's radically universal, non-Decisional 
identity as Principle of Sufficient Economy. But this universalisation of 
capital qua Capitalism is strictly inseparable from that of philosophy qua 
Decision, so that the uni(-)versalisation of capital occurs in the form of a 
`unidentification' of philosophy and capital, or as the `fusion' of the Principle 
of Sufficient Philosophy and the Principle Sufficient Economy in the form of 
a World-Capitalism. 
Gnostic Scepticism versus Epistemic Realism 
As a result of this uni(-)versalisation of philosophy, in `acting' upon 
philosophical Decision, non-philosophy `acts' upon the World. More 
specifically, in bringing forth this uni(-)versalised fusion of philosophy and 
capital, non-philosophy `acts' upon World-Capitalism; - albeit with a crucial 
non-philosophical nuance which amounts to a transformation of the sense of 
the word 'act'. Thus, if non-philosophical thinking `acts' upon World- 
Capitalism it is according to the new, intrinsically non-Decisional -which is to 
order to mark this constitutive dominance of the economic over the social; a 
dominance concomitant 
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say, non-empirical or non-spontaneous- paradigm of agency articulated in the 
operation of cloning. Non-philosophical practise is not an empirical 
intervention in the World effected by way of Decision; it is a transcendental 
effectuation of that which is foreign to the World by way of cloning309. And 
since this is an effectuation that suspends World-Capitalism's self- 
legitimating authority and all-encompassing potency, the better to reconfigure 
the bounds of cognitive possibility in accordance with the unknown, it is the 
manifestation of a radically sceptical force-(of)-thought. Cloning is an 
instance of transcendental scepticism. 
Thus, where philosophical materialism oscillates between the stances 
of complacent quietism and agnostic cynicism as far as the superstitions of 
phenomenological realism are concerned, the rigorously an-archic sceptical 
charge ferried through the `act' of cloning is uncompromisingly anti- 
phenomenological -which is to say, resolutely anti-idealist. Just as the 
`reality' of the World is no longer identified by way of a gratuitous, 
spontaneously idealising phenomenological empiricism, that of World- 
Capitalism is no longer identified by way of an immediately apprehended, 
but also objectively codified, socio-economic `materiality'. Paradoxically, it 
is by unilateralising the World's idealised material reality that non- 
with the hypo-thetical universal isation of capital. 
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materialism emancipates matter's Real -and phenomenologically foreclosed- 
Identity. That radically inconsistent Identity provides the fulcrum for a 
transcendental scepticism vis a vis the bounds of epistemic normativity, and 
the basis for a cognitive practise which encourages the proliferation of a 
universal epistemic chaos310 
Thus, non-materialism does not seek an indubitable 
phenomenological foundation for cognition by transcendentally reducing the 
world of the natural attitude, as Husserl sought to; on the contrary, it 
undermines the latter's `principle of all principles'311 along with the realm of 
phenomenological indubitability in its entirety simply by acknowledging the 
fact that the World qua phenomenological Decision has `always already' been 
suspended, which is to say, unilateralised, in accordance with the radical 
hyle's foreclosure, and hence given as an occasion for the non- 
phenomenological reconfiguration of cognitive experience. Consequently, if 
309This `foreignness' being the non-thetic Universe, which the Alien-subject clones as a transcendental 
function or effectuation of the World. 
310 Cf. supra, Chapter 8, pp. 420-421. 
311 «[ 
. 
]seeing essences is an originary presentive act and, as a presentive act, is the analogue of 
sensuous perceiving and not of . aoainina r7 No conceivable theory can make us err with respect to Po, im..... oL... ý 
the principle of all principles: that every originary presentive intuition is a legitimising source of 
cognition, that everything originally (so to speak, in its personal' actuality) offered to us in `intuition' 
is to be accepted simply as what it is presented as being, but also only within the limits in which it is 
presented there. "(Husserl, 1982, p. 44) Common-sense intuition can rarely if ever have received such an 
elaborately high-flown apologia as the one furnished for it by Husserl with his modestly titled 
`principle of all principles'. Bluntly formulated, the non-materialist credo is simply the denial of 
everything Husserl appeals to here: there are no originary `presentive acts'; all sensuous perceiving is 
already a theoretically mediated construct; `originary presentive intuitions' legitimate nothing since 
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non-materialism constitutes an instance of transcendental scepticism, it is 
primarily vis a vis the realm of phenomenological immediacy and the 
subsequent objectivation of 'material reality'. The intra-philosophical positing 
and presupposing of an extra-philosophical `material' reality by way of 
Decision is merely the most insidiously rarefied instance of 
phenomenological idealism. Transcendental scepticism discontinues 
materialism's crypto-phenomenological idealisation of the Real qua matter 
`itself in terms of the reality of matter `as such'. 
Thus, if non-materialism can be qualified as `sceptical', it is in the 
strictly active or pragmatic sense concomitant with cloning insofar as it 
constitutes a rigorously cognitive but non-epistemological practise. For 
peculiar to this non-philosophical `scepticism' is an entirely positive 
cognitive dimension which falls outside the purview of the epistemological 
distinction between `dubitable' and `indubitable', `doubt' and 'certainty'. The 
`non-epistemological' scepticism exemplified by non-materialism accords 
with a paradigm of knowing which suspends the authority of epistemological 
Decision and uses the known in order to proceed in a rigorously cognitive 
fashion from the unknown (the radical hyle) towards the unknown (the non- 
they do not exist; nothing `immediately presented' to us by `intuition' should ever under any 
circumstances be accepted simply as what it is presented as being. 
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thetic Universe)312. Epistemic Decision, by way of contrast, `progresses' 
under the aegis of an epistemological arche or foundation from the known 
toward the known by constantly striving to minimize the distinction between 
the known and the unknown. This suspension of the authority of the known 
and determination of cognition in accordance with the sovereignty of the 
unknown constitutes a rigorously an-archic or non-epistemic model of 
cognition; one which is entirely consonant with the most radical unknowing. 
In other words, it is a gnostic, rather than epistemic, paradigm of cognition. 
And as that knowing which accords with the most radical unknowing, gnosis 
is transcendental scepticism. 
Thus, scepticism as we construe it does not consist in doubting the 
known on the basis of a presupposition that one can discriminate between 
knowing and unknowing; which is to say, know that one does not know. 
Gnosis, or transcendental scepticism, does not attempt to distinguish between 
knowing and unknowing; it acknowledges the unilateral duality separating the 
Identity of the unknown from the epistemo-logical difference between 
knowing and unknowing. It is knowing according to the unknown; or the 
determination of the known in accordance with the unknown's a priori 
foreclosure. Moreover, gnosis constitutes a rigorously an-archic instance of 
312 Cf. supra, Chapter 8, pp. 418-419. 
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cognitive experience insofar as the Alien-subject of this transcendental 
scepticism313 simultaneously unilateralises the absolute authority of the 
World and the all-encompassing dominion of Capitalism. 
Capitalism, Information and Universal Noise 
At this juncture, a non-philosophical materialism must confront an 
apparently insuperable objection: to wit, that for all its putative `radicality', 
non-materialism amounts to nothing more than an impotent contemplative 
mysticism; a reactionary and terminally self-indulgent theoreticism. In order 
to circumvent the charge that non-materialism is merely another form of 
solipsistic quietism, it is necessary to explain why, philosophical appearances 
notwithstanding, transcendental scepticism constitutes a form of cognitive 
activity which may prove to be more virulently corrosive vis a vis the absolute 
authority of World-Capitalism than those spontaneously philosophical 
instances of supposedly revolutionary intellectual agency. 
While it is certainly true that gnostic scepticism would be an 
exceedingly poor substitute for militant political intervention at the empirical 
313The Greek skeptikos or `sceptic' derives from skeptomai, meaning "I examine". Thus, the sceptic is 
one who suspends judgement -or Decision- in order to examine, rather than one who simply 
`doubts'. 
Interestingly, given that the Greek hairesis simply means `choice' or `decision' (from hairein: 'to 
choose' or `to decide'), one could say that, although non-Decisional scepticism is `a-heretical' 
in the 
auto-Decisional sense, it is radically heretical in the non-auto-Decisional sense. Thus, the 
dualysing or 
cloning of Decision constitutes an instance of radical or non-auto-Decisional hairesis, and the non- 
Decisional positing of `matter itself' is radically heretical in character. Cf. Laruelle, 1998b. 
There is a 
sense in which non-materialism discovers the transcendental identity of the sceptic and the 
heretic. 
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or intra-Decisional level which targets the effectiveness of global capital, it 
might provide the latter with that indispensable transcendental complement 
which it requires in order to postpone its inevitable reintegration within the 
seamless, all-encompassing informational circuit of World-Capitalism. Non- 
materialism is the transcendental encryption of materialist Decision in such a 
way as to render the latter undecipherable according to the epistemic codes 
furnished by World-Capitalism. Whereas the empirical universalisation of 
capital as global capitalism perpetuates a distinction between material power 
and informational force, the transcendental uni(-)versalisation of capital as 
World-Capitalism identifies production and cognition, material power and 
informational force, by suspending the intra-empirical or philosophical 
distinction between the physical and the psychical, or between material power 
and cognitive force. Moreover, by suspending the phenomenological 
distinction between the conditions of material production and the conditions 
of cognitive discourse; by discontinuing the epistemic distinction 
between 
material power and informational force, the uni(-)versalisation of capital as 
World-Capitalism, along with the chaotic scrambling of informational codes 
effectuated through the transcendental scepticism of the 
Alien-subject, may 
serve to provide materialism with a necessary complement of 
phenomenologically undecipherable, hermeneutically undecodable noise. 
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Accordingly, transcendental scepticism is the unleashing of universal 
noise in an attempt to puncture the politically enforced bounds of epistemic 
meaning and to wash away the socially manufactured horizons of 
phenomenological sense. Thus, for instance, since phenomenology is a 
function of neurophysiology and neurophysiology is now subject to 
biotechnological regulation, there is a perfectly valid empirical sense in which 
phenomenology qua system of socioculturally constructed, politically 
enforced Ur-doxas is determined more or less directly via the abstract 
apparatuses of mass consumer capitalism in accordance with the logic of what 
Deleuze & Guattari have called a `generalised machinic enslavement'314. The 
populace is epistemically conditioned via a staple diet of manufactured 
information disseminated through magazines and newspapers, opinion-polls 
and market-research; but also phenomenologically enslaved via a process of 
continual immersion in advertisements, film and television, video, computer 
games, etc. Epistemic information is politically encoded; phenomenological 
experience is sociologically conditioned. The `revolutionary' left's continuing 
inability to recognize the extent to which World-Capitalism directly regulates 
314«[ ]it is as though human alienation through surplus labor were replaced by a generalised 
machinic enslavement' such that one may furnish surplus-value without doing any work (children, the 
retired, the unemployed, television viewers, etc. )[... ]capitalism operates less on a quantity of 
labor 
than by a complex qualitative process bringing into play modes of transportation, urban models, the 
media, the entertainment industries, ways of perceiving and feeling -every semiotic system. 
" (Deleuze 
& Guattari, 1988, p. 492) 
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the basic parameters of all phenomenological `experience', along with the 
epistemic codification of all physical information, by means of 
biotechnological intervention at the level of the human organism and 
socioeconomic interne nntio n at the level of consumer consensus, is not only an 
instance of empiricist myopia; it is ultimately a constitutively political failure. 
Yet it is a failure which transcendental scepticism may yet help 
circumvent through the Alien-subject's unilateralising force-(of)-thought; an 
intrinsically sceptical force which constitutes an instance of a priori cognitive 
resistance to those epistemic norms and informational codes via which a 
triumphant World-Capitalism maintains the structural isomorphy between 
material power and informational force, thereby ensuring its quasi- 
transcendental dominion over all cognitive experience. A transcendental 
scepticism agrees with eliminative naturalism: human beings are simply 
carbon-based information processing machines. But it also recognises the 
necessity of cross-pollinating that assessment born of evolutionary 
reductionism with transcendental insight; an insight which consists in 
radicalising and generalising Marx's identification of the material 
infrastructure as the ultimate determinant for the ideological superstructure315: 
World-Capitalism is now the global megamachine determining a priori the 
315 This, in a nutshell, is the aim of Laruelle's Introduction to Non-Marxism. Cf. Laruelle, 2000b. 
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cognitive parameters within which the phenomenological micromachinery of 
organically individuated sapience operates. By acknowledging the fact that 
political intervention can no longer afford to ignore this insight; by 
recognising that empirical agency alone is incapable of circumventing 
capital's all-encompassing universality as World-Capitalism, transcendental 
scepticism constitutes an instance of a priori political resistance. 
By way of conclusion, we will characterise this a priori form of 
cognitive and there y political resistance in terms of three immediately 
pragmatic consequences: 
1. The construction of rigorously meaningless, epistemically 
uninterpretable utterances, the better to unfold the Decisional 
circle whereby utterance's unobjectifiable material force is 
perpetually reinscribed within statement's objectivating 
horizons of significance316. 
2. The short-circuiting of the informational relay between 
material power and cognitive force. 
3. Finally, the engendering of a mode of cognition that 
simultaneously constitutes an instance of universal noise as far 
the commodification of knowledge is concerned. 
316 Cf supra, Chapter 4, pp. 194-199. 
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This threefold emancipation of thought from artificially manufactured 
horizons of phenomenological meaning, as well as contingently synthesised 
codes of cognition, may prove to be a small, but by no means inconsequential 
step toward political liberation. 
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